Colorado Voter Group

Colorado's non-transparent and unverifiable election system won't cut it in '12

2011-07-27T17:06:00.001-07:00

July 14, 2011

Mr. John Hickenlooper, Governor

Ms. Dianne Ray, Auditor

Mr. John Suthers, Attorney General

Mr. Walker Stapleton, Treasurer

Mr. Scott Gessler, Secretary of state

Mr. Scott Doyle, President of Colorado County Clerks Association

Mr. Brandon Shaffer, President of the Senate

Mr. Frank McNulty, Speaker of the House

Dear Honorable Colorado Officials:

We see dark clouds gathering over Colorado’s election systems. Officials are not fulfilling their positions of public trust and are compromising the very foundation of our government – free and open elections.

Time after time Colorado election officials have refused to produce for public analysis the data needed to detect election error and fraud. Officials responsible for enforcement ignore, provide cover, explain away, or outright excuse material errors and violations committed by themselves, other officials, and vendors.

Inadvertently sometimes, but other times purposefully, public officials circumvent and weaken election statutes and rules, increase the likelihood of election error and fraud, and make it more and more difficult for the public to verify that the election outcomes are correct. Also, rulemaking and complaint processing procedures have been established that are self-serving and altogether unfair to the public.

This letter intends to draw your personal attention to Colorado’s defective election systems. We seek your leadership in setting a high priority agenda to devise and implement immediate and long term remedies. As a key official you can speak out in behalf of the public and draw attention to the problems. And you can recruit talent suitable to the task of addressing these problems.

This is urgent. With the highly contested 2012 election season already underway, it is vital that changes needed to protect the integrity of this election be devised, implemented and enforced. The stakes are high. Emotions are high. There is a risk that a “win whatever it takes attitude” will encourage voter intimidation, vote selling, voter impersonation and other inappropriate activity.

Most of you have successfully navigated the election system so you are likely to be “generally satisfied” with the process. We, who have studied this system in detail for many years, are “strongly not satisfied”.

We are a multi-partisan group. We do not collaborate on election contests. Instead, we collaborate on oversight and improvement of the election process itself.

We have served as canvass board members, election judges, and poll watchers. We are highly knowledgeable active participants in: election rulemaking, election lawmaking, best election practices development, election complaint processing, post-election audit, election and open records litigation, and election system certification and testing. As a group, we have considerable technical and election expertise.

After more than a decade of work, we have observed a disturbing increase in the likelihood of a major election problem and a simultaneous decrease in the rights of citizens to verify election processes and results. If enough people do not trust election outcomes, there is no telling what might happen.

Unless current trends are reversed, we anticipate a massive loss of public confidence in election results and government officials.

The upcoming 2012 General Election is expected to be vigorously fought and highly emotional. Some see this election determining the fate of our nation. The stakes are exceptionally high. Requiring your immediate attention are at least the following issues:

1. Restrictions on private meetings of officials (electronic and/or in-person) when public business is discussed as required by the Colorado Open Meetings law C.R.S. § 24-6-401 & 402.

2. Disallowing the use of public funds for private meetings, lobbying, and promotion.

3. Appointment of truly independent (non-conflict of interest) and technically competent bodies to create election rules and to judge election complaints.

4. Appointment of truly independent (non-conflict of interest) bodies with the technical competence to monitor, report, and enforce government and public compliance with election statutes and rules.

5. Establish, measure, and enforce compliance with precise, quantifiable standards for all election processes including , but not limited to:

ü “timely public access to all election records and processes with the exception of the identity of which voter cast which ballot”,

ü “strict compliance with the “anonymity” intent of Colorado Constitution Article VII, Section 8”,

ü “enforceable standard for assessing substantial compliance’’,

ü and, publicly-verifiable voting system certification, canvass, recount, audit, test, identity verification, eligibility verification, ballot control, voter intent, poll watching, open records, and records retention.

When your contestant wins you accept the results. But what if they lose and you don’t believe it?

What better remedy than transparent election systems will enable the public to actually verify for themselves that election processes and results are fair and accurate? And research potential system improvements?

The voters of Colorado desperately need your help. We must not allow Colorado to be embarrassed in front of the nation by displaying on television our inferior non-transparent and unverifiable election systems.

Can we count on you to adopt a high priority agenda to devise and implement immediate and long term remedies? We would like to meet with you to provide details and to discuss potential solutions.

Al Kolwicz
for, Colorado Voter Group

This letter was published in the July 22, 2011 edition of the Colorado Statesman.

2012 National Election Fiasco in Colorado?

2011-07-24T10:39:00.000-07:00

The 2012 elections are big news, but the media are not reporting Colorado's potential role in a national election fiasco.

Those who understand election equipment and procedures warn that Colorado elections cannot withstand close scrutiny. We call for changes to prevent humiliation if the national press attempts to verify Colorado's election returns.

If Colorado were an "emerging democracy," the Carter Center would reject calls to monitor our elections because we fail to meet their minimum transparency standards.

If a national contest is decided by Colorado's vote, as Bush/Gore was by Florida, press everywhere will severely criticize the "Wild West" elections in some Colorado counties.

Surely the most mistake-ridden election in recent Colorado history has received little attention, although it is Colorado's "canary in the coal mine" of elections. A statewide grand jury report declared that numerous irregularities are routine in Colorado and therefore not subject to legal remedies. Many problematic election activities not viewed as blatantly fraudulent are deemed "substantially compliant" and therefore free from enforcement.

Do the following examples from Saguache County's November 2010 election for governor, senator and local races satisfy you as "good enough for government work"?

After a bipartisan citizens' canvass board refused to certify election results due to irregularities, the clerk unilaterally issued a certificate of election renewing her own job.

Improperly purchased, uncertified, untested and unsecured voting equipment failed the post-election audit, yet its tabulations were deemed "official." A canvass board's reasonable attempt to hand count was blocked by the secretary of state, in favor of the suspect machine counts.

Surveillance videos of equipment operations were deleted after a reporter filed a Colorado Open Records Act request.

The election night results showed that two incumbents lost. The clerk then conducted an unsanctioned new tabulation three days later that returned the incumbents to power.

The clerk destroyed most election night paper records and refuses to release electronic copies of election data, claiming they are a manufacturer's proprietary records.

Secretary of state staff initially boasted that they verified the new revised tabulation. But, when shown they weren't present to verify the tabulations, they claimed that a new count had not actually occurred, despite proof to the contrary.

The clerk mailed unsolicited ballots to selected voters for a controversial tax measure. At least four ineligible voters were permitted to vote on the tax increase. The measure unofficially passed by one vote, although the canvas board would not confirm the questionable tabulation. Taxes were increased despite the obvious uncertainty.

When the secretary of state ordered a ballot review, the clerk refused. He then sued her and the court has yet to issue a decision. The clerk continues to refuse access by public, press and secretary of state to the records required to verify or contest the election.

The public and the press investigated the uncertain Bush/Gore ballot tallies. That will not happen in most Colorado counties where election officials are closing doors to citizen oversight.

Transparency advocates are waiting for the Court of Appeals to decide if Colorado's law on public access to anonymous ballots is as open as in other states. In the meantime, egregious election irregularities are officially "substantially compliant" in Colorado.

Contact your state officials and demand that they abandon subpar standards and shore up Colorado's election code. The nation's voters expect nothing less of Colorado.

Marilyn Marks, Unaffiliated, Aspen

Harvie Branscomb, Democrat, Carbondale

Al Kolwicz, Republican, Boulder

Submitted to the Denver Post for publication in the July 24, 2011 edition.

Trust, but verify

2011-04-10T06:58:00.000-07:00

The Colorado County Clerks Association wants elections to be trusted but not publicly verified.

Exploiting a controversy surrounding Saguache County election records, the Association argued its case in a March 25th Denver Post guest editorial.

Disturbingly, most of the Association’s arguments are false and misleading – see “Protect the integrity of voters' ballots”.

The Association asserts that Secretary of State Scott Gessler has proposed an “unprecedented … review of ballots.” This is not true. The Secretary carried out a similar review after the November 2003 election in Garfield County. And in August 2010 election integrity advocates physically inspected and obtained photocopies of El Paso County election records (including ballots).

The Association repeatedly, and falsely, asserts that ballots are “private”. This assertion has no basis in law or in logic. Voters privately mark their ballots but once cast the ballots are anonymous and public.

There must be no way for anybody, including government officials and the voter themselves, to prove who cast which ballot.

Once cast, the anonymous ballots are required to be publicly, not privately, interpreted and counted to determine the election results.

The clerk’s Association claims that ballots are “sacred”. What does this even mean?

The Association asserts that ballots are “secretly cast”. That is false and the opposite of what the law requires. If ballots were secretly cast, there would be no way to prevent ineligible ballots.

The Association falsely asserts that Mr. Gessler would allow “cast ballots” to be transported anywhere. What has been discussed is that Saguache election officials provide suitable space for a team to carefully and openly inspect the election records.

Surely the clerks know that record custodians are required to facilitate public inspection of public records and to provide copies of these records?

Finally, the Association asserts that it is Colorado’s official keeper of election integrity. In fact, nothing can be further from the truth.

The Colorado County Clerks Association is a secret private group that circumvents Colorado’s Sunshine Laws, uses paid lobbyists, refuses public observers at their meetings, may be diverting public resources to their own needs, and develops government policy behind closed doors with no opportunity for public debate.

Mr. Gessler appears to be standing up for the rights of the public to verify public elections. If so, we applaud his efforts.

BACKGROUND

March 17, 2011
Gessler sues for access to Saguache ballots
http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_17631528

March 17, 2011
Editorial: Saguache review is valid
http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_17629283

March 25, 2011
Guest Commentary: Protect the integrity of voters' ballots
http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_17694150

March 26, 2011
Carroll: Counting ballots in the dark
http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_17702592

March 30, 2011
Guest Commentary: Gessler standing up for the public on ballots
http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_17728021#ixzz1I5UlILxB

March 31, 2011
Trust, but verify.
Center Post-Dispatch

April 1, 2011
Trust, but verify – County Clerks Association, please take note
http://www.coloradostatesman.com/content/992704-trust-verify-%3F-county-clerks-association-please-take-note

Illegal 6-foot barrier blocks Colorado poll watchers

2010-11-27T11:27:00.000-07:00

From: Al Kolwicz
Sent: Saturday, November 27, 2010 11:17 AM
To: 'Marilyn R Marks'; 'judd.choate@sos.state.co.us'

Subject: RE: Urgent Action Required to Lift Unfair 6 foot rule policies in Saguache

Marilyn, Judd,

It troubles me that an illegal 6-foot barrier is being referred to as a “six foot rule”.

In the first place, as we all know, there is no such rule.

In the second place, the 6-foot barrier is illegal. The illegal 6-foot barrier restricts poll watchers in a way that blocks poll watchers from exercising their rights under “C.R.S. 1-7-108(3) Each watcher shall have the right to maintain a list of eligible electors who have voted, to witness and verify each step in the conduct of the election from prior to the opening of the polls through the completion of the count and announcement of the results, to challenge ineligible electors, and to assist in the correction of discrepancies.”

I ask that you cease referring to the illegal 6-foot barrier as a “six foot rule” and suggest that you refer to the “6-foot barrier”, or “illegal 6-foot barrier”.

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group

We need your help!

2010-10-16T10:00:00.000-07:00

We need your help!

The Colorado Attorney General’s office has issued an opinion (October 15th email below) that, if left unchallenged, would essentially shut down independent oversight of elections.

I encourage each of you to intensify your efforts to ensure that Colorado elections are independently verifiable by the public. If we fail, we are one step closer to widespread election fraud and error.

Remember that the Attorney General is the attorney for the Secretary of State – not the people’s Attorney General.

There are three sections below. Please take time to read thru them. Then share your ideas. We must act promptly.

1. October 15th email from Attorney General’s office

2. My annotations to the AG’s email.

3. My notes regarding Colorado’s statutes and election rules

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
http://coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com/

October 15th email from Attorney General’s office

From: Judd Choate [mailto:Judd.Choate@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Friday, October 15, 2010 9:11 AM
To: Marilyn R Marks
Cc: attorney.general@state.co.us; Harvie Branscomb; Al Kolwicz; joseph richey
Subject: RE: opinion on poll watching

Here is what Maurice Knaizer, the Deputy Attorney General, sent me last night regarding the six foot rule. If you would prefer that he put this on a letterhead, I’m sure that can be accomplished.

Poll Watchers have asked whether they may witness activities of election officials involving voting equipment, voting booths and the ballot boxes within six feet of such equipment, booths and boxes when a voter is not present. The Department of State has concluded that watchers may not be permitted within six feet of the equipment, booths and ballot boxes even when a voter is not present.

Section 1-5-503 provides:

"The voting equipment or voting booths and the ballot box shall be situated in the polling place so as to be in plain view of the election officials and watchers. No person other than the election officials and those admitted for the purpose of voting shall be permitted within the immediate voting area, which shall be considered as within six feet of the voting equipment or voting booths and the ballot box, except by authority of election judges or the designated election official, and then only when necessary to keep order and enforce the law"

This section does not contain any temporal limitations It covers activities, such as casting of ballots, counting of ballots and recounts, that occur during the election process. It also covers all locations where equipment or ballot boxes may be placed while ballots are being cast or counted. If a ballot box is moved from one location in a polling place to another, the six foot buffer would apply to the second location. Ballots themselves are also covered because the primary purpose of this section is to protect the integrity of the ballot and preserve the secrecy of the ballot. Allowing persons other than designated election officials or their agents to come closer to the equipment, booths or ballot boxes increases the likelihood that a watcher with malevolent intent could corrupt the election process. Any potential disadvantage to the watcher is mitigated by the requirement that the equipment, booths and ballot boxes must be "in plain view."

For these reasons, I concur with the Secretary's interpretation.

Maurice Knaizer

Kolwicz annotations to the AG’s email.

1. The statement of the issue is ill-formed, and will result in a fuzzy response. It is sort of a “straw-man”. It restricts the issue to one that might be answered by 1-5-503. We have actually asked for much more transparency, and never asked to see what is happening in the immediate area of the voting booth or see the content of non-anonymous ballots.

Poll Watchers have asked whether they may witness activities of election officials involving voting equipment, voting booths and the ballot boxes within six feet of such equipment, booths and boxes when a voter is not present. The Department of State has concluded that watchers may not be permitted within six feet of the equipment, booths and ballot boxes even when a voter is not present.

2. The citation, by Knaizer, of 1-5-503 is faulty in that it refers only to the polling place, and not to all of the other election activities. Also, it is clear to me that the intent is to protect the privacy of the voter and the anonymity of the ballot. Once the ballot is cast it must be, by constitution and statute, anonymous.

Section 1-5-503 provides:

"The voting equipment or voting booths and the ballot box shall be situated in the polling place so as to be in plain view of the election officials and watchers. No person other than the election officials and those admitted for the purpose of voting shall be permitted within the immediate voting area, which shall be considered as within six feet of the voting equipment or voting booths and the ballot box, except by authority of election judges or the designated election official, and then only when necessary to keep order and enforce the law"

3. Knaizer conveniently eliminates all of the other, many, statutes and election rules related to this topic. I have scraped many of these in the synopsis below.

4. Knaizer then goes on and creates, on his own initiative, an extensive expansion of the written law.

This section does not contain any temporal limitations It covers activities, such as casting of ballots, counting of ballots and recounts, that occur during the election process. It also covers all locations where equipment or ballot boxes may be placed while ballots are being cast or counted. If a ballot box is moved from one location in a polling place to another, the six foot buffer would apply to the second location. Ballots themselves are also covered because the primary purpose of this section is to protect the integrity of the ballot and preserve the secrecy of the ballot. Allowing persons other than designated election officials or their agents to come closer to the equipment, booths or ballot boxes increases the likelihood that a watcher with malevolent intent could corrupt the election process. Any potential disadvantage to the watcher is mitigated by the requirement that the equipment, booths and ballot boxes must be "in plain view."

It appears to me that Mr. Knaizer’s response is political rather than legal, and should be challenged immediately.

Kolwicz notes regarding Colorado’s statutes and election rules.

The reason that watchers need to get within 6 feet of computer screens, cast ballots, and various other election information is so that watchers, who are trying to accomplish their statutory rights, can actually “see” and “hear” what is going on. We have no interest in seeing the computer screens or the issued-but-uncast ballot seen by the elector as he marks, verifies, and casts an anonymous ballot.

I have clipped pertinent sections of our statutes and rules below. Any reasonable reading will conclude that watchers are expected to have access to election data including who is voting, how the votes on a ballot are interpreted, and how the votes on a ballot are counted.

The public depends on independent oversight (watchers) because watchers can discover errors that might otherwise get missed or covered up, and to prevent official misdeeds. It is not difficult to understand that there are often measures on the ballot that affect the jobs and pay of government officials. (Officials often have “a horse in the race”.) In Colorado counties, election officials can choose their own people for mail-in, early, and provisional ballot processing, and for all vote counting. In many cases these people are government employees. Sometimes key processes of the election are performed by sub-contractors, some of which may be offsite, or even out of state.

With the exception of voter privacy issues outlined above, watchers need both real-time access to the data in every election process, including anonymous cast ballots, and post election access to all election data computer files.

We trust the officials, but, since they are human, and to obtain certainty, we must verify.

Al

1-1-104. Definitions. (51) "Watcher" means an eligible elector other than a candidate on the ballot who has been selected by a political party chairperson on behalf of the political party, by a party candidate at a primary election, by an unaffiliated candidate at a general, congressional vacancy, or nonpartisan election, or by a person designated by either the opponents or the proponents in the case of a ballot issue or ballot question.

1-7-108. Requirements of watchers. (1) Watchers shall take an oath administered by one of the election judges that they are eligible electors, that their name has been submitted to the designated election official as a watcher for this election, and that they will not in any manner make known to anyone the result of counting votes until the polls have closed.

(2) Neither candidates nor members of their immediate families by blood or marriage to the second degree may be poll watchers for that candidate.

(3) Each watcher shall have the right to maintain a list of eligible electors who have voted, to witness and verify each step in the conduct of the election from prior to the opening of the polls through the completion of the count and announcement of the results, to challenge ineligible electors, and to assist in the correction of discrepancies.

1-7-307. Method of counting paper ballots. (4) All persons, except election judges and watchers, shall be excluded from the place where the ballot counting is being held until the count has been completed.

1-7-507. Electronic vote-counting - procedure. (1) All proceedings at the counting centers shall be under the direction of the designated election official and the representatives of the political parties, if a partisan election, or watchers, if a nonpartisan election. No persons, except those authorized for the purpose, shall touch any ballot, ballot card, "prom" or other electronic device, or return.

1-7.5-107.5. Counting mail ballots. The election officials at the mail ballot counting place may receive and prepare mail ballots delivered and turned over to them by the designated election official for tabulation. Counting of the mail ballots may begin fifteen days prior to the election and continue until counting is completed. The election official in charge of the mail ballot counting place shall take all precautions necessary to ensure the secrecy of the counting procedures, and no information concerning the count shall be released by the election officials or watchers until after 7 p.m. on election day.

1-8-109. Watchers at mail-in polling places. Any political party, candidate, or proponents or opponents of a ballot issue entitled to have watchers at polling places shall each have the right to maintain one watcher in the office of the designated election official and mail-in polling places during the period in which mail-in ballots may be applied for or received.

1-8-206. Watchers at early voters' polling places. Any political party, candidate, or proponents or opponents of a ballot issue entitled to have watchers at polling places shall each have the right to maintain one watcher at the early voters' polling place during the casting and counting of early voters' ballots.

1-8-208. Manner of early voting. (1) An eligible elector who receives an early voters' ballot may cast the ballot in the early voters' polling place, as provided in this part 2. Ballot boxes for early voting shall be locked and sealed each night with a numbered seal under the supervision of the election judges or watchers, and the keys shall remain in the possession of the designated election official until transferred to the supply judge for the mail-in and early voters' counting place for preparation for counting and tabulating pursuant to section 1-8-303. When a seal is broken, the designated election official and a person who shall not be of the same political party as the designated election official shall record the number of the seal and maintain the seal along with an explanation of the reasons for breaking the seal.

1-9-201. Right to vote may be challenged. (1) (a) A person's right to vote at a polling place or in an election may be challenged.

(b) If a person whose right to vote is challenged refuses to answer the questions asked or sign the challenge form in accordance with section 1-9-203 or take the oath pursuant to section 1-9-204, the person shall be offered a provisional ballot. If the person casts a provisional ballot, the election judge shall attach the challenge form to the provisional ballot envelope and indicate "Challenge" on the provisional ballot envelope.

(2) An election judge shall challenge any person intending to vote who the judge believes is not an eligible elector. In addition, challenges may be made by watchers or any eligible elector of the precinct.

(3) A challenge at a polling place shall be made in the presence of the person whose right to vote is challenged.

1-10-101. Canvass board for partisan elections - appointment, fees, oaths. (1) (a) At least fifteen days before any primary, general, congressional vacancy, or special legislative election, the county chairpersons of each of the two major political parties in each county shall certify to the county clerk and recorder, in the manner prescribed by such clerk and recorder, the appointment of one or more registered electors to serve as a member of the county canvass board. The appointees, together with the county clerk and recorder, constitute the county canvass board. Each minor political party whose candidate is on the ballot and each unaffiliated candidate whose name is on the ballot in such election may designate, in the manner prescribed by such clerk and recorder, one watcher to observe the work of the county canvass board.

1-10.5-102. Recounts for congressional, state, and district offices, state ballot questions, and state ballot issues. (1) If the secretary of state determines that a recount is required for the office of United States senator, representative in congress, any state office or district office of state concern, any state ballot question, or any state ballot issue certified for the ballot by the secretary of state, the secretary of state shall order a complete recount of all the votes cast for that office, state ballot question, or state ballot issue no later than the twenty-fifth day after the election.

(2) The secretary of state shall notify the county clerk and recorder of each county involved by registered mail and facsimile transmission of a public recount to be conducted in the county at a place prescribed by the secretary of state. The recount shall be completed no later than the thirtieth day after any election. The secretary of state shall promulgate and provide each county clerk and recorder with the necessary rules and regulations to conduct the recount in a fair, impartial, and uniform manner, including provisions for watchers during the recount. Any rule or regulation concerning the conduct of a recount shall take into account the type of voting system and equipment used by the county in which the recount is to be conducted.

1-13-702. Interfering with watcher. Any person who intentionally interferes with any watcher while he is discharging his duties set forth in section 1-7-108 (3) is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 1-13-111.

1-13-712. Disclosing or identifying vote. (1) Except as provided in section 1-7-108, no voter shall show his ballot after it is prepared for voting to any person in such a way as to reveal its contents. No voter shall place any mark upon his ballot by means of which it can be identified as the one voted by him, and no other mark shall be placed on the ballot by any person to identify it after it has been prepared for voting.

(2) No person shall endeavor to induce any voter to show how he marked his ballot.

(3) No election official, watcher, or person shall reveal to any other person the name of any candidate for whom a voter has voted or communicate to another his opinion, belief, or impression as to how or for whom a voter has voted.

(4) Any person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 1-13-111.

1-13-718. Release of information concerning count. Any election official, watcher, or other person who releases information concerning the count of ballots cast at precinct polling places or of mail-in voters' ballots prior to 7 p.m. on the day of the election is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 1-13-111.
ELECTION RULES
8.7 What Watchers May Observe. Duly appointed Watchers may observe polling place voting, early voting and the processing and counting of precinct, provisional, mail, and mail-in ballots. For mail ballot elections, or mail-in ballot processing, watchers may be present at each stage of the election including the receiving and bundling of the ballots received by the designated election official. Watchers may be present during provisional ballot processing but may not have access to confidential voter information.

8.8 Limitations of Watchers. Duly appointed Watchers may observe election judges but may not interrupt or disrupt the processing, verification and counting of any ballots or any other stage of the election. Watchers may track the names of electors who have cast ballots by utilizing their previously obtained lists, but may not write down any ballot numbers or any other identifying information about the electors. Watchers may not handle the poll books, official signature cards, ballots, mail ballot envelopes, mail-in ballot envelopes or provisional ballot envelopes, voting or counting machines or machine components. Watchers shall not interfere with the orderly process and conduct of any election, including ballot issuance, receiving of ballots, voting or counting of the ballots. Watchers may not be allowed to interact with election officials or election judges, except that each designated election official shall name at least one individual in each precinct polling place or election location to whom Watchers may direct questions or from whom watchers may seek requested information.

Pollbook 101

2010-05-14T15:39:00.001-07:00

To Aspen Election Commission

I have clipped some sections from Title 1, and created a paper demonstration of how a pollbook works.

If you follow these procedures you should be on firm ground. You will have anonymous ballots and be able to consider release of same to the public. If you start afresh, I suggest that you use a public forum to do so, because of side effects that you might not personally know about. Off-hand I am unaware of anything in Title 31 that would prevent you from adopting these recommendations.

I believe that there is an advantage to maintaining a pollbook as a sequential list of the electors who were issued ballots.

Each row of the list should contain the row number, the name/voter_ID of the elector, and the serial number on the ballot stub that was issued to the elector. Space needs to be provided for issuing replacement ballots (up to three).

• When a person is determined to be an eligible elector they are admitted to the voting area.

• When a ballot is issued, the row is completed by the issuing judge.

• Before the ballot is cast, the stub containing the serial number, is removed and retained as an election record.

• When the ballot box is opened, the ballots are shuffled.

• Before the ballots are copied, a new unique identifier is recorded on the original ballot. This identifier will appear in any copies and can be used to (a) specifically identify the original ballot, and (2) appear as a field in Cast Vote Records.

This procedure preserves the data needed to audit the election AND it strictly preserves voter privacy by using an anonymous ballot.

The sequential pollbook has advantages:

1. It supports the needs of GOTV pollwatchers. Electronic pollbooks do not. Use of the registration list as a pollbook requires that the pollwatcher flip through the registration list to locate “their” voters.

2. In larger counties, or vote centers, or other multi-precinct polling locations, it reduces the amount of searching by pollwatchers for “their voters”. Presently pollwatchers are limited.

3. It supports the needs of election officials (including the canvass board) to promptly audit the election. One can tell immediately how many voters voted (for example), and how many ballots were issued.

4. It facilitates preparation and verification of vote history records that record which electors voted using which voting method.

Imagine the following pollbook.

See how easy it is to know how many ballots are supposed to be in the Ballot Box.

Also, this makes it easy to determine the number of spoiled and unused ballots.

The use of ballot stubs does not require that the ballots be issued in sequence number order.

Some counties do have voters sign the registration book. But, this is inconvenient for both the poll watchers and the officials. And, it is error prone to count the voters – especially when one considers the provisional, emergency, etc. special cases. Some electors names are not in the registration book.

Polling Location ABC Ballot Styles: S01 S02

Voter..Name...................ID............1stBallot#....2ndBallot#....3rdBallot#....LastBallot#

1 ........Mike LaBonte..... 70851........S01-0001

2 ........Marilyn Marks..... 8020156...S01-0002...S01-0005

3 ........Harvie Branscomb.643201....S01-0003

4 ........Al Kolwicz ...........5572463 ..S01-0004

5........ Elizabeth Milas.....20744432 .S02-0001

6.........Bob Leatherman ..8012247... S01-0006

7 ........Ward Hauenstein 77443322...S02-0002

Following is a selective set of items from the CRS. I think that it nearly supports my recommendation for maintaining sequential list for a pollbook.

The “post-cast” ballot shuffling and numbering recommendation is something that is not directly required in current law, but would help. To my knowledge, there is nothing in Title 1 that would disallow either. Shuffling would help achieve the required anonymity, so I think that it would survive debate. Post-cast numbering would help achieve a more vigorous post election audit, so I think that it would survive debate.

Selections from TITLE 1 C.R.S.

1-1-104. Definitions.

(27) "Pollbook" means the list of eligible electors who are permitted to vote at a polling place or by mail ballot in an election conducted under this code.

(36) "Registration book" means the original elector registration records for each county retained and stored by one of the following methods:

(a) On registration records by precinct in bound books arranged alphabetically for all active and all inactive registrations with all withdrawn and canceled registrations kept in separate bound books or on film; or

(b) On film and computer with access to the registration records available both alphabetically and by precinct. The system shall have the capability to print out active and inactive registration records, to retain the voting history for each active and inactive registration by surname, and to film completed voter signature forms by precinct for each election. Computer lists of registration records shall be furnished for use at the precinct polling places on election days.

1-7-109. Judges to keep pollbooks. (1) The election judges shall keep a pollbook which shall contain one column headed "names of voters" and one column headed "number on ballot". The name and the number on the ballot of each eligible elector voting shall be entered successively under the appropriate headings in the pollbook.

1-7-302. Electors given only one ballot. Election judges shall give to each eligible elector a single ballot, which shall be separated from the stub by tearing or cutting along the perforated or dotted line. The election judge having charge of the ballots shall endorse his or her initials on the duplicate stub.

Another election judge shall enter the date and the number of the ballot on the registration record of the eligible elector before delivering the ballot to the eligible elector. The election judge having charge of the pollbook shall write the name of the eligible elector and the number of the ballot on the pollbook.

1-7-305. Counting by counting judges.

(3) When an exchange of ballot boxes is made as described in subsection (2) of this section, the receiving judges shall sign and furnish to the counting judges a statement showing the number of ballots that are to be found in each ballot box as indicated by the pollbooks. The counting judges shall then count ballots in the manner prescribed in section 1-7-307.

1-7-307. Method of counting paper ballots. (1) The election judges shall first count the number of ballots in the box. If the ballots are found to exceed the number of names entered on each of the pollbooks, the election judges shall then examine the official endorsements. If, in the unanimous opinion of the judges, any of the ballots in excess of the number on the pollbooks are deemed not to bear the proper official endorsement, they shall be put into a separate pile and into a separate record, and a return of the votes in those ballots shall be made under the heading "excess ballots". When the ballots and the pollbooks agree, the judges shall proceed to count the votes.

1-7-502. Elector given only one ballot or ballot card. An election judge shall give to each eligible elector only one ballot or ballot card, which shall be removed from the package by tearing it along the perforated line below the stub. The election judge having charge of the pollbook shall write the name of the eligible elector and the number of the ballot or ballot card upon the pollbook.

1-7-505. Close of polls - count and seals in electronic voting.

(2) In precincts in which voting is on a ballot or ballot card, election judges shall prepare a return in
duplicate showing the number of eligible electors, as indicated by the pollbook, who have voted in the
precinct, the number of official ballots or ballot cards received, and the number of spoiled and unused
ballots or ballot cards returned. The original copy of the return shall be deposited in the metal or durable plastic transfer box, along with all voted and spoiled ballots. The transfer box shall then be sealed in such a way as to prevent tampering with the box or its contents. The designated election official shall provide a numbered seal. The duplicate copy of the return shall be mailed at the nearest post office or post-office box to the designated election official by an election judge other than the one who delivers the transfer box to the designated counting center. For partisan elections, two election judges of different political affiliations, as provided in section 1-6-109.5, shall deliver the sealed transfer box to the counting center designated by the county clerk and recorder.

Aspen - Both transparency and trustworthy elections are required. There can be no tradeoff.

2010-05-04T18:11:00.000-07:00

May 4, 2009

TO: Aspen Independent Election Commissioners

Dear Commissioners Hauenstein and Leatherman

I am writing in regard to tomorrow’s Election Commission meeting. Please permit me to first introduce myself. I have lived and worked in Colorado since 1966. For more than a decade, I have worked to improve Colorado’s election system. I am a Trustee and co-founder of Colorado Voter Group. I have served on multiple Boulder County Canvass Boards and voting equipment test boards. I have actively participated in Colorado’s equipment certification process, and contributed to the development of election rules, and have testified numerous times before state and local governmental bodies. I have testified in court as an expert witness on election system matters. I have closely monitored with much interest Aspen’s May 2009 election and its follow on activities. I have worked closely with Nick Koumoutseas of TrueBallot, the vendor whose system was used in the election. I have had a private demonstration of the TrueBallot system including a description of the database tables and macros, and the software used to capture, interpret and correct votes. I have also explored the software used to calculate the selection of the winners. In addition, I have analyzed the database and strings, as well as the first-pass vote interpretations published by Aspen. I have studied Title 31 and have in-depth knowledge of Title 1, the Colorado Election Rules, and Colorado Constitution Article VII Section 8.

My interest in the May 2009 election is due to the ranked choice methodology used for the election. The Colorado legislature has instructed the Secretary of State to prepare a report of Colorado IRV experience by February 2011. As of now, it appears that Aspen’s will be the only Colorado IRV election completed before the report deadline. I hope that by detailed analysis of this election we can make a significant contribution to the Secretary of State’s report to the legislature. We expect this report to significantly influence future legislation.

Clean government does not just happen. The public needs protection from potentially tyrannical governments. Therefore, protection must be independent of government. It must work to serve public, not government, interests. The Aspen Election Commission should strive to become such a protector. You have statutory authority, and your tools are transparency and trustworthy elections.

Transparency means that public information is public and affordable. Government has the power, but not the right, to withhold or destroy information that might undermine its power. The Commission can and should facilitate the public’s access to all non-private election-related information.

A trustworthy election is one that can be independently verified. Voters are supposed to exercise power over government through elections. However, once elected, officials wield an awesome power that can be turned against the public. Officials, through appointments and laws, can hide and misrepresent information and events. And, unmonitored, officials can rig elections in order to pick the winners. The Commission can and should do all in its power to give people access to the all of the information needed to independently verify elections.

In 1946, Coloradoans voted for a constitutional amendment to reject the “trust government” approach. (See attached report, 1946 Ballot Issue No. 1.) Until then, Colorado ballots were voter-identifiable; each ballot was linked to a specific voter. Now, cast ballots must be anonymous – that is, there must be no way for anybody (including government, election judges, even the voters themselves) to be able to determine who voted which ballot. The 1945 amendment also requires voting in private – that is, there must be no way for anybody other than the voter to see what choices the voter is marking on their ballot.

Anonymous ballots and private voting are now the law in Colorado. Creating information that could have been used to connect voters and ballots is now illegal. Information that can be used to prove how a person voted must never be created.

Voter-identifiable ballots could be used to support directed product marketing, fundraising, and electioneering activities. Anonymous ballots and private voting are our protections against intimidation and vote selling. Government employers with access to voter-identifiable ballots can punish employees that do not vote as told. Officials can leak or even sell this information to others who can similarly punish those who do not vote as told. Jobs, promotions and raises can be withheld. Contracts can be withheld or even withdrawn. Housing opportunities or permits can be denied. A market for vote selling is created. Buyers can verify, or plausibly threaten to verify, that “what they bought is what they got”.

Aspen officials have admittedly violated the law. They created and operated an election system that does not provide for anonymous ballots.

1. Their violation is now being exploited by these same officials in their efforts to justify their refusal to produce election records in response to an open records request.

2. There is no public effort underway to enforce the anonymous ballot requirement for future elections.

3. There is no public effort underway to identify and hold accountable those responsible for the violation.

To restore voter confidence in Aspen elections, I recommend that the Commission:

1. Using your legal authority, assert your independence and your intent to represent the public.

2. Define, adopt, and implement a policy of strict compliance with requirements for open election records including, but not limited to, copies of: (a) pollbooks, (b) ballots, and (c) the interpretation of the votes on each ballot.

3. Define, adopt, and implement a policy of strict compliance with requirements for anonymous ballots, private voting, open election records, and trustworthy elections.

4. Reproduce and shuffle copies of the May 2009 ballots and make these PDF files or photocopies available for open records requests.

5. If there are ballots that you believe contain voter-identifiable information, (a) create a team that includes someone who is free from government influence, (b) swear the team as election judges, and (c) instruct them to make anonymous replacement ballots by hand-duplicating these ballots before they are copied.

6. Refer the officials suspected of the anonymous ballot violation to law enforcement.

Both transparency and trustworthy elections are required. There can be no tradeoff.

Good things happen when election records cannot be used to determine a voter’s votes. Copies of pollbooks and ballots can be published for public inspection, as can the interpretation of each and every vote on each and every ballot. The public can verify for itself that the correct ballots were included in the count, and that each vote was correctly interpreted and counted. Although not a complete verification that an election is trustworthy, it is a very important first step.

I am available to discuss these matters with you more fully. And I most sincerely hope that you will accept these recommendations.

Yours truly,

Al Kolwicz

Trustee, Colorado Voter Group

1946 BALLOT ISSUE NO. 1 – Referred

The right to vote using an anonymous ballot was created by the people of Colorado when they adopted a referred amendment to the Colorado Constitution. A brief history follows.

Article VII, Sec. 8 of the 1876 Constitution says:

All elections by the people shall be by ballot; every ballot voted shall be numbered in the order in which it shall be received, and the number be recorded by the election officers on the list of voters opposite the name of the voter who presents the ballot. The election officers shall be sworn or affirmed not to enquire or disclose how any elector shall have voted. In all cases of contested elections, the ballots cast may be counted, compared with the list of voters, and examined under such safeguards and regulations as may be prescribed by law.

On November 7, 1946, an election was held in which there was a contest to adopt an amendment to the Colorado Constitution. As follows:

1946 BALLOT ISSUE NO. 1 – Referred

TITLE - Amendment to Article VII of the Constitution of the State of Colorado providing for secret ballots

The Rocky Mountain News opposed the amendment in its editorial of November 2, 1946, saying:

Reject the Amendments

Both the proposed amendments referred to the people by the last General Assembly are dangerous and should be voted down.

Amendment No. 1 rules out the use of numbered ballots. The aim is to protect the secrecy of the ballot. If adopted, however, this proposal would make virtually impossible the tracing of ballots and would prevent the investigation of election frauds, such as is now underway in Kansas city. The disadvantages would far outweigh the advantages.

According to a report, Legislative Council Staff to Interim Committee on Judiciary, August 11, 1977, the 1946 Amendment No. 1 was passed by the following vote:

FOR 118,470 (56%)
AGAINST 92,203 (44%)
TOTAL 210,673

The Secret Ballot Amendment was put into law by the 1947 General Assembly:

HB47-0248 – ELECTIONS – Amends present statutes to provide for putting into effect the amendment to the constitution of the state providing for a secret ballot. April 22, 1947. (From Digest of Senate and House Bills Enacted by the 36th General Assembly of the State of Colorado (1947 Regular Session - http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/PDF/digest1947.pdf )

I have not researched the Denver Post or news articles before November 1946. Nor have I researched the actual language of the General Assembly in 1946 that adopted the referred measure or 1947 that adopted HB47-0248. These documents are available at CU Norlin and the Legislative Council.

There is no ambiguity in what Article VII Sec. 8 means. Prior to November 1946 ballots were given serial numbers. After November 1946 ballots were not permitted to have serial numbers or other marks that could be used to identify the voter of a ballot. Colorado voters clearly knew what they were doing when they changed the constitution.

Wrongly denied, again. Public seeks scanned ballot image files from HART InterCivic system.

2010-04-07T15:35:00.000-07:00

Subject: RE: Response to your letter of March 29th re: CORA

Dear Mr. Kolwicz:

The bottom line to all of your records requests is that the documents you are seeking are not in existence and under CORA we have no obligation to create any documents. That is not to say that the information does not exist – it does, just not in document form. As I noted before, these files cannot be exported. I have conferred with Stephanie Cegielski at the Secretary of State’s Office and she agrees with this interpretation of CORA in light of your request. In fact, she suggested, as a custodian of records, that you contact her about your request should you have any further questions. She can be reached at 894-2200 ext 6327, and I am copying her on this e-mail.

As far as Rule 45.5.2.1.7 is concerned, that Rule applies to the testing for certification process which has already occurred. Furthermore, the records you request are not “election results” as contemplated by that Rule. Therefore, that Rule is not applicable to your request.

Finally, I am aware of which Title applies to our elections. I mentioned the Pitkin County Order by way of analogy only as there are similar provisions in the Election Code.

Sincerely,

Shelley Bailey
Assistant County Attorney
Boulder County

Public seeks scanned ballot image files from HART InterCivic system.

2010-04-06T19:11:00.000-07:00

Shelley Bailey
Assistant County Attorney
Boulder County, Colorado

April 5, 2010

RE: Response to your March 29th letter regarding our CORA request.

Dear Ms. Bailey:

We have studied your letter of March 29, 2010. Perhaps you were rushed in preparing your letter since it contains several significant errors of law. I have copied the text of your letter into numbered sections below so that we may conveniently respond to each section.

1. First, our system does not allow us to export these files.

If this is true, then the voting system is defective. Colorado Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7 requires that all election data be exportable. If “your” system does not comply with this Rule, as an agent of the court you should report this fact to the Secretary of State and ask that its certification be withdrawn.

2. Second, under statutory law, C.R.S. 31-10-616(1),[…]the clerk is to keep the ballots secret and to preserve them for access only for contest proceedings.

Boulder County elections are conducted under Title 1, not Title 31. Title 31 has absolutely nothing to do with our elections. Surely you must know this.

For your information, you infer that Title 31 has something to do with the computer files that we have requested. A careful reading shows that this is not true. 31-10-616(1) describes when the actual ballots may be removed from the ballot box, and when they must be destroyed. As you must know, we are not seeking access to the actual ballots. 31-10-616(2) explicitly does not restrict access to or require destruction of any “other official election records and forms”.

3. and [under] Article VII, Section 8 of the State’s Constitution, the clerk is to keep the ballots secret and to preserve them for access only for contest proceedings.

There is no such language in Article VII, Section 8. It does not say anything about “keeping ballots secret” or “preserving ballots”. Surely you must know this.

What Article VII, Section 8 does say, explicitly, is, “no ballots shall be marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it”. Boulder County routinely violates this Constitutional provision. It is the intent of the 1946 Constitutional Amendment that created this protection that every ballot must be anonymous – meaning that there is no way to identify which voter marked which ballot.

4. Your CORA request is not a proceeding to contest the election, and the time for such a contest has passed.

We made no claim to contest the election. Surely you must know this. Further, your comment suggests that you are confusing Title 31 and Title 1 election laws. (See discussion in #2 above.)

5. C.R.S. 31-10-1303 See also Marks v Koch, Case Number P09CV294, Pitkin County (e-mail to follow) Therefore, these records are not available pursuant to a CORA request.

To repeat, Title 31 is not relevant to Title 1 elections.

6. It has always been the County’s position, as well as the secretary of state’s position, that it would do substantial harm to the public interest to allow the release of mail ballot images.

If you have documentation supporting this assertion we would like to review it. I do not recall any published arguments from Boulder County detailing the harm that might occur by releasing to the public copies of computer files containing scanned images of anonymous ballots.

We have a December 18, 2009 document from Secretary of State Buescher saying in part, “…I am not opposed in principle to the public disclosure of images …”.

7. The County has never released ballot images.

This is a problem for the public. For a number of years we have submitted CORA requests for the data and have never been given the opportunity to inspect the data.

8. Finally, our system does not allow us to export these files. They are only viewable with Ballot Now, proprietary software, in our database.

To repeat, this is a violation of Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7.

If need be, we are willing to negotiate ways that the county can meet its obligations by providing us access to the proprietary software so that we may inspect the records in Boulder County’s database.

9. With regard to your request for the cast vote records, again, the County’s system does not allow the export of these files.

To repeat, this is a violation of Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7.

If need be, we are willing to negotiate ways that the county can meet its obligations by providing us access to the proprietary software so that we may inspect the records in Boulder County’s database.

10. Cast vote records are not the same as results, and they cannot be printed out. They are the record of how Ballot Now tabulates each ballot.

In the first place, you should know that we have not requested a printout of the cast vote records. Our request is to inspect the actual cast vote records. Once we see these records, we will decide whether or not to request copies of the computer files containing them.

Also, for your information, you have been misinformed. The cast vote records are NOT a record of how BallotNow “tabulates” each ballot. The cast vote records are the record of how BallotNow “interprets” each vote on each ballot. The votes on the cast vote records are subsequently tabulated by a program referred to as TALLY.

11. The statement of vote is available, however.

We are not, at this time, seeking access to the statement of vote.

12. I am still working on the administrative logs that you requested and will get an answer to you as soon as possible. Could you please explain with specificity what it is you are asking for?

To expedite this response, please provide us with a list of the official titles and summary description of all files created and/or maintained by the HART voting system. We have found that when we do not ask for an exact file name, we are not able to make a request that staff understands.

Now that we have presented and directed you to the correct legal framework, we expect you to promptly arrange for us to inspect the materials we have requested.

Please let me know when we may review the materials.

Sincerely,

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group

CC:

Hillary Hall, Boulder County Clerk & Recorder
Bernie Buescher, Colorado Secretary of State
Judd Choate, Director, Colorado Division of Elections
Harvie Branscomb, Trustee, Colorado Voter Group

COMPLAINT: Urgent - ongoing violation of Open Meetings Laws

2010-04-02T09:34:00.001-07:00

From: Al Kolwicz [mailto:AlKolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 10:26 AM
To: 'attorney.general@state.co.us'
Cc: 'Newsroom Denver_Post'; 'coloradovoter@googlegroups.com'
Subject: COMPLAINT: Urgent - ongoing violation of Open Meetings Laws

Dear Attorney General Suthers,

There is a meeting of Colorado election officials underway today in Westminster. These same officials are interfering with the Public’s right to observe. Your immediate intervention is requested.

These officials are operating behind a shield of the Colorado County Clerks Association.

However, it is our understanding that they are discussing topics that lead to decisions regarding election law (see email thread below).

We believe that these officials are violating the spirit and letter of the Colorado open meetings laws.

Will you please intervene in behalf of the people of Colorado?

Thank you for your immediate attention.

Al

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
303-494-1540
mailto:AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/

Protect independent Logic and Accuracy Testing

2010-03-21T21:23:00.001-07:00

RE: Please amend HB 1116 to protect independent Logic and Accuracy Testing

Dear Senator Heath:

It is my understanding that the State, Veterans & Military Affairs committee will take up HB 1116 on Monday afternoon.
In your position as Chair of the committee, and as a fellow Boulder County resident, you are in a position to give serious consideration to and recommend adoption of the following proposal to amend HB 1116.

To earn voter confidence, it is vital that Logic and Accuracy Test members be chosen independently of election officials.

Please amend HB 1116 to something like the following:

1-7-509. Electronic and electromechanical vote counting - testing of equipment required.

(1)(c)(I) For all partisan elections, the County major Political Party Chairs shall appoint to a Testing Board an equal number of one or more registered electors. The number of members of the Testing Board shall be determined by the county clerk and recorder.

(II) For nonpartisan elections that are coordinated elections, the County major Political Party Chairs shall appoint to a Testing Board an equal number of one or more registered electors. The number of members of the Testing Board shall be determined by the county clerk and recorder. In addition, each participating Governing Board will recommend to the designated election official one or more Testing Board members, and the designated election official will choose from among these recommended testers no fewer than one and no more than half of the number allocated to the political parties.

(III) For nonpartisan elections that are not coordinated elections, a Testing Board will be appointed with the number of members determined by the designated election official. Each participating Governing Board will recommend to the designated election official one or more Testing Board members, and the designated election official will choose from among these recommended testers no fewer than two and will attempt to evenly distribute the Testing Board members across the districts.

The key objective of the amendment is to make sure that county-wide elections are supported by party appointed testers, and that other elections are supported by governing boards of the districts.

We hope the law will maximize independence and minimize official control over the verification that the election system is ready to conduct a fair and accurate election.

As you may recall, Boulder County has had embarrassing problems during the last few elections. Many of these problems could have been avoided by an independent (and system wide) LAT.

The current language proposed in HB 1116, Section 15 removes the party affiliation requirements for judges who perform logic and accuracy testing on electronic voting equipment if the election for which the equipment is being tested is a nonpartisan election.

SECTION 15. 1-7-509 (1) (c), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read:

1-7-509. Electronic and electromechanical vote counting - testing of equipment required.

(1) (c) (I) FOR ALL PARTISAN ELECTIONS, the designated election official shall select a testing board comprising at least two persons, one from each major political party, from the list provided by the major political parties pursuant to section 1-6-102.

(II) FOR ALL NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS, THE DESIGNATED ELECTION OFFICIAL SHALL SELECT A TESTING BOARD COMPRISING AT LEAST TWO PERSONS WHO ARE REGISTERED ELECTORS.

In the first place, why should the clerk select the testing board members for PARTISAN elections? Each Major Political Party Chair should select the person(s) that they feel confident will best perform this highly technical duty. This paragraph should be revised by an amendment that assigns to the County Political Party Chair the appointment of the person or persons that will participate in the design and execution of the LAT.

Secondly, why should the clerk select the testing board members for NONPARTISAN elections? Again, the major political party chairs should each make at least one appointment. They have experience, and are a stable element of the community. In addition, each of the participating districts should submit a candidate for LAT tester, and the Clerk can choose among the appointees of the special districts.

Some Colorado County Clerks are guilty of restricting LAT test cases to things that the clerk has pre-tested before the test. For example, only a blue or black pen may be used to mark LAT ballots. In so doing, Clerks wind up serving as surrogates for the vendors. They use these unfair testing procedures to cover up defects in the equipment and procedures.

• Clerks won’t permit testers to use “realistic marks” on the test ballots.

• Clerks won’t permit the “expected results” to be hidden from the people running the equipment and performing the ballot resolution function.

• Clerks won’t permit testers to address many of the election procedures required by law, including compliance with “conditional certification requirements”.

Even more egregious, but probably not fixable in HB 1116, the LAT itself is flawed in that it does not test the entire path.

• Currently, there is no testing to verify that signature verifiers are able to detect forgery.

• Currently, there is no testing to verify that procedures are followed.

• Currently, there is no testing to verify that batch controls work, and that the election can be accurately canvassed..

• Currently, there is no testing to verify that election reports comply with the law.

Sadly, the LAT has devolved into an ineffective drama designed to generate false confidence. Most of the defects discovered in recent elections should have and would have been detected by a fair public testing process.

Eventually, the Legislature must ensure that pre-election testing will verify that (1) every eligible voter will be given an opportunity to vote once, (2) every eligible vote will be correctly counted once, and that (3) every aspect of the election (with the exception of where a voter’s SSN would be made public, or a connection between the voter and the voted ballot would be exposed) will be fully transparent and independently verifiable.

It is reckless for the clerks to select the LAT teams.

Please amend the bill as recommended in the opening language above.

Elections will be better, and more trustworthy.

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder CO, 80305
303-494-1540
mailto:AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/

Cc: 'geoff.johnson@state.co.us'; 'linda.newell.senate@gmail.com'

Polling place voting is more secure and more accurate than mail ballots..

2010-03-21T06:43:00.000-07:00

March 19, 2010

TO: Boulder County Commissioners: Ben Pearlman (Chair), Will Toor, Cindy Domenico
CC: Boulder County Clerk and Recorder: Hillary Hall

RE: Arguments for conducting the 2010 Primary Election as a Polling Place Election.

Dear Commissioners:

Before addressing the voting method, we beg you to take necessary action to remove the unique ballot bar-code/serial-number from our ballots. The unique identification of ballots denies voters the right to cast an anonymous ballot. Identified ballots can be linked back to the voter, despite official admonitions to “trust the government”. Please forbid this violation of voter’s rights.

At the time of the writing of this appeal, the public has seen no real numbers to support the official claims that eliminating in-person voting will cost less and increase turnout. How much less cost, and how many more voters? Where are the historical and forecast numbers to support these assertions? And, what is the threat assessment for each of the voting methods? Please ensure that the facts are available for verification before making a decision based on emotion and hearsay.

It is important to keep in mind that elections can be won by one vote. One single case of undetected fraud or error can change the outcome.

We submit the following to encourage Boulder County to conduct the 2010 Primary Election as a polling place election.

In a polling place election, voters can choose to vote in person or by mail ballot.
A polling place election will honor the wishes of electors who have signed up to vote as permanent mail-in elector.
A polling place election is more secure.
A polling place election is more accurate.
There will be less opportunity for mischief in a polling place election.

Despite intensive promotion by Colorado election officials, fewer than 50 percent of Boulder County’s 219,600 eligible electors are scheduled to receive a permanent mail ballot. The remaining 50 percent are free to choose whether to vote in person or by mail. Forcing these electors to vote by mail-in ballot would deprive them of this freedom of choice.

Electors who want the freedom to choose to vote at a polling place do so for a variety of reasons:

1. Objections to overreaching by government.

Some electors object to being forced to vote using a mail-ballot system that they believe is insecure and inaccurate.

2. Some voters want to know the facts before they vote.

Late breaking news, available on Election Day, can affect a voter’s choices. Mail-in ballots must be posted days in advance of Election Day.

3. Campaigns are less costly.

Shorter campaigns can be less expensive, and candidates have a less difficult time programming their campaign activities. Mail-in ballot voting might start a soon as 20 days before Election Day. A lot can happen in 20 days. Instead of scheduling election activities around one day, Election Day, broadcast advertising and literature mailings for mail ballot elections must be repeated in order to reach voters near the time that the voter is preparing to mark their ballot. These costs are incurred by each of the campaigns.

4. Polling place voting is more secure.

a. There is much tighter control over the physical ballots since the ballots never leave the control of the election judges.
b. It is more likely that the person who marks the ballot is the eligible elector. Electors must show their face at the polls.
c. There is much tighter control over electioneering.

5. Mail-in voting is less secure.

a. Ineligible ballots can be voted and the votes counted.
b. Mail ballots are sent to electors that are not eligible because they no longer live in the County.
c. Incorrect mail ballots are issued to people who are ineligible to vote the ballot style because they have changed jurisdictions within the county.
d. The Postal Service does not guarantee delivery of ballots to the intended elector.
e. Ballots are delivered to addresses where the elector is no longer eligible.
f. Ballots are delivered to an address, but the elector never receives the ballot.
g. People can vote by mail in Boulder County and vote again in another out of state location.

6. Non-professional signature verification is not proof that the eligible elector freely marked and cast a mail ballot.

a. Identity theft can be used to forge signatures on ballots that are harvested in dumpsters and Post Office trash barrels.
b. Family members, roommates, and office mates can successfully forge an elector’s signature.
c. With modern technology, it is relatively easy to scan a stolen signature and adjust its size and density for printing onto a ballot return envelope.
d. Temporary election workers are not certified to accurately detect false signatures.

7. Polling place voters have less possibility of suffering voter intimidation.

a. When a private voting booth is available to a voter, the voter cannot be pressured by others, including friends and family. The voter can say that they voted X when they actually voted Y.
b. Votes on mail ballots can easily be traded, and/or sold.
c. Electioneering can take place in the elector’s home, as the elector is encouraged to mark their ballot in front of somebody electioneering.

8. Claims of increased voter turnout in mail ballot elections are not substantiated.

a. High voter turnout results from competitive contests and the elector’s belief that their vote can affect the results. High turnout does not result from forcing everybody to vote using mail ballots.
b. Even year elections have higher turnout than odd, and general election have higher turnout than primary elections. Given two supposedly equal mail ballot elections, the turnout in one varies from another.
c. In past Boulder County Primary elections, where voting by mail ballot was available to all electors, turnout has varied:

· DEM 13,230 REP 10,267 1998 Governor’s Primary (both contested)
· DEM 7,742 REP 6,561 2002 Governor’s Primary (both uncontested)
· DEM 12,963 REP 6,537 2006 Governor’s Primary (both uncontested)

d. It is common for the same voter to have a different turnout on the same ballot in the same election. They vote for some contests but not others.
e. Even when a permanent mail in elector is sent a ballot, a large percentage of these ballots are not accepted for counting.
f. And among those mail ballots accepted for counting, there is no hard evidence that the ballots were voted by eligible electors voting without intimidation and/or vote trading.

9. Inappropriate electioneering of Permanent mail-in voter option.

a. Using public funds to engineer an overturn of the 2002 Amendment 28 vote of the people, election officials have misinformed electors. Electors, therefore, do not have the facts needed to make an informed choice when deciding whether or not to elect permanent mail ballot status.

· With no explanation of risk, driver license officials encourage new registrants to sign us as a permanent mail-in voter.
· Election offices persuade electors to sign up for permanent mail-in ballots.
· Government sponsored literature stresses (potential) benefits, and fails to disclose the uncertainties and problems associated with mail ballot elections.
· Rosy claims about fabulously low costs and deliriously high turnout are not supported with detailed cost and turnout data.

10. Attempt to overturn 2002 election results.

a. Special interests, despite the fact that Amendment 28 was defeated in 63 out of 64 Colorado counties, did not give up when they lost the 2002 statewide contest to eliminate polling place elections. (60 percent of Boulder County voters voted NO to this scheme.) Since then:

· Officials worked against the public to create the permanent mail-in option.
· They have expended public money to persuade electors to sign up for permanent mail-in status.
· They have worked to permit forced mail-in voting for partisan Primary elections.

b. And who are these special interests? Some are unknown, but one is the Colorado County Clerks Association. CCCA is a secret association that influences its members to eliminate polling place elections. The association refuses to permit representatives of the public to observe their meetings, and refuses to permit representatives of the public to present facts that contradict their dogma.

11. Election cost detail is not available.

a. The public is unable to analyze the differences between mandatory mail-in ballot and polling place elections, because the detail needed for such an analysis is not available to the public. A questioning public might discover opportunities to cut costs.
b. Mail ballot packets cost more to print, package, and mail than polling place ballots -- a great deal more.
c. Many permanent mail ballots are returned as Undeliverable. This demonstrates that the voter list is not accurate, it releases live ballots into the wild, and it costs the County a great deal to print, package, and mail these ballots. Postage costs extra for returning the undeliverable ballot packets to the county.
d. Boulder County residents benefit when money spent on elections is kept in Boulder County. It appears that a polling place election will keep more money at home than would a mail ballot election.
e. If we understand correctly, there is no publicly verified estimate of the cost for running the Primary as a polling place election or a mail ballot only election.

· Whatever the difference, it is not sufficient to deprive voters of the right to vote in person if they choose to do so.
· It is not sufficient to accept the additional threats to integrity which come with a mail ballot election.

f. Is Boulder County prepared to sacrifice the integrity of its election for money?
g. We hope that the commissioners will require cost data with sufficient detail to determine if all of the related costs are included. For example, fees to HART, postage in and out and undeliverable ballot packet returns, how many early voting locations for each voting method, etc.

12. Election integrity is threatened with mail-in ballots.

a. Mail ballots are issued, accepted/rejected, opened and processed up to 22 days before Election Day, and votes may be counted up to 15 days before Election Day. This makes possible the leakage of voting information to “friendly” campaigns, opening the possibility of unfair elections. For example, a visual assessment by an “insider” of the number of votes cast for each contestant in a key contest is valuable information. This data could be used by campaigns to tune their last minute spending and activities, and thereby unfairly influence the outcome of the election.

13. Polling place elections build and nurture community.

a. Some electors believe that elections have a secondary benefit – they build and nurture community. People directly participate in the election processes as workers, poll watchers, and election judges.
b. More community involvement has the secondary benefit of increasing public confidence that the election results are fair and accurate.
c. Whereas, mail ballot elections are sterile, and most of the activity occurs in the back room.

14. Polling place elections have independent oversight.

a. Most of the election workers in a mail-in only election are staff and temporary employees of the Clerk. In polling place elections, most election workers are election judges who are not employees of the Clerk. We need the transparency of independent oversight.

Boulder County is fortunate to have a well-intentioned County Clerk. Pressure on her to minimize cost is high, as it should be. However, as outlined above, it is vital that election cost is not awarded a higher priority than election integrity and voter confidence. The first job for government is to protect the integrity of the ballot box. The second job is to do so as efficiently as practical.

We encourage Boulder County to conduct the 2010 Primary Election as a standard polling place election. Let those who wish to vote by mail ballot do so. Let those who wish to vote in person, and cast a ballot that is not enclosed in an envelope that is coded with the voter’s name and address, do so.

And please keep in mind that each and every single vote counts.

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder CO, 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/

Public radio reports on Aspen election satire

2009-12-25T11:24:00.002-07:00

Local Public Radio Station KAJX reports on the Better Bad News Video satire on the Aspen Elections.

Click on the link to see the 5 minute video made by artists in Berkeley who found humor in some of the bizarre events in Aspen's May election, and hear KAJX interview with George Coates, the creator of the video, and election integrity advocate Harvie Branscomb. Mayor Ireland, who found no humor in the piece, is also interviewed.

Please Help Protect Election Transparency and Integrity

2009-12-09T16:40:00.005-07:00

A very important lawsuit will soon decide whether or not elected officials and bureaucrats can block the Public from accessing the Public Records needed to independently verify that votes in Public elections are correctly interpreted and counted. A hearing is set for late January 2010.

This is a Public Records lawsuit regarding election records that already exist. The government has denied Public Access to the computer files containing scanned ballot images from Aspen's May 2009 election. Scanned ballot image files have been released to the Public in other states, e.g. Minnesota and California.

This is a court battle between the government (which has a vested interest in hiding election data) and the Public (who has a vested interest in verifying that votes are correctly interpreted and counted). Read Bev Harris’s message, for details about this lawsuit.

If the Court mistakenly decides in favor of the government, there is little hope that future elections will allow the Public controls necessary to oversee Public elections.

An important message from Bev Harris, of Black Box Voting, includes an urgent fundraising request for this Aspen Open Records Litigation. Click to read this message.

Aspen officials are using the apparently bottomless pit of Public funds to block release of these Public Records. Their unnecessarily long and complex motions have forced the Aspen Project to spend $35,000.00 so far.

Please do two things: (1) donate what you can by check or online, and (2) invest some of your valuable time by soliciting funds from people and groups that are working on Voting Rights, including Transparency and Election Integrity. This case must be won.

Black Box Voting has established a tax-deductable (to the extent allowable by law) restricted fund for the Aspen Project. Checks should be made out to “Black Box Voting”, and indicate that the money is “for the Aspen Project” in the memo or comment.

Send your donation online at Donation to Black Box Voting. Make a note in the COMMENT section of the online form, “for the Aspen Project”.

Send your donation by mail. The Payee should be "Black Box Voting", and make a note in the MEMO section of the check, “for the Aspen Project”

Black Box Voting, Inc.
330 SW 43rd St Suite K
PMB 547
Renton, WA
98057

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/
bev@blackboxvoting.org

Black Box Voting (.ORG) is a 501c(3) charitable organization. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law. The Black Box Voting 501c(3) IRS authorization letter is online at: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/IRSletter.pdf

Public Elections belong to the Public, not to the government. We must not tolerate any government that refuses to release Public Information to the Public.

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder CO, 80305
303-494-1540
mailto:AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/

Publish corruption testimony on EAC site.

2009-03-26T06:49:00.004-07:00

March 26, 2009

Ms. Gineen Beach, Chairwoman
Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Avenue NW, Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Chairwoman Beach:

The attached email was submitted as testimony for the March 17th public hearing on Voter Registration Databases. Will you please publish the email on the Meeting page on the Commission’s website? See: http://www.eac.gov/News/meetings/03-17-09-public-meeting-washington-d-c

There is some background here. I have requested, multiple times, to be included in the Commission’s announcements list, but have not received notices. When I discovered the March 17th meeting I immediately submitted the attached. It was sent at 4:58 PM MST, but failed to arrive by 5:00 PM EST. Consequently your staff has refused to include the letter in the record.

As you can see, the letter is brief, to the point, and contains disturbing facts that need to be addressed by the Commission.

I hope that the Commission will take this matter seriously, investigate the facts, and intercede in behalf of the people.

Sincerely,

Al Kolwicz
Trustee
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
303-494-1540

----------------------------------------------

From: Al Kolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Monday, March 16, 2009 4:58 PM
To: 'testimony@eac.gov'
Cc: Barbara Simons; Colorado Voter Group; Bernie Buescher - Colorado SOS
Subject: TESTIMONY for March 17th EAC meeting - Reviewing HAVA Mandated Guidance

Dear EAC Chair and Members:

Colorado’s voter registration database system and procedures are corrupt. Colorado uses SCORE II.

We have reported specific defects, with exact records illustrating the defects.

We have filed a HAVA Complaint, using the official procedures, with the Colorado Secretary of State and the Department of Justice. A portion of the complaint is posted on the Secretary of State’s website at: http://www.elections.colorado.gov/WWW/default/HAVA/Complaints/Kolwicz%20Final%20Determination%2001-12-09.pdf

Our request for a public hearing, provided for in the law, has been denied. DOJ/Voting Rights did not accept our plea for help.

Our evidence has been brushed off, and not given serious attention.

Without any question whatsoever, the SCORE system used in Colorado does not comply with HAVA. And, there is no way to hold those accountable to take responsibility and fix the problems.

What does the EAC think is supposed to happen?

Does EAC consider that it has a role in ensuring compliance with HAVA?

Will EAC help us?

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
http://www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com/

Online voter registration is not ready.

2009-03-25T07:01:00.003-07:00

It would be interesting to learn the factual basis for the Denver Post's support of online voter registration, see Online voter registration is a move to 21st century.

Has the Post investigated the HAVA complaint charging five violations of HAVA by the SCORE voter registration system? It would be interesting to learn the findings.
Has the Post learned of some new technology that enables election officials to know who is actually logged onto the computer that is using an identity to create or change a voter registration record? If not, what assurance is there that voter registration records are not being fabricated?
Has the Post studied the effectiveness of the Arizona and Washington online voter registration systems? If so, how many ineligible, fabricated, inaccurate, and out of date voter registration records exist in these databases?
Has the Post discussed the topic with Colorado's private sector technical experts? If so, it would be interesting to learn the technical arguments for and against online voter registration.

The HB 1160 scheme for online voter registration is predicated on hope rather than fact. There are no studies. There has been no public technical debate. Tough questions are simply ignored.

The purpose of voter registration is to create a secure and accurate record that can be used to (1) verify that a person is who they claim to be, and (2) verify that the person is eligible to vote in a particular election.

I have personal experience with the Secretary of State's self-supervision and I assure you that it is not working. The SOS is not motivated to disclose or even discover its problems. To explicitly exclude independent testing (and independent oversight) would be a disaster.

The enthusiasm for the so-called "digital signature" is misplaced. Just because somebody has possession of a set of credentials does not mean that the person using the credentials is the person to whom the credentials belong.

The enthusiasm for an "airtight system", ensured by state election officials, is also misplaced. the CIA, credit card companies, even the IRS have not successfully discovered such a system, What makes anybody think that Colorado can do so?

Let's stabilize Colorado's voter registration system and fix its known problems before adding disruptive and unscientifically proven online voter registration.

Statisticians and election systems

2009-03-10T13:34:00.000-07:00

One of Colorado Voter Group's objectives is to achieve transparent verification of each election.

To my knowledge, there has been no peer reviewed specification of the election system components. Nor is there, to my knowledge, any study of the means by which each component/process can be verified.

None of the Colorado election systems I am familiar with are transparent. None of the Colorado election system components/processes that I am familiar with are verifiable.

All of the statistical work that I have reviewed to date has insufficient scope to be conclusive. For example, there has been no attempt to determine whether or not eligible electors have been disallowed from voting or ineligible electors allowed to vote. Counting the wrong votes correctly does not mean that an election is fair or accurate.

Without an agreed to specification of the entire election system it is far too early for a professional statistician to seriously undertake to test and make conclusions regarding the fairness and accuracy of an election.

Furthermore, the statistical work that I have reviewed to date seems to give insufficient consideration to the variation in populations being sampled, and treats unlike populations as though they were statistically identical. This would be like testing for the color of fruit by sampling only bananas in a carton of apples and bananas.

I ask that we not relinquish our quest for transparent verification. We must not accept simplistic statistical methodology that does not accomplish the goal.

To be clear, there is a place for statistical methods in election system verification, but the statistical methods used must be comprehensive and correct or they serve to further mask real problems. We must not delegate our voice on this vital matter.

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group

What's different - more ...

2008-11-07T09:25:00.000-07:00

Yes -- the Longmont City special election in January used folded ballots. They could have been folded so as not to interfere with the boxes, but they were folded so that they did. I didn't hear of any issues concerning where the fold was, but I wasn't near the machines. Neal may know better.

Interestingly, the security sleeve for both the November 07 and January 08 elections would not fit back into the mailer once the ballot was completed and inserted. Voters could either tear the glued seam on the sleeve to make it fit (which is what was done in my household) or toss the security sleeve, which is what most voters did.Longmont elections officials (our clerk) and many voters that I've talked to complained about this in November. However the exact same problem was repeated in January of 08.Since I voted on the first day of early voting (my mail ballot never arrived), I have no idea what the security sleeve was sized for this time.

Perhaps the security sleeve was the source of the paper dust?

The best way to overcome the Ballot Now systems' issues with tiny particles is NOT TO USE IT. Every November this system has some kind of issue that causes terrible problems. Every year we here the same four words, "How could we know?"We can know because it does the same thing every time. Neal's tiny dot test proved that Ballot Now cannot discern a vote from an accidental pen swipe."How could we know?" makes me want a prescription for the same drugs the clerk's office is taking. Maybe I can forget the last 8 years.

Paul Tiger -- Longmont

Looking forward

2008-11-06T13:26:00.000-07:00

I generally concur with Al Kolwicz on his deeper analysis below. It is true that there is no adequate mechanism for information flow about voting systems, and to the extent that such a mechanism is in place it is too often scuttled by those in positions of power and influence. Their actions represented in the points below are taken at a real and tangible risk of loss of the accuracy of our elections. The problem of spurious marks is not unexpected by those of us watching closely, and has been encountered before. It is soluble by simple but time consuming human interception of any machine’s limited capability at vote interpretation.

In the future we must redesign our system (laws, rules, common practice, and equipment) with improved checks and remedies and perhaps more direct human involvement. But for now we must allow our existing checks in place to go forward, even if it takes days to interpret and count the marks on the paper ballots. We have always recognized that the benefit of having a countable record of voter intent depends on the ability and willingness to actually count it. While there are those who see benefits in simplicity and efficiency in losing the human countable record of voter intent, and there are also those who demand rapid results reporting, I see only loss of accuracy in those places.

Al says the spurious marks issue is not forgivable, but I see it only as foreseeable and some aspencts of it actually foreseen. This very real issue remains difficult to address under the currently popular presumption of the fallibility of the human counting of votes by many election officials. Naturally we should look for remedies involving an increase of human involvement in the vote interpretation process.

Harvie Branscomb

Answers to Audit questions

2008-11-06T13:23:00.001-07:00

On Thu, Nov 06, 2008 at 10:36:46AM -0700, Al Kolwicz wrote:
>
> Neal,
>
> Does the group's audit procedure provide the facts needed to answer"

A good audit according to the Principles from the auditing experts would give good answers to those questions.

> 1. How accurate is "mis-interpreted vote detection" by the machine audit procedure that "the group" has developed?

First, the procedure is not a "machine audit", but rather an audit of voter-verfied paper records and how various parts of the whole system interpreted them.

The benefits of audits include: http://electionaudits.org/whyaudit

* Revealing when recounts are necessary to verify election outcomes
* Finding error whether accidental or intentional
* Deterring fraud
* Providing for continuous improvement in the conduct of elections
* Promoting public confidence in elections

The details of even defining a mis-interpreted vote depend on state laws, so as always in the US, local conditions will be important.

> 2. Does the percentage of mis-interpreted votes, in one or more audited contests, extend to the non-audited contests?

If you don't audit a particular contest, your information will of course be limited and it would be hard to say. But of course you'd have a lot more information than if you don't do a good audit of at least some contests, and very few jurisdictions do good audits now.

> 3. How about the non-audited machines?

In a proper audit, all ballots would be eligible for selection, and thus all machines and other elements of the election tallying process would in some sense be "audited".

A proper audit will give good statistics about ballots that weren't chosen for hand-counting and the performance of associated machines for the contest in question. The level of confidence chosen is of course important here. And note that it is often best to focus most on detecting mistakes in tight races, which would mean that smaller levels of misinterpretation in races with a wide margin wouldn't be picked up.

> 4. Does "the group's" machine audit procedure have the ability to project the total number of misinterpreted votes?

Note we have "principles", not yet detailed, specific recommended procedures.

The procedures designed by Philip Stark do a great job of determining when problems found indicate need for an escallation by doing that sort of projection.

He has a nice page of good auditing references:

http://statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark/Vote/index.htm

> 5. How about the number of mis-interpreted votes that occurred in undervoted contests?

Sure - all categories of vote interpretation must be audited.

> Thanks for work that you are doing.

My pleasure! A good canvass with tracking of ballots is also of course critical to a good audit, so your work there is also important.

Neal McBurnett

Speed is not the issue

2008-11-06T13:18:00.002-07:00

Hi Harvie,
what is the stated capacity of the Hart scanner in ballots per min? Even the ES&S will do >200 ballots / min (with stops for ballots that go to resolution committee. So 12,000 per hour. now that is high speed. With the Hart system they might as well do hand counting...... that's your point!! ??
Joel

-------------------------------------

Joel
The Hart system is simply software which attaches to a variety of COTS (off the shelf) scanners (which is a good idea by the way).
The speed of scanning at full speed depends on the scanner. The Kodak scanners used by Eagle and I am sure the ones used by Boulder are plenty fast. This isn’t the issue. If anything they are too fast and don’t reliably handle forms which have been on people’s living room tables…
scan problems are of the following nature:

Part of ballot is folded under in the stack
Ballot upside down (supposedly can be handled, and hart prints ballots with a curved corner to avoid this, but more memory is required)
Ballot folds help drag the adjacent ballot into the scanner
Ripped ballot gets caught on the next ballot or on the scanner
Bar code on ballot is slightly damaged by a mark (this rejection seems to happen unnecessarily, considering that bar codes are very resilient)
Foreign material build up on various components in the scanner

The scanner we are using Kodak i610 I think is about 1/sec- plenty fast if the software didn’t screw up in between scanning the batches. (I mean the frequent need to reboot systems, struggle with user interface, etc.)

Also the Hart system allows all scanning to be done before resolving… the ballot images are all stored (inaccessibly as far as I can tell in a big database) so scanning can be done independently of either resolving or of uploading votes to memory cards. This allows a lot of flexibility in use of the equipment.

I think the point is that voting system software can actually aid in hand counting ballots accurately! If you have a scanned image of a ballot you can show a particular contest magnified from one ballot to the next (Hart does this well) and flip through the ballots at 10/second If you want looking for an anomaly. This is an excellent service to those who would check ballots for voter intent. For example, the voting system could assemble all the ballots in which it interpreted the vote to be for McCain and the human operator could actually sequentially visit all those portions of the ballots very quickly to look for anomalies. Such a voting system does not exist today. The system could (Hart doesn’t really do this very well) keep a record of the human interpretation and in principle could then machine mark the vote interpretations in a harmless location on the ballot image or conceivably even on the paper ballot itself (in a different design of system) for later auditing.

I would say that it makes sense that the ballots are being examined one by one, as I think they are in Boulder, on the screen. It is true that very light marks, almost invisible to the naked eye are presented in full black on the image, and so certain stray marks and dust are emphasized on the electronic version of the visible image of the ballot. Certainly with a Hart like system you could do very good machine assisted hand counting (machine suggested human confirmed interpretation and machine tabulation) in the same amount of time that Boulder is spending with the ballots and get probably even better accuracy. With an improved design machine, you could do it much faster, and also do it in precincts.

If the press would stop bad mouthing the speed of producing results from Boulder, we would have a better chance to make a more sensible system in the future.

What happened in Florida with the Republicans and the press bad mouthing the punch cards is an example of what we do NOT want to do again.

All of the above discussion relates for the long term only to mail-in ballots or what happens if we go to all an all mail-in election.

At precinct polls we could hand count (or machine assist hand count) our ballots much sooner because of the larger number of people involved.

Harvie Branscomb

Hold these officials accountable

2008-11-06T13:13:00.001-07:00

Harvie,

I have a different take on your question, “Why hasn’t Boulder County Clerk Hillary Hall heard about dust problems on her Hart Scanners? I would suggest that the reason is that there is no mechanism for this kind of problem sharing to take place.“

The problem of spurious marks was detected by the State’s Voting System Certification Team. A CONDITION OF USE was set up that would require special manual pre-scanning treatment of all HART paper ballots. At a hearing, we attempted to protect this condition. However, the powerful, secret, Colorado County Clerks Association lobbied, using incomplete and erroneous arguments, to protect the vendor and themselves from this condition of use. They persuaded the SOS to remove the condition of use.
The architecture of all paper ballot vote counting systems certified in Colorado is fatally flawed. None of these systems provide exports of the ballot images and the interpretation of each vote on each individual ballot. Consequently, independent verification of vote interpretation is not possible – not even by the Canvass Boards.
The LAT is contrived and inadequate. The procedures and materials are idealized, and not at all representative of the real world. And, in the case of Boulder County, the Clerk contrived to exclude the people most knowledgeable of the HART system from serving on the LAT team. (Not to sound like sour grapes, I was not permitted to serve.)
Despite repeated requests that officials follow Colorado Statutes and Rules, the County and the State have neglected to perform “acceptance Tests” of the voting system. The system test would include ballot printers/vendors as well as every other component/subsystem.

From my perspective, the problem of spurious marks on HART optical scanners is not a surprise and is not forgivable.

Election officials should be held individually accountable for this problem.

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group

Objection to Daily Camera Editorial Staff

2008-11-06T13:11:00.001-07:00

TO: Erika (Stulzman) of the Daily Camera Editorial Staff
(copy of a letter to Erika written through the Daily Camera web site)

I would hope you get a chance to educate yourself on the election reform topic more before writing again about how bad it might be that Boulder is slow reporting vote counts. Speed of reporting is just about the lowest criterion for quality in the election, and there is much which should be prioritized over speed. I hope you come to realize how destructive the pressure for quick reporting can be. This is an enormously complex topic and some of us are basically devoting all of our free time to trying to understand it, and testify about it on behalf of the voting public at the Legislature. I have written about what is wrong with Colorado election law, as well has testified on numerous occasions. I do hope that you will contact members of the Boulder community of election quality activists such as Neal McBurnett 494-6493 (Green) or Al Kolwicz 494-1540 (Republican) or Mary Eberle 442-2164 (Unaffiliated) or Margit Johansson 442-1668 (Democratic). All of us have been working together to improve elections.

One of the greatest challenges is to spread a better understanding of the reality of voting through the media. I just don't understand why you wrote the following:

"But the county needs to get it together. If Jefferson and Denver counties can have their votes counted in a timely manner (and they did), why can't we? A serious dialogue about scrapping our system is step No. 1. Had this been a contested election with major problems, Boulder County's mysterious "dust" would be this year's hanging chads. That is unacceptable.
And a note to anyone wanting to challenge Hall for her clerk's position because of the slow election results: That's what she said."

I don’t disagree that a discussion about scrapping the system is in order. In fact a discussion about scrapping all the systems in Colorado is in order. The technical test board of the Secretary of State actually recommended not certifying any of the voting systems currently in use in Colorado (except hand counting). Only through the catch-22 of Colorado law and with the help of our 2008 Legislature could our Secretary of State (now Congressman to be) Mike Coffman personally decide that all voting systems were ok to use. There are better voting systems which could be certified and there are certainly better systems which could be designed if state laws would only accommodate these better ideas.

It could be that Jefferson and Denver counties are not as careful as Boulder County about election quality. Have you checked? Why not investigate the truth about "hanging chads"? These were foolishly presented as the worst thing that ever happened to an American election when in reality they were an indication of a reasonably well designed voting system valiantly recording evidence of voter intent when rank mismanagement of the voting system made it very difficult for voters to vote. Rank mismanagemnet on a totally electronic voting system leads to no record of voter intent whatsoever. Think about it. That is a very good reason to use paper ballots. Paper ballots allow voters in difficult situations (and eligible voters represent a spectacularly wide variety of human characteristics not the least of which includes old age) to express themselves. Machines do have difficulty interpreting some of these marks on paper ballots, although they are quite good at adding them up, once the marks have been understood.

I would be glad to send you more information about the defects of Colorado elections and election law, and would invite you to attend the Election Reform Committee hearings on Nov 12, although these should be taken with a grain of salt considering that the Commission consists of mostly election officials who are not the ones who most need a commission to improve the election... they have considerable power in their own hands. Perhaps you could widen the scope of your writing on this topic.

FYI Eagle County votes with a similar system to that of Boulder County. I am the Canvass Board member for the Democratic Party. I have first hand experience, through testing, of the various defects and benefits of that system, although I am now sure I have not seen all the defects yet.

Please send me your email address and I will reply with more information.

Harvie Branscomb
Eagle County Canvass Board
Colorado Voter Group

Eagle County has encountered a number of similar problems with HART

2008-11-06T13:05:00.002-07:00

Excerpt from article reproduced in full at bottom of email (referring to Boulder County vote counting delays)

To ensure accuracy, election workers are visually checking a picture of
each ballot on computers, searching for the troublesome dust line. Though
officials hope a couple of technological fixes will speed up the counting, the
rate of votes counted Wednesday hung around 1,200 ballots an hour.
“Accuracy
is more important than speed,” said Boulder County Clerk and Recorder Hillary
Hall. “People expect accuracy — this is the job I was elected to do.”

The molasses speed of the counting process is frustrating Hall, but
perhaps more confounding is that there doesn’t appear to be any obvious
explanation for why the paper-dust problem showed up now.

“I just don’t know,” she said. “If this is a common problem, I’ve
frankly never heard about it.”
The Laura Snider article is quite reasonable
in its coverage of the Boulder vote counting process.

Why hasn’t Boulder County Clerk Hillary Hall heard about dust problems on her Hart Scanners? I would suggest that the reason is that there is no mechanism for this kind of problem sharing to take place. The manufacturer has little motivation to encourage the sharing of election problems with their equipment… the CCCI (clerks association) doesn’t either, apparently, other than what happens through serendipity. The state has no mechanism for this and the election quality advocates among the public are largely shut out of the process so have difficulty learning about these problems, and also have problems having their criticisms heard once they do have information.

Eagle County has encountered a number of similar problems with Hart and Kodak systems, and has been very frustrated by the operation of this system during the past few days. Will the reports of this frustration reach other counties and other states? Probably not.

“The county needs to talk to their printer,” said Peter Lichtenheld, director of
marketing for Hart InterCivic. “Hart did not print the ballots ... and the
printer did not use Hart secure ballot stock.”

Unlike Boulder, Eagle County has its ballots manufactured by Hart. These ballots are also problematic but in a different way. They do not seem to be emitting dust particles, but they are showing evidence shadow imprinting of portions of the ballot onto other portions. In our case, fortunately, this is occurring only on the removable stub… but in past elections we have experienced transfer of ballot toner onto the active part of the ballot (on Diebold printed ballots in the past).

In addition, Hart created (I do not think these are actually, technically, “printed”) ballots are folded at the factory. These multiple folds are very difficult to straighten out and have caused immense difficulty in feeding the ballots into the scanners. On many batches there are one or more ballots which fail to scan and therefore have to be deleted from the digital records and rescanned in an adjacent batch. (Alternatively the batch must be sequentially rescanned until successful, but this proves to be too slow). In another area, the score at the top of each page which allows the stub to be removed is too weak and hence the stub is extremely difficult to remove, also delaying the scanning process and often leaving a rough edge at the top of the ballot.

Eagle County is stopping to dismantle parts from the scanners and vacuum the interior on a very frequent basis. During the tests it was found that the scanner needed extra white metal shields to be added to successfully scan 17” ballots. This information had not been provided in advance by Hart.

It was also discovered that inserting ballots bottom first caused an extra load on the ballot processing software, actually slowing the process and causing it to run out of memory, frequently. When it ran out of memory the program would not recover gracefully. This actually caused certain batches of ballots to consistently fail to scan. When all ballots were loaded head first, this problem was relieved (apparently for technical reasons related to the design of the software, but probably never encountered during State testing and in any case unknown to Hart system users). However it was then discovered that since the first fold was about ¾ of an inch from the top, the ballots were bent in a direction which, if inserted top up, would not allow the scanner roller to pick up the pages consistently. It was deemed necessary to load the ballots bottom up. None of this was advised by Hart, the voting system supplier, in advance and was all discovered in the initial scanning process of this particular ballot in this election.

Will reports of these problems reach Hart and other Hart county users? Will someone make a huge manual of gotchas which will benefit local election officials?

Doubtful.

The remaining references to attention to detail in this article are admirable.. I note that John Gideon’s 2005 report of the white line is probably not entirely what Boulder County is experiencing although it may be part of it. I suspect that there are a variety of single pixel or larger black marks on the ballots as well. It would be better if the press were able to get sufficient access to be able to report accurately on this topic.

Harvie Branscomb
Eagle County Canvass Board
(Eagle is a user of a similar system to that used in Boulder County)

How precise are audits?

2008-11-06T12:59:00.002-07:00

Does the Audit Elections group's audit procedure provide the facts needed to answer"

How accurate is "mis-interpreted vote detection" by the machine audit procedure that "the group" has developed?
Does the percentage of mis-interpreted votes, in one or more audited contests, extend to the non-audited contests?
How about the non-audited machines?
Does "the group's" machine audit procedure have the ability to project the total number of misinterpreted votes?
How about the number of mis-interpreted votes that occurred in undervoted contests?

Thanks for work that you are doing at https://launchpad.net/electionaudits

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group

How closely are other counties looking at their ballots?

2008-11-06T12:57:00.000-07:00

The best story I've seen so far on this is from Laura Snider at the Boulder Daily Camera. Or maybe I'm biased since she called me and put in a quote or two 8-)

http://www.dailycamera.com/news/2008/nov/05/boulder-countys-counting-crawls/

From the limited information I have, it seems to me that the magnitude of the problem is relatively small and might not be noticed by counties that don't look closely at their ballots via a good audit or the sort of screen images that the BallotNow system provides (despite its many flaws, that is an interesting aspect of the Hart system).

So how closely are other counties looking at their ballots, from systems known to have problems?

Snider writes:

Last winter, Secretary of State Mike Coffman de-certified all Hart scanning equipment because the scanners "failed to count votes accurately when there are extraneous marks on the ballot."
...
Coffman's testing board recommended that he institute regulations requiring county officials to review every ballot, looking for the stray marks. Instead, Coffman chose to re-certify the machines, which are used in 47 Colorado counties, without the extra regulations.

That creates the possibility that some counties using the Hart scanners may be having dust problems and not know it.

Improved audits were required by the conditions of use imposed by the Secretary of State. But who besides Boulder in Colorado is really doing good audits of mail-in ballots?

What is your county doing?
Neal McBurnett http://neal.mcburnett.org/

More on print through

2008-11-06T12:56:00.001-07:00

As concerns print through or transfer of one part of the ballot to another, either at the original manufacturing process or while being crushed in folded form in postal sorting machines, or stacked after receipt at the county... it is important to know that many ballot manufacturing processes are similar to laser printing... ie toner is used, and toner is subject to transfer from one place to another when heat is involved if not in other circumstances. Hart manufactured ballots seem to sometimes have toner transfer onto the removable stub on the back side, in this election.

It is not the case that ballots are necessarily printed with ink. However, it is useful to know if this is the case. I understand Boulder County Colorado ballots may have been manufactured or printed by some company other than Hart.

Harvie Branscomb

Ghost votes - print through

2008-11-06T12:54:00.000-07:00

I've worked as a resolution judge today. The problem is called ghost
votes by the other judges with whom I worked. Changes in threshold
setting on the mark detector software seem to be making a dramatic
improvement in ths processing. But, to my untrained eye, there is
something very strange going on. The details of the images of marks
that I see don't fit well with any explanation that has been suggested
to me. I feel sorry for the people working on this problem. The environment
in which they are gathering data is certainly not a scientifit/engineering
laboratory. There a lot of constraints on the experiments they can
perform, and there is a lot of pressure to perform very quickly. But
when you discover that there is a problem with the actual count you
have to announce to the press and try to deal with their questions.
I'm sure a lot of time is being wasted dealing with crazy theories
generated by the press and public.

Part of the problem that I did see was a kind of print through of text on
the ballot onto other parts of the ballot. This was attributed to a wrong
ink used by the printer. This wrong ink remelted in the Post Office sorting
machine when the mail passed between hot rollers. (I don't think the
rollers are deliberately heated. They just get hot during normal operation
of the sorter. But I'm not sure.)

I had no problem fitting my mail-in ballot into the return-mail envelope
for this election. The envelopes were correctly sized, IMHO.

Paul Condon

Do not use “auto-resolve damaged contest”

2008-11-06T12:53:00.000-07:00

The problem mentioned in the Gideon report is completely soluble or at least identifiable if “auto-resolve damaged contest” is not used.

In Eagle County we “auto-resolve undervotes” only. It seems that “auto resolve undervotes” is relatively harmless, if not completely so. The experience we have is that if any mark however light is found within the target the BNIP software detects either a vote or an overvote, and if there is any damage to the existing ballot target (occlusion of the target rectangle), manual resolution of a “damaged contest” is required. It is almost impossible for a foreign particle or something causing a white line to produce an undervote, unless “autoresolve damaged contest” is selected. One would have to imagine a particle of precise size and placement to occlude the entire voter mark without touching the surrounding rectangle. I would therefore recommend to operate with auto-resolve undervote selected (only). Having turned off auto-resolution of undervotes, the manual resolution of undervotes would be extremely time consuming and would not produce any differences due to human recognized voter intent. We have actually tried this in Eagle County in the early scanning of our mail-in ballots and have come to that conclusion.

On the other hand, if foreign particles, smudges or other spurious marks are causing extraneous marks on the scanned images of the ballots which are being recognized as votes, the solution would be a real hand eye scan of each contest which is actually resolved as a vote- i.e. in Hart, a contest which is not marked with a colored overlay at all- and this of course is generally the majority of all contests on all the ballot images. There is no way to select for slightly marked, or less than fully marked targets within the Hart system as far as I know. This is the function that would be required to help find the effect of spurious marks. Also of course, the “none of the above” option as a choice on the ballot would greatly help in finding spurious marks- without this the system is depending on the likelihood that an overvote will be generated to find that such a problem exists. If you know the problem already exists and is significant, then effectively, each contest must be hand counted… although it may be convenient to use the optically scanned version of the ballot to conduct this hand count and to use the hart resolution software interface to reflect and record the observed voter intent.

Having now experienced the resolution process first hand, I can say that there are some very interesting patterns of mis-voting which arise, and spurious marks certainly do create overvote situations. No doubt then, the same effects will cause voter undervoted contests to mistakenly become recognized as voted.

Harvie Branscomb
Eagle County Canvass Board

What's different?

2008-11-06T12:48:00.001-07:00

So why is Boulder County having problems three years later?

Margit

==============================

These [November 4, 2008] ballots were huge so were folded in quarters to mail. There were tons of mailed ballots this time.

Neal, do you know whether the Longmont City Council special election used folded ballots? The Daily Camera article mentions that the Longmont ballots were created by the same vendor as was used for yesterday's election.

Mary

All it takes is a can of pressurized air to fix the problem.

2008-11-06T12:44:00.001-07:00

Boulder Co is suffering from paper dust and dirt from the ballots. This is something that we reported in July 2005 from problems in Yakima Co WA.

http://www.votersunite.org/info/yakimaproblemreport.asp

All it takes is a can of pressurized air to fix the problem. --

John Gideon
Co-Executive Director
VotersUnite.Org

HART OpScan fails again

2008-11-06T12:27:00.002-07:00

Daily Camera
Explanation for ‘paper dust’ still elusive
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/2008/nov/05/boulder-countys-counting-crawls/

Daily Camera
Dust slows Boulder County’s ballot count
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/2008/nov/04/election-day-begins-early-voting-may-result-shorte/

Longmont Times-Call
Boulder County - ‘Phantom’ marks frustrate election workers [Hart eScan problems]
http://www.timescall.com/news_story.asp?ID=11914

7 NEWS Denver
Boulder County - Dust, Creases Slow Ballot Count In Boulder Workers Have To Inspect Ballots [Hart eScan]
http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/17895498/detail.html#-

VotersUnite.ORG
Hart InterCivic Optical-Scan Has A Weak Spot
http://www.votersunite.org/info/yakimaproblemreport.asp

Boulder County Clerk refuses some CORA requests, ignores others.

2008-07-18T06:51:00.005-07:00

On July 17, 2008, Boulder County Clerk Hillary Hall responded to a Colorado Open Records Act request dated July 1, 2008 and augmented July 8th. The following summarizes our July 8th request and transcribes the clerk's response to the request.

We will visit the Clerk's office to examine the materials.

REQUEST: We wish to review the Scanned Ballot Image Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

ACTION: Please reply to the above questions, and please reconsider the County’s July 7th response to our request for scanned ballot image files.

CLERK’s RESPONSE: The Scanned Ballot Image Files are not available for you to view. The BallotNow System does not store the images in a non-proprietary way. The Boulder County Clerk & Recorder's office complies with Colorado law. The Boulder County Clerk and Recorder's office is in compliance with Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7.

REQUEST: We wish to review the Ballot Now Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

ACTION: Please provide a list of all system objects so that we can use the proper identifiers. Please respond to the attached resubmission for BallotNow log files.

CLERK’S RESPONSE: Please schedule a time to visit our office to review these documents, 303-413-7766.

REQUEST: We wish to review the Cast Vote Record Files (Ballot Now and eSlate/JBC) created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

ACTION: Please respond to our original request for eSlate/JBC Cast Vote Record files, and BallotNow Cast vote Record files.

CLERK’S RESPONSE: Please schedule a time to visit our office to review these documents, 303-413-7766.

REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Results Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

ACTION: Please confirm that the NEW SCORE voter database was not integrated into the system for the LAT. Please confirm that the County has performed no Acceptance Test which would have integrated all of the components of the elections system.

CLERK’S RESPONSE: We provided you with available data on July 3.

REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

ACTION: Please respond to the attached resubmission request for TALLY log files.

CLERK’S RESPONSE: We provided you with the complete TALLY Log Files on July 3.

REQUEST: We wish to review the (1) the detailed procedures and instructions that were used to plan, manage, and conduct the test, (2) any observations regarding the test, and (3) any test reports from the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

ACTION: The HART Central Scanner has known quality problems, and was only conditionally certified. One of the conditions for use is related to pre-scanning inspection.

CLERK’S RESPONSE: Please schedule a time to visit our office to review these documents, 303-413-7766.
During our inspection at the printer, we discovered one ballot printed on one side. We purposely included this ballot in the testing to ensure the system could properly handle the ballot.

REQUEST: In all of the responses to our requests for “files”, paper was produced. We requested “files” – computer files.

ACTION: Please respond to our request for files with computer files.

CLERK’S RESPONSE: No response.

REQUEST: Staff required test developers to write the correct test “answer” on each ballot. This “open book” approach to testing eliminates the possibility that the voter’s intent can be ambiguous, and is therefore not a realistic test.

ACTION: Conceal the “answers” from those operating the system by recording them on the test plan (expected results) document rather than on the actual ballot.

CLERK’S RESPONSE: No response.

REQUEST: Election Rule 45.11 requires that a new or modified voting system must undergo acceptance testing before it may be used to cast or count votes in any election. Since the LAT did not include use of the NEW SCORE data, the LAT was reliant on the results of an earlier acceptance test.

ACTION: If acceptance tests of the entire voting system were performed, we wish to review the test plans and the test results. If the acceptance tests were not performed, we wish to know how Boulder County’s election system will be brought into compliance with Rule 45.11 before it is used to cast or count votes for the Primary Election.

CLERK’S RESPONSE: The CORA request regarding acceptance testing: the voting equipment did not change. We are in full compliance with Rule 45.11.

Open Records Request gets non-responsive reply.

2008-07-10T14:46:00.003-07:00

July 8, 2008
Ms. Hillary Hall
Boulder County Clerk & Recorder

RE: Colorado Open Records Act request dated July 1, 2008

Dear Ms. Hall:

At a meeting today with Elections Coordinator, Carlos Webb, materials produced in response to our Colorado Open Records Act request were reviewed.

The following summarizes: our request, the data provided by staff, and our assessment of the data.

REQUEST: We wish to review the Scanned Ballot Image Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

A non-responsive July 7th letter from Assistant County Attorney, Shelley Bailey, responded, “These records do not exist, therefore, we are unable to fulfill your request at this time.”

Even if it were true that the records did not exist on July 7th, did the records not exist on July 3rd at about 10:00 AM when a set of reports was produced in response to our Open Records request?

At what time, and under whose authority were these election records destroyed?

Are these election records not preserved in the BOSS database, or other database that is backed up as a permanent record of the Logic and Accuracy Test?

Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7 requires that all election data shall be exportable on-demand by authorized users. What is the explanation for the destruction of these particular election records?

ELECTION RULE
45.5.2.1.7 The voting system application shall provide authorized users with the capability to produce electronic files including election results in either ASCII (both comma-delimited and fixed-width) or webbased format that shall contain (a) all data or (b) any user selected data elements from the database. The software shall provide authorized users with the ability to generate these files on an “on-demand” basis. After creating such files, the authorized users shall, at their discretion, have the capability to copy the files to diskette, tape, or CD-ROM or to transmit the files to another information system.

If any, what other election records were destroyed?

ACTION: Please reply to the above questions, and please reconsider the County’s July 7th response to our request for scanned ballot image files.

REQUEST: We wish to review the Ballot Now Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

Due to a nomenclature problem, rather than the BallotNow Log files, staff produced, in response to our open records request, the following non-responsive reports, one set for each of the 8 BallotNow computer systems, dated July 3, 2008 approximately 10:00 AM:

· Election Report - Official
· Election MBBs – Official
· Resolve Status Report – Official
· Scan Batch Summary – Official
· Scanned Ballots by Batch – Official (multiple pages)

We discussed what we are looking for with Patty Stahl and she asked that we resubmit the request using the title “BallotNow System Audit Log”. We have attached this request.

We also asked if there is a copy of the specifications for the system or a detailed list of system objects that we can review, so that we can be better informed of the correct identifiers for system objects.

We remain concerned that the identifier “BallotNow System Audit Log” may not include all of the log data we seek. If it does not, by way of explanation, we want to review all log data. This would include system administration tasks, the state of and state-changes of application and system switches, the trusted build hash value (MD5 or SHA-1) of the firmware or software, the engineering level of the equipment, the details of vote interpretation for individual ballots, Cast Vote Record creation and revision, MBB creation and revision, etc. In other words, all logs.

ACTION: Please provide a list of all system objects so that we can use the proper identifiers. Please respond to the attached resubmission for BallotNow log files.

REQUEST: We wish to review the Cast Vote Record Files (Ballot Now and eSlate/JBC) created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

Due to a nomenclature problem, rather than the Cast Vote Record files (BallotNow and eSlate/JBC), staff produced, in response to our open records request, the following non-responsive reports”:

· JBC Connectivity
· Devices Backed Up
· 4 JBC Paper Tape Summaries

We agreed to produce for Carlos a sample of a printout of a Cast Vote Record, which is attached. The attached sample comes from an eSlate/JBC device.

ACTION: Please respond to our original request for eSlate/JBC Cast Vote Record files, and BallotNow Cast vote Record files.

REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Results Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

The partially responsive materials presented were:

· Unofficial County-wide Summary by Contest (9 pages)
· MBBs Read report (17 MBBs) (1 page)
· Precinct Turnout report (7 pages)
· Canvass Report (142 pages)

We identified what we consider to be several problems with the materials presented:

· The Canvass Report does not include precinct/contest OVER-UNDER votes.
· The reports show that the voter file data used for the LAT was not real voter data. The integration of the NEW SCORE voter data into the system was therefore not tested.

ACTION: Please confirm that the NEW SCORE voter database was not integrated into the system for the LAT. Please confirm that the County has performed no Acceptance Test which would have integrated all of the components of the elections system.

REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

There was a misunderstanding of our request. We will assume that the same nomenclature used for the BallotNow request, above, applies to the TALLY log files.

ACTION: Please respond to the attached resubmission request for TALLY log files.

REQUEST: We wish to review the (1) the detailed procedures and instructions that were used to plan, manage, and conduct the test, (2) any observations regarding the test, and (3) any test reports from the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

The partially responsive materials presented were:

Temporary Badge Log
Guidelines for Observers
LAT Procedure (3 pages)
LAT Agenda and Procedures (4 pages)
C.R.S. 1-7-509

We were informed that there are no written observations regarding the test, and no report about the test results, and no log of issues detected and/or resolved. This appears to be in violation of 1-7-509(2)(e).

C.R.S. 1-7-509(2)(e) The testing board or its representative shall sign a written statement indicating the devices tested, the results of the testing, the protective counter numbers of each device, if applicable, the number of the seal attached to each device upon completion of the testing, any problems reported to the designated election official as a result of the testing, and whether each device tested is satisfactory or unsatisfactory.

During discussion, Carlos told us that a ballot was missing printing on one side of the ballot. He did not produce a copy of that ballot for us to inspect.

We asked if this problem was detected by any pre-scanning inspection. Carlos told us that it was not. He further told us that there was no pre-scanning inspection.

In a separate meeting, Republican LAT representative, Amy Barnes Fry, reported to Neal and me that there was an additional printing problem. This problem was not disclosed in response to our open records request and not disclosed orally by Mr. Webb. This problem was a misprinting of the vote capture box such that the box itself was detected as a vote. This is a case of the “spurious mark” problem that has troubled the HART system.

Problems, such as the problems with the misprinted ballot, were hidden from our review. We believe that this should have been disclosed in response to our open records request.

ACTION: The HART Central Scanner has known quality problems, and was only conditionally certified. One of the conditions for use is related to pre-scanning inspection.

If it is correct that the LAT was performed without a pre-scanning inspection, the equipment was used in a non-certified manner. The Secretary of State must be immediately notified that the mitigation for the HART “spurious mark” problem did not work, and must be replaced by a procedure that does work.

We wish the County to report this non-compliance to the Secretary of State, and consider re-running the LAT using pre-scanning inspectors, emphasizing tests that will stress the ability of the inspectors to intercept spurious marks.

More …

In all of the responses to our requests for “files”, paper was produced. We requested “files” – computer files. It is nearly impossible to analyze a large election on paper.

ACTION: Please respond to our request for files with computer files.

Staff required test developers to write the correct test “answer” on each ballot. This “open book” approach to testing eliminates the possibility that the voter’s intent can be ambiguous, and is therefore not a realistic test. Testing ambiguous voter intent can be especially important to verifying that duplication board and resolution board activities are functioning properly.

ACTION: Conceal the “answers” from those operating the system by recording them on the test plan (expected results) document rather than on the actual ballot.

Election Rule 45.11 requires that a new or modified voting system must undergo acceptance testing before it may be used to cast or count votes in any election. Since the LAT did not include use of the NEW SCORE data, the LAT was reliant on the results of an earlier acceptance test. We expect that the acceptance test will verify all system functions, including but not limited to:

The accuracy and adequacy of all reports.
The voting system’s ability to perform the recount procedure.
The voting system’s ability to perform the post-election audit procedure.
The voting system’s ability to perform the Canvass procedure.

ELECTION RULE
45.11 Acceptance Testing by Jurisdictions

45.11.1 Whenever an
election jurisdiction acquires a new system or modification of an existing
system certified by the Secretary of State, the election jurisdiction shall
perform acceptance tests of the system before it may be used to cast or count
votes at any election. The voting system shall be operating correctly, pass all
tests as directed by the acquiring jurisdiction’s project manager or contract
negotiator, and shall be identical to the voting system certified by the
Secretary of State.

45.11.2 The voting system provider shall
provide all manuals and training necessary for the proper operation of the
system to the jurisdiction, or as indicated by their
contract.

45.11.3 The election jurisdiction shall perform a series
of functional and programming tests that shall test all functions of the voting
system at their discretion.

45.11.4 The jurisdiction shall
coordinate acceptance testing with the Secretary of State’s designated agent and
complete a Jurisdiction Acceptance Test form provided by the Secretary of State.

ACTION: If acceptance tests of the entire voting system were performed, we wish to review the test plans and the test results. If the acceptance tests were not performed, we wish to know how Boulder County’s election system will be brought into compliance with Rule 45.11 before it is used to cast or count votes for the Primary Election.

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group

Enclosed: Three open records requests.

Clerk acknowledges voter file problems

2008-07-08T05:51:00.002-07:00

-----Original Message-----
From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Monday, July 07, 2008 3:54 PM
To: Al Kolwicz [Colorado Voter Group]
Cc: Thomas, Scott [Chief Deputy Clerk]
Subject: Voter file

Al,

The export provided to the parties is more complete and gives the most comprehensive look at our voter registration database ever available in an export. We appreciate you looking it over and letting us know your concerns. If you have further questions please contact Scott Thomas.

Below are answers to your questions.

Hillary

Al Kolwicz: The Voter Registration file contains: Non-citizens.
Hillary Hall: While 36 people have been flagged as non-citizens, these voters were flagged incorrectly. This field is one of the issues that we have identified in SCORE. We are continuing to work with the Colorado Secretary of State's office to make improvements to such areas of the system. As you are aware anyone registering to vote is required to sign an oath, which includes an affirmation that they are a U.S. citizen. It is noted on all voter registration forms that it is a crime to swear or affirm falsely to this qualification. Therefore, anyone who has completed, signed, and returned a voter registration form to our office is to our knowledge a U.S. citizen. We also check all voters' certified identification as provided by the Help America Vote Act. It should also be noted that even if a voter is tagged by this field in SCORE, it does not disqualify the voter from receiving a ballot as this non-citizen field is a report only field.

Al Kolwicz: People registered in invalid precincts.
Hillary Hall: This is just another example of the issues we have identified while in the process of scrubbing the SCORE files. We have identified a total of 113 voters in invalid precincts. We have 39 voter registration files left to correct. Many of these people have provided addresses that are located in new developments not yet in the County's records. The 0 precinct is a place holder precinct.

Al Kolwicz: A suspiciously small number of 2008 Primary Election mail-in voters. We know of at least one voter who is not marked as a non-permanent mail in voter.
Hillary Hall: I am not sure what you mean by "marked as non-permanent mail in voter". As to the small number, it is reflected in SCORE that we have 66, 563 Boulder County registered voters signed up for permanent mail-in voting. A large portion of these are affiliated as either Democratic or Republican and will receive mail-in ballots for the 2008 Primary Election. Voters are encouraged to check their voter information on our website, www.VoteBoulder.org, to ensure they are registered to vote by mail if they have signed up for this service. If the person to whom you refer accidentally signed up for permanent mail-in status but wanted to vote by mail in this election only, he or she can correct this issue by contacting the Elections Division at 303-413-7740.

Al Kolwicz: There are no place-markers for CONFIDENTIAL voters, so it will be impossible to accurately verify election results for the Canvass.
Hillary Hall: Al, you are viewing a public export file in which Confidential voters are not included for their protection. A report that includes confidential voters will be available only to the Canvass Board.

Al Kolwicz: There is no DATE associated with the PERMANENT MAIL-IN FLAG.
Hillary Hall: True. However, our office can look up any voter who has requested to vote by mail and find the date record that the vote by mail request was made to our office.

Al Kolwicz: Key information is not included in the file. For example, there is no indicator for "1st time voter who registered by mail" This will limit the effectiveness of poll watchers.
Hillary Hall: True. You are correct that this data is not indicated; however, this information is not of consequence for poll watchers because all voters who vote at a polling location are required to show ID. In addition, this information has never been available to the public.

Al Kolwicz: There is no indicator showing that a voter's ballot was REJECTED and its VOTES NOT COUNTED.
Hillary Hall: This is true, however, there are other reports available that contain a ballot's status, whether it was rejected or if a vote was not counted. This information would be provided to the Canvass Board.

Al Kolwicz: You can easily see the poor quality of the terminology used in the fields. Inconsistent, redundant, and unintelligible.
Hillary Hall: I disagree with your assessment; employees in the Elections Division are clear on the field information.

Al Kolwicz: 1. It appears that there are no records for voters that voted in prior elections, but are no longer on the current registration file.
Hillary Hall: True. Cancelled or moved voters are not included in the report, as this information is no longer pertinent to our office. The voter history file only provides a snapshot of how current voters participated in past elections. The report cannot be used to reconstruct a past election. You would need to reference the Statement of Vote if you wished to understand an accurate statistical analysis of voter participation in a past election.

Al Kolwicz: 2. There are records in the Voter Registration file that are not present in the Vote History Details file.
Hillary Hall: True. Voters with no voting history will have no records in the history file.

Al Kolwicz: 3. There are records in the Vote History Details file that are not present in the Voter Registration file.
Hillary Hall: True. The history file contains placeholders for the confidential voters. The voter details file does not.

Al Kolwicz: Detail records do not indicate the precinct number of the voter when the vote was recorded.
Hillary Hall: True. But if an individual voter wants this information, we can research it and find it.

Al Kolwicz: Detail records contain invalid METHOD OF VOTING.
Hillary Hall: Not true. The Method of Voting field may be empty. There are 244 voter history records that have no data in Method of Voting. All but one of these is from elections prior to 2001. The exception is from the 2004 election.

SCORE Voter Files are incorrect and insufficient.

2008-07-01T11:51:00.003-07:00

From: Al Kolwicz
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 7:57 AM
To: Hillary Hall [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: Carlos Webb; Canvass Board Group; SOS Mike Coffman ; 'Richard Coolidge'
Subject: SCORE Voter Files are incorrect and insufficient.

Dear Ms. Hall,

We have completed a very preliminary analysis of the SCORE voter files dated June 23rd.

The Voter Registration file contains:

Non-citizens.
People registered in invalid precincts.
A suspiciously small number of 2008 Primary Election mail-in voters. We know of at least one voter who is not marked as a non-permanent mail in voter.

There are no place-markers for CONFIDENTIAL voters, so it will be impossible to accurately verify election results for the Canvass.

There is no DATE associated with the PERMANENT MAIL-IN FLAG.

Key information is not included in the file. For example, there is no indicator for “1st time voter who registered by mail” This will limit the effectiveness of poll watchers.

The Voter History files are:

Attached is a summary analysis of the Vote History data.

There is no indicator showing that a voter’s ballot was REJECTED and its VOTES NOT COUNTED.
You can easily see the poor quality of the terminology used in the fields. Inconsistent, redundant, and unintelligible.
The counts indicate that there are a massive number of missing records.

It appears that there are no records for voters that voted in prior elections, but are no longer on the current registration file.
There are records in the Voter Registration file that are not present in the Vote History Details file.
The are records in the Vote History Details file that are not present in the Voter Registration file.

Detail records do not indicate the precinct number of the voter when the vote was recorded.
Detail records contain invalid METHOD OF VOTING.

Obviously, this brief review of the files is incomplete. The fact that there are so many issues at this late date is very disturbing.

Will you please e-mail the entity relationship diagram and the field specifications? We want to see what data are available so that we can formulate a request for a more complete voter file.

Also, we have had a number of discussions with you regarding the frequency of update and the electronic delivery of this data to the political party organizations. We hope that you will implement our requests.

Al Kolwicz
Canvass Board Member
Boulder County Republican Party
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/CanvassBoard/
http://www.bouldercountygop.org/

Boulder County Clerk questioned on her mail-in ballot promotion

2008-06-21T07:18:00.004-07:00

From: Al Kolwicz [Colorado Voter Group Trustee]
Sent: Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:42 PM
To: Hillary Hall [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: 'Colorado Voter Group'; Canvass Board Group; John Fryar ; Matt Sebastian ; Richard Valenty; Bob Greenlee
Subject: Unsolicited promotional mailing

Dear Ms. Hall,

We have conducted some research on your recent “Why wait in line… vote at home!” promotional mailing. We have several questions regarding the mailing:

What section of the law authorizes the clerk to use public money to promote one method of voting over all others? (We use the word promote because the packet is unquestionably a promotional push marketing package. We cannot find such a promotional mailing in the law.)
Before the package was mailed, was the package discussed with the political parties? The Secretary of State? The public?
What funding was used to finance this unsolicited and unnecessary mailing?
Approximately what was the total cost of the promotion, including design of the package and processing of responses?
To whom was this mailing sent? (We have reports from households where some electors did and some did not receive the mailing.)
How is it being verified that it is the eligible elector who submitted the request for mail-in voting? Have signatures been verified?
Since the return-form enclosed in the promotional mailing is not the county’s official mail-in application form and is not in the form of a letter from the elector, by what authority has the clerk accepted this form as a valid application?
The form included with the mailing has several significant flaws which very likely will have deceived some electors into signing up for permanent mail-in status. For example, there is no way that the elector can use the form for a one time mail-in ballot application. Also, the form does not provide the elector with the option to remove their name from the list. Also, the form does not notify the elector that they may ignore the request without risk of losing their right to vote using other voting methods including one-time mail-in voting.
Would a privately designed return-form/promotion indicating an elector’s preference for in-person voting be accepted as a valid transaction by the clerk?
By what authority does this mailing qualify as “Official Election Mail”?
The return envelope indicates “Official Ballot Enclosed”, yet there is no such ballot.
The package does not alert the elector to any of the problems of vote by mail, including direct and indirect disenfranchisement.

We look forward to your response.

Regards,

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group

========================

From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2008 11:57 PM
To: Al Kolwicz [Colorado Voter Group Trustee]
Subject: RE: Unsolicited promotional mailing

1. What section of the law authorizes the clerk to use public money to promote one method of voting over all others? (We use the word promote because the packet is unquestionably a promotional push marketing package. We cannot find such a promotional mailing in the law.)

My job as County Clerk and Recorder is to make voters aware of all the ways they may participate in an election. I know you are opposed to mail ballot elections and voting by mail, however it is a legal way to participate in the election and many prefer to do so. State legislature passed a law last year allowing voters to sign up as permanent mail-ballot voter if they so choose. County Clerks have the statutory authority to perform voter education and outreach, as well as to manage elections in the manner that puts taxpayers' dollars to the most effective use while still meeting strong requirements for security, accuracy and anonymity. Boulder County's recent mailing notified voters about this new option and is in no way prohibited by the law. The postage per envelope did not exceed standard non-profit pricing for a single letter.

In addition, as Boulder County Clerk & Recorder, I'm dedicated to upholding the democratic right to vote for all County residents and ensuring fair, accessible, accurate elections. This includes offering secure options that will enable the greatest number of eligible voters to cast their votes. We will continue to provide polling place elections in Boulder County as well as the options to vote early, and vote by mail. Voting by mail is an option for voters; not a single voter will be forced to sign up to vote by mail. Following is the statute passed by our legislature:

1-8-104.5. Application for permanent mail-in voter status. (1) Any eligible elector may apply for permanent mail-in voter status. The application for permanent mail-in voter status shall be made in writing or by facsimile using an application form furnished by the designated election official or in the form of a letter. The application shall contain the same information submitted in connection with an application for a mail-in ballot pursuant to section 1-8-104. (2) Upon receipt of an application for permanent mail-in voter status, the designated election official shall process the application in the same manner as an application for a mail-in ballot. If it is determined that the applicant is an eligible elector, the designated election official shall place the eligible elector's name upon the list maintained pursuant to section 1-8-108 of those eligible electors to whom a mail-in ballot is mailed each time there is a coordinated election.

2. Before the package was mailed, was the package discussed with the political parties? The Secretary of State? The public?

As part of my obligation to Boulder County registered voters, it is my duty to notify voters of their voting options. This mailing did exactly that: inform voters that they now have the option to vote by mail permanently. The contents of this mailing contained no reference to or bias towards any political party or candidate, and were in complete accordance with Colorado Revised Statues. Therefore, there was no reason to request approval with the Secretary of State's office or the political parties. I value and revere our country's democracy, in which the public has the power to express their wishes by electing representatives to make governmental choices on their behalf. By virtue of being an elected - rather than appointed - position, the Clerk and Recorder's office that I fill comes with the inherent understanding that the public has expressed their trust that I, as their representative, will make discretionary choices that represent their best interests; if the public feels that those choices are out of line with their desires, they are welcome to contact me or, ultimately, to voice their opinion through the power of the vote next term. Judging by the response to the mail ballot program in which more than 50,000 voters have signed up, the mail-ballot program and associated outreach do, indeed, have the tacit support of a very significant portion of the public.

3. What funding was used to finance this unsolicited and unnecessary mailing?

As the Boulder County Clerk & Recorder, I have a financial responsibility to make our elections as economical as possible while providing our voters with the voting methods they prefer to use. I am responsible for managing the elections' budget. The financing of this mailing was part of this budget. Furthermore, the return on investment of the mailing is significant in terms of total savings of public dollars. Providing the option to vote by mail saves valuable tax dollars. Delivering a mail ballot costs half as much as delivering a ballot to a polling location. In fact, the 2007 Coordinated Election, conducted entirely by mail-in ballots cost $X less than the 2006 General Election. In addition, the majority of voters did not object to voting by mail in the 2007 Coordinated Election.

This mailing was not unnecessary. While we will continue to provide polling place elections in Boulder County, it is also my responsibility to make voting by mail accessible to the registered voters in Boulder County who prefer this method and to notify them of their right to vote by mail.

4. Approximately what was the total cost of the promotion, including design of the package and processing of responses?

The total cost was $21,000.

5. To whom was this mailing sent? (We have reports from households where some electors did and some did not receive the mailing.)

This mailing was sent to all registered voters that voted in the 2004 and 2006 election and are registered at the same address during this time period. Mobile voters do not make a good demographic for permanent mail as we need to make sure that the ballot is delivered to the correct address.

6. How is it being verified that it is the eligible elector who submitted the request for mail-in voting? Have signatures been verified?

As long as the elector is a registered voter, there is no law that requires verification of a mail-in ballot application. However, we will verify the signature of the voter upon the return of their voted mail-in ballot.

7. Since the return-form enclosed in the promotional mailing is not the county's official mail-in application form and is not in the form of a letter from the elector, by what authority has the clerk accepted this form as a valid application?

According to Colorado Revised Statute 1-8-104.5. Application for permanent mail-in voter status. (1) Any eligible elector may apply for permanent mail-in voter status. The application for permanent mail-in voter status shall be made in writing or by facsimile using an application form furnished by the designated election official or in the form of a letter. The application shall contain the same information submitted in connection with an application for a mail-in ballot pursuant to section 1-8-104. (2) Upon receipt of an application for permanent mail-in voter status, the designated election official shall process the application in the same manner as an application for a mail-in ballot. If it is determined that the applicant is an eligible elector, the designated election official shall place the eligible elector's name upon the list maintained pursuant to section 1-8-108 of those eligible electors to whom a mail-in ballot is mailed each time there is a coordinated election.

8. The form included with the mailing has several significant flaws which very likely will have deceived some electors into signing up for permanent mail-in status. For example, there is no way that the elector can use the form for a one-time mail-in ballot application. Also, the form does not provide the elector with the option to remove their name from the list. Also, the form does not notify the elector that they may ignore the request without risk of losing their right to vote using other voting methods including one-time mail-in voting.

The purpose of this mailing was to inform voters of their right to sign up to vote by mail permanently. It is clearly stated on the application form, that in order "to receive the permanent ballot form, you are required to check the box below." We did not send this form to electors who were already signed up to vote by mail. Therefore, there was no reason to provide the option to remove their name from the list. Any elector who wishes to remove their name from the vote by mail list can do so at any time. The form does not indicate in any way that a voter would lose their right to vote if they disregarded the form. While voters continue to sign up to vote by mail every day from this mailing, there are voters who have simply disregarded the mailing, knowing there is no risk to their registration status. Finally, this is part of a greater outreach and education campaign in which we have clearly stated voters' various options, including polling place voting, signing up as a one-time mail ballot recipient or signing up to be a permanent mail-ballot voter, not to mention signing up to be a Boulder County election judge. You can visit, www.VoteBoulder.org <http://www.VoteBoulder.org> for examples of this language.

9. Would a privately designed return-form/promotion indicating an elector's preference for in-person voting be accepted as a valid transaction by the clerk?

Current statue does not address this. If an election is conducted by all mail, then the voter would receive a ballot in the mail.

10. By what authority does this mailing qualify as "Official Election Mail"?

Mail sent from the Boulder County Clerk & Recorder's Elections Division qualifies as official election mail. The statement "Official Election Mail" simply notifies voters that it is mail regarding elections.

11. The return envelope indicates "Official Ballot Enclosed", yet there is no such ballot.

The language that you are referencing is on a graphic on the upper left hand corner of the return envelope. The graphic falls under the language 'Why Wait in Line, Vote at Home'. In its context, this graphic where the language appears on a small picture of an envelope is a representation of voting from home on Election Day; it is not meant to indicate the return envelope is a ballot.

12. The package does not alert the elector to any of the problems of vote by mail, including direct and indirect disenfranchisement.

Voting by mail does not disenfranchise voters in any way. Colorado law provides for voters to vote by mail. Furthermore, voting by mail is absolutely safe. Voters' signatures are concealed on the return envelope and their signatures must be verified with the signature in our online database. Additionally, all voters take an oath when they register to vote. It is a federal offense to tamper with another voter's ballot or mail.

==================

More about forbidden secret ballots

2008-06-19T10:49:00.004-07:00

-- 1 of 2 --
From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 9:05 AM
To: Al Kolwicz [Trustee Colorado Voter Group]
Cc: 'Colorado Voter Group'; CFVI; Paper TigersSubject:
RE: Anonymous ballots

Al and everyone,

So here is the longer answer that I was unable to write to you the first time. We may be able to run the primary with out bar codes, not sure and haven't had time to test. We can not run the general with out the bar codes as it will be a two page ballot and ballots must be in page order. I will not be changing processes from the primary to the general. Do I want to find a way to get the bar codes off the ballot and make sure we have a reliable election yes, will the bar codes be removed this year no. I did not pick this system and I must make the best of it that I can. The long term solution is to either work with the vendor to change the system or look at a new system. All of these are issues for the 2009 year. When we have time to experiment and properly test any changes in process that may give us all the outcomes we want. We are not only heading into the largest election ever, we are also going to be using a new voter registration system. My first priority is to insure that the election both primary and general run smoothly. Changing processes between elections with no time to test out the new methods if it they are even viable is not the best way to ensure for a successful election.

Hillary

=============================
-- 2 of 2 --
From: Al Kolwicz [Trustee Colorado Voter Group]
Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 9:31 AM
To: 'Hall, Hillary' [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: 'Colorado Voter Group'; CFVI; Paper Tigers;'Bev Harris'
Subject: RE: Anonymous ballots

Ms. Hall,

The Secretary of State’s certification process did not report that the HART system is unable to comply with Colorado law regarding anonymous ballots.

To our knowledge, there is no documented exception or condition describing such a defect.

When we directly asked HART about this, on the record and in front of the Secretary of State’s personnel, HART made no exceptions when they testified that the system works without unique serial numbers. In fact, HART indicated that this is the way that the system is usually used.

We must assume that you have been misinformed, or we have been misinformed.

If it is true that the HART system cannot comply with Colorado’s laws regarding secret ballots, the system was improperly certified and must be immediately removed from the certified equipment list.

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group

Colorado Clerk forbids voting by secret ballot

2008-06-18T16:30:00.003-07:00

From: Al Kolwicz [Trustee, Colorado Voter Group]
Sent: Tuesday, April 29, 2008 11:54 AM
To: Hillary Hall [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Subject: Anonymous ballots

Hi Hillary,

Yesterday, at the Public Demonstration, HART demonstrated how to set up ballots with no unique identifiers (not digits or bar code). They set the bar code value to a constant of “0”.

Also, they demonstrated how to set up the ballot with a removable ballot stub. The stub can contain a serial number. They indicated that this is a very commonly used form of ballot. HART produces these ballots.

We recommend that Boulder County use ballots with serial numbers recorded on removable stubs. This will comply with the Colorado Constitution, Article VII section 8, and will provide the audit trail needed for ballot integrity.

Can we count on Boulder County to use ballots with serial numbers recorded on removable stubs for the 2008 elections?

Thanks

Al

---------------------------------------------------------

From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Wednesday, June 11, 2008 8:00 AM
To: Al Kolwicz [Trustee, Colorado Voter Group]
Subject: RE: Anonymous ballots

Al,

After reviewing the system and how it functions. We will be using the system as it has been designed. While it MAY be able to use the system without bar codes for the primary, we must use the bar codes for the general. Therefore, we will be using the system as it has been designed.

The long term solution to this problem is to purchase a new system. At this point in time, there is neither a system that I could recommend switching to nor the funds to do so.

Hillary

---------------------------------------------------------

From: Al Kolwicz [Trustee, Colorado Voter Group]
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 12:35 PM
To: 'Hall, Hillary' [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: Colorado Voter Group; CFVI, Paper Tigers
Subject: RE: Anonymous ballots

Ms. Hall,

Your reply is a great disappointment. Based on your pre-election statements, we were counting on you to eliminate Boulder County’s use of non-secret ballots.

We have been told, on the record by HART officials, that the HART system is designed to use paper ballots with removable stubs so that the serial numbers [can be removed before the ballot is cast, and] so that the voter cannot identify their own ballot once it has been cast. After all, if this were not the case it would violate Colorado’s Constitution and the system could not have been certified, could it?

Please reconsider your decision before it is too late. The voters of Boulder County expect and deserve secret ballots. It is your decision alone to deprive us of this right.

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group

Voters choose paper ballots over voting machines

2008-03-27T09:55:00.004-07:00

Dear Ms. Kim,

I am concerned that your story in today’s Rocky Mountain News might mislead voters and election officials. Voters enthused about mail option

The phrases “Coloradans are responding so enthusiastically” and “voters who want to only vote by mail “ strongly suggest that voters want to use the “permanent absentee” method of voting. Increased usage does not necessarily mean that voters want or prefer the method. In fact, there are several other explanations for the increased usage of the method.

Preference for paper ballots -- Where paper ballots in precinct polling locations is not an option, we have for years now recommended that voters obtain and hand deliver an absentee ballot. This is how voters can vote a paper ballot on Election Day, even when the county does not offer paper ballots in precinct polling locations. (We explain to voters that hand delivery does not guarantee that votes will be counted, but the risk is less than the risk when using electronic vote recording equipment.)
Unauthorized promotion -- County clerks have been aggressively promoting the use of “permanent absentee” status. I have personally observed a clerk employee persuade a new registrant to choose this method. I have a photo of a sign in the clerk’s office promoting the method. The clerk’s are mailing unauthorized propaganda to voters that encourages voters to use the “permanent absentee” method.

The propaganda completely ignores the risks associated with “permanent absentee” voting, and therefore misleads the voters. It is very difficult for election system reformers to overcome the unauthorized use of thousands and thousands of dollars of public funds that are being used to promote this voting method and to silence the questions raised by reformers. When the clerks want to do something, they find the money. And they want to make their own lives easier and less accountable.
Unaccountable clerks -- County clerks are not accountable for the error and fraud that results from this unauthorized propaganda effort. Lacking effective oversight, clerks have nothing to lose by promoting this unsafe method. “Permanent absentee” is different than “absentee” voting. With absentee voting, a voter submits an application for a ballot. This application applies only to the current election. It is pretty likely that the voter is alive, receiving mail at the address indicated on the application, and intends to vote in the current election. The county verifies that the application is valid, and fulfills the request. With “permanent absentee” voting, there is no application for the current election. Whether the voter is alive or has moved or is absent from their residence or does not intend to vote in the current election has no bearing. A ballot is mailed to the “permanent absentee” address. Many of these ballots will be fraudulently voted and counted.

It is important to distinguish between voters who want a paper ballot and voters who actually understand and want to use the “permanent absentee” method.

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.ColoradoVoterGroup.org
www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com

SPEAKOUT: Colorado’s county clerks do not know best

2008-03-22T16:39:00.002-07:00

SPEAKOUT: Colorado’s county clerks do not know best
By Al Kolwicz

Despite assurances to the contrary, Colorado county clerks do not know best. Their job has changed. It used to be an administrative job, overseeing people, procedures, and paper. It is now a systems manager job, overseeing the design, purchase, testing and operation of complex computerized election systems.

Not many county clerks are qualified to do the job they have chosen. Not surprisingly, clerks abdicate responsibilities to equipment suppliers who claim to know what’s best. Clerks have an unhealthy dependency on these suppliers. The supplier’s agenda is not the electorate’s agenda.

Clerks shun accountability and public debate. They hold secret meetings. They withhold data needed to detect election errors and fraud. They block public participation in election planning and oversight. To promote their agenda, clerks use public resources to lobby against the interests of the electorate, and they make misleading statements that disparage watchdogs and give false assurances to voters.

Most county clerks give convenience and cost their top priority. Many claim that voter confidence tops their list. But voter confidence is not based on convenience and cost. Voter confidence is earned when an election is transparent, each process is independently verified, and every problem is publicly disclosed. Clerks may know what is best for clerks; but clerks don’t do what is best for the electorate.

In his recent SPEAKOUT: Colorado’s county clerks know best, Secretary of State Coffman puts words into the mouth of election system activists and practices revisionist history. He says that clerks know best, but he does not support this assertion.

Mr. Coffman says that the “ultimate goal” of so-called voter activists “is to prohibit the use of all electronic voting devices”. This is not true, and it has never been true. Election system activists want election systems that are transparent and verifiable. The systems certified by the Secretary of State are neither.

Mr. Coffman says that the court ordered re-certification was only about documentation. This is not true. The court decision was about standards and competence. The new standards are weak and the re-certification team largely ignored them. All of the equipment failed to meet these weak and selectively tested standards. Ignoring problems does not make them go away.

We agree with Mr. Coffman when he originally said “I have more confidence in having votes cast on paper ballots at the polls rather than relying exclusively on electronic voting machines or in voting by mail.” (SOS News, 12/26/07).

We disagree with Mr. Coffman when he now says, “The legislature and the Governor should defer to Colorado’s county clerks …” (SPEAKOUT, 3/12/08). Colorado county clerks do not share the electorate’s agenda, they refuse to be accountable, and they resist transparent and verifiable systems.

Election system activists do not know everything about election law, but they do know some. And, they know a great deal about computers, software and systems. It is time for Colorado’s clerks to acknowledge their limitations and to work toward a transparent and verifiable election system.

People should trust their clerk, but independently verify their elections.

Al Kolwicz, for Colorado Voter Group
www.ColoradoVoterGroup.org
303-494-1540

Election system auditing - whither?

2008-03-10T19:14:00.003-07:00

This note is not intended to offend the fine people working on election system auditing. I hope that it will be viewed positively, and spur folks to meet its challenge.

Before getting too committed to a post election audit scheme, I suggest that we take a step back and think about what the audit is supposed to accomplish -- precisely.

Lots of folks are getting enthusiastic about potential mechanisms – the solutions. But I have not seen an adequate statement of requirements for what the election system audit is committing to accomplish. And exactly how will we know when it has succeeded, or failed?

Election system auditing is a technical/analytical/ almost mathematical problem. This is not the way I see it being approached. Sure, people are using statistics and arithmetic, but I see no postulate leading to proof.

Election system auditing is being discussed as though every ballot is like every other ballot. This is not a correct assumption. The ballot style, including its precinct, makes ballots fall into a number of non-identical sets. Something true of one ballot may be untrue for ballots of a different style/precinct.

Election system audit designers seem to not differentiate between the various methods of voting – precinct-paper, precinct-electronic, early-paper, early-electronic, absentee, provisional, and emergency. These are non-identical methods. Results from a sample in one set do not necessarily carry over to another set.

Election auditor designers seem to not differentiate between the individual units of voting equipment used to record and count ballots and votes. Just because a ballot is successfully processed on one unit does not mean that it would be processed correctly on a different unit of the same type. Each individual unit is uniquely customized for each election. No two units are identical. What is true of one unit is not necessarily true of any other unit.

And, election audit designers seem to ignore completely the processes that do not involve voting equipment, yet represent enormous opportunities for error and fraud. The voter eligibility system, the ballot issuing mechanisms, ballot production, mailing, return mail processing, signature verification, batch integrity, etc. Every one of these represents a potential threat.

In a nutshell, I hope that people wanting to be election system audit experts will first develop widespread agreement on the exact requirements for the audit and how it will be verified that the audit meets these requirements. Only then does it make sense to propose a solution.

Finally, there are data flows that make auditing possible, and data flows that do not. None of the election systems certified for use in Colorado have an auditable data flow. Consequently, all of the work being done on audit today is destined to be discarded once a more rigorous data flow model is adopted.

It is time to establish the precise requirements for election system auditing.

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
http://www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com/

Questions re: Colorado's Paper Ballot Bill

2008-02-29T22:45:00.002-07:00

Many questions about elections, many news reports and still not enough answers.

The Colorado Secretary of State has done what Myriah Conroy predicted in her recent testimony and has already recertified most of the voting machines in a political process which lacked transparency. The process may have avoided actually determining the accuracy of the voting systems. This looks like a very unsatisfying end to the saga of the Conroy v. Dennis law suit. It ought to be observed that the accuracy tested by Colorado certification is limited to a best case count of 10,000 ballots, when elections may process considerably more than that number on a single machine. We cannot have confidence in machine counts when the only set of tests which is intended to prove that the machines are accurate has not counted ballots on an election scale, and may not have addressed the ability of voting systems to obtain voter intent from ballots in a manner which is consistent with statute.

When and if we are ever able to determine if the tests were adequate to determine accuracy we will of course report on this. The fact that the Secretary has recertified systems will have little or no bearing on whether or not the tests prove accuracy or fail to do so. His ability to define substantial compliance has allowed him to make capricious decisions for which there is so far precious little explanation or justification. The extent to which the Secretary carried on with a non technical approach to the needs of the State regarding elections even after enduring the spotlight on this topic in the course of discussion over HB 1155 shows how little intelligence is applied in our State regulatory framework for elections. The Secretary has told members of the public that their only avenues for improvement of this situation is in the courts and in the legislature. He will then be expecting our response from both directions. The legislature will one would hope be prepared to address public interests on behalf of or in stead of the Secretary.

Senator Gordon's paper ballot bill is here, click to read bill.

The Senate State Affairs meeting on this bill is scheduled for 1:30 PM on Monday March 3rd.

The public have not been adequately served in the airing of information about elections in the Colorado press. This is primarily because the press do not provide an adequate platform for discussion and debate of issues and underlying facts. Most often important facts do not reach the form of printed word. It is the legislative process which allows for a form of debate, although it tends to be one sided and non interactive by the nature of the protocol used for these public sessions in which one side has control over the order and extent of the commentary. The public is depending, in this case almost entirely,on the legislature for the opportunity to have facts about elections aired to a full extent, even though a permanent written record is not created.

In the course of discussion of the SB 189 the following topics ought to be addressed and the underlying truths revealed. It will take time in committee to expose the answers to these questions. I sincerely hope that this time is made available:

1) Is precinct reporting needed and is it a valuable resource for public oversight and understanding of election results?

2) Can clerks perform precinct reporting and if so, just how hard is it? If not, why not? How many clerks are in this condition?

3) Do vote centers actually solve problems for elections or do they primarily introduce new and difficult problems? Why are vote centers not just combined precincts?

4) Can lines be avoided on election day without the guaranteed availability of a paper ballot?

5) How can paper ballots and paper poll books be employed to provide the best accountability and the least amount of waiting at precinct polling places? Will the existing statute and rule favor an accountable and transparent election where voters do not have to stand in line for more than a few minutes?

6) Will the widespread public exposure of a record of length of lines, machine audit logs, audit procedures and interim and final results help improve our election? Would it be better to actively collect the stories of success and failure of our elections including specific complaints or successes by clerks and by voters? And will the Secretary of State be likely to collect and publish this information under existing statute?

7) Paper ballot elections are good in part because humans can count ballots in the case an election flaw or exception is discovered. Is Colorado prepared to actually count paper ballots by hand when this becomes necessary? Do we have adequate preparations and adequate training to hand count our ballots accurately? Can the legislature assist in improving our hand count procedures? Could the clerks' negative attitude about hand counting self fulfill in the form of poor election practices and less accurate results?

8) What difference is there in the efficiency and on the other hand transparency and accountability and accuracy of election systems of the following types: an all mail ballot, an all electronic precinct election, an election with precinct counting of paper ballots and a precinct election with central counting? As far as I can tell this discussion has never taken place in Colorado.

8) Can hand counting be performed by using a bar code? Current definitions allow this. Is publication by newspaper sufficient for public oversight? Can the Department of State improve its methods of publication to make access to records more convenient? Will this take place without statutory changes?

9) Can we ever achieve a straight forward approach to elections if the legislature remains short sighted by enacting law for the current year only? What is the byproduct of limiting legislation to one year?

10) Can we expect the Secretary of State to take a non political and technically proficient approach to election quality? Will a Secretary appointed task force actually change the existing practices of the Department in addressing election process? How can the legislature serve the public in motivating beneficial change at the Secretary of State's office.

11) What is the procedural response to a narrow victory margin election under current statute and rule (less than 1/2 percent)?
Under what conditions would ballots be hand counted for voter intent in a recount? What procedure or source proves the sufficient accuracy of the machine which is used to count ballots accurately to the precision necessary to have confidence in a close margin election? Is it possible to hand count with the precision necessary to determine the outcome of a close election with confidence? Is it practical to undertake such a recount?

These are some fundamental questions for which both State Affairs committees. Legislators and the public ought to have a good understanding of the answers which would be provided not only by clerks and Department of State staff, but by members of the public who serve in the voluntary or superficially paid roles as canvass board members who do not benefit directly from a lack of exposure of election system deficiencies to the public.

I would like to see each of these questions answered in the course of the testimony on SB 189.

Harvie Branscomb
Colorado Voter Group

Detecting election fraud made virtually impossible

2008-01-27T12:40:00.000-07:00

The story by Myung Oak Kim on Voter-database doubts in yesterday's Rocky Mountain News raises serious questions about the potential for election fraud. From the article it appears that election officials intend to use Colorado's SCORE II statewide voter registration database as an electronic poll book during precinct elections in the future. Certainly electronic poll books are already in use, and required for vote center and mail ballot elections. However, such usage is fraught with peril, and the current system cannot even keep such simple fields as a voter's party affiliation straight. Since the system has been developed in secret, and public review will no doubt be extremely limited in the future, there is absolutely no way to know whether the names in the database are corporeal, the addresses exist and are residential, how many are in a secret file for alleged victims of domestic violence, what other chicanery exists or, more likely, gross incompetence is hidden behind "security by obscurity."

Before going further, I would like to recommend the book Deliver The Vote, A History Of Election Fraud, An American Political Tradition - 1742-2004 by Tracy Campbell. Anyone familiar with election fraud, and as Tracy Campbell abundantly documents, realizes that a basic and essential tool for detecting election fraud is a printed poll book containing signatures of those who appeared at the precinct and voted in the election. But election officials are rapidly eliminating that fundamental protection with no debate or review.

While the use of "repeaters," "drifters," and "illegals," together with vote buying and selling are nothing new to American elections, requiring a voter to appear in person at their precinct and physically sign a printed poll book in which they were listed, and that was available for future inspection, at least made the logistics of election fraud complicated and heightened the possibility of exposure and prosecution. But with electronic poll books there is little likelihood that public inspection can be easily accomplished or that the records will be preserved intact and complete. Also, signature capture and comparison is becoming all-electronic with little or no testing, and certainly no standards, for the required equipment and methods. The problems are particularly acute with mail ballots and exacerbated by mail-in voter registration where the "citizen" never personally appears before an election official, then may request a ballot by mail without any justification, or may be sent a ballot without even requesting one.

Thus we now have a system where we don't have access to any real documentation, there is no requirement that "voters" establish their physical existence, and only ephemeral electronic records exist for the election that we can't see.

One of the perennial problems with election fraud is that there are more ballots cast than voters who signed the poll book. Ofttimes there are even more ballots cast than there are registered voters in a precinct, which has happened on numerous occasions with electronic voting machines. But with vote centers it hasn't proven possible to break the voters and ballots down by precinct. With electronic poll books, mail ballots, early voting, and precinct voting combined it is impossible to control the number of ballots cast in a precinct in an election. While anyone with evil intent will insure that the total number of ballots cast is somewhat less than the number of registered voters in the precinct, with only easily-manipulated electronic records the problems of proving election fraud are greatly increased. The issue is also made worse by the tendency for county clerks to determine voter turnout by dividing the number of ballots returned by the number of ballots they send out in mail ballot elections. That is done to make it appear turnout was larger than in traditional elections, but such smoke-and-mirror techniques only serve to hide underlying problems which is, of course, desirable for election officials.

I always quake in fear when attorneys set out in haste to dictate solutions to technical problems. That is particularly true when they legislate on such fundamental issues as elections. I'm quite certain that I don't know all the problems that will result from this mad dash to computerized voting, yet legislators are hastily passing laws to dictate the unknown and, inevitably, the election disasters of tomorrow.

Given hundreds of years of election fraud experience, our forefathers had figured out that, except in very limited circumstances, requiring voters to physically appear at their local precinct on Election Day and sign a printed poll book that identified them as registered voters in that precinct was the safest, but not perfect, way to insure only eligible citizen's were allowed to vote.

After establishing their identity and valid registration, voters were then given a ballot that they hand marked in the privacy of a voting booth. Before the voter left their polling place the ballot was dropped into a ballot box after any identifying tags were removed. That ensured a secret ballot cast free from any intimidation, coercion, or electioneering. Vote buying and selling were also minimized by this method.

When the polls closed the ballots were hand counted at the precinct in full view of poll watchers and the public, and the totals posted at the precinct before the sealed ballot boxes and totals were taken to the clerk's office. The county clerk then totaled the results from all precincts in the county and gave out a public notice that could easily be verified by totaling up the posted precinct results.

The discerning reader will note that none of these protections exist today in many elections. Perhaps we should heed the lessons learned by our forefathers and return to the methods they developed for secure and honest elections. That isn't to say better means and methods for voting can't or won't be developed in the future, or that computers don't have a place in elections. But it is safe to state that present hastily and ill-informed election legislation has and is making elections less trustworthy and secure.

Chuck Corry
Charles E. Corry, Ph.D., F.G.S.A.
President
Equal Justice Foundation http://www.ejfi.org/

________________________________________

Board says, "do not certify any of the voting equipment".

2007-12-20T17:52:00.000-07:00

The voting system certification board report says none of the voting equipment passed the tests. The reports for each vendor can be found at:

Certification Overview - Premier
Certification Overview - ES&S
Certification Overview - HART
Certification Overview - Sequoia

A court ordered re-certification of voting equipment in Colorado has concluded that none of the voting equipment supplied by Premier, Hart, ES&S, and Sequoia should be certified for use in elections.

The reasons for decertification vary, they focus on security and accuracy, and they include some of the problems identified by Ohio and California.

Despite Secretary of State Mike Coffman’s hand-picked certification board’s conclusions and recommendations, Mr. Coffman granted conditional certification to Premier’s voting and counting equipment. He also granted conditional certification to HART DREs and Sequoia optical scanners. His override of the board’s determination is an illustration that the process is not independent. Until the certification process is independent, it should not be trusted.

Colorado voting integrity advocates are very displeased with Mr. Coffman’s decisions, although they are relieved to be proven correct in their years long efforts to discredit the equipment. According to them, the certification process itself is fatally flawed. It is not independent, it is not comprehensive, and its factual determinations can be overridden by political expediency. And there is no test to verify that voting equipment components work when they are combined into a system.

There is a massive flurry of activity in Colorado as county clerks and vendors try to come up with a plan to get around the certification decisions. Mr. Coffman has announced his intent to request legislative changes that would enable him to get around the laws designed to protect the election system. He wants to shop around for a state that has certified this equipment, and use their positive certification results instead of Colorado’s negative results. He also wants legislative permission to bypass required testing of changes to the equipment and software.

Voter integrity groups and local systems experts who advocate for verifiable and transparent elections are fighting to break thru the wall of secrecy thrown up by officials. The public is being excluded from even observing meetings of election officials. This raises the question, are officials overtly violating Colorado’s open government laws?

This is a story that needs to be told. Colorado press on Monday and Tuesday was filled with the story.

Key points are:

• What are the implications for other states that are using this equipment?
• What does this decertification mean for the results of past elections that used this unreliable and insecure equipment?
• Is Colorado violating open government laws?
• What will Colorado do for 2008?

For more information see:

Colorado Voter Group

CAMBER

Request to be heard by the JBC during Department of State Hearing

2007-12-07T17:19:00.000-07:00

December 7, 2007

Colorado Joint Budget Committee
200 E. Colfax
Denver, CO 80203

RE: Request to be heard by the JBC during Department of State Hearing
Dear JBC Chairman and Members:

It is our understanding that your committee has invited some county clerks to be present at the planned December 20th continuation of your Nov 15th JBC meeting.

As you know, the county clerks, the Secretary of State, and their staffs constitute one of the interests in election matters – the election officials.

A second interest is represented by their legislative representatives – the electors.

A third interest includes the producers of election related goods and services – the suppliers.

A fourth interest, with valuable election expertise, often forgotten and generally un-represented, includes the canvass boards, election judges, poll watchers, candidates, campaign managers and campaigns, petitioners, expert witnesses, technology experts, and election system advocates – the independent overseers.

The Colorado Voter Group has dedicated many person-years to the improvement of Colorado’s election system. Members of the Board of Trustees have been or currently are: canvass board members, election judges, poll watchers, political party county chairmen, candidates, petitioners, campaign managers, expert witnesses, technology experts, voting system standards developers, and leaders of statewide and national election system advocacy groups.

The perspective of the independent overseer is unique and valuable, yet is generally denied a place at the table during election system discussions between election officials and the electorate’s representatives.

1. Election officials, being burdened by cost and efficiency responsibilities, are motivated to create the impression that each election is secure, accurate, fraud-free, and error-free. They manufacture voter confidence and polish their own public image by controlling the facts.

To maintain control, election officials resist independent oversight. What they cannot prevent outright, they thwart by preventing access to the facts. By positioning themselves so they are not accountable, election officials can make unsubstantiated claims that effectively cannot be challenged. The Attorney General represents the Secretary of State, not the electors. Courts accept the tiniest hint of compliance as “substantial” and resist interfering with elected officials.

Election officials, because of their unhealthy dependence on them, protect their suppliers at the expense of the people. Further, most election officials lack the technical training to oversee their suppliers or their complicated and secretive voting and vote counting equipment. They are easily overwhelmed by election complexity, and this increases their substantial reliance on assistance from the manufacturers.

2. Electors rely on the purity of the election system including the laws established by the legislators, election officials and rules, and independent overseers to guarantee a fair and accurate election. Aside from the valuable acts of voter registration and voting, most electors do not directly engage in the planning, conduct or verification of an election. They trust, but do not verify.

3. Suppliers work to make profits by convincing election officials that their products and services are superior. They establish a dependency relationship with officials using proprietary technology, secrecy, and overly complex products. They resist oversight and public disclosure.

4. Independent overseers are absent from the discussion. We propose to represent the interests of the various constituents that we have identified as the independent overseers. We believe that our information will help you complete your understanding of (1) the state of our election system, and (2) the best alternative for conducting the 2008 elections.

Attached is a Framework for Colorado’s 2008 Election. It contradicts the positions expressed by many election officials, and it is a cost-effective and verifiably trustworthy way to conduct our elections – all things being considered.

For many years, we have documented concerns regarding election system certification and SCORE II. These concerns have not been addressed.

Specific details aside, it is most troubling that election officials have been unwilling to engage in a two-way public discussion of the issues we have raised. If election officials are permitted to continue to operate in this protective self-defined vacuum, without benefit of oversight, transparency and accountability, public distrust of the election system will reach a level that will likely prompt backlash.

We ask you to invite us to actively participate in your December 20th meeting. We believe that our unique perspective and knowledge are valuable assets. It is vital that the needs of election overseers be represented in the discussion.

Assuming that you will permit us to participate, we are happy to work with you or your representatives to properly prepare for your hearing.

We thank you for your consideration of this request.

Al Kolwicz
For the Board of Trustees, Colorado Voter Group

Attachments:
Colorado Elections 2008 - Framework for Primary and General Elections – 11/19/2007
Colorado Voter Group wants polling place elections with a few adjustments. – 11/19/2007
Open letter to Colorado Clerk - Colorado Elections 2008 - Framework for Elections – 11/20/2007

Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.AlKolwicz.net

Colorado Voter Group wants polling place elections with a few adjustments.

2007-11-20T07:38:00.000-07:00

Group concerned that back room deals will trade accuracy for convenience. November 19, 2007

County clerks have been pushing Colorado legislators to adopt all-mail elections for the 2008 elections. Colorado Voter Group has published a superior alternative.

The framework shows how to significantly reduce election risk and uncertainty by limiting the use of questionable equipment, and rigorously auditing the equipment that does get used.

The framework says "no" to all-mail elections and "no" to invisible electronic ballots.

Click to read the press release.

Click to read Colorado Elections 2008 - Framework for Primary and General Elections

Secret scheme to overturn 2002 vote against mail ballot elections

2007-11-11T06:03:00.000-07:00

The Colorado Secretary of State and several county clerks are scheming to overturn the 2002 vote which rejected the use of mail ballot elections for major elections. Rumors persist that certain state legislators are involved in the plot.

Colorado Voter Group hopes to inform readers of the background and facts regarding Colorado's current voting system mess.

1. In November 2002, Colorado voters rejected Amendment 28, which would have deprived voters of the right to vote in precincts by anonymous ballot.

63 of 64 Colorado counties voted this amendment down. 757,299 voters, nearly 60 percent of the votes, voted “no”. See election results on pages 145 and 159 of the November 2002 Abstract of Votes.

2. It appears from a Rocky Mountain News article, County clerks urge all-mail vote in '08, that county clerks are meeting in secret with the Secretary of State to overturn the vote of the people.

Further, it appears that clerks were not informed that the Colorado Voter Group has already submitted to the Secretary of State a workable voting alternative in the event that voting equipment is decertified. This alternative fulfills both the law and the wishes of the people of Colorado, and is a superior alternative to mail ballot elections.

3. Mail ballot elections have been proven to be undesirable. They are not secure, not accurate, not verifiable, not accessible, not anonymous, not transparent, and not accountable. Those who claim otherwise are either not informed or don’t care.

None of the problems brought out during the debate on Amendment 28 have been fixed.

The Rocky Mountain News published an Editorial, Don't take chance on mail ballots.

The Denver Post published PRO-CON opinions of Rutt Bridges (Bighorn Center) and Al Kolwicz (CAMBER) that addressed many of the issues.

CBS investigative reporter Rick Salinger, in an October 31, 2002 televised report, disproved the accuracy and security claims of election officials.

It is wrong for Colorado officials to secretly scheme to override the vote of the people.

It would be wrong to force Colorado voters to vote using a system that cannot be trusted because it cannot be verified.

Colorado legislators should reject any attempt to get them to join in this conspiracy to override the will of Colorado voters. They should use their position of trust to represent the people, not the bureaucracy.

We challenge the Secretary of State, the county clerks, and Colorado Legislators to an independently moderated public debate on whether mail ballot elections are secure, accurate, verifiable, anonymous, accessible, accountable, and transparent.

New voting system standards

2007-09-18T06:15:00.000-07:00

From: stds-scc38@IEEE.ORG [mailto:stds-scc38@IEEE.ORG] On Behalf Of Al Kolwicz
Sent: Sunday, September 16, 2007 10:10 AM
To: g.robinson@computer.org
Cc: stds-scc38@IEEE.ORG; w.ash@IEEE.ORG
Subject: RE: SCC38 meeting announcement Oct 29 and 30

Mr. Robinson,

Two items that I would like to have included in the agenda are (1) scope of effort, and (2) governance. Neither of these items can be resolved at the meeting, but the committee can form a common understanding of what is meant by each, and can create subcommittees to address each.

Regarding "scope of effort", in my opinion this committee's prior efforts and the current EAC standards are both incomplete and misdirected. Incomplete, because the focus of the effort is on the EQUIPMENT and not the SYSTEM. Misdirected, because the work product is focused on mechanics rather than outcomes. A VOTING SYSTEM must meet certain functional requirements and do so within precisely measured performance specifications.

Voting System requirements deal with topics like districts/jurisdictions, eligibility (contests, contestants, and electors), anonymity, accuracy, verifiability, security, transparency, accountability, accessibility, poll watching, canvass boards, auditing, testing, etc. To date, the work of this committee has ignored most of the important functional elements of a voting system. If this committee does not choose to address these elements, then the committee should at a minimum declare in a set of "assumptions" that specific elements are to be addressed elsewhere. At a very minimum, we must have a voting systems diagram with each of the functional elements identified with standard nomenclature.

By focusing on minutiae, the volume of the standard is so large it becomes ineffective. No county clerk or judge in a court of law will ever read or understand the work. Re-focusing the effort will enable the standard to incorporate all of the functional elements, and do so in a manner that is durable over time and technology.

Regarding "governance", in my opinion this committee's work-in-progress should be available on the Internet - at no charge - including copies of drafts and committee correspondence. To my knowledge, there is no document of understanding detailing how this work will be used by government, and this needs to be negotiated and documented. Further, I cannot help but feel that the prior work product was misused by the prior leadership. Rules should be set to establish maximum transparency and to prevent misuse of the work.

Al

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.AlKolwicz.net
www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com

Absolutely reckless election planned

2007-09-01T06:48:00.000-07:00

Check out the article -- Voting Equipment Recert Delayed, Lawsuit Likely.

We support Paul Hultin’s position, as we have previously written to the Colorado Department of State.

CDOS is trying to fabricate distinctions where none exist when they attempt to justify their position that the Nov 2007 election is not subject to the recertification court order. No such distinction was mentioned (or even conceived of?) during the trial.

The people of Colorado rely on the State Certification process for their local decisions. That’s the way the law is designed. If county commissioners had been informed that the equipment was not certified, they would not have authorized its purchase, and public pressure would have “encouraged” commissioners to deny the purchase request.

We have provided specific evidence that the equipment is not trustworthy, and will likely produce an inaccurate and unverifiable election in November 2007. CDOS must immediately issue guidance to the County Clerks informing them of the facts.

At present the facts are being wrongfully withheld.

It would be absolutely reckless to use uncertified DRE and optical scan equipment that is known to suffer serious defects.

Any close contests will surely wind up in court.

Al Kolwicz

Verifying vote counts

2007-08-27T10:23:00.000-07:00

Even with a great set of written vote interpretation procedures, votes counted on the current crop of optical scan equipment are not verifiable.

Three of the issues are:

1. The equipment does not produce a verifiable record of how it INTERPRETED each vote on each ballot. Instead, the equipment collects votes from many ballots and offers a “batch” total as proof of proper interpretation. We do not trust this method, and prefer the ability to perform vote by vote verification.

2. The equipment is controlled by software which is itself “controlled” by parameters and option switches that control the “rules” used to interpret votes. There is no way to verify which “rules” were used to interpret each specific vote. We do not trust this unverifiable method, and prefer that there be a way to know what rules were used to interpret each specific vote.

3. The equipment does not produce a file by batch that includes for each specific ballot page, the VOTES that were interpreted by the system. Without this computer file, there is o way to independently verify that the COUNTS have been calculated correctly. Obviously, we prefer that such a file be required.

We’d prefer optical scan equipment to (1) endorse each ballot page with a unique identifier at the time that the ballot page is first scanned, (2) create an exportable file of scanned ballot images as the ballots are scanned, (3) create an exportable file of the votes interpreted from each ballot page, and (4) create and exportable file of detailed vote count totals including over, under, and ambiguous votes.

In this way, the public can independently compare individual votes (from a particular scanned ballot image) against the interpreted votes (from the corresponding interpreted votes record). Also, the file of interpreted votes can be imported into a program, such as Microsoft Access. This way the results can be independently calculated and compared against the official results.

[What is meant by verifiable?]

Good question. Hope this is a useful answer.

1. To verify, one must have access to a specification of correct (expected) behaviour, transparent access to an indelible record of actual behaviour, and the ability to detect every difference between expected and actual. In voting we have several discrete steps: issue ballot, mark votes on ballot, interpret marks, and count votes.

2. In voting, only the voter can verify that votes are actually recorded as intended (expected), and this must be done before the ballot is cast. It must be physically impossible for any other person to make this determination. It must be physically impossible for the voter to make this determination after the ballot is cast.

3. Before voting, there must be a set of verifiable specifications that result in the particular ballot issued to a voter. These specifications must include the specification of districts, voter eligibility, and ballot style. If an ineligible person is permitted to vote, this must be detectable. If an eligible person is given the wrong ballot style, this must be detectable.

4. After the ballot is cast, each of the following discrete steps must be verifiable:

a. Batch control - it must be verifiable that all and only the ballots cast in a batch are counted. This is a verification of ballots, not of votes.

b. It must be verifiable that each individual vote is interpreted according to (vote interpretation) specifications. Because some votes can be recorded ambiguously, it must be verifiable that the interpretation of ambiguously recorded votes is consistent. In a hand counting situation, the ballots for each contest can (should) be sorted into stacks, one for each contestant, and one each for over, under, and ambiguous. In the case of optical scan count, each interpreted vote should produce a permanent record that includes the source of the vote, as well as the interpretation of the vote itself. This way, it is possible to statistically sample items, and go back to the original materials to compare the marks against the interpretation.If the scanned ballot images are recorded, then the file of scanned ballot images and the file of interpreted votes can be published on the Internet for independent verification.

c. It must be verifiable that the totals for each contest be correct, and distributed according to specification (eg. into precincts, absentee votes, districts, etc.) This cannot be done by statistical sampling. Count verification requires that all interpreted votes be independently tallied. [If original tallies are reported by batch, then individual batches can be verified, however, the process of selecting representative batches is very complex and may not result in sufficient confidence.In the case of hand counted paper ballots, the ballots in each stack can be independently counted by different teams and the results compared by an independent judge.In the case of optical scan counting, the data file containing the votes can be published on the Internet for the world to use for independent verification.

Not-so-secret ballots. It's worse than reported.

2007-08-22T08:13:00.000-07:00

C/NET has published a Story: E-voting predicament: Not-so-secret ballots

The secret ballot issues raised by Moyer and Cropcho www.thepublicballot.org won't be solved until the toilet-paper roles used to sequentially record voter activity are eliminated.

As a Colorado poll watcher, I have the right to record the names of people who vote. By observing the sequence in which they use a specific DRE, I know the sequence of their (supposed) votes recorded on the VVPAT. Access to the roll means access to their "ballot". The canvass board and election officials have legal access to the roll.

NO!, I do not trust the officials. Not because they are evil, but because the protection of a secret ballot is sacrosanct. If any pathway to retrieving a specific voters ballot exists, it might be used: (1) by the court, or (2) for political purposes by a partisan official, or (3) to create a "threat of disclosure" needed by vote-buyers and voter-intimidators to suggest that they can know a voter's selections.

Furthermore, HART Intercivic suffers not only the problem described above, but also uniquely identifies every PAPER and VVPAT ballot with a unique, NON-REMOVABLE, serial number and barcode. Voters can make a record of this serial number on their ballot and use it to later identify their specific ballot. Consequently, the market for vote-selling is facilitated and the opportunity for voter intimidation is supported.

The arrogance of vendors who trample on our right to use a secret ballot must be punished by immediately forcing them to meet our requirements for "privately voted anonymous ballots".

Al

Harmonizing expectations!

2007-06-26T09:57:00.000-07:00

It is no secret that election officials and voting system public advocates are not working together. It is vital that growing hostility and distrust be redirected into positive collaboration. The alternative is not pretty.

Key to finding a solution is an understanding of the root cause of the problem. We believe the following to be the root cause.

Problem: Conflicting expectations

On almost every election system topic there is a difference in expectations between election officials and voting system public advocates.

The problem has existed for at least eight years (perhaps forever). It is present before, during and after elections. It exists at the federal, state, county and municipal levels. It is actively interfering with today’s achievement of objectives for high quality and trustworthy elections.

Think about it. When public advocates have a conflict with election officials, it invariably results from a fundamental disagreement over expectations. Public advocates think that officials are supposed to be doing “X” while officials think that they are supposed to be doing “Y”.

Take Colorado’s voting system certification test underway as an illustration. Public advocates’ expectation for what it takes to certify a voting system is not the same as that of officials. Public advocates criticize officials for not doing what advocates believe to be vital requirements of election code and rules. Driven by a different set of priorities, officials treat these criticisms and complaints as irrelevant.

From the perspective of the public advocate, the issues never get resolved. Worse, there is no mutually acceptable process for resolving these differences in expectations. Currently: (a) officials unilaterally dictate unacceptable decisions, or (b) officials simply ignore public advocates.

There is a way to solve the “conflicting expectations” problem. We call it “harmonizing expectations”.

Solution: Harmonizing expectations!

1. Domains of mutually accepted expectations must be identified including:
Relationships between players. Who are the actors, what is their role, who decides? Who are the customers and who are the suppliers?
Transparency and participation. What is open and what is closed? How to achieve access in a timely manner – without disruption, and before irreversible commitment? How to achieve a dialog between public advocates and officials?
Accountability. How to achieve independent oversight? How to achieve independent judgment? Who is responsible for what?
Performance priorities. Prioritized list of election system performance expectations, precise definitions, how measured, and acceptable performance range? Consequences?

2. A process for harmonizing expectations must be created and formalized.
It must be mutually acceptable to public advocates and officials.
It must be subject to independent oversight.
It must produce measurable expectations.
It must be instituted immediately.

Secretaries of State are required to act within the boundaries of the law. Officials believe that legal restrictions may limit their ability to collaborate. In Colorado, we believe that ways can be found to get the right things done.

Step one is for the Secretary of State to acknowledge the problem and the immediate need to harmonize expectations. OpEd?
Step two is for the Secretary of State and the Colorado Voter Group to recruit a mutually acceptable volunteer independent moderator(s) who will ensure a fair debate and who will serve as editor of the work products.
Step three is for the moderator to oversee negotiation of a process to harmonize expectations.
Step four is for the moderator to oversee the development of harmonized expectation agreements.
Step five is for the Secretary of State to implement the expectation agreements.

Implementation of these steps will produce a durable improvement in the way that voting system public advocates and election officials work together. It will also provide the basis for increased voter confidence.

CDOS transparency and accountability

2007-06-17T17:41:00.000-07:00

From: Al Kolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Sunday, June 17, 2007 5:07 PM
To: SOS Mike Coffman (Secretary@sos.state.co.us)
Cc: Jonathan Tee (Jonathan.Tee@SOS.State.CO.US); Paul Hultin; Colorado Voter Group (ColoradoVoter@googlegroups.com); 'peter.groff.senate@state.co.us'; 'reppaul@aol.com'; 'Harvie Branscomb'
Subject: CDOS transparency and accountability
Attachments: CDOS transparency and accountability
Compressed file of documents

Dear Mr. Coffman:

Attached is a letter that we hope will gain your attention. It addresses our concerns about CDOS transparency and accountability, and it recommends that certification be denied to the vendor products currently under re-certification orders.

Also attached is a compressed file containing copies of the documents referred to in the letter.

Mr. Branscomb and I are meeting with Mr. Tee on Wednesday morning. We hope to include this letter in the topics discussed at this meeting.

Al Kolwicz

Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com/

The Colorado Voter Group is a private sector entity that is working to improve the Colorado election system.

Certification questions and concerns

2007-05-29T06:54:00.000-07:00

Colorado Voter Group

May 25, 2007

RE: Voting System Public Demonstration

Dear Mr. Tee:

We just completed another unsatisfactory Voting System Public Demonstration - the fifth day of pointless demonstrations.

We suspect that the Colorado Department of State intends to claim that the public was involved in the certification process. First, the demonstrations are so superficial that they cannot be considered a substantive part of any legitimate certification process. Second, the time that we have invested has been made superficial and inconsequential by this unprofessional process.

The demonstrations were superficial and addressed almost no real election system issues. So what is the point? Even the temporary workers who are watching the demonstrations and occupying valuable seats will not be sufficiently informed by the demo to be ready to operate the equipment.

Questions asked by the public might have inspired the test board to include tests for real election problems. But we have been told that the questions posed by the public will not result in any change of the planned functional testing. Why allow staff to deceive management into believing that they are actually doing something of value?

1. We were aghast when the ES&S representative announced the six (6) Mesa County and Jefferson County employees as being present “to support the vendors”. Who paid for these people? Why were they representing the interests of the vendors instead of the public? More than once, the vendor asked these county employees to participate in the demo. It was clear that they were not under the same restrictions as the rest of the public attendees.

2. Unchanged from Kolwicz’s May 3 note to Secretary Coffman, the public was still unable to clearly see or hear the May 25th demonstration. Thankfully, the Legislative Liaison for the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, Sheila Hicks, attended the ES&S session and successfully got the meeting stopped and the seating rearranged. We would like to understand why Ms. Hicks received an immediate response, and our report was ignored. Is it because she was in a wheelchair?.

3. We overheard at the ES&S demo that Mr. Gardner controlled the seating arrangements and purposefully assigned the "best" seats to insiders and squished the public into a noisy back corner of the room. We would like to know if this is true. We definitely observed that the table containing the “test board” has served as a barrier between the vendor and the public in every test.

4. At the ES&S demo, there was a new person sitting at the "Test Board Table". When Mr. Branscomb asked Mr. Gardner, informally during a break, if there were now five members of the Test Board, Gardner stated that the meeting was on break and questions could only be asked at the end of the demo. When Mr. Branscomb repeated the question during the public question period Gardner refused to respond on the basis that the question was not one for the vendor pertaining to the demo. (At the May 2nd demo Gardner announced that questions could be posed to the vendor or to the SOS staff.) After the demonstration was over Branscomb approached Gardner one more time, at which time Gardner said: “You are just pushing too much” and he told Branscomb that he had “filed too many open records requests” and should “go downstairs for an answer”. In fact, Mr. Branscomb has not filed an open records request at all. However, Mr. Kolwicz has and may have to do so again to obtain even simple answers to simple questions. This is only an example of how badly the public is being treated.We hope that an adult and civil response to Branscomb’s question is immediately forthcoming from CDOS.

5. We have heard that there will be another demonstration focused on disabled voter capabilities. If this is true, when and where will this demonstration be conducted, who has been invited to attend, and may we attend?

6. In our March 28 letter to Secretary Coffman, our April 26 email to you, and our May 3 conversation with and email to Dan Kopelman, we discussed the lack of transparency of the entire certification process, including functional testing. How can we observe the functional testing process? How will the critical decision for approval/rejection of equipment be made and who will make this decision? How will the public participate in this decision?

7. In the ES&S demonstration, as in the past, the public did not have enough time to ask all of their questions, and was prohibited by Mr. Gardner from even asking relevant questions. As well, Mr. Gardner chose the order of questioners according to his own preference and apparently arbitrarily decided the ending time, forcing (as had been done previously) the public to cease asking questions at the time he decided (in spite of the maximum 3 day plan for this demonstration set in the rules). Does Secretary Coffman approve of this heavy-handed, unfair treatment of the public? Does he support these methods which obviously censor the public’s speech? If not, what will Mr. Coffman do about it? If so, how may we appeal this policy?

8. What is the procedure for gaining access to the un-redacted video tapes of the demonstrations?

To reiterate what we said in our May 3 note to Secretary Coffman, the demonstrations continue to be unsatisfactory.

Based on what we saw and what we know from the public record, two things are clear enough to make recommendations.

· We recommend that the following DRE voting equipment not be advanced to functional testing: (a) Hart Intercivic eSlate, (b) Diebold AccuVote TSX, (c) Sequoia AVC Edge, and (d) ES&S iVotronic. All of these products fail to meet Colorado requirements. All bring unnecessary risk and uncertainty to Colorado’s election process. All would subvert Secretary Coffman's plan to restore public trust in elections.

· We recommend that the AutoMark be advanced to functional testing. This product uses simple and straightforward full-ballot-text paper ballots. These ballots are verifiable, they simplify election processes, and they avoid the security issues of electronic ballots. The AutoMark permits blind and physically restricted voters, and in fact almost all voters (more of the voters than with any of the DREs), to independently and privately select and verify their votes. As an extra practical advantage, this vote is recorded on a reliable and easily verifiable and re-countable full size paper ballot. Without sacrificing voter privacy, AutoMark provides a way for any voter, with or without disability, to make use of an assistant if needed. It clearly satisfies the HAVA requirements in a manner which is compatible with the interests of the voting public at large.

We hope that you will be able to quickly get answers to our questions and concerns. We are available to meet with you or talk by phone to discuss these points.

We thank you very much for facilitating and expediting this communication and for anything that you do to improve the transparency and credibility of this re-certification process.

Al Kolwicz

Harvie Branscomb

Colorado suppresses criticism

2007-05-05T22:25:00.000-07:00

May 5, 2007

Mr. Hobbs
Colorado Deputy Secrecary of State

RE: Ruling to prohibit testimony

At the May 1st rules hearing, you ruled to limit my oral testimony to the text that was proposed for modification. I infer that staff will so limit their reading of my written testimony.

I was not permitted to address the entirety of each rule that was proposed for change. I disagreed with your ruling because: (a) it defies common sense, (b) it censors the public, and (c) it is not authorized by statute or rule.

Myopic. Colorado’s election rules are not crafted in a way that the content of each subsection is a stand alone rule. A change to any part of a rule can ripple over the entire rule. When a rule is opened for change, the collective experience gained using the pre-amended rule is available for improving the quality of the rule.

Not transparent. The draft of the proposed rule change is created by a process that prevents public influence on the proposed change. The drafting process is not transparent, and there is no accountability for the completeness and quality of the draft. Lacking a fair forum for debate on the content of the proposed rule change, the only opportunity for the public to improve a rule is at the rules hearing.

Unauthorized ruling. We have scanned the online documents and cannot find any place that supports your ruling to limit discussion of each rule to the text proposed for modification.

While searching the state’s online documents, we did not find a “Rules Drafting Manual” corresponding to the “Legislative Drafting Manual”. Is there such a document?

When you consider your response to this letter, I hope that you will also review my testimony regarding transparency. Staff has consistently refused to discuss election rules with the public; yet staff regularly discusses proposed rules with county clerks and secret committees. Is it official policy that the public be prohibited from participating in the drafting process?

I hope that you will reconsider your ruling to restrict comment during a rulemaking hearing to the text of the proposed changes. If there are writings that support your ruling I would like to learn of them so that we can work on getting them changed.

As we tried to communicate in our written submission, the proposed rules are deficient and must be repaired in order to protect the purity of elections.

Al Kolwicz

REF: http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/LDM/03.0_Amendments_to_Bills.pdf

Al Kolwicz
CAMBER – Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results

Colorado Department of State --- secretive, arbitrary and anti-scientific.

2007-05-03T15:01:00.000-07:00

Colorado Department of State is secretive, arbitrary and anti-scientific.

The Colorado Department of State has chosen to operate in a secretive, arbitrary and anti-scientific manner. This has cost the department highly valuable voluntary contributions of many experts who have shown their interest in election quality. It has cost the voters of Colorado a trustworthy election system. Examples of this assertion include:

Many problem and suggestion documents have been submitted to the Department of State and have gone unanswered. (Some of these documents have received non-responsive responses.)

The Department of State consistently refuses to engage in open conversation and debate regarding election system issues. (This refusal is one-sided and unfair. It is used to exclude voting system quality advocates, but does not exclude County Clerks, election officials, and hand picked people.)

It is hoped that the Department of State will discontinue its practice of exclusion, and replace it with a policy that will lead to trustworthy elections. This requires that election processes be held to uniform standards and metrics, and that every element of the election system be secure, accurate, verifiable, anonymous, accessible, transparent, and accountable.

To listen to the hearing where this assertion was presented, go so Department of State Audio and listen to the May 1st hearing.

Click to read specific critiques of the Proposed Rules and Regulatory Analysis.

Disallow HART Certification

2007-05-03T09:13:00.000-07:00

Mike Coffman By FAX: 303 869 4860
Colorado Secretary of State
1700 Broadway, Suite 270
Denver, CO 80290

May 3, 2007

RE: Voting System Demonstration – May 2, 2007

Dear Mr. Coffman:

You have a problem in your elections office that requires your immediate attention. Yesterday’s voting system demonstration was mind-numbing, irrelevant, and unbelievably poorly organized.

The presentation did not address the topics required by election rule 45.
The vendor and the elections division staff representatives were unable or unwilling to answer questions. I was essentially disallowed from even asking relevant questions.
The public was rudely treated. They could not see, could not hear, and could not speak – even to ask for inaudible utterances to be repeated – and was forced to endure six hours of inaudible presentation in order to ask questions that were not answered.

You have stated that transparency is one of your key goals. I want you to know, in no uncertain terms; yesterday’s demonstration was a total failure in this regard.

I for one am highly offended by what happened yesterday. There were four video cameras running during the demonstration. The public was seated well behind the cameras. You might wish to review the tapes so you can make your own assessment.

There are at least two more demonstrations scheduled. I hope that you will take immediate action to (a) disallow the HART application from proceeding to functional testing, and (b) ensure that the remaining demonstrations comply with the rule, are transparent, and are friendlier to the public.

In addition, we were aghast to learn that ITA testing will not be conducted for this certification.

Al Kolwicz
CAMBER – Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
www.coloradovoter.blogspot.com

NO on SB 234 -- Junk mail ballots

2007-04-27T16:50:00.000-07:00

Colorado Legislators: Please Vote NO on SB 234.

This bill would compromise our entire election system and must be defeated.

As you may recall, in 2002, the people spent an entire year working to defeat Amendment 28, the Mandatory Mail Ballot Election amendment. The amendment was resoundingly defeated by 63 of 64 Colorado counties – 60 percent of the votes cast said “NO”. Every Colorado County voted "no", with the single exception of La Plata County.

The Rocky Mountain News as well as many other papers opposed the amendment then, and just a few days ago, on April 24, Vince Carroll of the Rocky Mountain News wrote:

“Ballot ballet
Once again I’ve cast more than a single ballot in a local election. And once again it’s given me an uneasy feeling about the integrity of mail elections.
On Monday I dropped off three ballots at the Wellington Webb building in downtown Denver. It’s legal to mail or deliver a ballot that isn’t yours, of course, although you have to sign in and record the number you produce in person.
But how would they know how many ballots I’d dumped in a trash bin out back?
What if I’d promised to deliver a dozen ballots from a nursing home where a relative of mine resided — saving each voter the escalating postage — and then quietly discarded those I suspected disagreed with my own electoral choices?
There are simply too many points at which a mail ballot may be in the control of someone other than the voter or the office tabulating the results. And one of these days we’ll discover that it matters.
Vincent Carroll is editor of the editorial pages. Reach him at carrollv@RockyMountainNews.com .”

Our welcome screen highlights some of the problems – see www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz/welcome.htm

Supporters of junk mail ballots hope to exploit the opportunity created when thousands of ballots are retrieved by unknown recipients. They’ll argue that the voter asked for the ballot. But we all know that voter registration data is never current, and that we live in a mobile society.

SB 234 is attempting to resurrect this bad idea using a device called the “permanent absentee ballot”. WE can prove that the approach is not secure, does not yield accurate results, and disenfranchises voters. This bill will re-open the opportunity for massive error and vote fraud that we fought so hard to successfully defeat.

Please do everything you can to stop this affront against the people of Colorado.

Please Vote NO on SB 234. And please help us to reach other Representatives and convince them that SB 234 is a terrible idea that has already been rejected by the voters.

CO Senate Bill 83- must protect election verifiability

2007-04-26T16:10:00.000-07:00

To: Representatives
re. Senate Bill 83 (election statutes)

April 26 2007 v.3

From: Coloradoans for Voting Integrity (CFVI);
The Voting Integrity Project, Be The Change USA;
Honest Elections U.S.;
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results (CAMBER);
Democracy For Colorado (DFC)

(six pages attached with talking points for each issue, one per page)

Coloradoans for Voting Integrity (CFVI) a state-wide election advocacy group, and the other groups listed above have prepared a list of talking points on 4 critical elements of SB83 which impact the public in general and need correction now before the bill becomes law. We are looking for sponsors for amendments on these issues:

Verified paper audit trail should contain ballot issue submission clause not only number or letter
Vote center must have a functional local backup poll book for cases of network failures
ballot marking devices should be acceptable by statute to be certified
preserve accuracy and full records of audits

. and two provisions which have already been removed by House committee which removal is consistent with the public interest and should not be reversed on the house floor or in the conference committee…

polling place posting of results should be maintained
mandatory recount on close election should be maintained

These six are appended to this message. We hope members of the House can use this information and these arguments to support needed amendments to the SB-83 bill language in the floor debate on second reading. Please keep these pages in your file for SB083.

Please introduce and or support an amendment on second reading of SB083 to the following effect :

Require Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (V-VPAT) to contain "name" of ballot issue

SECTION 2 (P. 4, LINES 15-21 of March 30 engrossed bill)

PRO ARGUMENT: THE V-VPAT SHOULD DISPLAY THE SUBMISSION CLAUSE OR FULL TEXT OF THE ISSUE AND QUESTION, AND THE NAME OF COLORADO JUDGES STANDING FOR RETENTION (supporting change in language from "number or letter" to "submission clause and or full text"):

* voter can not be expected to remember the meaning of the number or letter of every issue and question on the ballot
* voter expected to verify meaning of "Amendment 39 Yes"
* submission clause is already used in statute, required on results printout from machine (which is itself usually a long narrow paper tape)
* V-VPAT is useless unless truly verified (except blind disabled voters can not verify on current DRE machines)

COUNTER ARGUMENT
* may not be room for submission clause on paper tape (also may not be room for candidate name)
* voter may not care to, or be able to verify (which is the very reason not to use DRE machines and to return to paper ballots for all voters using optical scanners and BMDs)

*******************************************************************

Please introduce and or support an amendment on second reading of SB083 to the following effect :

PROVIDE LOCAL BACKUP SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION BOOKS IN CASE OF VOTE CENTER NETWORK FAILURE

(CRS 1-5-102.7- substitute language on p 18 line 5 of Mar 30 engrossed SB083)

PRO ARGUMENT - THERE IS VITAL NEED FOR A POLL SITED COPY OF THE COUNTY REGISTRATION LISTS. (supporting change of language)

* Denver's 2006 election failure caused huge disenfranchisement of eligible voters who left the poll sites without voting- possibly affecting outcome of election
* Denver election failure could have been avoided if registration data were available locally at each poll site, and Colorado statute and SOS rule would allow its use to verify voter eligibility at the poll site
* registration is now finalized 30 days prior to election, so data are easy to produce either on paper poll books, or on electronic storage for local use
* if any voter votes twice, their name will be forwarded to DA and criminal prosecution will follow, and every case will be recorded and likely reported to the public
* enfranchisement of many voters takes priority over prevention of the remote possibility of occasional duplicate voting
* depending on size of county, data may be kept on paper or electronic media

COUNTER ARGUMENT
* registration book for a large county with vote centers is almost unprintable on paper poll books
* non networked local data for emergency means voter could vote twice in 2 different polling places
* registration lookup on paper may be difficult with a paper poll book

*****************************************************************

ALLOW BALLOT MARKING DEVICES (BMD) TO BE CERTIFIED BY THE SOS AS HAVA-COMPLIANT ACCESSIBLE VOTING SYSTEMS

PRO ARGUMENTS (supporting re-inserting language to allow BMD certification):

(please amend to re-insert page 19 lines 9-23 of the 2^nd engrossed version of the bill which were removed by amendment in House committee)

* two states, Colorado and Arkansas, prevent certification of BMD systems now in use
* BMDs are superior to DRE in aiding disabled- they provide full verification on a paper ballot
* BMD permit all voters to vote on paper, but DREs require electronic ballots and it is hard to verify electronic counts and may prevent voting on paper
* Disabled voters' lobby argues that they should vote in the same method as others, this argument can and has worked to disadvantage of all voters when DRE provides less transparency and accessibility for testing and auditing and recounting than paper ballots and BMD systems
* if a county chooses 100% DRE, voters have no right or ability to vote at polling place on paper
* if there is no right to vote on a paper ballot, polling can not be designed to avoid lines when crowds appear at the polls... but with paper ballots, distributed freely with proper procedures, lines can be avoided.
* casting of hand marked paper ballots with precinct optical scan often consists of a voter carrying a ballot in a secrecy sleeve to an election judge who sometimes removes the ballot and operates the optical scanner. This is no different from an election judge assisting the disabled voter to perform the same function. This comparison shows that the existing language does not differentially discriminate against the disabled, nor is it a violation of equal protection.

COUNTER ARGUMENT (supporting removal of existing SB83 "CASTING" language, which supplements the current statute)

* disabled deserve to "independently" and personally deposit their ballot into the ballot box or optical scanner, since this is what casting of a ballot consists of
* the existing statue was written to favor the DRE system; the disabled voter is able to electronically "cast" their ballot without assistance even though the blind can not verify their vote

Please introduce and or support an amendment with the following beneficial effects on post election audit:

AMENDMENT 044 on audits adopted by committee 4/24/07

RECOMMENDATION TO AMEND AUDIT PROVISION TO PRESERVE ACCURACY and FULL RECORDS of AUDITS:

(Concerning page 24 lines 9-18 of March 30 engrossed SB083)

A discussion on auditing will come to the floor of the House. The reality of auditing typically being performed is already chaotic and not technically sound. The amended bill now calls for 5% of the machines to be audited for two randomly selected races where also all of the races are now to be audited, but this statute does not sufficiently define what constitutes an audit. The amended bill also calls for an alternate audit method to be used by approval of the SOS. We recommend that additional language be applied to call for improved accuracy in this alternative audit. We also recommend that records be kept of the precise method of audit in each audit report, as well as a log of exceptions found, corrections made, and lessons learned. This new audit report created by the canvass board should be published with the audit numerical results on the SOS web site. This will permit access to enough information to be able to compare the success of two or more methods of audit, as well as to be able to evaluate the success of the audit qualitatively.

There is basically zero record-keeping of the existing audit under existing rules. The legislature should call for the SOS to require additional record-keeping and publishing of a description of the process taken by the canvass board in each district to supplement the already published simple numerical results of audits... to reveal the real situation with audits for future analysis. As canvass board members in different counties both Al Kolwicz and Harvie Branscomb have attempted to include notes with the audit results and these results have not been made public by the SOS.

We will never have a truly functional audit until the legislature and other people who care about election quality (other than the secretary of state and his office) can read what has transpired during the audits. It is very possible that human error could produce a "perfect" audit in the reconciliation process when election officials strive to cause the numbers to match. I have heard of this happening.

Please consider to bring an amendment for record keeping and publishing of the actual audit procedures and incremental results found including exceptions and recommended enhancements. (e.g. “first a mismatch was uncovered, then a human error was found and subsequently the hand count and machine tally were found to match”, etc.)... This would fit well with Chairman Weissman's idea of promoting a "pilot audit" in certain counties if they choose to do so. If the procedures taken and results of this pilot audit are not published, how useful will such a pilot be?

Also please support any amendment to the effect that any replacement audit should achieve statistical accuracy and significance greater than the audit it replaces.

PROPOSED AUDIT AMENDMENT LANGUAGE for SB083

Section 26 1-7-514(1)(a)(III), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read:

(III) For an election taking place in a county on or after the date the county has satisfied the requirements of section 1-5-802, the audit shall be conducted for the purpose of comparing the manual tallies of the voter-verified paper records produced or employed by each voting device selected for such audit with the corresponding ballot tallies recorded directly by each such device IN THE ORIGINAL ELECTION TALLY.

(b) To the extent practicable, no voting device that is used for the random audit required by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) shall be used for conducting the testing of voting devices for recount purposes required by section 1-10.5-102 (3) (a).

(2) (a) Upon completion of the audit required by subsection (1) of this section, if there is any discrepancy between the manual tallies, as specified in accordance with the requirements of subparagraph (II) or (III) of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, as applicable, of the voting device selected for the audit, and the corresponding tallies recorded by such devices, and the discrepancy is not able to be accounted for by voter error, the county clerk and recorder, in consultation with the canvass board of the county established pursuant to section 1-10-101, shall investigate the discrepancy and shall take such remedial action as necessary in accordance with its powers under this title.

(b) Upon receiving any written complaint from a registered elector from within the county containing credible evidence concerning a problem with a voting device, the canvass board along with the county clerk and recorder shall investigate the complaint and take such remedial action as necessary in accordance with its powers under this title. (but the canvass board has no such powers)

Section 26 1-7-514(2)(c), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read:

(c) The CANVASS BOARD AND county clerk and recorder shall promptly report to the secretary of state A DESCRIPTION OF THE AUDIT PROCESS UNDERTAKEN INCLUDING ANY INITIAL, INTERIM, AND FINAL ~~the~~ results of any completed audit or investigation conducted pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection (2).

Section 26 1-7-514(3), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read:

(3) The secretary of state shall post the REPORTS ~~results~~ of any completed audit or investigation ~~conducted~~ RECEIVED pursuant to the requirements of subsection (2) of this section on the official website of the department of state not later than twenty-four hours after receiving the results of the completed audit or investigation. The clerk and recorder of the affected county may timely post the results of the completed audit or investigation on the official website of the county. The secretary shall publish once in a newspaper of general circulation throughout the state notification to the public that the results have been posted on the department's website.

Change to end the polling place posting of the vote abstract

This section of SB-83 has been removed in committee on a vote, thanks. Please vote against any attempt to reinsert this damaging provision.

(This Section of SB-83 should be removed-Delete lines 26-27 on page 25 and lines 1-16 on page 26 of the 2^nd engrossed bill)

PRO ARGUMENT: PRECINCT POSTING OF VOTE ABSTRACT IS PROTECTIVE OF VALID ELECTION RESULTS:

* Precinct posting requires quick resolution of results at polling place, avoids delay of the reporting of election results, internet posting is neither immediate nor polling place specific
* quick posting helps prevent hiding of poll site errors and fraud
* precinct posting is usually a direct printout from the voting machine, not manipulated results
* without precinct posting, no motivation for the rules to call for or the machine to be designed to produce an immediate local results record on paper
* posting is an early warning system for results, and allows quick election problem follow up
* posting allows immediate election day comparison of similar results from different places
* posting is popular with voters and is expected in many counties especially rural areas,
* posting can be done with simple physical security and should be accompanied by a sign notifying site tenants of the 48 hour posting period
* for cross checking, posting should include under and over votes.
* new language in this section does not specify either time or place that poll results can be obtained
* without posting, clerks will likely wait until data is combined before release of results to the public
* data separated by polling place allows errors to be noticed earlier
* public has a right to have quick access to all vote counts and exceptions
* Central posting of results may be a long distance from rural poll site
* posting provides faster access to results... where otherwise we must wait for memory cards to be transported and uploaded at central tabulation center, manipulated and redistributed

COUNTER ARGUMENT: POLL SITE ABSTRACT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO BE POSTED AT THE POLL SITE- ONLY AT CENTRAL CLERKS OFFICE

* posting is inconvenient in certain locations such as without a glass door or window accessible to the public- abstract tapes could blow away
* posting is inconvenient in metro vote centers where so many precincts vote together and voting machine tapes are therefore long, cumbersome and take space
* some county clerks have programmed their voting machines to not produce the precinct abstract tapes
*****************************************************

Waiver of Mandatory Election Recount

(This section of SB-83 has been removed in committee 4/24/07, thanks. Please vote against any reintroduction of this damaging provision):

SECTION 30 (CORRECTED 2ND ENGROSSED SB-083, pp. 27, LINES 10-27)

PRO ARGUMENT: CURRENT MANDATORY ELECTION RECOUNTS ARE BENEFICIAL FOR DEMOCRACY:
* preserves status quo- provides some means for verifiability
* recount is for election accuracy, not losing candidate "sour grapes" or vanity
* recount involves needed extra attention to ballots by hand counting- (preferably NOT by machine counting unverifiable barcodes as currently permitted)
* use of recount is rare - elections are not often within 1/2% margin
* recount becomes unlikely if it is made optional but costly
* pressure on losing candidate to waive recount is inevitable
* pressure is likely on political and fiscal conservation arguments
* pressure will be self-asserted by the loser (not necessarily overt)
* recount should resolve unseen mistakes and overlooked ballots
* losing candidate does not have the right to make this a personal choice - it is the public's election
* benefit of recount is for all persons in Colorado, not merely the losing candidate

THE COUNTER ARGUMENT:
* recount is expensive and time consuming for county election officials

*****************************************

Additional notes by Harvie Branscomb, CFVI on the Ballot Marking Device issue and BMD advantages versus DRE (electronic voting and counting- Direct Record Electronic) April 25, 2007

1) CFVI is concerned that SB-83 will affect the public's future access to paper ballots at the polls because it does not sufficiently address ballot marking devices (BMD). These are electronic devices which permit any voter including many disabled to mark a standard paper ballot. In committee, a provision in SB-83 supporting BMD (Section 18 of the Corrected 2nd Engrossed SB-83 - pp.19, lines 11-23) was lost. The current Colorado statute [CRS Section 1-5-704 (1)(N)(I)] on HAVA compliant accessible voting systems has been the stated excuse used by prior Colorado SOS certification directors for blocking the state certification of ballot marking devices (BMD) in Colorado. The SOS office felt that they were bound to reject certification followng the restrictive statutory language concerning "casting of ballots" - however "casting" has not been statutorily defined.

Colorado is one of only two or three states in the U.S. that have not election-certified Ballot Marking Devices (Arkansas is another). This denial of certification of BMD systems has severely affected the Colorado voter's access to paper ballots. In turn, this has forced county clerks, in trying to be HAVA compliant, to buy DRE machine systems. The counties could have purchased Ballot Marking Devices to supplement their existing paper ballot optical scanners to satisfy federal HAVA requirements for disabled voter access (as has happened in counties in most other states).

Counties like Eagle, Douglas, Routt and others, decided that while taking the federal HAVA money, they could try to go to 100% DRE machine voting. However, this has proved to be much less than desirable... leaving disgruntled would-be voters abandoning the poll sites because of long lines (CFVI has the names of voters who abandoned in Eagle County). This "fleeing voter" problem, resulting from long lines, also occurred in Denver, Routt and Montrose counties - these counties are all now on the SOS "election watch" list for 2008. This would not have happened with Ballot Marking Device systems, since the voters could have chosen voter-marked paper ballots if the BMD machines malfunctioned. The lack of or misuse of a paper ballot alternative system created problems in many Colorado counties in 2006. We simply do not know how many counties were affected and by how much.

County Clerks, like in Eagle County, argue they are saving the time it would take to train election judges on two voting systems, but in reality the extra cost of the DRE machines (capital cost, maintenance, testing and future software upgrades) surely far outweighs any possible extra cost of election judge training for two parallel election technologies at the polls.

The language which has recently been removed from the SB-83 bill was meant to ensure that BMD systems could be SOS certified. The use of a BMD paper ballot system would have allowed both disabled and non-specific voters to use the same paper ballots and optical scanner equipment.

The argument that some disabled advocates (but not all) are making about "independent" unassisted voting, makes little sense when the DRE machine alternative allows very few disabled voters to actually verify their ballot choices as marked on the DRE screen. This seems clearly more problematic than the inability for some small number of the disabled voters to personally carry, or visually verify that an election judge carried their voted, secrecy-sleeved ballot from the Ballot Marking Device machine to the counting device or ballot box. All voters choosing to use the BMD system would cast their ballot in the same manner - there would be no equal protection issues with the BMD systems.

Paper ballots vs. DRE

The unnecessary switch from paper ballots to DRE (direct record electronic voting ) machines involves several disadvantages:

1) extreme increase in testing time and decrease in test accuracy during pre-election Logic and Accuracy Testing, required by statute.

2) reduced accessibility to ballots for election officials to recount the votes

3) much higher cost per voter with these DRE systems (not even calculating future upgrade and maintenance costs of these machines)

4) complex election judge retraining and extra machine security required per SOS rules

5) the possibility that voters can not have their vote intention correctly interpreted by the touch screen (or similar) interface, and are too embarrassed to report this to the poll site election judges (this is indicated in part by totally blank electronic ballots- a statistic which should be recorded and published)

6) the impossibility of quickly creating new DRE voting stations at a poll site as necessitated by high turnout and long lines. This is easy to accomplish with paper ballot based systems.

Coloradoans for Voting Integrity (CFVI) hope you will seriously consider our 6 major points about SB-83 and most importantly seriously consider finding BMD language to motivate the SOS and election machine manufacturers to bring Ballot Marking Device paper ballot systems to Colorado. The national federal legislative trend is towards a return to paper ballots, and Colorado needs to re-emphasize the advantages of paper ballots at Colorado polling places - for both the disabled voting community and for all Colorado voters.

Respectfully submitted,

Cary Lacklen, CFVI

Harvie Branscomb, CFVI

Margit Johansson, CFVI

Claudia Kuhns, The Public Integrity Project, Be The Change, USA

Jeff Cook, Honest Elections U.S.

Al Kolwicz, Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Results

Joe Richey, Democracy For Colorado

SB083 talking points: protecting election integrity

2007-04-22T21:28:00.000-07:00

Specific arguments about issues in SB 083 for the State, Veterans, and Military Affairs Committee and for any debate on the House floor or in conference committee:

(1) SECTION 30 (CORRECTED 2ND ENGROSSED SB-083, pp. 27, LINES 10-27)

Waiver of Mandatory Election Recount (This section of SB-83 should be removed):

PRO ARGUMENT: CURRENT MANDATORY ELECTION RECOUNTS ARE BENEFICIAL FOR DEMOCRACY:
* preserves status quo- provides some means for verifiability
* recount is for election accuracy, not loser "sour grapes" or vanity
* recount involves needed extra attention to ballots by hand counting- must NOT be by barcode count as currently permitted
* use of recount is rare - elections are not often within 1/2% margin
* recount becomes unlikely if it is made optional but costly
* pressure on losing candidate to waive recount is inevitable
* pressure is likely on political and fiscal conservation arguments
* pressure will be self-asserted by the loser (not necessarily overt)
* recount should resolve unseen mistakes and overlooked ballots
* losing candidate does not have the right to make this a personal choice - it is the public's election
* benefit of recount is for all persons in Colorado, not merely the losing candidate

THE COUNTER ARGUMENT:
* recount is expensive and time consuming for county election officials

****************************************************************

(2) Change in the polling place posting of the vote abstract to end required posting
(This Section of SB-83 should be removed-Delete lines 26-27 on page 25 and lines 1-16 on page 26 of the 2^nd engrossed bill)

PRO ARGUMENT: PRECINCT POSTING OF VOTE ABSTRACT IS PROTECTIVE OF VALID ELECTION RESULTS:

* Precinct posting requires quick resolution of results at polling place, avoids delay of the reporting of election results,
* quick posting helps prevent hiding of poll site errors and fraud
* precinct posting is usually of direct result from voting machine, not manipulated results
* without precinct posting, no motivation for the rules to call for or the machine to be designed to produce an immediate local results record on paper
* posting is an early warning system for results, and allows quick election problem follow up
* posting allows immediate election day comparison of similar results from different places
* posting is popular with voters and is expected in many counties especially rural areas,
* posting can be done with simple physical security and should be accompanied by a sign notifying site tenants of the 48 hour posting period
* for cross checking, posting should include under and over votes.
* new language in this section does not specify either time or place that poll results can be obtained
* without posting, clerks will likely wait until all data is combined before release of results to the public
* data separated by polling place allows errors to be noticed earlier
* public has a right to have quick access to all vote counts and exceptions
* Dentral posting of abstract results may be at central clerk's office a long distance from rural poll site
* posting provides faster access to results... where otherwise we must wait for memory cards to be transported and uploaded at central tabulation center

COUNTER ARGUMENT: POLL SITE ABSTRACT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO BE POSTED AT THE POLL SITE- ONLY AT CENTRAL CLERKS OFFICE

* posting is inconvenient in certain locations such as without a glass door or window accessible to the public- abstract tapes could blow away
* posting is inconvenient in metro vote centers where so many precincts vote together and voting machine tapes are therefore long, cumbersome and take space
* some county clerks have programmed their voting machines to not produce the precinct abstract tapes

***********************************************************************

(3) SECTION 2 (P. 4, LINES 15-21) Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (V-VPAT) not required to contain "name" of ballot issue

PRO ARGUMENT: THE V-VPAT SHOULD DISPLAY THE SUBMISSION CLAUSE OR FULL TEXT OF THE ISSUE AND QUESTION, AND THE NAME OF COLORADO JUDGES STANDING FOR RETENTION (supporting change in language from "number or letter" to "submission clause and or full text"):

* voter can not be expected to remember the meaning of the number or letter of every issue and question on the ballot
* voter expected to verify meaning of "Amendment 39 Yes"
* submission clause is already used in statute, required on results printout from machine (which is itself usually a long narrow paper tape)
* V-VPAT is useless unless truly verified (except blind disabled voter can not verify on most DRE machines)

COUNTER ARGUMENT
* may not be room for submission clause on paper tape (also may not be room for candidate name)
* voter may not care to, or be able to verify (which is the very reason not to use DRE machines and to return to required paper ballots for the majority of or all voters)

*******************************************************************

(4) PROVIDE LOCAL BACKUP SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION BOOKS IN CASE OF VOTE CENTER NETWORK FAILURE (CRS 1-5-102.7- substitute language on p 18 line 5)

PRO ARGUMENT - THERE IS VITAL NEED FOR A POLL SITED COPY OF THE COUNTY
REGISTRATION LISTS. (supporting change of language)

* Denver'S 2006 election failure caused huge disenfranchisement of eligible voters who left the poll sites without voting- possibly affecting outcome of election
* Denver election failure could have been avoided if registration data was
available locally at each poll site, and Colorado statute and SOS rule would allow its use to verify voter eligibility to vote at the poll site
* registration is now finalized 30 days prior to election, so data is easy to produce either on paper poll books, or on electronic storage for local use
* if any voter votes twice, their name will be forwarded to DA and criminal prosecution will follow, and every case will be recorded and likely reported to the public
* enfranchisement of many voters takes priority over prevention of of the remote possibility of occasional duplicate voting
* depending on size of county, data may be kept on paper or electronic media

COUNTER ARGUMENT
* registration book for a large county with vote centers is almost unprintable on paper poll books
* non networked local data for emergency means voter could vote twice
* registration lookup on paper may be difficult with a paper poll book

*****************************************************************

(5) BALLOT MARKING DEVICES (BMD) - ALLOW BALLOT MARKING DEVICES TO BE CERTIFIED BY THE SOS AS HAVA-C0MPLIANT ACCESSIBLE VOTING SYSTEMS

PRO ARGUMENT (supporting existing language allowing BMD certification):
(retain page 19 lines 9-23 of the 2^nd engrossed version of the bill)

* only two states, Colorado and Arkansas, prevent certification of of BMD systems now in use
* BMDs are superior to DRE in aiding disabled- they provide full verification on a paper ballot
* BMD permit all voters to vote on paper, but DREs require electronic ballots and it is hard to verify electronic counts and may prevent voting on paper
* Disabled voters' lobby argues that they should vote in the same method as others, this argument can and has worked to disadvantage of all voters when DRE provides less transparency and accessibility for testing and auditing and recounting than paper ballots and BMD systems
* if a county chooses 100% DRE, voters have no right or ability to vote at polling place on paper
* if there is no right to vote on a paper ballot, polling can not be designed to avoid lines when crowds appear at the polls... but with paper ballots, distributed freely with proper procedures, lines can be avoided.
* typical casting of hand marked paper ballots with precinct optical scan, consists of voter handing a ballot in a secrecy sleeve to an election judge who removes the ballot and operates the optical scanner. This is no different from an election judge assisting the disabled voter to perform the same function. This comparison shows that the existing language does not differentially discriminate against the disabled, nor is it a violation of equal protection of equal protection

COUNTER ARGUMENT (supporting removal of existing SB83 "CASTING" language, which supplements the current statute)

* disabled deserve to "independently" and personally deposit their ballot into the ballot box or optical scanner, since this is what casting of a ballot consists of
* the original statue was written for the DRE machine system, and the disabled voter is able to electronically "cast" their ballot without assistance

*******************************************************************

Protecting verifiability from Colorado Senate Bill 83

2007-04-22T20:21:00.000-07:00

TO: House State, Veterans and Military Committee April 22, 2007 version 4

*for committee meeting on Tuesday April 24 at 1:30PM

FROM: Coloradoans for Voting Integrity (CFVI); The Public Integrity Project, BTC

USA

; Honestelections.us; & Joe Richey, Democracy For Colorado (DFC)

RE: SB07-083: On Conduct of Elections (Tupa, Weissman)

Please consider changing the following three provisions of the 2^nd Engrossed version (March 30) of SB07-083 which contradict the public interest of verifiability and transparency of elections:

1. ELIMINATION OF THE AUTOMATIC RECOUNT

Replacing the now-required automatic recount in close elections, this provision allows the losing candidate to waive the recount.

Rationale for opposition: Recounts should not be politicized and this provision would cause political pressure to be a major factor of whether recounts would occur. The outcome of an election has consequences for the entire electorate, not just the losing candidate, who may be subjected to intimidation or improper inducements to waive the recount. The recount is required to maintain high standards of accuracy, not to satisfy the loser.

Recommended: Remove the item. Delete lines 10-27 on page 27 of the 2nd engrossed bill.

2. TERMINATION OF POLLING-PLACE POSTING OF RESULTS

This is a provision to abandon the practice of posting polling results at the polling place immediately after election officials have signed off on them on election night, for 48 hours, and leaving the time of publication unspecified.

Rationale for opposition: Posted results are a major tool for public transparency of elections and timely onsite records provide the best accuracy check. Public records enhance the trust of an electorate that is presently suspicious of the election process. Existing practice is essential as it increases the chances that an accurate record exists of polling place results. Posted results can raise red flags immediately about problems at particular polling locations, if results differ from those of other polling places where similar results are expected.

Recommended: Remove the item. Delete lines 26-27 on page 25 and lines 1-16 on page 26 of the 2^nd engrossed bill.

3. BALLOT ISSUES ON THE VOTER-VERIFIABLE PAPER RECORD KNOWN ONLY BY NUMBER OR LETTER

This is a provision to identify ballot issues or questions only by “THE NUMBER OR LETTER” on the voter-verifiable paper audit trail.

Rationale for opposition: Makes voter verification difficult. It will substantially impair the ability of voters whose ballots are created electronically to be able to verify that their votes were recorded correctly.

Recommended: The statutory requirement should be improved to require, at minimum, the short description of an item known as “the submission clause”, or, where possible, the full text.

(On page 4, line 15 of 2nd Engrossed bill, replace “THE NUMBER OR LETTER” with “THE SUBMISSION CLAUSE AND OR FULL TEXT”.)

--SB083 elections statute alert April 22, 2007 version 4 page 1--

Please add to SB083:

4. REQUIRE LOCAL BACKUP OF THE COMPUTERIZED REGISTRATION BOOK USED AT A VOTE CENTER.

Rationale for inclusion: An amendment to remove the non computerized registration books from this bill recently passed in the Senate, but the local backup of the vote center registration data is of paramount importance to prevent spectacular election failures.

Recommended: (on page 18 line 5 substitute for “EQUIPMENT” “EQUIPMENT WITH NON-COMPUTERIZED REGISTRATION BOOKS OR REGISTRATION DATA LOCALLY STORED AT THE POLLING PLACE TO BE USED IN CASE OF A SYSTEM FAILURE”

Please also support the following existing text in SB083:

5. DEFINING THE CASTING OF A BALLOT FOR ACCESSIBLE VOTING SYSTEMS

Rationale for support: The Secretary of State’s office has denied certification to ballot marking devices on the grounds that some disabled voters would have to depend on help to cast their ballot after it was printed by the electronic device. Currently, SB083 defines “the final step of casting a ballot” as “causing a ballot to be placed into any device that protects the privacy and integrity of the elector’s choice”. Transporting the ballot in a secrecy sleeve across the room to an optical scanner or ballot box is what this discussion is about.

Blind engineer and computer expert Noel Runyon asserts that there are ballot marking devices that meet essential requirements for a secret ballot for the disabled, and that the assistance required of some disabled to cast the ballot when using a ballot marking device is no more compromising of a person’s privacy than the help required by some to insert the card permitting them to vote into a machine. He also asserts that the several direct record electronic voting machines (DRE’s which were certified by the Secretary of State) serve the disabled less well than a ballot marking device, as none of them allow the blind to verify their vote.

Recommended: Keep the amendment in the bill so that ballot marking devices can be certified.

(Keep page 19 lines 9-23 of the 2^nd engrossed version of the bill.)

Notes: Regarding posting, we also recommend putting up a sign near the posted election results, which cites the requirement that they remain posted for 48 hours, in both English and other languages commonly spoken in the county. In addition, the Secretary of State should require that the results be posted in a relatively protected manner.

Many Colorado voters still vote on machines which do not allow them to verify their votes; many verifiable ballots go unverified; most races are never audited; and the audit as currently implemented is relatively unlikely to catch errors. This unfortunately impairs transparency and accountability in our elections, making it particularly important that we preserve the information that election-night polling-place postings provide. The posted abstract of votes should include totals of undervotes and overvotes to permit full cross checking of vote tallies.

Colorado statute should also confirm that stored ballots constitute a public record and the Colorado Open Records Act ensures public access to stored ballots when requested.

We have identified many serious problems with existing statutes and practice which have not been addressed: method of audit, recount and testing, use of barcodes, lack of access to paper ballots at the polls, insufficient oversight and many other problems.

We are looking for legislators to carry future legislation on these topics.

Please contact us at margitjo [at] gmail.com.

--SB083 elections statute alert April 22, 2007 version 4 detail page 2--

Colorado Voter Group publishes public BLOG

2007-03-29T13:55:00.000-07:00

The Colorado Voter Group is a private sector entity that is working to improve the Colorado election system.

This BLOG is used to communicate with the public.

Membership in the group itself is by invitation only. We are assembling a team of people with technical expertise and election experience that works well together.

The group has established two projects. Each project is working to understand the needs and wishes of voters and contestants.

Public oversight and official accountability
The oversight and accountability project focuses on independent oversight and official accountability. The scope of the effort will be determined by the project. The oversight and accountability project's allegiance is to voters and contestants, as contrasted with election officials and equipment suppliers.

Technical
This technical project focuses on all technical aspects of the election process. The scope of the effort will include districting, voter registration and eligibility, candidate eligibility, voting, counting, reporting, auditing and canvassing, standards, and certification. The technical project will establish goals and objectives for the system and its components, and they will evaluate the work of others. It will not design or develop voting systems.

The public is encouraged use this BLOG to communicate with the Colorado Voter Group.