Yes -- the Longmont City special election in January used folded ballots. They could have been folded so as not to interfere with the boxes, but they were folded so that they did. I didn't hear of any issues concerning where the fold was, but I wasn't near the machines. Neal may know better.
Interestingly, the security sleeve for both the November 07 and January 08 elections would not fit back into the mailer once the ballot was completed and inserted. Voters could either tear the glued seam on the sleeve to make it fit (which is what was done in my household) or toss the security sleeve, which is what most voters did.Longmont elections officials (our clerk) and many voters that I've talked to complained about this in November. However the exact same problem was repeated in January of 08.Since I voted on the first day of early voting (my mail ballot never arrived), I have no idea what the security sleeve was sized for this time.
Perhaps the security sleeve was the source of the paper dust?
The best way to overcome the Ballot Now systems' issues with tiny particles is NOT TO USE IT. Every November this system has some kind of issue that causes terrible problems. Every year we here the same four words, "How could we know?"We can know because it does the same thing every time. Neal's tiny dot test proved that Ballot Now cannot discern a vote from an accidental pen swipe."How could we know?" makes me want a prescription for the same drugs the clerk's office is taking. Maybe I can forget the last 8 years.
Paul Tiger -- Longmont
Friday, November 07, 2008
Thursday, November 06, 2008
Looking forward
I generally concur with Al Kolwicz on his deeper analysis below. It is true that there is no adequate mechanism for information flow about voting systems, and to the extent that such a mechanism is in place it is too often scuttled by those in positions of power and influence. Their actions represented in the points below are taken at a real and tangible risk of loss of the accuracy of our elections. The problem of spurious marks is not unexpected by those of us watching closely, and has been encountered before. It is soluble by simple but time consuming human interception of any machine’s limited capability at vote interpretation.
In the future we must redesign our system (laws, rules, common practice, and equipment) with improved checks and remedies and perhaps more direct human involvement. But for now we must allow our existing checks in place to go forward, even if it takes days to interpret and count the marks on the paper ballots. We have always recognized that the benefit of having a countable record of voter intent depends on the ability and willingness to actually count it. While there are those who see benefits in simplicity and efficiency in losing the human countable record of voter intent, and there are also those who demand rapid results reporting, I see only loss of accuracy in those places.
Al says the spurious marks issue is not forgivable, but I see it only as foreseeable and some aspencts of it actually foreseen. This very real issue remains difficult to address under the currently popular presumption of the fallibility of the human counting of votes by many election officials. Naturally we should look for remedies involving an increase of human involvement in the vote interpretation process.
Harvie Branscomb
In the future we must redesign our system (laws, rules, common practice, and equipment) with improved checks and remedies and perhaps more direct human involvement. But for now we must allow our existing checks in place to go forward, even if it takes days to interpret and count the marks on the paper ballots. We have always recognized that the benefit of having a countable record of voter intent depends on the ability and willingness to actually count it. While there are those who see benefits in simplicity and efficiency in losing the human countable record of voter intent, and there are also those who demand rapid results reporting, I see only loss of accuracy in those places.
Al says the spurious marks issue is not forgivable, but I see it only as foreseeable and some aspencts of it actually foreseen. This very real issue remains difficult to address under the currently popular presumption of the fallibility of the human counting of votes by many election officials. Naturally we should look for remedies involving an increase of human involvement in the vote interpretation process.
Harvie Branscomb
Answers to Audit questions
On Thu, Nov 06, 2008 at 10:36:46AM -0700, Al Kolwicz wrote:
>
> Neal,
>
> Does the group's audit procedure provide the facts needed to answer"
A good audit according to the Principles from the auditing experts would give good answers to those questions.
> 1. How accurate is "mis-interpreted vote detection" by the machine audit procedure that "the group" has developed?
First, the procedure is not a "machine audit", but rather an audit of voter-verfied paper records and how various parts of the whole system interpreted them.
The benefits of audits include: http://electionaudits.org/whyaudit
* Revealing when recounts are necessary to verify election outcomes
* Finding error whether accidental or intentional
* Deterring fraud
* Providing for continuous improvement in the conduct of elections
* Promoting public confidence in elections
The details of even defining a mis-interpreted vote depend on state laws, so as always in the US, local conditions will be important.
> 2. Does the percentage of mis-interpreted votes, in one or more audited contests, extend to the non-audited contests?
If you don't audit a particular contest, your information will of course be limited and it would be hard to say. But of course you'd have a lot more information than if you don't do a good audit of at least some contests, and very few jurisdictions do good audits now.
> 3. How about the non-audited machines?
In a proper audit, all ballots would be eligible for selection, and thus all machines and other elements of the election tallying process would in some sense be "audited".
A proper audit will give good statistics about ballots that weren't chosen for hand-counting and the performance of associated machines for the contest in question. The level of confidence chosen is of course important here. And note that it is often best to focus most on detecting mistakes in tight races, which would mean that smaller levels of misinterpretation in races with a wide margin wouldn't be picked up.
> 4. Does "the group's" machine audit procedure have the ability to project the total number of misinterpreted votes?
Note we have "principles", not yet detailed, specific recommended procedures.
The procedures designed by Philip Stark do a great job of determining when problems found indicate need for an escallation by doing that sort of projection.
He has a nice page of good auditing references:
http://statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark/Vote/index.htm
> 5. How about the number of mis-interpreted votes that occurred in undervoted contests?
Sure - all categories of vote interpretation must be audited.
> Thanks for work that you are doing.
My pleasure! A good canvass with tracking of ballots is also of course critical to a good audit, so your work there is also important.
Neal McBurnett
>
> Neal,
>
> Does the group's audit procedure provide the facts needed to answer"
A good audit according to the Principles from the auditing experts would give good answers to those questions.
> 1. How accurate is "mis-interpreted vote detection" by the machine audit procedure that "the group" has developed?
First, the procedure is not a "machine audit", but rather an audit of voter-verfied paper records and how various parts of the whole system interpreted them.
The benefits of audits include: http://electionaudits.org/whyaudit
* Revealing when recounts are necessary to verify election outcomes
* Finding error whether accidental or intentional
* Deterring fraud
* Providing for continuous improvement in the conduct of elections
* Promoting public confidence in elections
The details of even defining a mis-interpreted vote depend on state laws, so as always in the US, local conditions will be important.
> 2. Does the percentage of mis-interpreted votes, in one or more audited contests, extend to the non-audited contests?
If you don't audit a particular contest, your information will of course be limited and it would be hard to say. But of course you'd have a lot more information than if you don't do a good audit of at least some contests, and very few jurisdictions do good audits now.
> 3. How about the non-audited machines?
In a proper audit, all ballots would be eligible for selection, and thus all machines and other elements of the election tallying process would in some sense be "audited".
A proper audit will give good statistics about ballots that weren't chosen for hand-counting and the performance of associated machines for the contest in question. The level of confidence chosen is of course important here. And note that it is often best to focus most on detecting mistakes in tight races, which would mean that smaller levels of misinterpretation in races with a wide margin wouldn't be picked up.
> 4. Does "the group's" machine audit procedure have the ability to project the total number of misinterpreted votes?
Note we have "principles", not yet detailed, specific recommended procedures.
The procedures designed by Philip Stark do a great job of determining when problems found indicate need for an escallation by doing that sort of projection.
He has a nice page of good auditing references:
http://statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark/Vote/index.htm
> 5. How about the number of mis-interpreted votes that occurred in undervoted contests?
Sure - all categories of vote interpretation must be audited.
> Thanks for work that you are doing.
My pleasure! A good canvass with tracking of ballots is also of course critical to a good audit, so your work there is also important.
Neal McBurnett
Speed is not the issue
Hi Harvie,
what is the stated capacity of the Hart scanner in ballots per min? Even the ES&S will do >200 ballots / min (with stops for ballots that go to resolution committee. So 12,000 per hour. now that is high speed. With the Hart system they might as well do hand counting...... that's your point!! ??
Joel
-------------------------------------
Joel
The Hart system is simply software which attaches to a variety of COTS (off the shelf) scanners (which is a good idea by the way).
The speed of scanning at full speed depends on the scanner. The Kodak scanners used by Eagle and I am sure the ones used by Boulder are plenty fast. This isn’t the issue. If anything they are too fast and don’t reliably handle forms which have been on people’s living room tables…
scan problems are of the following nature:
The scanner we are using Kodak i610 I think is about 1/sec- plenty fast if the software didn’t screw up in between scanning the batches. (I mean the frequent need to reboot systems, struggle with user interface, etc.)
Also the Hart system allows all scanning to be done before resolving… the ballot images are all stored (inaccessibly as far as I can tell in a big database) so scanning can be done independently of either resolving or of uploading votes to memory cards. This allows a lot of flexibility in use of the equipment.
I think the point is that voting system software can actually aid in hand counting ballots accurately! If you have a scanned image of a ballot you can show a particular contest magnified from one ballot to the next (Hart does this well) and flip through the ballots at 10/second If you want looking for an anomaly. This is an excellent service to those who would check ballots for voter intent. For example, the voting system could assemble all the ballots in which it interpreted the vote to be for McCain and the human operator could actually sequentially visit all those portions of the ballots very quickly to look for anomalies. Such a voting system does not exist today. The system could (Hart doesn’t really do this very well) keep a record of the human interpretation and in principle could then machine mark the vote interpretations in a harmless location on the ballot image or conceivably even on the paper ballot itself (in a different design of system) for later auditing.
I would say that it makes sense that the ballots are being examined one by one, as I think they are in Boulder, on the screen. It is true that very light marks, almost invisible to the naked eye are presented in full black on the image, and so certain stray marks and dust are emphasized on the electronic version of the visible image of the ballot. Certainly with a Hart like system you could do very good machine assisted hand counting (machine suggested human confirmed interpretation and machine tabulation) in the same amount of time that Boulder is spending with the ballots and get probably even better accuracy. With an improved design machine, you could do it much faster, and also do it in precincts.
If the press would stop bad mouthing the speed of producing results from Boulder, we would have a better chance to make a more sensible system in the future.
What happened in Florida with the Republicans and the press bad mouthing the punch cards is an example of what we do NOT want to do again.
All of the above discussion relates for the long term only to mail-in ballots or what happens if we go to all an all mail-in election.
At precinct polls we could hand count (or machine assist hand count) our ballots much sooner because of the larger number of people involved.
Harvie Branscomb
what is the stated capacity of the Hart scanner in ballots per min? Even the ES&S will do >200 ballots / min (with stops for ballots that go to resolution committee. So 12,000 per hour. now that is high speed. With the Hart system they might as well do hand counting...... that's your point!! ??
Joel
-------------------------------------
Joel
The Hart system is simply software which attaches to a variety of COTS (off the shelf) scanners (which is a good idea by the way).
The speed of scanning at full speed depends on the scanner. The Kodak scanners used by Eagle and I am sure the ones used by Boulder are plenty fast. This isn’t the issue. If anything they are too fast and don’t reliably handle forms which have been on people’s living room tables…
scan problems are of the following nature:
- Part of ballot is folded under in the stack
- Ballot upside down (supposedly can be handled, and hart prints ballots with a curved corner to avoid this, but more memory is required)
- Ballot folds help drag the adjacent ballot into the scanner
- Ripped ballot gets caught on the next ballot or on the scanner
- Bar code on ballot is slightly damaged by a mark (this rejection seems to happen unnecessarily, considering that bar codes are very resilient)
- Foreign material build up on various components in the scanner
The scanner we are using Kodak i610 I think is about 1/sec- plenty fast if the software didn’t screw up in between scanning the batches. (I mean the frequent need to reboot systems, struggle with user interface, etc.)
Also the Hart system allows all scanning to be done before resolving… the ballot images are all stored (inaccessibly as far as I can tell in a big database) so scanning can be done independently of either resolving or of uploading votes to memory cards. This allows a lot of flexibility in use of the equipment.
I think the point is that voting system software can actually aid in hand counting ballots accurately! If you have a scanned image of a ballot you can show a particular contest magnified from one ballot to the next (Hart does this well) and flip through the ballots at 10/second If you want looking for an anomaly. This is an excellent service to those who would check ballots for voter intent. For example, the voting system could assemble all the ballots in which it interpreted the vote to be for McCain and the human operator could actually sequentially visit all those portions of the ballots very quickly to look for anomalies. Such a voting system does not exist today. The system could (Hart doesn’t really do this very well) keep a record of the human interpretation and in principle could then machine mark the vote interpretations in a harmless location on the ballot image or conceivably even on the paper ballot itself (in a different design of system) for later auditing.
I would say that it makes sense that the ballots are being examined one by one, as I think they are in Boulder, on the screen. It is true that very light marks, almost invisible to the naked eye are presented in full black on the image, and so certain stray marks and dust are emphasized on the electronic version of the visible image of the ballot. Certainly with a Hart like system you could do very good machine assisted hand counting (machine suggested human confirmed interpretation and machine tabulation) in the same amount of time that Boulder is spending with the ballots and get probably even better accuracy. With an improved design machine, you could do it much faster, and also do it in precincts.
If the press would stop bad mouthing the speed of producing results from Boulder, we would have a better chance to make a more sensible system in the future.
What happened in Florida with the Republicans and the press bad mouthing the punch cards is an example of what we do NOT want to do again.
All of the above discussion relates for the long term only to mail-in ballots or what happens if we go to all an all mail-in election.
At precinct polls we could hand count (or machine assist hand count) our ballots much sooner because of the larger number of people involved.
Harvie Branscomb
Hold these officials accountable
Harvie,
I have a different take on your question, “Why hasn’t Boulder County Clerk Hillary Hall heard about dust problems on her Hart Scanners? I would suggest that the reason is that there is no mechanism for this kind of problem sharing to take place.“
From my perspective, the problem of spurious marks on HART optical scanners is not a surprise and is not forgivable.
Election officials should be held individually accountable for this problem.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
I have a different take on your question, “Why hasn’t Boulder County Clerk Hillary Hall heard about dust problems on her Hart Scanners? I would suggest that the reason is that there is no mechanism for this kind of problem sharing to take place.“
- The problem of spurious marks was detected by the State’s Voting System Certification Team. A CONDITION OF USE was set up that would require special manual pre-scanning treatment of all HART paper ballots. At a hearing, we attempted to protect this condition. However, the powerful, secret, Colorado County Clerks Association lobbied, using incomplete and erroneous arguments, to protect the vendor and themselves from this condition of use. They persuaded the SOS to remove the condition of use.
- The architecture of all paper ballot vote counting systems certified in Colorado is fatally flawed. None of these systems provide exports of the ballot images and the interpretation of each vote on each individual ballot. Consequently, independent verification of vote interpretation is not possible – not even by the Canvass Boards.
- The LAT is contrived and inadequate. The procedures and materials are idealized, and not at all representative of the real world. And, in the case of Boulder County, the Clerk contrived to exclude the people most knowledgeable of the HART system from serving on the LAT team. (Not to sound like sour grapes, I was not permitted to serve.)
- Despite repeated requests that officials follow Colorado Statutes and Rules, the County and the State have neglected to perform “acceptance Tests” of the voting system. The system test would include ballot printers/vendors as well as every other component/subsystem.
From my perspective, the problem of spurious marks on HART optical scanners is not a surprise and is not forgivable.
Election officials should be held individually accountable for this problem.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
Objection to Daily Camera Editorial Staff
TO: Erika (Stulzman) of the Daily Camera Editorial Staff
(copy of a letter to Erika written through the Daily Camera web site)
I would hope you get a chance to educate yourself on the election reform topic more before writing again about how bad it might be that Boulder is slow reporting vote counts. Speed of reporting is just about the lowest criterion for quality in the election, and there is much which should be prioritized over speed. I hope you come to realize how destructive the pressure for quick reporting can be. This is an enormously complex topic and some of us are basically devoting all of our free time to trying to understand it, and testify about it on behalf of the voting public at the Legislature. I have written about what is wrong with Colorado election law, as well has testified on numerous occasions. I do hope that you will contact members of the Boulder community of election quality activists such as Neal McBurnett 494-6493 (Green) or Al Kolwicz 494-1540 (Republican) or Mary Eberle 442-2164 (Unaffiliated) or Margit Johansson 442-1668 (Democratic). All of us have been working together to improve elections.
One of the greatest challenges is to spread a better understanding of the reality of voting through the media. I just don't understand why you wrote the following:
"But the county needs to get it together. If Jefferson and Denver counties can have their votes counted in a timely manner (and they did), why can't we? A serious dialogue about scrapping our system is step No. 1. Had this been a contested election with major problems, Boulder County's mysterious "dust" would be this year's hanging chads. That is unacceptable.
And a note to anyone wanting to challenge Hall for her clerk's position because of the slow election results: That's what she said."
I don’t disagree that a discussion about scrapping the system is in order. In fact a discussion about scrapping all the systems in Colorado is in order. The technical test board of the Secretary of State actually recommended not certifying any of the voting systems currently in use in Colorado (except hand counting). Only through the catch-22 of Colorado law and with the help of our 2008 Legislature could our Secretary of State (now Congressman to be) Mike Coffman personally decide that all voting systems were ok to use. There are better voting systems which could be certified and there are certainly better systems which could be designed if state laws would only accommodate these better ideas.
It could be that Jefferson and Denver counties are not as careful as Boulder County about election quality. Have you checked? Why not investigate the truth about "hanging chads"? These were foolishly presented as the worst thing that ever happened to an American election when in reality they were an indication of a reasonably well designed voting system valiantly recording evidence of voter intent when rank mismanagement of the voting system made it very difficult for voters to vote. Rank mismanagemnet on a totally electronic voting system leads to no record of voter intent whatsoever. Think about it. That is a very good reason to use paper ballots. Paper ballots allow voters in difficult situations (and eligible voters represent a spectacularly wide variety of human characteristics not the least of which includes old age) to express themselves. Machines do have difficulty interpreting some of these marks on paper ballots, although they are quite good at adding them up, once the marks have been understood.
I would be glad to send you more information about the defects of Colorado elections and election law, and would invite you to attend the Election Reform Committee hearings on Nov 12, although these should be taken with a grain of salt considering that the Commission consists of mostly election officials who are not the ones who most need a commission to improve the election... they have considerable power in their own hands. Perhaps you could widen the scope of your writing on this topic.
FYI Eagle County votes with a similar system to that of Boulder County. I am the Canvass Board member for the Democratic Party. I have first hand experience, through testing, of the various defects and benefits of that system, although I am now sure I have not seen all the defects yet.
Please send me your email address and I will reply with more information.
Harvie Branscomb
Eagle County Canvass Board
Colorado Voter Group
(copy of a letter to Erika written through the Daily Camera web site)
I would hope you get a chance to educate yourself on the election reform topic more before writing again about how bad it might be that Boulder is slow reporting vote counts. Speed of reporting is just about the lowest criterion for quality in the election, and there is much which should be prioritized over speed. I hope you come to realize how destructive the pressure for quick reporting can be. This is an enormously complex topic and some of us are basically devoting all of our free time to trying to understand it, and testify about it on behalf of the voting public at the Legislature. I have written about what is wrong with Colorado election law, as well has testified on numerous occasions. I do hope that you will contact members of the Boulder community of election quality activists such as Neal McBurnett 494-6493 (Green) or Al Kolwicz 494-1540 (Republican) or Mary Eberle 442-2164 (Unaffiliated) or Margit Johansson 442-1668 (Democratic). All of us have been working together to improve elections.
One of the greatest challenges is to spread a better understanding of the reality of voting through the media. I just don't understand why you wrote the following:
"But the county needs to get it together. If Jefferson and Denver counties can have their votes counted in a timely manner (and they did), why can't we? A serious dialogue about scrapping our system is step No. 1. Had this been a contested election with major problems, Boulder County's mysterious "dust" would be this year's hanging chads. That is unacceptable.
And a note to anyone wanting to challenge Hall for her clerk's position because of the slow election results: That's what she said."
I don’t disagree that a discussion about scrapping the system is in order. In fact a discussion about scrapping all the systems in Colorado is in order. The technical test board of the Secretary of State actually recommended not certifying any of the voting systems currently in use in Colorado (except hand counting). Only through the catch-22 of Colorado law and with the help of our 2008 Legislature could our Secretary of State (now Congressman to be) Mike Coffman personally decide that all voting systems were ok to use. There are better voting systems which could be certified and there are certainly better systems which could be designed if state laws would only accommodate these better ideas.
It could be that Jefferson and Denver counties are not as careful as Boulder County about election quality. Have you checked? Why not investigate the truth about "hanging chads"? These were foolishly presented as the worst thing that ever happened to an American election when in reality they were an indication of a reasonably well designed voting system valiantly recording evidence of voter intent when rank mismanagement of the voting system made it very difficult for voters to vote. Rank mismanagemnet on a totally electronic voting system leads to no record of voter intent whatsoever. Think about it. That is a very good reason to use paper ballots. Paper ballots allow voters in difficult situations (and eligible voters represent a spectacularly wide variety of human characteristics not the least of which includes old age) to express themselves. Machines do have difficulty interpreting some of these marks on paper ballots, although they are quite good at adding them up, once the marks have been understood.
I would be glad to send you more information about the defects of Colorado elections and election law, and would invite you to attend the Election Reform Committee hearings on Nov 12, although these should be taken with a grain of salt considering that the Commission consists of mostly election officials who are not the ones who most need a commission to improve the election... they have considerable power in their own hands. Perhaps you could widen the scope of your writing on this topic.
FYI Eagle County votes with a similar system to that of Boulder County. I am the Canvass Board member for the Democratic Party. I have first hand experience, through testing, of the various defects and benefits of that system, although I am now sure I have not seen all the defects yet.
Please send me your email address and I will reply with more information.
Harvie Branscomb
Eagle County Canvass Board
Colorado Voter Group
Eagle County has encountered a number of similar problems with HART
Excerpt from article reproduced in full at bottom of email (referring to Boulder County vote counting delays)
Why hasn’t Boulder County Clerk Hillary Hall heard about dust problems on her Hart Scanners? I would suggest that the reason is that there is no mechanism for this kind of problem sharing to take place. The manufacturer has little motivation to encourage the sharing of election problems with their equipment… the CCCI (clerks association) doesn’t either, apparently, other than what happens through serendipity. The state has no mechanism for this and the election quality advocates among the public are largely shut out of the process so have difficulty learning about these problems, and also have problems having their criticisms heard once they do have information.
Eagle County has encountered a number of similar problems with Hart and Kodak systems, and has been very frustrated by the operation of this system during the past few days. Will the reports of this frustration reach other counties and other states? Probably not.
In addition, Hart created (I do not think these are actually, technically, “printed”) ballots are folded at the factory. These multiple folds are very difficult to straighten out and have caused immense difficulty in feeding the ballots into the scanners. On many batches there are one or more ballots which fail to scan and therefore have to be deleted from the digital records and rescanned in an adjacent batch. (Alternatively the batch must be sequentially rescanned until successful, but this proves to be too slow). In another area, the score at the top of each page which allows the stub to be removed is too weak and hence the stub is extremely difficult to remove, also delaying the scanning process and often leaving a rough edge at the top of the ballot.
Eagle County is stopping to dismantle parts from the scanners and vacuum the interior on a very frequent basis. During the tests it was found that the scanner needed extra white metal shields to be added to successfully scan 17” ballots. This information had not been provided in advance by Hart.
It was also discovered that inserting ballots bottom first caused an extra load on the ballot processing software, actually slowing the process and causing it to run out of memory, frequently. When it ran out of memory the program would not recover gracefully. This actually caused certain batches of ballots to consistently fail to scan. When all ballots were loaded head first, this problem was relieved (apparently for technical reasons related to the design of the software, but probably never encountered during State testing and in any case unknown to Hart system users). However it was then discovered that since the first fold was about ¾ of an inch from the top, the ballots were bent in a direction which, if inserted top up, would not allow the scanner roller to pick up the pages consistently. It was deemed necessary to load the ballots bottom up. None of this was advised by Hart, the voting system supplier, in advance and was all discovered in the initial scanning process of this particular ballot in this election.
Will reports of these problems reach Hart and other Hart county users? Will someone make a huge manual of gotchas which will benefit local election officials?
Doubtful.
The remaining references to attention to detail in this article are admirable.. I note that John Gideon’s 2005 report of the white line is probably not entirely what Boulder County is experiencing although it may be part of it. I suspect that there are a variety of single pixel or larger black marks on the ballots as well. It would be better if the press were able to get sufficient access to be able to report accurately on this topic.
Harvie Branscomb
Eagle County Canvass Board
(Eagle is a user of a similar system to that used in Boulder County)
To ensure accuracy, election workers are visually checking a picture of
each ballot on computers, searching for the troublesome dust line. Though
officials hope a couple of technological fixes will speed up the counting, the
rate of votes counted Wednesday hung around 1,200 ballots an hour.
“Accuracy
is more important than speed,” said Boulder County Clerk and Recorder Hillary
Hall. “People expect accuracy — this is the job I was elected to do.”
The molasses speed of the counting process is frustrating Hall, but
perhaps more confounding is that there doesn’t appear to be any obvious
explanation for why the paper-dust problem showed up now.
“I just don’t know,” she said. “If this is a common problem, I’ve
frankly never heard about it.”
The Laura Snider article is quite reasonable
in its coverage of the Boulder vote counting process.
Why hasn’t Boulder County Clerk Hillary Hall heard about dust problems on her Hart Scanners? I would suggest that the reason is that there is no mechanism for this kind of problem sharing to take place. The manufacturer has little motivation to encourage the sharing of election problems with their equipment… the CCCI (clerks association) doesn’t either, apparently, other than what happens through serendipity. The state has no mechanism for this and the election quality advocates among the public are largely shut out of the process so have difficulty learning about these problems, and also have problems having their criticisms heard once they do have information.
Eagle County has encountered a number of similar problems with Hart and Kodak systems, and has been very frustrated by the operation of this system during the past few days. Will the reports of this frustration reach other counties and other states? Probably not.
“The county needs to talk to their printer,” said Peter Lichtenheld, director ofUnlike Boulder, Eagle County has its ballots manufactured by Hart. These ballots are also problematic but in a different way. They do not seem to be emitting dust particles, but they are showing evidence shadow imprinting of portions of the ballot onto other portions. In our case, fortunately, this is occurring only on the removable stub… but in past elections we have experienced transfer of ballot toner onto the active part of the ballot (on Diebold printed ballots in the past).
marketing for Hart InterCivic. “Hart did not print the ballots ... and the
printer did not use Hart secure ballot stock.”
In addition, Hart created (I do not think these are actually, technically, “printed”) ballots are folded at the factory. These multiple folds are very difficult to straighten out and have caused immense difficulty in feeding the ballots into the scanners. On many batches there are one or more ballots which fail to scan and therefore have to be deleted from the digital records and rescanned in an adjacent batch. (Alternatively the batch must be sequentially rescanned until successful, but this proves to be too slow). In another area, the score at the top of each page which allows the stub to be removed is too weak and hence the stub is extremely difficult to remove, also delaying the scanning process and often leaving a rough edge at the top of the ballot.
Eagle County is stopping to dismantle parts from the scanners and vacuum the interior on a very frequent basis. During the tests it was found that the scanner needed extra white metal shields to be added to successfully scan 17” ballots. This information had not been provided in advance by Hart.
It was also discovered that inserting ballots bottom first caused an extra load on the ballot processing software, actually slowing the process and causing it to run out of memory, frequently. When it ran out of memory the program would not recover gracefully. This actually caused certain batches of ballots to consistently fail to scan. When all ballots were loaded head first, this problem was relieved (apparently for technical reasons related to the design of the software, but probably never encountered during State testing and in any case unknown to Hart system users). However it was then discovered that since the first fold was about ¾ of an inch from the top, the ballots were bent in a direction which, if inserted top up, would not allow the scanner roller to pick up the pages consistently. It was deemed necessary to load the ballots bottom up. None of this was advised by Hart, the voting system supplier, in advance and was all discovered in the initial scanning process of this particular ballot in this election.
Will reports of these problems reach Hart and other Hart county users? Will someone make a huge manual of gotchas which will benefit local election officials?
Doubtful.
The remaining references to attention to detail in this article are admirable.. I note that John Gideon’s 2005 report of the white line is probably not entirely what Boulder County is experiencing although it may be part of it. I suspect that there are a variety of single pixel or larger black marks on the ballots as well. It would be better if the press were able to get sufficient access to be able to report accurately on this topic.
Harvie Branscomb
Eagle County Canvass Board
(Eagle is a user of a similar system to that used in Boulder County)
How precise are audits?
Does the Audit Elections group's audit procedure provide the facts needed to answer"
- How accurate is "mis-interpreted vote detection" by the machine audit procedure that "the group" has developed?
- Does the percentage of mis-interpreted votes, in one or more audited contests, extend to the non-audited contests?
- How about the non-audited machines?
- Does "the group's" machine audit procedure have the ability to project the total number of misinterpreted votes?
- How about the number of mis-interpreted votes that occurred in undervoted contests?
Thanks for work that you are doing at https://launchpad.net/electionaudits
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
How closely are other counties looking at their ballots?
The best story I've seen so far on this is from Laura Snider at the Boulder Daily Camera. Or maybe I'm biased since she called me and put in a quote or two 8-)
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/2008/nov/05/boulder-countys-counting-crawls/
From the limited information I have, it seems to me that the magnitude of the problem is relatively small and might not be noticed by counties that don't look closely at their ballots via a good audit or the sort of screen images that the BallotNow system provides (despite its many flaws, that is an interesting aspect of the Hart system).
So how closely are other counties looking at their ballots, from systems known to have problems?
Snider writes:
Last winter, Secretary of State Mike Coffman de-certified all Hart scanning equipment because the scanners "failed to count votes accurately when there are extraneous marks on the ballot."
...
Coffman's testing board recommended that he institute regulations requiring county officials to review every ballot, looking for the stray marks. Instead, Coffman chose to re-certify the machines, which are used in 47 Colorado counties, without the extra regulations.
That creates the possibility that some counties using the Hart scanners may be having dust problems and not know it.
Improved audits were required by the conditions of use imposed by the Secretary of State. But who besides Boulder in Colorado is really doing good audits of mail-in ballots?
What is your county doing?
Neal McBurnett http://neal.mcburnett.org/
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/2008/nov/05/boulder-countys-counting-crawls/
From the limited information I have, it seems to me that the magnitude of the problem is relatively small and might not be noticed by counties that don't look closely at their ballots via a good audit or the sort of screen images that the BallotNow system provides (despite its many flaws, that is an interesting aspect of the Hart system).
So how closely are other counties looking at their ballots, from systems known to have problems?
Snider writes:
Last winter, Secretary of State Mike Coffman de-certified all Hart scanning equipment because the scanners "failed to count votes accurately when there are extraneous marks on the ballot."
...
Coffman's testing board recommended that he institute regulations requiring county officials to review every ballot, looking for the stray marks. Instead, Coffman chose to re-certify the machines, which are used in 47 Colorado counties, without the extra regulations.
That creates the possibility that some counties using the Hart scanners may be having dust problems and not know it.
Improved audits were required by the conditions of use imposed by the Secretary of State. But who besides Boulder in Colorado is really doing good audits of mail-in ballots?
What is your county doing?
Neal McBurnett http://neal.mcburnett.org/
More on print through
As concerns print through or transfer of one part of the ballot to another, either at the original manufacturing process or while being crushed in folded form in postal sorting machines, or stacked after receipt at the county... it is important to know that many ballot manufacturing processes are similar to laser printing... ie toner is used, and toner is subject to transfer from one place to another when heat is involved if not in other circumstances. Hart manufactured ballots seem to sometimes have toner transfer onto the removable stub on the back side, in this election.
It is not the case that ballots are necessarily printed with ink. However, it is useful to know if this is the case. I understand Boulder County Colorado ballots may have been manufactured or printed by some company other than Hart.
Harvie Branscomb
It is not the case that ballots are necessarily printed with ink. However, it is useful to know if this is the case. I understand Boulder County Colorado ballots may have been manufactured or printed by some company other than Hart.
Harvie Branscomb
Ghost votes - print through
I've worked as a resolution judge today. The problem is called ghost
votes by the other judges with whom I worked. Changes in threshold
setting on the mark detector software seem to be making a dramatic
improvement in ths processing. But, to my untrained eye, there is
something very strange going on. The details of the images of marks
that I see don't fit well with any explanation that has been suggested
to me. I feel sorry for the people working on this problem. The environment
in which they are gathering data is certainly not a scientifit/engineering
laboratory. There a lot of constraints on the experiments they can
perform, and there is a lot of pressure to perform very quickly. But
when you discover that there is a problem with the actual count you
have to announce to the press and try to deal with their questions.
I'm sure a lot of time is being wasted dealing with crazy theories
generated by the press and public.
Part of the problem that I did see was a kind of print through of text on
the ballot onto other parts of the ballot. This was attributed to a wrong
ink used by the printer. This wrong ink remelted in the Post Office sorting
machine when the mail passed between hot rollers. (I don't think the
rollers are deliberately heated. They just get hot during normal operation
of the sorter. But I'm not sure.)
I had no problem fitting my mail-in ballot into the return-mail envelope
for this election. The envelopes were correctly sized, IMHO.
Paul Condon
votes by the other judges with whom I worked. Changes in threshold
setting on the mark detector software seem to be making a dramatic
improvement in ths processing. But, to my untrained eye, there is
something very strange going on. The details of the images of marks
that I see don't fit well with any explanation that has been suggested
to me. I feel sorry for the people working on this problem. The environment
in which they are gathering data is certainly not a scientifit/engineering
laboratory. There a lot of constraints on the experiments they can
perform, and there is a lot of pressure to perform very quickly. But
when you discover that there is a problem with the actual count you
have to announce to the press and try to deal with their questions.
I'm sure a lot of time is being wasted dealing with crazy theories
generated by the press and public.
Part of the problem that I did see was a kind of print through of text on
the ballot onto other parts of the ballot. This was attributed to a wrong
ink used by the printer. This wrong ink remelted in the Post Office sorting
machine when the mail passed between hot rollers. (I don't think the
rollers are deliberately heated. They just get hot during normal operation
of the sorter. But I'm not sure.)
I had no problem fitting my mail-in ballot into the return-mail envelope
for this election. The envelopes were correctly sized, IMHO.
Paul Condon
Do not use “auto-resolve damaged contest”
The problem mentioned in the Gideon report is completely soluble or at least identifiable if “auto-resolve damaged contest” is not used.
In Eagle County we “auto-resolve undervotes” only. It seems that “auto resolve undervotes” is relatively harmless, if not completely so. The experience we have is that if any mark however light is found within the target the BNIP software detects either a vote or an overvote, and if there is any damage to the existing ballot target (occlusion of the target rectangle), manual resolution of a “damaged contest” is required. It is almost impossible for a foreign particle or something causing a white line to produce an undervote, unless “autoresolve damaged contest” is selected. One would have to imagine a particle of precise size and placement to occlude the entire voter mark without touching the surrounding rectangle. I would therefore recommend to operate with auto-resolve undervote selected (only). Having turned off auto-resolution of undervotes, the manual resolution of undervotes would be extremely time consuming and would not produce any differences due to human recognized voter intent. We have actually tried this in Eagle County in the early scanning of our mail-in ballots and have come to that conclusion.
On the other hand, if foreign particles, smudges or other spurious marks are causing extraneous marks on the scanned images of the ballots which are being recognized as votes, the solution would be a real hand eye scan of each contest which is actually resolved as a vote- i.e. in Hart, a contest which is not marked with a colored overlay at all- and this of course is generally the majority of all contests on all the ballot images. There is no way to select for slightly marked, or less than fully marked targets within the Hart system as far as I know. This is the function that would be required to help find the effect of spurious marks. Also of course, the “none of the above” option as a choice on the ballot would greatly help in finding spurious marks- without this the system is depending on the likelihood that an overvote will be generated to find that such a problem exists. If you know the problem already exists and is significant, then effectively, each contest must be hand counted… although it may be convenient to use the optically scanned version of the ballot to conduct this hand count and to use the hart resolution software interface to reflect and record the observed voter intent.
Having now experienced the resolution process first hand, I can say that there are some very interesting patterns of mis-voting which arise, and spurious marks certainly do create overvote situations. No doubt then, the same effects will cause voter undervoted contests to mistakenly become recognized as voted.
Harvie Branscomb
Eagle County Canvass Board
In Eagle County we “auto-resolve undervotes” only. It seems that “auto resolve undervotes” is relatively harmless, if not completely so. The experience we have is that if any mark however light is found within the target the BNIP software detects either a vote or an overvote, and if there is any damage to the existing ballot target (occlusion of the target rectangle), manual resolution of a “damaged contest” is required. It is almost impossible for a foreign particle or something causing a white line to produce an undervote, unless “autoresolve damaged contest” is selected. One would have to imagine a particle of precise size and placement to occlude the entire voter mark without touching the surrounding rectangle. I would therefore recommend to operate with auto-resolve undervote selected (only). Having turned off auto-resolution of undervotes, the manual resolution of undervotes would be extremely time consuming and would not produce any differences due to human recognized voter intent. We have actually tried this in Eagle County in the early scanning of our mail-in ballots and have come to that conclusion.
On the other hand, if foreign particles, smudges or other spurious marks are causing extraneous marks on the scanned images of the ballots which are being recognized as votes, the solution would be a real hand eye scan of each contest which is actually resolved as a vote- i.e. in Hart, a contest which is not marked with a colored overlay at all- and this of course is generally the majority of all contests on all the ballot images. There is no way to select for slightly marked, or less than fully marked targets within the Hart system as far as I know. This is the function that would be required to help find the effect of spurious marks. Also of course, the “none of the above” option as a choice on the ballot would greatly help in finding spurious marks- without this the system is depending on the likelihood that an overvote will be generated to find that such a problem exists. If you know the problem already exists and is significant, then effectively, each contest must be hand counted… although it may be convenient to use the optically scanned version of the ballot to conduct this hand count and to use the hart resolution software interface to reflect and record the observed voter intent.
Having now experienced the resolution process first hand, I can say that there are some very interesting patterns of mis-voting which arise, and spurious marks certainly do create overvote situations. No doubt then, the same effects will cause voter undervoted contests to mistakenly become recognized as voted.
Harvie Branscomb
Eagle County Canvass Board
What's different?
So why is Boulder County having problems three years later?
Margit
==============================
These [November 4, 2008] ballots were huge so were folded in quarters to mail. There were tons of mailed ballots this time.
Neal, do you know whether the Longmont City Council special election used folded ballots? The Daily Camera article mentions that the Longmont ballots were created by the same vendor as was used for yesterday's election.
Mary
Margit
==============================
These [November 4, 2008] ballots were huge so were folded in quarters to mail. There were tons of mailed ballots this time.
Neal, do you know whether the Longmont City Council special election used folded ballots? The Daily Camera article mentions that the Longmont ballots were created by the same vendor as was used for yesterday's election.
Mary
All it takes is a can of pressurized air to fix the problem.
Boulder Co is suffering from paper dust and dirt from the ballots. This is something that we reported in July 2005 from problems in Yakima Co WA.
http://www.votersunite.org/info/yakimaproblemreport.asp
All it takes is a can of pressurized air to fix the problem. --
John Gideon
Co-Executive Director
VotersUnite.Org
http://www.votersunite.org/info/yakimaproblemreport.asp
All it takes is a can of pressurized air to fix the problem. --
John Gideon
Co-Executive Director
VotersUnite.Org
HART OpScan fails again
Daily Camera
Explanation for ‘paper dust’ still elusive
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/2008/nov/05/boulder-countys-counting-crawls/
Daily Camera
Dust slows Boulder County’s ballot count
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/2008/nov/04/election-day-begins-early-voting-may-result-shorte/
Longmont Times-Call
Boulder County - ‘Phantom’ marks frustrate election workers [Hart eScan problems]
http://www.timescall.com/news_story.asp?ID=11914
7 NEWS Denver
Boulder County - Dust, Creases Slow Ballot Count In Boulder Workers Have To Inspect Ballots [Hart eScan]
http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/17895498/detail.html#-
VotersUnite.ORG
Hart InterCivic Optical-Scan Has A Weak Spot
http://www.votersunite.org/info/yakimaproblemreport.asp
Explanation for ‘paper dust’ still elusive
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/2008/nov/05/boulder-countys-counting-crawls/
Daily Camera
Dust slows Boulder County’s ballot count
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/2008/nov/04/election-day-begins-early-voting-may-result-shorte/
Longmont Times-Call
Boulder County - ‘Phantom’ marks frustrate election workers [Hart eScan problems]
http://www.timescall.com/news_story.asp?ID=11914
7 NEWS Denver
Boulder County - Dust, Creases Slow Ballot Count In Boulder Workers Have To Inspect Ballots [Hart eScan]
http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/17895498/detail.html#-
VotersUnite.ORG
Hart InterCivic Optical-Scan Has A Weak Spot
http://www.votersunite.org/info/yakimaproblemreport.asp
Friday, July 18, 2008
Boulder County Clerk refuses some CORA requests, ignores others.
On July 17, 2008, Boulder County Clerk Hillary Hall responded to a Colorado Open Records Act request dated July 1, 2008 and augmented July 8th. The following summarizes our July 8th request and transcribes the clerk's response to the request.
We will visit the Clerk's office to examine the materials.
REQUEST: We wish to review the Scanned Ballot Image Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
ACTION: Please reply to the above questions, and please reconsider the County’s July 7th response to our request for scanned ballot image files.
REQUEST: We wish to review the Ballot Now Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
ACTION: Please provide a list of all system objects so that we can use the proper identifiers. Please respond to the attached resubmission for BallotNow log files.
REQUEST: We wish to review the Cast Vote Record Files (Ballot Now and eSlate/JBC) created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
ACTION: Please respond to our original request for eSlate/JBC Cast Vote Record files, and BallotNow Cast vote Record files.
REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Results Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
ACTION: Please confirm that the NEW SCORE voter database was not integrated into the system for the LAT. Please confirm that the County has performed no Acceptance Test which would have integrated all of the components of the elections system.
REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
ACTION: Please respond to the attached resubmission request for TALLY log files.
REQUEST: We wish to review the (1) the detailed procedures and instructions that were used to plan, manage, and conduct the test, (2) any observations regarding the test, and (3) any test reports from the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
ACTION: The HART Central Scanner has known quality problems, and was only conditionally certified. One of the conditions for use is related to pre-scanning inspection.
REQUEST: In all of the responses to our requests for “files”, paper was produced. We requested “files” – computer files.
ACTION: Please respond to our request for files with computer files.
ACTION: Conceal the “answers” from those operating the system by recording them on the test plan (expected results) document rather than on the actual ballot.
ACTION: If acceptance tests of the entire voting system were performed, we wish to review the test plans and the test results. If the acceptance tests were not performed, we wish to know how Boulder County’s election system will be brought into compliance with Rule 45.11 before it is used to cast or count votes for the Primary Election.
We will visit the Clerk's office to examine the materials.
REQUEST: We wish to review the Scanned Ballot Image Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
ACTION: Please reply to the above questions, and please reconsider the County’s July 7th response to our request for scanned ballot image files.
CLERK’s RESPONSE: The Scanned Ballot Image Files are not available for you to view. The BallotNow System does not store the images in a non-proprietary way. The Boulder County Clerk & Recorder's office complies with Colorado law. The Boulder County Clerk and Recorder's office is in compliance with Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7.
REQUEST: We wish to review the Ballot Now Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
ACTION: Please provide a list of all system objects so that we can use the proper identifiers. Please respond to the attached resubmission for BallotNow log files.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: Please schedule a time to visit our office to review these documents, 303-413-7766.
REQUEST: We wish to review the Cast Vote Record Files (Ballot Now and eSlate/JBC) created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
ACTION: Please respond to our original request for eSlate/JBC Cast Vote Record files, and BallotNow Cast vote Record files.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: Please schedule a time to visit our office to review these documents, 303-413-7766.
REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Results Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
ACTION: Please confirm that the NEW SCORE voter database was not integrated into the system for the LAT. Please confirm that the County has performed no Acceptance Test which would have integrated all of the components of the elections system.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: We provided you with available data on July 3.
REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
ACTION: Please respond to the attached resubmission request for TALLY log files.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: We provided you with the complete TALLY Log Files on July 3.
REQUEST: We wish to review the (1) the detailed procedures and instructions that were used to plan, manage, and conduct the test, (2) any observations regarding the test, and (3) any test reports from the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
ACTION: The HART Central Scanner has known quality problems, and was only conditionally certified. One of the conditions for use is related to pre-scanning inspection.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: Please schedule a time to visit our office to review these documents, 303-413-7766.
During our inspection at the printer, we discovered one ballot printed on one side. We purposely included this ballot in the testing to ensure the system could properly handle the ballot.
REQUEST: In all of the responses to our requests for “files”, paper was produced. We requested “files” – computer files.
ACTION: Please respond to our request for files with computer files.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: No response.REQUEST: Staff required test developers to write the correct test “answer” on each ballot. This “open book” approach to testing eliminates the possibility that the voter’s intent can be ambiguous, and is therefore not a realistic test.
ACTION: Conceal the “answers” from those operating the system by recording them on the test plan (expected results) document rather than on the actual ballot.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: No response.REQUEST: Election Rule 45.11 requires that a new or modified voting system must undergo acceptance testing before it may be used to cast or count votes in any election. Since the LAT did not include use of the NEW SCORE data, the LAT was reliant on the results of an earlier acceptance test.
ACTION: If acceptance tests of the entire voting system were performed, we wish to review the test plans and the test results. If the acceptance tests were not performed, we wish to know how Boulder County’s election system will be brought into compliance with Rule 45.11 before it is used to cast or count votes for the Primary Election.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: The CORA request regarding acceptance testing: the voting equipment did not change. We are in full compliance with Rule 45.11.
Thursday, July 10, 2008
Open Records Request gets non-responsive reply.
July 8, 2008
Ms. Hillary Hall
Boulder County Clerk & Recorder
RE: Colorado Open Records Act request dated July 1, 2008
Dear Ms. Hall:
At a meeting today with Elections Coordinator, Carlos Webb, materials produced in response to our Colorado Open Records Act request were reviewed.
The following summarizes: our request, the data provided by staff, and our assessment of the data.
REQUEST: We wish to review the Scanned Ballot Image Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
A non-responsive July 7th letter from Assistant County Attorney, Shelley Bailey, responded, “These records do not exist, therefore, we are unable to fulfill your request at this time.”
Even if it were true that the records did not exist on July 7th, did the records not exist on July 3rd at about 10:00 AM when a set of reports was produced in response to our Open Records request?
At what time, and under whose authority were these election records destroyed?
Are these election records not preserved in the BOSS database, or other database that is backed up as a permanent record of the Logic and Accuracy Test?
Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7 requires that all election data shall be exportable on-demand by authorized users. What is the explanation for the destruction of these particular election records?
If any, what other election records were destroyed?
ACTION: Please reply to the above questions, and please reconsider the County’s July 7th response to our request for scanned ballot image files.
REQUEST: We wish to review the Ballot Now Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
Due to a nomenclature problem, rather than the BallotNow Log files, staff produced, in response to our open records request, the following non-responsive reports, one set for each of the 8 BallotNow computer systems, dated July 3, 2008 approximately 10:00 AM:
· Election Report - Official
· Election MBBs – Official
· Resolve Status Report – Official
· Scan Batch Summary – Official
· Scanned Ballots by Batch – Official (multiple pages)
We discussed what we are looking for with Patty Stahl and she asked that we resubmit the request using the title “BallotNow System Audit Log”. We have attached this request.
We also asked if there is a copy of the specifications for the system or a detailed list of system objects that we can review, so that we can be better informed of the correct identifiers for system objects.
We remain concerned that the identifier “BallotNow System Audit Log” may not include all of the log data we seek. If it does not, by way of explanation, we want to review all log data. This would include system administration tasks, the state of and state-changes of application and system switches, the trusted build hash value (MD5 or SHA-1) of the firmware or software, the engineering level of the equipment, the details of vote interpretation for individual ballots, Cast Vote Record creation and revision, MBB creation and revision, etc. In other words, all logs.
ACTION: Please provide a list of all system objects so that we can use the proper identifiers. Please respond to the attached resubmission for BallotNow log files.
REQUEST: We wish to review the Cast Vote Record Files (Ballot Now and eSlate/JBC) created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
Due to a nomenclature problem, rather than the Cast Vote Record files (BallotNow and eSlate/JBC), staff produced, in response to our open records request, the following non-responsive reports”:
· JBC Connectivity
· Devices Backed Up
· 4 JBC Paper Tape Summaries
We agreed to produce for Carlos a sample of a printout of a Cast Vote Record, which is attached. The attached sample comes from an eSlate/JBC device.
ACTION: Please respond to our original request for eSlate/JBC Cast Vote Record files, and BallotNow Cast vote Record files.
REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Results Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
The partially responsive materials presented were:
· Unofficial County-wide Summary by Contest (9 pages)
· MBBs Read report (17 MBBs) (1 page)
· Precinct Turnout report (7 pages)
· Canvass Report (142 pages)
We identified what we consider to be several problems with the materials presented:
· The Canvass Report does not include precinct/contest OVER-UNDER votes.
· The reports show that the voter file data used for the LAT was not real voter data. The integration of the NEW SCORE voter data into the system was therefore not tested.
ACTION: Please confirm that the NEW SCORE voter database was not integrated into the system for the LAT. Please confirm that the County has performed no Acceptance Test which would have integrated all of the components of the elections system.
REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
There was a misunderstanding of our request. We will assume that the same nomenclature used for the BallotNow request, above, applies to the TALLY log files.
ACTION: Please respond to the attached resubmission request for TALLY log files.
REQUEST: We wish to review the (1) the detailed procedures and instructions that were used to plan, manage, and conduct the test, (2) any observations regarding the test, and (3) any test reports from the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
The partially responsive materials presented were:
We asked if this problem was detected by any pre-scanning inspection. Carlos told us that it was not. He further told us that there was no pre-scanning inspection.
In a separate meeting, Republican LAT representative, Amy Barnes Fry, reported to Neal and me that there was an additional printing problem. This problem was not disclosed in response to our open records request and not disclosed orally by Mr. Webb. This problem was a misprinting of the vote capture box such that the box itself was detected as a vote. This is a case of the “spurious mark” problem that has troubled the HART system.
Problems, such as the problems with the misprinted ballot, were hidden from our review. We believe that this should have been disclosed in response to our open records request.
ACTION: The HART Central Scanner has known quality problems, and was only conditionally certified. One of the conditions for use is related to pre-scanning inspection.
If it is correct that the LAT was performed without a pre-scanning inspection, the equipment was used in a non-certified manner. The Secretary of State must be immediately notified that the mitigation for the HART “spurious mark” problem did not work, and must be replaced by a procedure that does work.
We wish the County to report this non-compliance to the Secretary of State, and consider re-running the LAT using pre-scanning inspectors, emphasizing tests that will stress the ability of the inspectors to intercept spurious marks.
More …
In all of the responses to our requests for “files”, paper was produced. We requested “files” – computer files. It is nearly impossible to analyze a large election on paper.
ACTION: Please respond to our request for files with computer files.
Staff required test developers to write the correct test “answer” on each ballot. This “open book” approach to testing eliminates the possibility that the voter’s intent can be ambiguous, and is therefore not a realistic test. Testing ambiguous voter intent can be especially important to verifying that duplication board and resolution board activities are functioning properly.
ACTION: Conceal the “answers” from those operating the system by recording them on the test plan (expected results) document rather than on the actual ballot.
Election Rule 45.11 requires that a new or modified voting system must undergo acceptance testing before it may be used to cast or count votes in any election. Since the LAT did not include use of the NEW SCORE data, the LAT was reliant on the results of an earlier acceptance test. We expect that the acceptance test will verify all system functions, including but not limited to:
ACTION: If acceptance tests of the entire voting system were performed, we wish to review the test plans and the test results. If the acceptance tests were not performed, we wish to know how Boulder County’s election system will be brought into compliance with Rule 45.11 before it is used to cast or count votes for the Primary Election.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
Enclosed: Three open records requests.
Ms. Hillary Hall
Boulder County Clerk & Recorder
RE: Colorado Open Records Act request dated July 1, 2008
Dear Ms. Hall:
At a meeting today with Elections Coordinator, Carlos Webb, materials produced in response to our Colorado Open Records Act request were reviewed.
The following summarizes: our request, the data provided by staff, and our assessment of the data.
REQUEST: We wish to review the Scanned Ballot Image Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
A non-responsive July 7th letter from Assistant County Attorney, Shelley Bailey, responded, “These records do not exist, therefore, we are unable to fulfill your request at this time.”
Even if it were true that the records did not exist on July 7th, did the records not exist on July 3rd at about 10:00 AM when a set of reports was produced in response to our Open Records request?
At what time, and under whose authority were these election records destroyed?
Are these election records not preserved in the BOSS database, or other database that is backed up as a permanent record of the Logic and Accuracy Test?
Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7 requires that all election data shall be exportable on-demand by authorized users. What is the explanation for the destruction of these particular election records?
ELECTION RULE
45.5.2.1.7 The voting system application shall provide authorized users with the capability to produce electronic files including election results in either ASCII (both comma-delimited and fixed-width) or webbased format that shall contain (a) all data or (b) any user selected data elements from the database. The software shall provide authorized users with the ability to generate these files on an “on-demand” basis. After creating such files, the authorized users shall, at their discretion, have the capability to copy the files to diskette, tape, or CD-ROM or to transmit the files to another information system.
If any, what other election records were destroyed?
ACTION: Please reply to the above questions, and please reconsider the County’s July 7th response to our request for scanned ballot image files.
REQUEST: We wish to review the Ballot Now Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
Due to a nomenclature problem, rather than the BallotNow Log files, staff produced, in response to our open records request, the following non-responsive reports, one set for each of the 8 BallotNow computer systems, dated July 3, 2008 approximately 10:00 AM:
· Election Report - Official
· Election MBBs – Official
· Resolve Status Report – Official
· Scan Batch Summary – Official
· Scanned Ballots by Batch – Official (multiple pages)
We discussed what we are looking for with Patty Stahl and she asked that we resubmit the request using the title “BallotNow System Audit Log”. We have attached this request.
We also asked if there is a copy of the specifications for the system or a detailed list of system objects that we can review, so that we can be better informed of the correct identifiers for system objects.
We remain concerned that the identifier “BallotNow System Audit Log” may not include all of the log data we seek. If it does not, by way of explanation, we want to review all log data. This would include system administration tasks, the state of and state-changes of application and system switches, the trusted build hash value (MD5 or SHA-1) of the firmware or software, the engineering level of the equipment, the details of vote interpretation for individual ballots, Cast Vote Record creation and revision, MBB creation and revision, etc. In other words, all logs.
ACTION: Please provide a list of all system objects so that we can use the proper identifiers. Please respond to the attached resubmission for BallotNow log files.
REQUEST: We wish to review the Cast Vote Record Files (Ballot Now and eSlate/JBC) created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
Due to a nomenclature problem, rather than the Cast Vote Record files (BallotNow and eSlate/JBC), staff produced, in response to our open records request, the following non-responsive reports”:
· JBC Connectivity
· Devices Backed Up
· 4 JBC Paper Tape Summaries
We agreed to produce for Carlos a sample of a printout of a Cast Vote Record, which is attached. The attached sample comes from an eSlate/JBC device.
ACTION: Please respond to our original request for eSlate/JBC Cast Vote Record files, and BallotNow Cast vote Record files.
REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Results Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
The partially responsive materials presented were:
· Unofficial County-wide Summary by Contest (9 pages)
· MBBs Read report (17 MBBs) (1 page)
· Precinct Turnout report (7 pages)
· Canvass Report (142 pages)
We identified what we consider to be several problems with the materials presented:
· The Canvass Report does not include precinct/contest OVER-UNDER votes.
· The reports show that the voter file data used for the LAT was not real voter data. The integration of the NEW SCORE voter data into the system was therefore not tested.
ACTION: Please confirm that the NEW SCORE voter database was not integrated into the system for the LAT. Please confirm that the County has performed no Acceptance Test which would have integrated all of the components of the elections system.
REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
There was a misunderstanding of our request. We will assume that the same nomenclature used for the BallotNow request, above, applies to the TALLY log files.
ACTION: Please respond to the attached resubmission request for TALLY log files.
REQUEST: We wish to review the (1) the detailed procedures and instructions that were used to plan, manage, and conduct the test, (2) any observations regarding the test, and (3) any test reports from the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.
The partially responsive materials presented were:
- Temporary Badge Log
- Guidelines for Observers
- LAT Procedure (3 pages)
- LAT Agenda and Procedures (4 pages)
- C.R.S. 1-7-509
C.R.S. 1-7-509(2)(e) The testing board or its representative shall sign a written statement indicating the devices tested, the results of the testing, the protective counter numbers of each device, if applicable, the number of the seal attached to each device upon completion of the testing, any problems reported to the designated election official as a result of the testing, and whether each device tested is satisfactory or unsatisfactory.During discussion, Carlos told us that a ballot was missing printing on one side of the ballot. He did not produce a copy of that ballot for us to inspect.
We asked if this problem was detected by any pre-scanning inspection. Carlos told us that it was not. He further told us that there was no pre-scanning inspection.
In a separate meeting, Republican LAT representative, Amy Barnes Fry, reported to Neal and me that there was an additional printing problem. This problem was not disclosed in response to our open records request and not disclosed orally by Mr. Webb. This problem was a misprinting of the vote capture box such that the box itself was detected as a vote. This is a case of the “spurious mark” problem that has troubled the HART system.
Problems, such as the problems with the misprinted ballot, were hidden from our review. We believe that this should have been disclosed in response to our open records request.
ACTION: The HART Central Scanner has known quality problems, and was only conditionally certified. One of the conditions for use is related to pre-scanning inspection.
If it is correct that the LAT was performed without a pre-scanning inspection, the equipment was used in a non-certified manner. The Secretary of State must be immediately notified that the mitigation for the HART “spurious mark” problem did not work, and must be replaced by a procedure that does work.
We wish the County to report this non-compliance to the Secretary of State, and consider re-running the LAT using pre-scanning inspectors, emphasizing tests that will stress the ability of the inspectors to intercept spurious marks.
More …
In all of the responses to our requests for “files”, paper was produced. We requested “files” – computer files. It is nearly impossible to analyze a large election on paper.
ACTION: Please respond to our request for files with computer files.
Staff required test developers to write the correct test “answer” on each ballot. This “open book” approach to testing eliminates the possibility that the voter’s intent can be ambiguous, and is therefore not a realistic test. Testing ambiguous voter intent can be especially important to verifying that duplication board and resolution board activities are functioning properly.
ACTION: Conceal the “answers” from those operating the system by recording them on the test plan (expected results) document rather than on the actual ballot.
Election Rule 45.11 requires that a new or modified voting system must undergo acceptance testing before it may be used to cast or count votes in any election. Since the LAT did not include use of the NEW SCORE data, the LAT was reliant on the results of an earlier acceptance test. We expect that the acceptance test will verify all system functions, including but not limited to:
- The accuracy and adequacy of all reports.
- The voting system’s ability to perform the recount procedure.
- The voting system’s ability to perform the post-election audit procedure.
- The voting system’s ability to perform the Canvass procedure.
ELECTION RULE
45.11 Acceptance Testing by Jurisdictions
45.11.1 Whenever an
election jurisdiction acquires a new system or modification of an existing
system certified by the Secretary of State, the election jurisdiction shall
perform acceptance tests of the system before it may be used to cast or count
votes at any election. The voting system shall be operating correctly, pass all
tests as directed by the acquiring jurisdiction’s project manager or contract
negotiator, and shall be identical to the voting system certified by the
Secretary of State.
45.11.2 The voting system provider shall
provide all manuals and training necessary for the proper operation of the
system to the jurisdiction, or as indicated by their
contract.
45.11.3 The election jurisdiction shall perform a series
of functional and programming tests that shall test all functions of the voting
system at their discretion.
45.11.4 The jurisdiction shall
coordinate acceptance testing with the Secretary of State’s designated agent and
complete a Jurisdiction Acceptance Test form provided by the Secretary of State.
ACTION: If acceptance tests of the entire voting system were performed, we wish to review the test plans and the test results. If the acceptance tests were not performed, we wish to know how Boulder County’s election system will be brought into compliance with Rule 45.11 before it is used to cast or count votes for the Primary Election.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
Enclosed: Three open records requests.
Tuesday, July 08, 2008
Clerk acknowledges voter file problems
-----Original Message-----
From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Monday, July 07, 2008 3:54 PM
To: Al Kolwicz [Colorado Voter Group]
Cc: Thomas, Scott [Chief Deputy Clerk]
Subject: Voter file
Al,
The export provided to the parties is more complete and gives the most comprehensive look at our voter registration database ever available in an export. We appreciate you looking it over and letting us know your concerns. If you have further questions please contact Scott Thomas.
Below are answers to your questions.
Hillary
Al Kolwicz: The Voter Registration file contains: Non-citizens.
Hillary Hall: While 36 people have been flagged as non-citizens, these voters were flagged incorrectly. This field is one of the issues that we have identified in SCORE. We are continuing to work with the Colorado Secretary of State's office to make improvements to such areas of the system. As you are aware anyone registering to vote is required to sign an oath, which includes an affirmation that they are a U.S. citizen. It is noted on all voter registration forms that it is a crime to swear or affirm falsely to this qualification. Therefore, anyone who has completed, signed, and returned a voter registration form to our office is to our knowledge a U.S. citizen. We also check all voters' certified identification as provided by the Help America Vote Act. It should also be noted that even if a voter is tagged by this field in SCORE, it does not disqualify the voter from receiving a ballot as this non-citizen field is a report only field.
Al Kolwicz: People registered in invalid precincts.
Hillary Hall: This is just another example of the issues we have identified while in the process of scrubbing the SCORE files. We have identified a total of 113 voters in invalid precincts. We have 39 voter registration files left to correct. Many of these people have provided addresses that are located in new developments not yet in the County's records. The 0 precinct is a place holder precinct.
Al Kolwicz: A suspiciously small number of 2008 Primary Election mail-in voters. We know of at least one voter who is not marked as a non-permanent mail in voter.
Hillary Hall: I am not sure what you mean by "marked as non-permanent mail in voter". As to the small number, it is reflected in SCORE that we have 66, 563 Boulder County registered voters signed up for permanent mail-in voting. A large portion of these are affiliated as either Democratic or Republican and will receive mail-in ballots for the 2008 Primary Election. Voters are encouraged to check their voter information on our website, www.VoteBoulder.org, to ensure they are registered to vote by mail if they have signed up for this service. If the person to whom you refer accidentally signed up for permanent mail-in status but wanted to vote by mail in this election only, he or she can correct this issue by contacting the Elections Division at 303-413-7740.
Al Kolwicz: There are no place-markers for CONFIDENTIAL voters, so it will be impossible to accurately verify election results for the Canvass.
Hillary Hall: Al, you are viewing a public export file in which Confidential voters are not included for their protection. A report that includes confidential voters will be available only to the Canvass Board.
Al Kolwicz: There is no DATE associated with the PERMANENT MAIL-IN FLAG.
Hillary Hall: True. However, our office can look up any voter who has requested to vote by mail and find the date record that the vote by mail request was made to our office.
Al Kolwicz: Key information is not included in the file. For example, there is no indicator for "1st time voter who registered by mail" This will limit the effectiveness of poll watchers.
Hillary Hall: True. You are correct that this data is not indicated; however, this information is not of consequence for poll watchers because all voters who vote at a polling location are required to show ID. In addition, this information has never been available to the public.
Al Kolwicz: There is no indicator showing that a voter's ballot was REJECTED and its VOTES NOT COUNTED.
Hillary Hall: This is true, however, there are other reports available that contain a ballot's status, whether it was rejected or if a vote was not counted. This information would be provided to the Canvass Board.
Al Kolwicz: You can easily see the poor quality of the terminology used in the fields. Inconsistent, redundant, and unintelligible.
Hillary Hall: I disagree with your assessment; employees in the Elections Division are clear on the field information.
Al Kolwicz: 1. It appears that there are no records for voters that voted in prior elections, but are no longer on the current registration file.
Hillary Hall: True. Cancelled or moved voters are not included in the report, as this information is no longer pertinent to our office. The voter history file only provides a snapshot of how current voters participated in past elections. The report cannot be used to reconstruct a past election. You would need to reference the Statement of Vote if you wished to understand an accurate statistical analysis of voter participation in a past election.
Al Kolwicz: 2. There are records in the Voter Registration file that are not present in the Vote History Details file.
Hillary Hall: True. Voters with no voting history will have no records in the history file.
Al Kolwicz: 3. There are records in the Vote History Details file that are not present in the Voter Registration file.
Hillary Hall: True. The history file contains placeholders for the confidential voters. The voter details file does not.
Al Kolwicz: Detail records do not indicate the precinct number of the voter when the vote was recorded.
Hillary Hall: True. But if an individual voter wants this information, we can research it and find it.
Al Kolwicz: Detail records contain invalid METHOD OF VOTING.
Hillary Hall: Not true. The Method of Voting field may be empty. There are 244 voter history records that have no data in Method of Voting. All but one of these is from elections prior to 2001. The exception is from the 2004 election.
From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Monday, July 07, 2008 3:54 PM
To: Al Kolwicz [Colorado Voter Group]
Cc: Thomas, Scott [Chief Deputy Clerk]
Subject: Voter file
Al,
The export provided to the parties is more complete and gives the most comprehensive look at our voter registration database ever available in an export. We appreciate you looking it over and letting us know your concerns. If you have further questions please contact Scott Thomas.
Below are answers to your questions.
Hillary
Al Kolwicz: The Voter Registration file contains: Non-citizens.
Hillary Hall: While 36 people have been flagged as non-citizens, these voters were flagged incorrectly. This field is one of the issues that we have identified in SCORE. We are continuing to work with the Colorado Secretary of State's office to make improvements to such areas of the system. As you are aware anyone registering to vote is required to sign an oath, which includes an affirmation that they are a U.S. citizen. It is noted on all voter registration forms that it is a crime to swear or affirm falsely to this qualification. Therefore, anyone who has completed, signed, and returned a voter registration form to our office is to our knowledge a U.S. citizen. We also check all voters' certified identification as provided by the Help America Vote Act. It should also be noted that even if a voter is tagged by this field in SCORE, it does not disqualify the voter from receiving a ballot as this non-citizen field is a report only field.
Al Kolwicz: People registered in invalid precincts.
Hillary Hall: This is just another example of the issues we have identified while in the process of scrubbing the SCORE files. We have identified a total of 113 voters in invalid precincts. We have 39 voter registration files left to correct. Many of these people have provided addresses that are located in new developments not yet in the County's records. The 0 precinct is a place holder precinct.
Al Kolwicz: A suspiciously small number of 2008 Primary Election mail-in voters. We know of at least one voter who is not marked as a non-permanent mail in voter.
Hillary Hall: I am not sure what you mean by "marked as non-permanent mail in voter". As to the small number, it is reflected in SCORE that we have 66, 563 Boulder County registered voters signed up for permanent mail-in voting. A large portion of these are affiliated as either Democratic or Republican and will receive mail-in ballots for the 2008 Primary Election. Voters are encouraged to check their voter information on our website, www.VoteBoulder.org, to ensure they are registered to vote by mail if they have signed up for this service. If the person to whom you refer accidentally signed up for permanent mail-in status but wanted to vote by mail in this election only, he or she can correct this issue by contacting the Elections Division at 303-413-7740.
Al Kolwicz: There are no place-markers for CONFIDENTIAL voters, so it will be impossible to accurately verify election results for the Canvass.
Hillary Hall: Al, you are viewing a public export file in which Confidential voters are not included for their protection. A report that includes confidential voters will be available only to the Canvass Board.
Al Kolwicz: There is no DATE associated with the PERMANENT MAIL-IN FLAG.
Hillary Hall: True. However, our office can look up any voter who has requested to vote by mail and find the date record that the vote by mail request was made to our office.
Al Kolwicz: Key information is not included in the file. For example, there is no indicator for "1st time voter who registered by mail" This will limit the effectiveness of poll watchers.
Hillary Hall: True. You are correct that this data is not indicated; however, this information is not of consequence for poll watchers because all voters who vote at a polling location are required to show ID. In addition, this information has never been available to the public.
Al Kolwicz: There is no indicator showing that a voter's ballot was REJECTED and its VOTES NOT COUNTED.
Hillary Hall: This is true, however, there are other reports available that contain a ballot's status, whether it was rejected or if a vote was not counted. This information would be provided to the Canvass Board.
Al Kolwicz: You can easily see the poor quality of the terminology used in the fields. Inconsistent, redundant, and unintelligible.
Hillary Hall: I disagree with your assessment; employees in the Elections Division are clear on the field information.
Al Kolwicz: 1. It appears that there are no records for voters that voted in prior elections, but are no longer on the current registration file.
Hillary Hall: True. Cancelled or moved voters are not included in the report, as this information is no longer pertinent to our office. The voter history file only provides a snapshot of how current voters participated in past elections. The report cannot be used to reconstruct a past election. You would need to reference the Statement of Vote if you wished to understand an accurate statistical analysis of voter participation in a past election.
Al Kolwicz: 2. There are records in the Voter Registration file that are not present in the Vote History Details file.
Hillary Hall: True. Voters with no voting history will have no records in the history file.
Al Kolwicz: 3. There are records in the Vote History Details file that are not present in the Voter Registration file.
Hillary Hall: True. The history file contains placeholders for the confidential voters. The voter details file does not.
Al Kolwicz: Detail records do not indicate the precinct number of the voter when the vote was recorded.
Hillary Hall: True. But if an individual voter wants this information, we can research it and find it.
Al Kolwicz: Detail records contain invalid METHOD OF VOTING.
Hillary Hall: Not true. The Method of Voting field may be empty. There are 244 voter history records that have no data in Method of Voting. All but one of these is from elections prior to 2001. The exception is from the 2004 election.
Tuesday, July 01, 2008
SCORE Voter Files are incorrect and insufficient.
From: Al Kolwicz
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 7:57 AM
To: Hillary Hall [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: Carlos Webb; Canvass Board Group; SOS Mike Coffman ; 'Richard Coolidge'
Subject: SCORE Voter Files are incorrect and insufficient.
Dear Ms. Hall,
We have completed a very preliminary analysis of the SCORE voter files dated June 23rd.
The Voter Registration file contains:
The Voter History files are:
Will you please e-mail the entity relationship diagram and the field specifications? We want to see what data are available so that we can formulate a request for a more complete voter file.
Also, we have had a number of discussions with you regarding the frequency of update and the electronic delivery of this data to the political party organizations. We hope that you will implement our requests.
Al Kolwicz
Canvass Board Member
Boulder County Republican Party
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/CanvassBoard/
http://www.bouldercountygop.org/
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 7:57 AM
To: Hillary Hall [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: Carlos Webb; Canvass Board Group; SOS Mike Coffman ; 'Richard Coolidge'
Subject: SCORE Voter Files are incorrect and insufficient.
Dear Ms. Hall,
We have completed a very preliminary analysis of the SCORE voter files dated June 23rd.
The Voter Registration file contains:
- Non-citizens.
- People registered in invalid precincts.
- A suspiciously small number of 2008 Primary Election mail-in voters. We know of at least one voter who is not marked as a non-permanent mail in voter.
There are no place-markers for CONFIDENTIAL voters, so it will be impossible to accurately verify election results for the Canvass.
There is no DATE associated with the PERMANENT MAIL-IN FLAG.
Key information is not included in the file. For example, there is no indicator for “1st time voter who registered by mail” This will limit the effectiveness of poll watchers.
The Voter History files are:
Attached is a summary analysis of the Vote History data.
- There is no indicator showing that a voter’s ballot was REJECTED and its VOTES NOT COUNTED.
- You can easily see the poor quality of the terminology used in the fields. Inconsistent, redundant, and unintelligible.
- The counts indicate that there are a massive number of missing records.
- It appears that there are no records for voters that voted in prior elections, but are no longer on the current registration file.
- There are records in the Voter Registration file that are not present in the Vote History Details file.
- The are records in the Vote History Details file that are not present in the Voter Registration file.
- Detail records do not indicate the precinct number of the voter when the vote was recorded.
- Detail records contain invalid METHOD OF VOTING.
Will you please e-mail the entity relationship diagram and the field specifications? We want to see what data are available so that we can formulate a request for a more complete voter file.
Also, we have had a number of discussions with you regarding the frequency of update and the electronic delivery of this data to the political party organizations. We hope that you will implement our requests.
Al Kolwicz
Canvass Board Member
Boulder County Republican Party
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/CanvassBoard/
http://www.bouldercountygop.org/
Saturday, June 21, 2008
Boulder County Clerk questioned on her mail-in ballot promotion
From: Al Kolwicz [Colorado Voter Group Trustee]
Sent: Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:42 PM
To: Hillary Hall [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: 'Colorado Voter Group'; Canvass Board Group; John Fryar ; Matt Sebastian ; Richard Valenty; Bob Greenlee
Subject: Unsolicited promotional mailing
Dear Ms. Hall,
We have conducted some research on your recent “Why wait in line… vote at home!” promotional mailing. We have several questions regarding the mailing:
Regards,
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
========================
From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2008 11:57 PM
To: Al Kolwicz [Colorado Voter Group Trustee]
Subject: RE: Unsolicited promotional mailing
1. What section of the law authorizes the clerk to use public money to promote one method of voting over all others? (We use the word promote because the packet is unquestionably a promotional push marketing package. We cannot find such a promotional mailing in the law.)
My job as County Clerk and Recorder is to make voters aware of all the ways they may participate in an election. I know you are opposed to mail ballot elections and voting by mail, however it is a legal way to participate in the election and many prefer to do so. State legislature passed a law last year allowing voters to sign up as permanent mail-ballot voter if they so choose. County Clerks have the statutory authority to perform voter education and outreach, as well as to manage elections in the manner that puts taxpayers' dollars to the most effective use while still meeting strong requirements for security, accuracy and anonymity. Boulder County's recent mailing notified voters about this new option and is in no way prohibited by the law. The postage per envelope did not exceed standard non-profit pricing for a single letter.
In addition, as Boulder County Clerk & Recorder, I'm dedicated to upholding the democratic right to vote for all County residents and ensuring fair, accessible, accurate elections. This includes offering secure options that will enable the greatest number of eligible voters to cast their votes. We will continue to provide polling place elections in Boulder County as well as the options to vote early, and vote by mail. Voting by mail is an option for voters; not a single voter will be forced to sign up to vote by mail. Following is the statute passed by our legislature:
1-8-104.5. Application for permanent mail-in voter status. (1) Any eligible elector may apply for permanent mail-in voter status. The application for permanent mail-in voter status shall be made in writing or by facsimile using an application form furnished by the designated election official or in the form of a letter. The application shall contain the same information submitted in connection with an application for a mail-in ballot pursuant to section 1-8-104. (2) Upon receipt of an application for permanent mail-in voter status, the designated election official shall process the application in the same manner as an application for a mail-in ballot. If it is determined that the applicant is an eligible elector, the designated election official shall place the eligible elector's name upon the list maintained pursuant to section 1-8-108 of those eligible electors to whom a mail-in ballot is mailed each time there is a coordinated election.
2. Before the package was mailed, was the package discussed with the political parties? The Secretary of State? The public?
As part of my obligation to Boulder County registered voters, it is my duty to notify voters of their voting options. This mailing did exactly that: inform voters that they now have the option to vote by mail permanently. The contents of this mailing contained no reference to or bias towards any political party or candidate, and were in complete accordance with Colorado Revised Statues. Therefore, there was no reason to request approval with the Secretary of State's office or the political parties. I value and revere our country's democracy, in which the public has the power to express their wishes by electing representatives to make governmental choices on their behalf. By virtue of being an elected - rather than appointed - position, the Clerk and Recorder's office that I fill comes with the inherent understanding that the public has expressed their trust that I, as their representative, will make discretionary choices that represent their best interests; if the public feels that those choices are out of line with their desires, they are welcome to contact me or, ultimately, to voice their opinion through the power of the vote next term. Judging by the response to the mail ballot program in which more than 50,000 voters have signed up, the mail-ballot program and associated outreach do, indeed, have the tacit support of a very significant portion of the public.
3. What funding was used to finance this unsolicited and unnecessary mailing?
As the Boulder County Clerk & Recorder, I have a financial responsibility to make our elections as economical as possible while providing our voters with the voting methods they prefer to use. I am responsible for managing the elections' budget. The financing of this mailing was part of this budget. Furthermore, the return on investment of the mailing is significant in terms of total savings of public dollars. Providing the option to vote by mail saves valuable tax dollars. Delivering a mail ballot costs half as much as delivering a ballot to a polling location. In fact, the 2007 Coordinated Election, conducted entirely by mail-in ballots cost $X less than the 2006 General Election. In addition, the majority of voters did not object to voting by mail in the 2007 Coordinated Election.
This mailing was not unnecessary. While we will continue to provide polling place elections in Boulder County, it is also my responsibility to make voting by mail accessible to the registered voters in Boulder County who prefer this method and to notify them of their right to vote by mail.
4. Approximately what was the total cost of the promotion, including design of the package and processing of responses?
The total cost was $21,000.
5. To whom was this mailing sent? (We have reports from households where some electors did and some did not receive the mailing.)
This mailing was sent to all registered voters that voted in the 2004 and 2006 election and are registered at the same address during this time period. Mobile voters do not make a good demographic for permanent mail as we need to make sure that the ballot is delivered to the correct address.
6. How is it being verified that it is the eligible elector who submitted the request for mail-in voting? Have signatures been verified?
As long as the elector is a registered voter, there is no law that requires verification of a mail-in ballot application. However, we will verify the signature of the voter upon the return of their voted mail-in ballot.
7. Since the return-form enclosed in the promotional mailing is not the county's official mail-in application form and is not in the form of a letter from the elector, by what authority has the clerk accepted this form as a valid application?
According to Colorado Revised Statute 1-8-104.5. Application for permanent mail-in voter status. (1) Any eligible elector may apply for permanent mail-in voter status. The application for permanent mail-in voter status shall be made in writing or by facsimile using an application form furnished by the designated election official or in the form of a letter. The application shall contain the same information submitted in connection with an application for a mail-in ballot pursuant to section 1-8-104. (2) Upon receipt of an application for permanent mail-in voter status, the designated election official shall process the application in the same manner as an application for a mail-in ballot. If it is determined that the applicant is an eligible elector, the designated election official shall place the eligible elector's name upon the list maintained pursuant to section 1-8-108 of those eligible electors to whom a mail-in ballot is mailed each time there is a coordinated election.
8. The form included with the mailing has several significant flaws which very likely will have deceived some electors into signing up for permanent mail-in status. For example, there is no way that the elector can use the form for a one-time mail-in ballot application. Also, the form does not provide the elector with the option to remove their name from the list. Also, the form does not notify the elector that they may ignore the request without risk of losing their right to vote using other voting methods including one-time mail-in voting.
The purpose of this mailing was to inform voters of their right to sign up to vote by mail permanently. It is clearly stated on the application form, that in order "to receive the permanent ballot form, you are required to check the box below." We did not send this form to electors who were already signed up to vote by mail. Therefore, there was no reason to provide the option to remove their name from the list. Any elector who wishes to remove their name from the vote by mail list can do so at any time. The form does not indicate in any way that a voter would lose their right to vote if they disregarded the form. While voters continue to sign up to vote by mail every day from this mailing, there are voters who have simply disregarded the mailing, knowing there is no risk to their registration status. Finally, this is part of a greater outreach and education campaign in which we have clearly stated voters' various options, including polling place voting, signing up as a one-time mail ballot recipient or signing up to be a permanent mail-ballot voter, not to mention signing up to be a Boulder County election judge. You can visit, www.VoteBoulder.org <http://www.VoteBoulder.org> for examples of this language.
9. Would a privately designed return-form/promotion indicating an elector's preference for in-person voting be accepted as a valid transaction by the clerk?
Current statue does not address this. If an election is conducted by all mail, then the voter would receive a ballot in the mail.
10. By what authority does this mailing qualify as "Official Election Mail"?
Mail sent from the Boulder County Clerk & Recorder's Elections Division qualifies as official election mail. The statement "Official Election Mail" simply notifies voters that it is mail regarding elections.
11. The return envelope indicates "Official Ballot Enclosed", yet there is no such ballot.
The language that you are referencing is on a graphic on the upper left hand corner of the return envelope. The graphic falls under the language 'Why Wait in Line, Vote at Home'. In its context, this graphic where the language appears on a small picture of an envelope is a representation of voting from home on Election Day; it is not meant to indicate the return envelope is a ballot.
12. The package does not alert the elector to any of the problems of vote by mail, including direct and indirect disenfranchisement.
Voting by mail does not disenfranchise voters in any way. Colorado law provides for voters to vote by mail. Furthermore, voting by mail is absolutely safe. Voters' signatures are concealed on the return envelope and their signatures must be verified with the signature in our online database. Additionally, all voters take an oath when they register to vote. It is a federal offense to tamper with another voter's ballot or mail.
==================
Sent: Thursday, May 29, 2008 1:42 PM
To: Hillary Hall [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: 'Colorado Voter Group'; Canvass Board Group; John Fryar ; Matt Sebastian ; Richard Valenty; Bob Greenlee
Subject: Unsolicited promotional mailing
Dear Ms. Hall,
We have conducted some research on your recent “Why wait in line… vote at home!” promotional mailing. We have several questions regarding the mailing:
- What section of the law authorizes the clerk to use public money to promote one method of voting over all others? (We use the word promote because the packet is unquestionably a promotional push marketing package. We cannot find such a promotional mailing in the law.)
- Before the package was mailed, was the package discussed with the political parties? The Secretary of State? The public?
- What funding was used to finance this unsolicited and unnecessary mailing?
- Approximately what was the total cost of the promotion, including design of the package and processing of responses?
- To whom was this mailing sent? (We have reports from households where some electors did and some did not receive the mailing.)
- How is it being verified that it is the eligible elector who submitted the request for mail-in voting? Have signatures been verified?
- Since the return-form enclosed in the promotional mailing is not the county’s official mail-in application form and is not in the form of a letter from the elector, by what authority has the clerk accepted this form as a valid application?
- The form included with the mailing has several significant flaws which very likely will have deceived some electors into signing up for permanent mail-in status. For example, there is no way that the elector can use the form for a one time mail-in ballot application. Also, the form does not provide the elector with the option to remove their name from the list. Also, the form does not notify the elector that they may ignore the request without risk of losing their right to vote using other voting methods including one-time mail-in voting.
- Would a privately designed return-form/promotion indicating an elector’s preference for in-person voting be accepted as a valid transaction by the clerk?
- By what authority does this mailing qualify as “Official Election Mail”?
- The return envelope indicates “Official Ballot Enclosed”, yet there is no such ballot.
- The package does not alert the elector to any of the problems of vote by mail, including direct and indirect disenfranchisement.
Regards,
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
========================
From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2008 11:57 PM
To: Al Kolwicz [Colorado Voter Group Trustee]
Subject: RE: Unsolicited promotional mailing
1. What section of the law authorizes the clerk to use public money to promote one method of voting over all others? (We use the word promote because the packet is unquestionably a promotional push marketing package. We cannot find such a promotional mailing in the law.)
My job as County Clerk and Recorder is to make voters aware of all the ways they may participate in an election. I know you are opposed to mail ballot elections and voting by mail, however it is a legal way to participate in the election and many prefer to do so. State legislature passed a law last year allowing voters to sign up as permanent mail-ballot voter if they so choose. County Clerks have the statutory authority to perform voter education and outreach, as well as to manage elections in the manner that puts taxpayers' dollars to the most effective use while still meeting strong requirements for security, accuracy and anonymity. Boulder County's recent mailing notified voters about this new option and is in no way prohibited by the law. The postage per envelope did not exceed standard non-profit pricing for a single letter.
In addition, as Boulder County Clerk & Recorder, I'm dedicated to upholding the democratic right to vote for all County residents and ensuring fair, accessible, accurate elections. This includes offering secure options that will enable the greatest number of eligible voters to cast their votes. We will continue to provide polling place elections in Boulder County as well as the options to vote early, and vote by mail. Voting by mail is an option for voters; not a single voter will be forced to sign up to vote by mail. Following is the statute passed by our legislature:
1-8-104.5. Application for permanent mail-in voter status. (1) Any eligible elector may apply for permanent mail-in voter status. The application for permanent mail-in voter status shall be made in writing or by facsimile using an application form furnished by the designated election official or in the form of a letter. The application shall contain the same information submitted in connection with an application for a mail-in ballot pursuant to section 1-8-104. (2) Upon receipt of an application for permanent mail-in voter status, the designated election official shall process the application in the same manner as an application for a mail-in ballot. If it is determined that the applicant is an eligible elector, the designated election official shall place the eligible elector's name upon the list maintained pursuant to section 1-8-108 of those eligible electors to whom a mail-in ballot is mailed each time there is a coordinated election.
2. Before the package was mailed, was the package discussed with the political parties? The Secretary of State? The public?
As part of my obligation to Boulder County registered voters, it is my duty to notify voters of their voting options. This mailing did exactly that: inform voters that they now have the option to vote by mail permanently. The contents of this mailing contained no reference to or bias towards any political party or candidate, and were in complete accordance with Colorado Revised Statues. Therefore, there was no reason to request approval with the Secretary of State's office or the political parties. I value and revere our country's democracy, in which the public has the power to express their wishes by electing representatives to make governmental choices on their behalf. By virtue of being an elected - rather than appointed - position, the Clerk and Recorder's office that I fill comes with the inherent understanding that the public has expressed their trust that I, as their representative, will make discretionary choices that represent their best interests; if the public feels that those choices are out of line with their desires, they are welcome to contact me or, ultimately, to voice their opinion through the power of the vote next term. Judging by the response to the mail ballot program in which more than 50,000 voters have signed up, the mail-ballot program and associated outreach do, indeed, have the tacit support of a very significant portion of the public.
3. What funding was used to finance this unsolicited and unnecessary mailing?
As the Boulder County Clerk & Recorder, I have a financial responsibility to make our elections as economical as possible while providing our voters with the voting methods they prefer to use. I am responsible for managing the elections' budget. The financing of this mailing was part of this budget. Furthermore, the return on investment of the mailing is significant in terms of total savings of public dollars. Providing the option to vote by mail saves valuable tax dollars. Delivering a mail ballot costs half as much as delivering a ballot to a polling location. In fact, the 2007 Coordinated Election, conducted entirely by mail-in ballots cost $X less than the 2006 General Election. In addition, the majority of voters did not object to voting by mail in the 2007 Coordinated Election.
This mailing was not unnecessary. While we will continue to provide polling place elections in Boulder County, it is also my responsibility to make voting by mail accessible to the registered voters in Boulder County who prefer this method and to notify them of their right to vote by mail.
4. Approximately what was the total cost of the promotion, including design of the package and processing of responses?
The total cost was $21,000.
5. To whom was this mailing sent? (We have reports from households where some electors did and some did not receive the mailing.)
This mailing was sent to all registered voters that voted in the 2004 and 2006 election and are registered at the same address during this time period. Mobile voters do not make a good demographic for permanent mail as we need to make sure that the ballot is delivered to the correct address.
6. How is it being verified that it is the eligible elector who submitted the request for mail-in voting? Have signatures been verified?
As long as the elector is a registered voter, there is no law that requires verification of a mail-in ballot application. However, we will verify the signature of the voter upon the return of their voted mail-in ballot.
7. Since the return-form enclosed in the promotional mailing is not the county's official mail-in application form and is not in the form of a letter from the elector, by what authority has the clerk accepted this form as a valid application?
According to Colorado Revised Statute 1-8-104.5. Application for permanent mail-in voter status. (1) Any eligible elector may apply for permanent mail-in voter status. The application for permanent mail-in voter status shall be made in writing or by facsimile using an application form furnished by the designated election official or in the form of a letter. The application shall contain the same information submitted in connection with an application for a mail-in ballot pursuant to section 1-8-104. (2) Upon receipt of an application for permanent mail-in voter status, the designated election official shall process the application in the same manner as an application for a mail-in ballot. If it is determined that the applicant is an eligible elector, the designated election official shall place the eligible elector's name upon the list maintained pursuant to section 1-8-108 of those eligible electors to whom a mail-in ballot is mailed each time there is a coordinated election.
8. The form included with the mailing has several significant flaws which very likely will have deceived some electors into signing up for permanent mail-in status. For example, there is no way that the elector can use the form for a one-time mail-in ballot application. Also, the form does not provide the elector with the option to remove their name from the list. Also, the form does not notify the elector that they may ignore the request without risk of losing their right to vote using other voting methods including one-time mail-in voting.
The purpose of this mailing was to inform voters of their right to sign up to vote by mail permanently. It is clearly stated on the application form, that in order "to receive the permanent ballot form, you are required to check the box below." We did not send this form to electors who were already signed up to vote by mail. Therefore, there was no reason to provide the option to remove their name from the list. Any elector who wishes to remove their name from the vote by mail list can do so at any time. The form does not indicate in any way that a voter would lose their right to vote if they disregarded the form. While voters continue to sign up to vote by mail every day from this mailing, there are voters who have simply disregarded the mailing, knowing there is no risk to their registration status. Finally, this is part of a greater outreach and education campaign in which we have clearly stated voters' various options, including polling place voting, signing up as a one-time mail ballot recipient or signing up to be a permanent mail-ballot voter, not to mention signing up to be a Boulder County election judge. You can visit, www.VoteBoulder.org <http://www.VoteBoulder.org> for examples of this language.
9. Would a privately designed return-form/promotion indicating an elector's preference for in-person voting be accepted as a valid transaction by the clerk?
Current statue does not address this. If an election is conducted by all mail, then the voter would receive a ballot in the mail.
10. By what authority does this mailing qualify as "Official Election Mail"?
Mail sent from the Boulder County Clerk & Recorder's Elections Division qualifies as official election mail. The statement "Official Election Mail" simply notifies voters that it is mail regarding elections.
11. The return envelope indicates "Official Ballot Enclosed", yet there is no such ballot.
The language that you are referencing is on a graphic on the upper left hand corner of the return envelope. The graphic falls under the language 'Why Wait in Line, Vote at Home'. In its context, this graphic where the language appears on a small picture of an envelope is a representation of voting from home on Election Day; it is not meant to indicate the return envelope is a ballot.
12. The package does not alert the elector to any of the problems of vote by mail, including direct and indirect disenfranchisement.
Voting by mail does not disenfranchise voters in any way. Colorado law provides for voters to vote by mail. Furthermore, voting by mail is absolutely safe. Voters' signatures are concealed on the return envelope and their signatures must be verified with the signature in our online database. Additionally, all voters take an oath when they register to vote. It is a federal offense to tamper with another voter's ballot or mail.
==================
Thursday, June 19, 2008
More about forbidden secret ballots
-- 1 of 2 --
From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 9:05 AM
To: Al Kolwicz [Trustee Colorado Voter Group]
Cc: 'Colorado Voter Group'; CFVI; Paper TigersSubject:
RE: Anonymous ballots
Al and everyone,
So here is the longer answer that I was unable to write to you the first time. We may be able to run the primary with out bar codes, not sure and haven't had time to test. We can not run the general with out the bar codes as it will be a two page ballot and ballots must be in page order. I will not be changing processes from the primary to the general. Do I want to find a way to get the bar codes off the ballot and make sure we have a reliable election yes, will the bar codes be removed this year no. I did not pick this system and I must make the best of it that I can. The long term solution is to either work with the vendor to change the system or look at a new system. All of these are issues for the 2009 year. When we have time to experiment and properly test any changes in process that may give us all the outcomes we want. We are not only heading into the largest election ever, we are also going to be using a new voter registration system. My first priority is to insure that the election both primary and general run smoothly. Changing processes between elections with no time to test out the new methods if it they are even viable is not the best way to ensure for a successful election.
Hillary
=============================
-- 2 of 2 --
From: Al Kolwicz [Trustee Colorado Voter Group]
Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 9:31 AM
To: 'Hall, Hillary' [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: 'Colorado Voter Group'; CFVI; Paper Tigers;'Bev Harris'
Subject: RE: Anonymous ballots
Ms. Hall,
The Secretary of State’s certification process did not report that the HART system is unable to comply with Colorado law regarding anonymous ballots.
To our knowledge, there is no documented exception or condition describing such a defect.
When we directly asked HART about this, on the record and in front of the Secretary of State’s personnel, HART made no exceptions when they testified that the system works without unique serial numbers. In fact, HART indicated that this is the way that the system is usually used.
We must assume that you have been misinformed, or we have been misinformed.
If it is true that the HART system cannot comply with Colorado’s laws regarding secret ballots, the system was improperly certified and must be immediately removed from the certified equipment list.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 9:05 AM
To: Al Kolwicz [Trustee Colorado Voter Group]
Cc: 'Colorado Voter Group'; CFVI; Paper TigersSubject:
RE: Anonymous ballots
Al and everyone,
So here is the longer answer that I was unable to write to you the first time. We may be able to run the primary with out bar codes, not sure and haven't had time to test. We can not run the general with out the bar codes as it will be a two page ballot and ballots must be in page order. I will not be changing processes from the primary to the general. Do I want to find a way to get the bar codes off the ballot and make sure we have a reliable election yes, will the bar codes be removed this year no. I did not pick this system and I must make the best of it that I can. The long term solution is to either work with the vendor to change the system or look at a new system. All of these are issues for the 2009 year. When we have time to experiment and properly test any changes in process that may give us all the outcomes we want. We are not only heading into the largest election ever, we are also going to be using a new voter registration system. My first priority is to insure that the election both primary and general run smoothly. Changing processes between elections with no time to test out the new methods if it they are even viable is not the best way to ensure for a successful election.
Hillary
=============================
-- 2 of 2 --
From: Al Kolwicz [Trustee Colorado Voter Group]
Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 9:31 AM
To: 'Hall, Hillary' [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: 'Colorado Voter Group'; CFVI; Paper Tigers;'Bev Harris'
Subject: RE: Anonymous ballots
Ms. Hall,
The Secretary of State’s certification process did not report that the HART system is unable to comply with Colorado law regarding anonymous ballots.
To our knowledge, there is no documented exception or condition describing such a defect.
When we directly asked HART about this, on the record and in front of the Secretary of State’s personnel, HART made no exceptions when they testified that the system works without unique serial numbers. In fact, HART indicated that this is the way that the system is usually used.
We must assume that you have been misinformed, or we have been misinformed.
If it is true that the HART system cannot comply with Colorado’s laws regarding secret ballots, the system was improperly certified and must be immediately removed from the certified equipment list.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
Colorado Clerk forbids voting by secret ballot
From: Al Kolwicz [Trustee, Colorado Voter Group]
Sent: Tuesday, April 29, 2008 11:54 AM
To: Hillary Hall [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Subject: Anonymous ballots
Hi Hillary,
Yesterday, at the Public Demonstration, HART demonstrated how to set up ballots with no unique identifiers (not digits or bar code). They set the bar code value to a constant of “0”.
Also, they demonstrated how to set up the ballot with a removable ballot stub. The stub can contain a serial number. They indicated that this is a very commonly used form of ballot. HART produces these ballots.
We recommend that Boulder County use ballots with serial numbers recorded on removable stubs. This will comply with the Colorado Constitution, Article VII section 8, and will provide the audit trail needed for ballot integrity.
Can we count on Boulder County to use ballots with serial numbers recorded on removable stubs for the 2008 elections?
Thanks
Al
---------------------------------------------------------
From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Wednesday, June 11, 2008 8:00 AM
To: Al Kolwicz [Trustee, Colorado Voter Group]
Subject: RE: Anonymous ballots
Al,
After reviewing the system and how it functions. We will be using the system as it has been designed. While it MAY be able to use the system without bar codes for the primary, we must use the bar codes for the general. Therefore, we will be using the system as it has been designed.
The long term solution to this problem is to purchase a new system. At this point in time, there is neither a system that I could recommend switching to nor the funds to do so.
Hillary
---------------------------------------------------------
From: Al Kolwicz [Trustee, Colorado Voter Group]
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 12:35 PM
To: 'Hall, Hillary' [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: Colorado Voter Group; CFVI, Paper Tigers
Subject: RE: Anonymous ballots
Ms. Hall,
Your reply is a great disappointment. Based on your pre-election statements, we were counting on you to eliminate Boulder County’s use of non-secret ballots.
We have been told, on the record by HART officials, that the HART system is designed to use paper ballots with removable stubs so that the serial numbers [can be removed before the ballot is cast, and] so that the voter cannot identify their own ballot once it has been cast. After all, if this were not the case it would violate Colorado’s Constitution and the system could not have been certified, could it?
Please reconsider your decision before it is too late. The voters of Boulder County expect and deserve secret ballots. It is your decision alone to deprive us of this right.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
Sent: Tuesday, April 29, 2008 11:54 AM
To: Hillary Hall [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Subject: Anonymous ballots
Hi Hillary,
Yesterday, at the Public Demonstration, HART demonstrated how to set up ballots with no unique identifiers (not digits or bar code). They set the bar code value to a constant of “0”.
Also, they demonstrated how to set up the ballot with a removable ballot stub. The stub can contain a serial number. They indicated that this is a very commonly used form of ballot. HART produces these ballots.
We recommend that Boulder County use ballots with serial numbers recorded on removable stubs. This will comply with the Colorado Constitution, Article VII section 8, and will provide the audit trail needed for ballot integrity.
Can we count on Boulder County to use ballots with serial numbers recorded on removable stubs for the 2008 elections?
Thanks
Al
---------------------------------------------------------
From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Wednesday, June 11, 2008 8:00 AM
To: Al Kolwicz [Trustee, Colorado Voter Group]
Subject: RE: Anonymous ballots
Al,
After reviewing the system and how it functions. We will be using the system as it has been designed. While it MAY be able to use the system without bar codes for the primary, we must use the bar codes for the general. Therefore, we will be using the system as it has been designed.
The long term solution to this problem is to purchase a new system. At this point in time, there is neither a system that I could recommend switching to nor the funds to do so.
Hillary
---------------------------------------------------------
From: Al Kolwicz [Trustee, Colorado Voter Group]
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 12:35 PM
To: 'Hall, Hillary' [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: Colorado Voter Group; CFVI, Paper Tigers
Subject: RE: Anonymous ballots
Ms. Hall,
Your reply is a great disappointment. Based on your pre-election statements, we were counting on you to eliminate Boulder County’s use of non-secret ballots.
We have been told, on the record by HART officials, that the HART system is designed to use paper ballots with removable stubs so that the serial numbers [can be removed before the ballot is cast, and] so that the voter cannot identify their own ballot once it has been cast. After all, if this were not the case it would violate Colorado’s Constitution and the system could not have been certified, could it?
Please reconsider your decision before it is too late. The voters of Boulder County expect and deserve secret ballots. It is your decision alone to deprive us of this right.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
Thursday, March 27, 2008
Voters choose paper ballots over voting machines
Dear Ms. Kim,
I am concerned that your story in today’s Rocky Mountain News might mislead voters and election officials. Voters enthused about mail option
The phrases “Coloradans are responding so enthusiastically” and “voters who want to only vote by mail “ strongly suggest that voters want to use the “permanent absentee” method of voting. Increased usage does not necessarily mean that voters want or prefer the method. In fact, there are several other explanations for the increased usage of the method.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.ColoradoVoterGroup.org
www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com
I am concerned that your story in today’s Rocky Mountain News might mislead voters and election officials. Voters enthused about mail option
The phrases “Coloradans are responding so enthusiastically” and “voters who want to only vote by mail “ strongly suggest that voters want to use the “permanent absentee” method of voting. Increased usage does not necessarily mean that voters want or prefer the method. In fact, there are several other explanations for the increased usage of the method.
- Preference for paper ballots -- Where paper ballots in precinct polling locations is not an option, we have for years now recommended that voters obtain and hand deliver an absentee ballot. This is how voters can vote a paper ballot on Election Day, even when the county does not offer paper ballots in precinct polling locations. (We explain to voters that hand delivery does not guarantee that votes will be counted, but the risk is less than the risk when using electronic vote recording equipment.)
- Unauthorized promotion -- County clerks have been aggressively promoting the use of “permanent absentee” status. I have personally observed a clerk employee persuade a new registrant to choose this method. I have a photo of a sign in the clerk’s office promoting the method. The clerk’s are mailing unauthorized propaganda to voters that encourages voters to use the “permanent absentee” method.
The propaganda completely ignores the risks associated with “permanent absentee” voting, and therefore misleads the voters. It is very difficult for election system reformers to overcome the unauthorized use of thousands and thousands of dollars of public funds that are being used to promote this voting method and to silence the questions raised by reformers. When the clerks want to do something, they find the money. And they want to make their own lives easier and less accountable. - Unaccountable clerks -- County clerks are not accountable for the error and fraud that results from this unauthorized propaganda effort. Lacking effective oversight, clerks have nothing to lose by promoting this unsafe method. “Permanent absentee” is different than “absentee” voting. With absentee voting, a voter submits an application for a ballot. This application applies only to the current election. It is pretty likely that the voter is alive, receiving mail at the address indicated on the application, and intends to vote in the current election. The county verifies that the application is valid, and fulfills the request. With “permanent absentee” voting, there is no application for the current election. Whether the voter is alive or has moved or is absent from their residence or does not intend to vote in the current election has no bearing. A ballot is mailed to the “permanent absentee” address. Many of these ballots will be fraudulently voted and counted.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.ColoradoVoterGroup.org
www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com
Saturday, March 22, 2008
SPEAKOUT: Colorado’s county clerks do not know best
SPEAKOUT: Colorado’s county clerks do not know best
By Al Kolwicz
Despite assurances to the contrary, Colorado county clerks do not know best. Their job has changed. It used to be an administrative job, overseeing people, procedures, and paper. It is now a systems manager job, overseeing the design, purchase, testing and operation of complex computerized election systems.
Not many county clerks are qualified to do the job they have chosen. Not surprisingly, clerks abdicate responsibilities to equipment suppliers who claim to know what’s best. Clerks have an unhealthy dependency on these suppliers. The supplier’s agenda is not the electorate’s agenda.
Clerks shun accountability and public debate. They hold secret meetings. They withhold data needed to detect election errors and fraud. They block public participation in election planning and oversight. To promote their agenda, clerks use public resources to lobby against the interests of the electorate, and they make misleading statements that disparage watchdogs and give false assurances to voters.
Most county clerks give convenience and cost their top priority. Many claim that voter confidence tops their list. But voter confidence is not based on convenience and cost. Voter confidence is earned when an election is transparent, each process is independently verified, and every problem is publicly disclosed. Clerks may know what is best for clerks; but clerks don’t do what is best for the electorate.
In his recent SPEAKOUT: Colorado’s county clerks know best, Secretary of State Coffman puts words into the mouth of election system activists and practices revisionist history. He says that clerks know best, but he does not support this assertion.
Mr. Coffman says that the “ultimate goal” of so-called voter activists “is to prohibit the use of all electronic voting devices”. This is not true, and it has never been true. Election system activists want election systems that are transparent and verifiable. The systems certified by the Secretary of State are neither.
Mr. Coffman says that the court ordered re-certification was only about documentation. This is not true. The court decision was about standards and competence. The new standards are weak and the re-certification team largely ignored them. All of the equipment failed to meet these weak and selectively tested standards. Ignoring problems does not make them go away.
We agree with Mr. Coffman when he originally said “I have more confidence in having votes cast on paper ballots at the polls rather than relying exclusively on electronic voting machines or in voting by mail.” (SOS News, 12/26/07).
We disagree with Mr. Coffman when he now says, “The legislature and the Governor should defer to Colorado’s county clerks …” (SPEAKOUT, 3/12/08). Colorado county clerks do not share the electorate’s agenda, they refuse to be accountable, and they resist transparent and verifiable systems.
Election system activists do not know everything about election law, but they do know some. And, they know a great deal about computers, software and systems. It is time for Colorado’s clerks to acknowledge their limitations and to work toward a transparent and verifiable election system.
People should trust their clerk, but independently verify their elections.
Al Kolwicz, for Colorado Voter Group
www.ColoradoVoterGroup.org
303-494-1540
By Al Kolwicz
Despite assurances to the contrary, Colorado county clerks do not know best. Their job has changed. It used to be an administrative job, overseeing people, procedures, and paper. It is now a systems manager job, overseeing the design, purchase, testing and operation of complex computerized election systems.
Not many county clerks are qualified to do the job they have chosen. Not surprisingly, clerks abdicate responsibilities to equipment suppliers who claim to know what’s best. Clerks have an unhealthy dependency on these suppliers. The supplier’s agenda is not the electorate’s agenda.
Clerks shun accountability and public debate. They hold secret meetings. They withhold data needed to detect election errors and fraud. They block public participation in election planning and oversight. To promote their agenda, clerks use public resources to lobby against the interests of the electorate, and they make misleading statements that disparage watchdogs and give false assurances to voters.
Most county clerks give convenience and cost their top priority. Many claim that voter confidence tops their list. But voter confidence is not based on convenience and cost. Voter confidence is earned when an election is transparent, each process is independently verified, and every problem is publicly disclosed. Clerks may know what is best for clerks; but clerks don’t do what is best for the electorate.
In his recent SPEAKOUT: Colorado’s county clerks know best, Secretary of State Coffman puts words into the mouth of election system activists and practices revisionist history. He says that clerks know best, but he does not support this assertion.
Mr. Coffman says that the “ultimate goal” of so-called voter activists “is to prohibit the use of all electronic voting devices”. This is not true, and it has never been true. Election system activists want election systems that are transparent and verifiable. The systems certified by the Secretary of State are neither.
Mr. Coffman says that the court ordered re-certification was only about documentation. This is not true. The court decision was about standards and competence. The new standards are weak and the re-certification team largely ignored them. All of the equipment failed to meet these weak and selectively tested standards. Ignoring problems does not make them go away.
We agree with Mr. Coffman when he originally said “I have more confidence in having votes cast on paper ballots at the polls rather than relying exclusively on electronic voting machines or in voting by mail.” (SOS News, 12/26/07).
We disagree with Mr. Coffman when he now says, “The legislature and the Governor should defer to Colorado’s county clerks …” (SPEAKOUT, 3/12/08). Colorado county clerks do not share the electorate’s agenda, they refuse to be accountable, and they resist transparent and verifiable systems.
Election system activists do not know everything about election law, but they do know some. And, they know a great deal about computers, software and systems. It is time for Colorado’s clerks to acknowledge their limitations and to work toward a transparent and verifiable election system.
People should trust their clerk, but independently verify their elections.
Al Kolwicz, for Colorado Voter Group
www.ColoradoVoterGroup.org
303-494-1540
Monday, March 10, 2008
Election system auditing - whither?
This note is not intended to offend the fine people working on election system auditing. I hope that it will be viewed positively, and spur folks to meet its challenge.
Before getting too committed to a post election audit scheme, I suggest that we take a step back and think about what the audit is supposed to accomplish -- precisely.
Lots of folks are getting enthusiastic about potential mechanisms – the solutions. But I have not seen an adequate statement of requirements for what the election system audit is committing to accomplish. And exactly how will we know when it has succeeded, or failed?
Election system auditing is a technical/analytical/ almost mathematical problem. This is not the way I see it being approached. Sure, people are using statistics and arithmetic, but I see no postulate leading to proof.
Election system auditing is being discussed as though every ballot is like every other ballot. This is not a correct assumption. The ballot style, including its precinct, makes ballots fall into a number of non-identical sets. Something true of one ballot may be untrue for ballots of a different style/precinct.
Election system audit designers seem to not differentiate between the various methods of voting – precinct-paper, precinct-electronic, early-paper, early-electronic, absentee, provisional, and emergency. These are non-identical methods. Results from a sample in one set do not necessarily carry over to another set.
Election auditor designers seem to not differentiate between the individual units of voting equipment used to record and count ballots and votes. Just because a ballot is successfully processed on one unit does not mean that it would be processed correctly on a different unit of the same type. Each individual unit is uniquely customized for each election. No two units are identical. What is true of one unit is not necessarily true of any other unit.
And, election audit designers seem to ignore completely the processes that do not involve voting equipment, yet represent enormous opportunities for error and fraud. The voter eligibility system, the ballot issuing mechanisms, ballot production, mailing, return mail processing, signature verification, batch integrity, etc. Every one of these represents a potential threat.
In a nutshell, I hope that people wanting to be election system audit experts will first develop widespread agreement on the exact requirements for the audit and how it will be verified that the audit meets these requirements. Only then does it make sense to propose a solution.
Finally, there are data flows that make auditing possible, and data flows that do not. None of the election systems certified for use in Colorado have an auditable data flow. Consequently, all of the work being done on audit today is destined to be discarded once a more rigorous data flow model is adopted.
It is time to establish the precise requirements for election system auditing.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
http://www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com/
Before getting too committed to a post election audit scheme, I suggest that we take a step back and think about what the audit is supposed to accomplish -- precisely.
Lots of folks are getting enthusiastic about potential mechanisms – the solutions. But I have not seen an adequate statement of requirements for what the election system audit is committing to accomplish. And exactly how will we know when it has succeeded, or failed?
Election system auditing is a technical/analytical/ almost mathematical problem. This is not the way I see it being approached. Sure, people are using statistics and arithmetic, but I see no postulate leading to proof.
Election system auditing is being discussed as though every ballot is like every other ballot. This is not a correct assumption. The ballot style, including its precinct, makes ballots fall into a number of non-identical sets. Something true of one ballot may be untrue for ballots of a different style/precinct.
Election system audit designers seem to not differentiate between the various methods of voting – precinct-paper, precinct-electronic, early-paper, early-electronic, absentee, provisional, and emergency. These are non-identical methods. Results from a sample in one set do not necessarily carry over to another set.
Election auditor designers seem to not differentiate between the individual units of voting equipment used to record and count ballots and votes. Just because a ballot is successfully processed on one unit does not mean that it would be processed correctly on a different unit of the same type. Each individual unit is uniquely customized for each election. No two units are identical. What is true of one unit is not necessarily true of any other unit.
And, election audit designers seem to ignore completely the processes that do not involve voting equipment, yet represent enormous opportunities for error and fraud. The voter eligibility system, the ballot issuing mechanisms, ballot production, mailing, return mail processing, signature verification, batch integrity, etc. Every one of these represents a potential threat.
In a nutshell, I hope that people wanting to be election system audit experts will first develop widespread agreement on the exact requirements for the audit and how it will be verified that the audit meets these requirements. Only then does it make sense to propose a solution.
Finally, there are data flows that make auditing possible, and data flows that do not. None of the election systems certified for use in Colorado have an auditable data flow. Consequently, all of the work being done on audit today is destined to be discarded once a more rigorous data flow model is adopted.
It is time to establish the precise requirements for election system auditing.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
http://www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com/
Friday, February 29, 2008
Questions re: Colorado's Paper Ballot Bill
Many questions about elections, many news reports and still not enough answers.
The Colorado Secretary of State has done what Myriah Conroy predicted in her recent testimony and has already recertified most of the voting machines in a political process which lacked transparency. The process may have avoided actually determining the accuracy of the voting systems. This looks like a very unsatisfying end to the saga of the Conroy v. Dennis law suit. It ought to be observed that the accuracy tested by Colorado certification is limited to a best case count of 10,000 ballots, when elections may process considerably more than that number on a single machine. We cannot have confidence in machine counts when the only set of tests which is intended to prove that the machines are accurate has not counted ballots on an election scale, and may not have addressed the ability of voting systems to obtain voter intent from ballots in a manner which is consistent with statute.
When and if we are ever able to determine if the tests were adequate to determine accuracy we will of course report on this. The fact that the Secretary has recertified systems will have little or no bearing on whether or not the tests prove accuracy or fail to do so. His ability to define substantial compliance has allowed him to make capricious decisions for which there is so far precious little explanation or justification. The extent to which the Secretary carried on with a non technical approach to the needs of the State regarding elections even after enduring the spotlight on this topic in the course of discussion over HB 1155 shows how little intelligence is applied in our State regulatory framework for elections. The Secretary has told members of the public that their only avenues for improvement of this situation is in the courts and in the legislature. He will then be expecting our response from both directions. The legislature will one would hope be prepared to address public interests on behalf of or in stead of the Secretary.
Senator Gordon's paper ballot bill is here, click to read bill.
The Senate State Affairs meeting on this bill is scheduled for 1:30 PM on Monday March 3rd.
The public have not been adequately served in the airing of information about elections in the Colorado press. This is primarily because the press do not provide an adequate platform for discussion and debate of issues and underlying facts. Most often important facts do not reach the form of printed word. It is the legislative process which allows for a form of debate, although it tends to be one sided and non interactive by the nature of the protocol used for these public sessions in which one side has control over the order and extent of the commentary. The public is depending, in this case almost entirely,on the legislature for the opportunity to have facts about elections aired to a full extent, even though a permanent written record is not created.
In the course of discussion of the SB 189 the following topics ought to be addressed and the underlying truths revealed. It will take time in committee to expose the answers to these questions. I sincerely hope that this time is made available:
1) Is precinct reporting needed and is it a valuable resource for public oversight and understanding of election results?
2) Can clerks perform precinct reporting and if so, just how hard is it? If not, why not? How many clerks are in this condition?
3) Do vote centers actually solve problems for elections or do they primarily introduce new and difficult problems? Why are vote centers not just combined precincts?
4) Can lines be avoided on election day without the guaranteed availability of a paper ballot?
5) How can paper ballots and paper poll books be employed to provide the best accountability and the least amount of waiting at precinct polling places? Will the existing statute and rule favor an accountable and transparent election where voters do not have to stand in line for more than a few minutes?
6) Will the widespread public exposure of a record of length of lines, machine audit logs, audit procedures and interim and final results help improve our election? Would it be better to actively collect the stories of success and failure of our elections including specific complaints or successes by clerks and by voters? And will the Secretary of State be likely to collect and publish this information under existing statute?
7) Paper ballot elections are good in part because humans can count ballots in the case an election flaw or exception is discovered. Is Colorado prepared to actually count paper ballots by hand when this becomes necessary? Do we have adequate preparations and adequate training to hand count our ballots accurately? Can the legislature assist in improving our hand count procedures? Could the clerks' negative attitude about hand counting self fulfill in the form of poor election practices and less accurate results?
8) What difference is there in the efficiency and on the other hand transparency and accountability and accuracy of election systems of the following types: an all mail ballot, an all electronic precinct election, an election with precinct counting of paper ballots and a precinct election with central counting? As far as I can tell this discussion has never taken place in Colorado.
8) Can hand counting be performed by using a bar code? Current definitions allow this. Is publication by newspaper sufficient for public oversight? Can the Department of State improve its methods of publication to make access to records more convenient? Will this take place without statutory changes?
9) Can we ever achieve a straight forward approach to elections if the legislature remains short sighted by enacting law for the current year only? What is the byproduct of limiting legislation to one year?
10) Can we expect the Secretary of State to take a non political and technically proficient approach to election quality? Will a Secretary appointed task force actually change the existing practices of the Department in addressing election process? How can the legislature serve the public in motivating beneficial change at the Secretary of State's office.
11) What is the procedural response to a narrow victory margin election under current statute and rule (less than 1/2 percent)?
Under what conditions would ballots be hand counted for voter intent in a recount? What procedure or source proves the sufficient accuracy of the machine which is used to count ballots accurately to the precision necessary to have confidence in a close margin election? Is it possible to hand count with the precision necessary to determine the outcome of a close election with confidence? Is it practical to undertake such a recount?
These are some fundamental questions for which both State Affairs committees. Legislators and the public ought to have a good understanding of the answers which would be provided not only by clerks and Department of State staff, but by members of the public who serve in the voluntary or superficially paid roles as canvass board members who do not benefit directly from a lack of exposure of election system deficiencies to the public.
I would like to see each of these questions answered in the course of the testimony on SB 189.
Harvie Branscomb
Colorado Voter Group
The Colorado Secretary of State has done what Myriah Conroy predicted in her recent testimony and has already recertified most of the voting machines in a political process which lacked transparency. The process may have avoided actually determining the accuracy of the voting systems. This looks like a very unsatisfying end to the saga of the Conroy v. Dennis law suit. It ought to be observed that the accuracy tested by Colorado certification is limited to a best case count of 10,000 ballots, when elections may process considerably more than that number on a single machine. We cannot have confidence in machine counts when the only set of tests which is intended to prove that the machines are accurate has not counted ballots on an election scale, and may not have addressed the ability of voting systems to obtain voter intent from ballots in a manner which is consistent with statute.
When and if we are ever able to determine if the tests were adequate to determine accuracy we will of course report on this. The fact that the Secretary has recertified systems will have little or no bearing on whether or not the tests prove accuracy or fail to do so. His ability to define substantial compliance has allowed him to make capricious decisions for which there is so far precious little explanation or justification. The extent to which the Secretary carried on with a non technical approach to the needs of the State regarding elections even after enduring the spotlight on this topic in the course of discussion over HB 1155 shows how little intelligence is applied in our State regulatory framework for elections. The Secretary has told members of the public that their only avenues for improvement of this situation is in the courts and in the legislature. He will then be expecting our response from both directions. The legislature will one would hope be prepared to address public interests on behalf of or in stead of the Secretary.
Senator Gordon's paper ballot bill is here, click to read bill.
The Senate State Affairs meeting on this bill is scheduled for 1:30 PM on Monday March 3rd.
The public have not been adequately served in the airing of information about elections in the Colorado press. This is primarily because the press do not provide an adequate platform for discussion and debate of issues and underlying facts. Most often important facts do not reach the form of printed word. It is the legislative process which allows for a form of debate, although it tends to be one sided and non interactive by the nature of the protocol used for these public sessions in which one side has control over the order and extent of the commentary. The public is depending, in this case almost entirely,on the legislature for the opportunity to have facts about elections aired to a full extent, even though a permanent written record is not created.
In the course of discussion of the SB 189 the following topics ought to be addressed and the underlying truths revealed. It will take time in committee to expose the answers to these questions. I sincerely hope that this time is made available:
1) Is precinct reporting needed and is it a valuable resource for public oversight and understanding of election results?
2) Can clerks perform precinct reporting and if so, just how hard is it? If not, why not? How many clerks are in this condition?
3) Do vote centers actually solve problems for elections or do they primarily introduce new and difficult problems? Why are vote centers not just combined precincts?
4) Can lines be avoided on election day without the guaranteed availability of a paper ballot?
5) How can paper ballots and paper poll books be employed to provide the best accountability and the least amount of waiting at precinct polling places? Will the existing statute and rule favor an accountable and transparent election where voters do not have to stand in line for more than a few minutes?
6) Will the widespread public exposure of a record of length of lines, machine audit logs, audit procedures and interim and final results help improve our election? Would it be better to actively collect the stories of success and failure of our elections including specific complaints or successes by clerks and by voters? And will the Secretary of State be likely to collect and publish this information under existing statute?
7) Paper ballot elections are good in part because humans can count ballots in the case an election flaw or exception is discovered. Is Colorado prepared to actually count paper ballots by hand when this becomes necessary? Do we have adequate preparations and adequate training to hand count our ballots accurately? Can the legislature assist in improving our hand count procedures? Could the clerks' negative attitude about hand counting self fulfill in the form of poor election practices and less accurate results?
8) What difference is there in the efficiency and on the other hand transparency and accountability and accuracy of election systems of the following types: an all mail ballot, an all electronic precinct election, an election with precinct counting of paper ballots and a precinct election with central counting? As far as I can tell this discussion has never taken place in Colorado.
8) Can hand counting be performed by using a bar code? Current definitions allow this. Is publication by newspaper sufficient for public oversight? Can the Department of State improve its methods of publication to make access to records more convenient? Will this take place without statutory changes?
9) Can we ever achieve a straight forward approach to elections if the legislature remains short sighted by enacting law for the current year only? What is the byproduct of limiting legislation to one year?
10) Can we expect the Secretary of State to take a non political and technically proficient approach to election quality? Will a Secretary appointed task force actually change the existing practices of the Department in addressing election process? How can the legislature serve the public in motivating beneficial change at the Secretary of State's office.
11) What is the procedural response to a narrow victory margin election under current statute and rule (less than 1/2 percent)?
Under what conditions would ballots be hand counted for voter intent in a recount? What procedure or source proves the sufficient accuracy of the machine which is used to count ballots accurately to the precision necessary to have confidence in a close margin election? Is it possible to hand count with the precision necessary to determine the outcome of a close election with confidence? Is it practical to undertake such a recount?
These are some fundamental questions for which both State Affairs committees. Legislators and the public ought to have a good understanding of the answers which would be provided not only by clerks and Department of State staff, but by members of the public who serve in the voluntary or superficially paid roles as canvass board members who do not benefit directly from a lack of exposure of election system deficiencies to the public.
I would like to see each of these questions answered in the course of the testimony on SB 189.
Harvie Branscomb
Colorado Voter Group
Sunday, January 27, 2008
Detecting election fraud made virtually impossible
The story by Myung Oak Kim on Voter-database doubts in yesterday's Rocky Mountain News raises serious questions about the potential for election fraud. From the article it appears that election officials intend to use Colorado's SCORE II statewide voter registration database as an electronic poll book during precinct elections in the future. Certainly electronic poll books are already in use, and required for vote center and mail ballot elections. However, such usage is fraught with peril, and the current system cannot even keep such simple fields as a voter's party affiliation straight. Since the system has been developed in secret, and public review will no doubt be extremely limited in the future, there is absolutely no way to know whether the names in the database are corporeal, the addresses exist and are residential, how many are in a secret file for alleged victims of domestic violence, what other chicanery exists or, more likely, gross incompetence is hidden behind "security by obscurity."
Before going further, I would like to recommend the book Deliver The Vote, A History Of Election Fraud, An American Political Tradition - 1742-2004 by Tracy Campbell. Anyone familiar with election fraud, and as Tracy Campbell abundantly documents, realizes that a basic and essential tool for detecting election fraud is a printed poll book containing signatures of those who appeared at the precinct and voted in the election. But election officials are rapidly eliminating that fundamental protection with no debate or review.
While the use of "repeaters," "drifters," and "illegals," together with vote buying and selling are nothing new to American elections, requiring a voter to appear in person at their precinct and physically sign a printed poll book in which they were listed, and that was available for future inspection, at least made the logistics of election fraud complicated and heightened the possibility of exposure and prosecution. But with electronic poll books there is little likelihood that public inspection can be easily accomplished or that the records will be preserved intact and complete. Also, signature capture and comparison is becoming all-electronic with little or no testing, and certainly no standards, for the required equipment and methods. The problems are particularly acute with mail ballots and exacerbated by mail-in voter registration where the "citizen" never personally appears before an election official, then may request a ballot by mail without any justification, or may be sent a ballot without even requesting one.
Thus we now have a system where we don't have access to any real documentation, there is no requirement that "voters" establish their physical existence, and only ephemeral electronic records exist for the election that we can't see.
One of the perennial problems with election fraud is that there are more ballots cast than voters who signed the poll book. Ofttimes there are even more ballots cast than there are registered voters in a precinct, which has happened on numerous occasions with electronic voting machines. But with vote centers it hasn't proven possible to break the voters and ballots down by precinct. With electronic poll books, mail ballots, early voting, and precinct voting combined it is impossible to control the number of ballots cast in a precinct in an election. While anyone with evil intent will insure that the total number of ballots cast is somewhat less than the number of registered voters in the precinct, with only easily-manipulated electronic records the problems of proving election fraud are greatly increased. The issue is also made worse by the tendency for county clerks to determine voter turnout by dividing the number of ballots returned by the number of ballots they send out in mail ballot elections. That is done to make it appear turnout was larger than in traditional elections, but such smoke-and-mirror techniques only serve to hide underlying problems which is, of course, desirable for election officials.
I always quake in fear when attorneys set out in haste to dictate solutions to technical problems. That is particularly true when they legislate on such fundamental issues as elections. I'm quite certain that I don't know all the problems that will result from this mad dash to computerized voting, yet legislators are hastily passing laws to dictate the unknown and, inevitably, the election disasters of tomorrow.
Given hundreds of years of election fraud experience, our forefathers had figured out that, except in very limited circumstances, requiring voters to physically appear at their local precinct on Election Day and sign a printed poll book that identified them as registered voters in that precinct was the safest, but not perfect, way to insure only eligible citizen's were allowed to vote.
After establishing their identity and valid registration, voters were then given a ballot that they hand marked in the privacy of a voting booth. Before the voter left their polling place the ballot was dropped into a ballot box after any identifying tags were removed. That ensured a secret ballot cast free from any intimidation, coercion, or electioneering. Vote buying and selling were also minimized by this method.
When the polls closed the ballots were hand counted at the precinct in full view of poll watchers and the public, and the totals posted at the precinct before the sealed ballot boxes and totals were taken to the clerk's office. The county clerk then totaled the results from all precincts in the county and gave out a public notice that could easily be verified by totaling up the posted precinct results.
The discerning reader will note that none of these protections exist today in many elections. Perhaps we should heed the lessons learned by our forefathers and return to the methods they developed for secure and honest elections. That isn't to say better means and methods for voting can't or won't be developed in the future, or that computers don't have a place in elections. But it is safe to state that present hastily and ill-informed election legislation has and is making elections less trustworthy and secure.
Chuck Corry
Charles E. Corry, Ph.D., F.G.S.A.
President
Equal Justice Foundation http://www.ejfi.org/
________________________________________
Before going further, I would like to recommend the book Deliver The Vote, A History Of Election Fraud, An American Political Tradition - 1742-2004 by Tracy Campbell. Anyone familiar with election fraud, and as Tracy Campbell abundantly documents, realizes that a basic and essential tool for detecting election fraud is a printed poll book containing signatures of those who appeared at the precinct and voted in the election. But election officials are rapidly eliminating that fundamental protection with no debate or review.
While the use of "repeaters," "drifters," and "illegals," together with vote buying and selling are nothing new to American elections, requiring a voter to appear in person at their precinct and physically sign a printed poll book in which they were listed, and that was available for future inspection, at least made the logistics of election fraud complicated and heightened the possibility of exposure and prosecution. But with electronic poll books there is little likelihood that public inspection can be easily accomplished or that the records will be preserved intact and complete. Also, signature capture and comparison is becoming all-electronic with little or no testing, and certainly no standards, for the required equipment and methods. The problems are particularly acute with mail ballots and exacerbated by mail-in voter registration where the "citizen" never personally appears before an election official, then may request a ballot by mail without any justification, or may be sent a ballot without even requesting one.
Thus we now have a system where we don't have access to any real documentation, there is no requirement that "voters" establish their physical existence, and only ephemeral electronic records exist for the election that we can't see.
One of the perennial problems with election fraud is that there are more ballots cast than voters who signed the poll book. Ofttimes there are even more ballots cast than there are registered voters in a precinct, which has happened on numerous occasions with electronic voting machines. But with vote centers it hasn't proven possible to break the voters and ballots down by precinct. With electronic poll books, mail ballots, early voting, and precinct voting combined it is impossible to control the number of ballots cast in a precinct in an election. While anyone with evil intent will insure that the total number of ballots cast is somewhat less than the number of registered voters in the precinct, with only easily-manipulated electronic records the problems of proving election fraud are greatly increased. The issue is also made worse by the tendency for county clerks to determine voter turnout by dividing the number of ballots returned by the number of ballots they send out in mail ballot elections. That is done to make it appear turnout was larger than in traditional elections, but such smoke-and-mirror techniques only serve to hide underlying problems which is, of course, desirable for election officials.
I always quake in fear when attorneys set out in haste to dictate solutions to technical problems. That is particularly true when they legislate on such fundamental issues as elections. I'm quite certain that I don't know all the problems that will result from this mad dash to computerized voting, yet legislators are hastily passing laws to dictate the unknown and, inevitably, the election disasters of tomorrow.
Given hundreds of years of election fraud experience, our forefathers had figured out that, except in very limited circumstances, requiring voters to physically appear at their local precinct on Election Day and sign a printed poll book that identified them as registered voters in that precinct was the safest, but not perfect, way to insure only eligible citizen's were allowed to vote.
After establishing their identity and valid registration, voters were then given a ballot that they hand marked in the privacy of a voting booth. Before the voter left their polling place the ballot was dropped into a ballot box after any identifying tags were removed. That ensured a secret ballot cast free from any intimidation, coercion, or electioneering. Vote buying and selling were also minimized by this method.
When the polls closed the ballots were hand counted at the precinct in full view of poll watchers and the public, and the totals posted at the precinct before the sealed ballot boxes and totals were taken to the clerk's office. The county clerk then totaled the results from all precincts in the county and gave out a public notice that could easily be verified by totaling up the posted precinct results.
The discerning reader will note that none of these protections exist today in many elections. Perhaps we should heed the lessons learned by our forefathers and return to the methods they developed for secure and honest elections. That isn't to say better means and methods for voting can't or won't be developed in the future, or that computers don't have a place in elections. But it is safe to state that present hastily and ill-informed election legislation has and is making elections less trustworthy and secure.
Chuck Corry
Charles E. Corry, Ph.D., F.G.S.A.
President
Equal Justice Foundation http://www.ejfi.org/
________________________________________
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