Thursday, March 26, 2009

Publish corruption testimony on EAC site.

March 26, 2009

Ms. Gineen Beach, Chairwoman
Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Avenue NW, Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Chairwoman Beach:

The attached email was submitted as testimony for the March 17th public hearing on Voter Registration Databases. Will you please publish the email on the Meeting page on the Commission’s website? See:

There is some background here. I have requested, multiple times, to be included in the Commission’s announcements list, but have not received notices. When I discovered the March 17th meeting I immediately submitted the attached. It was sent at 4:58 PM MST, but failed to arrive by 5:00 PM EST. Consequently your staff has refused to include the letter in the record.

As you can see, the letter is brief, to the point, and contains disturbing facts that need to be addressed by the Commission.

I hope that the Commission will take this matter seriously, investigate the facts, and intercede in behalf of the people.


Al Kolwicz


From: Al Kolwicz []
Sent: Monday, March 16, 2009 4:58 PM
To: ''
Cc: Barbara Simons; Colorado Voter Group; Bernie Buescher - Colorado SOS
Subject: TESTIMONY for March 17th EAC meeting - Reviewing HAVA Mandated Guidance

Dear EAC Chair and Members:

Colorado’s voter registration database system and procedures are corrupt. Colorado uses SCORE II.

We have reported specific defects, with exact records illustrating the defects.

We have filed a HAVA Complaint, using the official procedures, with the Colorado Secretary of State and the Department of Justice. A portion of the complaint is posted on the Secretary of State’s website at:

Our request for a public hearing, provided for in the law, has been denied. DOJ/Voting Rights did not accept our plea for help.

Our evidence has been brushed off, and not given serious attention.

Without any question whatsoever, the SCORE system used in Colorado does not comply with HAVA. And, there is no way to hold those accountable to take responsibility and fix the problems.

What does the EAC think is supposed to happen?

Does EAC consider that it has a role in ensuring compliance with HAVA?

Will EAC help us?

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

Online voter registration is not ready.

It would be interesting to learn the factual basis for the Denver Post's support of online voter registration, see Online voter registration is a move to 21st century.
  1. Has the Post investigated the HAVA complaint charging five violations of HAVA by the SCORE voter registration system? It would be interesting to learn the findings.
  2. Has the Post learned of some new technology that enables election officials to know who is actually logged onto the computer that is using an identity to create or change a voter registration record? If not, what assurance is there that voter registration records are not being fabricated?
  3. Has the Post studied the effectiveness of the Arizona and Washington online voter registration systems? If so, how many ineligible, fabricated, inaccurate, and out of date voter registration records exist in these databases?
  4. Has the Post discussed the topic with Colorado's private sector technical experts? If so, it would be interesting to learn the technical arguments for and against online voter registration.

The HB 1160 scheme for online voter registration is predicated on hope rather than fact. There are no studies. There has been no public technical debate. Tough questions are simply ignored.

The purpose of voter registration is to create a secure and accurate record that can be used to (1) verify that a person is who they claim to be, and (2) verify that the person is eligible to vote in a particular election.

I have personal experience with the Secretary of State's self-supervision and I assure you that it is not working. The SOS is not motivated to disclose or even discover its problems. To explicitly exclude independent testing (and independent oversight) would be a disaster.

The enthusiasm for the so-called "digital signature" is misplaced. Just because somebody has possession of a set of credentials does not mean that the person using the credentials is the person to whom the credentials belong.

The enthusiasm for an "airtight system", ensured by state election officials, is also misplaced. the CIA, credit card companies, even the IRS have not successfully discovered such a system, What makes anybody think that Colorado can do so?

Let's stabilize Colorado's voter registration system and fix its known problems before adding disruptive and unscientifically proven online voter registration.

Tuesday, March 10, 2009

Statisticians and election systems

One of Colorado Voter Group's objectives is to achieve transparent verification of each election.

To my knowledge, there has been no peer reviewed specification of the election system components. Nor is there, to my knowledge, any study of the means by which each component/process can be verified.

None of the Colorado election systems I am familiar with are transparent. None of the Colorado election system components/processes that I am familiar with are verifiable.

All of the statistical work that I have reviewed to date has insufficient scope to be conclusive. For example, there has been no attempt to determine whether or not eligible electors have been disallowed from voting or ineligible electors allowed to vote. Counting the wrong votes correctly does not mean that an election is fair or accurate.

Without an agreed to specification of the entire election system it is far too early for a professional statistician to seriously undertake to test and make conclusions regarding the fairness and accuracy of an election.

Furthermore, the statistical work that I have reviewed to date seems to give insufficient consideration to the variation in populations being sampled, and treats unlike populations as though they were statistically identical. This would be like testing for the color of fruit by sampling only bananas in a carton of apples and bananas.

I ask that we not relinquish our quest for transparent verification. We must not accept simplistic statistical methodology that does not accomplish the goal.

To be clear, there is a place for statistical methods in election system verification, but the statistical methods used must be comprehensive and correct or they serve to further mask real problems. We must not delegate our voice on this vital matter.

Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group