Friday, July 18, 2008

Boulder County Clerk refuses some CORA requests, ignores others.

On July 17, 2008, Boulder County Clerk Hillary Hall responded to a Colorado Open Records Act request dated July 1, 2008 and augmented July 8th. The following summarizes our July 8th request and transcribes the clerk's response to the request.

We will visit the Clerk's office to examine the materials.

REQUEST: We wish to review the Scanned Ballot Image Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

ACTION: Please reply to the above questions, and please reconsider the County’s July 7th response to our request for scanned ballot image files.

CLERK’s RESPONSE: The Scanned Ballot Image Files are not available for you to view. The BallotNow System does not store the images in a non-proprietary way. The Boulder County Clerk & Recorder's office complies with Colorado law. The Boulder County Clerk and Recorder's office is in compliance with Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7.


REQUEST: We wish to review the Ballot Now Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

ACTION: Please provide a list of all system objects so that we can use the proper identifiers. Please respond to the attached resubmission for BallotNow log files.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: Please schedule a time to visit our office to review these documents, 303-413-7766.

REQUEST: We wish to review the Cast Vote Record Files (Ballot Now and eSlate/JBC) created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

ACTION: Please respond to our original request for eSlate/JBC Cast Vote Record files, and BallotNow Cast vote Record files.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: Please schedule a time to visit our office to review these documents, 303-413-7766.

REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Results Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

ACTION: Please confirm that the NEW SCORE voter database was not integrated into the system for the LAT. Please confirm that the County has performed no Acceptance Test which would have integrated all of the components of the elections system.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: We provided you with available data on July 3.

REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

ACTION: Please respond to the attached resubmission request for TALLY log files.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: We provided you with the complete TALLY Log Files on July 3.

REQUEST: We wish to review the (1) the detailed procedures and instructions that were used to plan, manage, and conduct the test, (2) any observations regarding the test, and (3) any test reports from the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

ACTION: The HART Central Scanner has known quality problems, and was only conditionally certified. One of the conditions for use is related to pre-scanning inspection.

CLERK’S RESPONSE: Please schedule a time to visit our office to review these documents, 303-413-7766.

During our inspection at the printer, we discovered one ballot printed on one side. We purposely included this ballot in the testing to ensure the system could properly handle the ballot.


REQUEST: In all of the responses to our requests for “files”, paper was produced. We requested “files” – computer files.

ACTION: Please respond to our request for files with computer files.

CLERK’S RESPONSE: No response.
REQUEST: Staff required test developers to write the correct test “answer” on each ballot. This “open book” approach to testing eliminates the possibility that the voter’s intent can be ambiguous, and is therefore not a realistic test.

ACTION: Conceal the “answers” from those operating the system by recording them on the test plan (expected results) document rather than on the actual ballot.

CLERK’S RESPONSE: No response.
REQUEST: Election Rule 45.11 requires that a new or modified voting system must undergo acceptance testing before it may be used to cast or count votes in any election. Since the LAT did not include use of the NEW SCORE data, the LAT was reliant on the results of an earlier acceptance test.

ACTION: If acceptance tests of the entire voting system were performed, we wish to review the test plans and the test results. If the acceptance tests were not performed, we wish to know how Boulder County’s election system will be brought into compliance with Rule 45.11 before it is used to cast or count votes for the Primary Election.
CLERK’S RESPONSE: The CORA request regarding acceptance testing: the voting equipment did not change. We are in full compliance with Rule 45.11.

Thursday, July 10, 2008

Open Records Request gets non-responsive reply.

July 8, 2008
Ms. Hillary Hall
Boulder County Clerk & Recorder

RE: Colorado Open Records Act request dated July 1, 2008

Dear Ms. Hall:

At a meeting today with Elections Coordinator, Carlos Webb, materials produced in response to our Colorado Open Records Act request were reviewed.

The following summarizes: our request, the data provided by staff, and our assessment of the data.

REQUEST: We wish to review the Scanned Ballot Image Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

A non-responsive July 7th letter from Assistant County Attorney, Shelley Bailey, responded, “These records do not exist, therefore, we are unable to fulfill your request at this time.”

Even if it were true that the records did not exist on July 7th, did the records not exist on July 3rd at about 10:00 AM when a set of reports was produced in response to our Open Records request?

At what time, and under whose authority were these election records destroyed?

Are these election records not preserved in the BOSS database, or other database that is backed up as a permanent record of the Logic and Accuracy Test?

Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7 requires that all election data shall be exportable on-demand by authorized users. What is the explanation for the destruction of these particular election records?

ELECTION RULE
45.5.2.1.7 The voting system application shall provide authorized users with the capability to produce electronic files including election results in either ASCII (both comma-delimited and fixed-width) or webbased format that shall contain (a) all data or (b) any user selected data elements from the database. The software shall provide authorized users with the ability to generate these files on an “on-demand” basis. After creating such files, the authorized users shall, at their discretion, have the capability to copy the files to diskette, tape, or CD-ROM or to transmit the files to another information system.

If any, what other election records were destroyed?

ACTION: Please reply to the above questions, and please reconsider the County’s July 7th response to our request for scanned ballot image files.

REQUEST: We wish to review the Ballot Now Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

Due to a nomenclature problem, rather than the BallotNow Log files, staff produced, in response to our open records request, the following non-responsive reports, one set for each of the 8 BallotNow computer systems, dated July 3, 2008 approximately 10:00 AM:

· Election Report - Official
· Election MBBs – Official
· Resolve Status Report – Official
· Scan Batch Summary – Official
· Scanned Ballots by Batch – Official (multiple pages)

We discussed what we are looking for with Patty Stahl and she asked that we resubmit the request using the title “BallotNow System Audit Log”. We have attached this request.

We also asked if there is a copy of the specifications for the system or a detailed list of system objects that we can review, so that we can be better informed of the correct identifiers for system objects.

We remain concerned that the identifier “BallotNow System Audit Log” may not include all of the log data we seek. If it does not, by way of explanation, we want to review all log data. This would include system administration tasks, the state of and state-changes of application and system switches, the trusted build hash value (MD5 or SHA-1) of the firmware or software, the engineering level of the equipment, the details of vote interpretation for individual ballots, Cast Vote Record creation and revision, MBB creation and revision, etc. In other words, all logs.

ACTION: Please provide a list of all system objects so that we can use the proper identifiers. Please respond to the attached resubmission for BallotNow log files.

REQUEST: We wish to review the Cast Vote Record Files (Ballot Now and eSlate/JBC) created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

Due to a nomenclature problem, rather than the Cast Vote Record files (BallotNow and eSlate/JBC), staff produced, in response to our open records request, the following non-responsive reports”:

· JBC Connectivity
· Devices Backed Up
· 4 JBC Paper Tape Summaries

We agreed to produce for Carlos a sample of a printout of a Cast Vote Record, which is attached. The attached sample comes from an eSlate/JBC device.

ACTION: Please respond to our original request for eSlate/JBC Cast Vote Record files, and BallotNow Cast vote Record files.

REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Results Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

The partially responsive materials presented were:

· Unofficial County-wide Summary by Contest (9 pages)
· MBBs Read report (17 MBBs) (1 page)
· Precinct Turnout report (7 pages)
· Canvass Report (142 pages)

We identified what we consider to be several problems with the materials presented:

· The Canvass Report does not include precinct/contest OVER-UNDER votes.
· The reports show that the voter file data used for the LAT was not real voter data. The integration of the NEW SCORE voter data into the system was therefore not tested.

ACTION: Please confirm that the NEW SCORE voter database was not integrated into the system for the LAT. Please confirm that the County has performed no Acceptance Test which would have integrated all of the components of the elections system.

REQUEST: We wish to review the TALLY Log Files created during the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

There was a misunderstanding of our request. We will assume that the same nomenclature used for the BallotNow request, above, applies to the TALLY log files.

ACTION: Please respond to the attached resubmission request for TALLY log files.

REQUEST: We wish to review the (1) the detailed procedures and instructions that were used to plan, manage, and conduct the test, (2) any observations regarding the test, and (3) any test reports from the 2008 Primary Election Logic and Accuracy Test.

The partially responsive materials presented were:
  • Temporary Badge Log
  • Guidelines for Observers
  • LAT Procedure (3 pages)
  • LAT Agenda and Procedures (4 pages)
  • C.R.S. 1-7-509
We were informed that there are no written observations regarding the test, and no report about the test results, and no log of issues detected and/or resolved. This appears to be in violation of 1-7-509(2)(e).



C.R.S. 1-7-509(2)(e) The testing board or its representative shall sign a written statement indicating the devices tested, the results of the testing, the protective counter numbers of each device, if applicable, the number of the seal attached to each device upon completion of the testing, any problems reported to the designated election official as a result of the testing, and whether each device tested is satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
During discussion, Carlos told us that a ballot was missing printing on one side of the ballot. He did not produce a copy of that ballot for us to inspect.

We asked if this problem was detected by any pre-scanning inspection. Carlos told us that it was not. He further told us that there was no pre-scanning inspection.

In a separate meeting, Republican LAT representative, Amy Barnes Fry, reported to Neal and me that there was an additional printing problem. This problem was not disclosed in response to our open records request and not disclosed orally by Mr. Webb. This problem was a misprinting of the vote capture box such that the box itself was detected as a vote. This is a case of the “spurious mark” problem that has troubled the HART system.

Problems, such as the problems with the misprinted ballot, were hidden from our review. We believe that this should have been disclosed in response to our open records request.

ACTION: The HART Central Scanner has known quality problems, and was only conditionally certified. One of the conditions for use is related to pre-scanning inspection.

If it is correct that the LAT was performed without a pre-scanning inspection, the equipment was used in a non-certified manner. The Secretary of State must be immediately notified that the mitigation for the HART “spurious mark” problem did not work, and must be replaced by a procedure that does work.

We wish the County to report this non-compliance to the Secretary of State, and consider re-running the LAT using pre-scanning inspectors, emphasizing tests that will stress the ability of the inspectors to intercept spurious marks.

More …


In all of the responses to our requests for “files”, paper was produced. We requested “files” – computer files. It is nearly impossible to analyze a large election on paper.

ACTION: Please respond to our request for files with computer files.

Staff required test developers to write the correct test “answer” on each ballot. This “open book” approach to testing eliminates the possibility that the voter’s intent can be ambiguous, and is therefore not a realistic test. Testing ambiguous voter intent can be especially important to verifying that duplication board and resolution board activities are functioning properly.

ACTION: Conceal the “answers” from those operating the system by recording them on the test plan (expected results) document rather than on the actual ballot.

Election Rule 45.11 requires that a new or modified voting system must undergo acceptance testing before it may be used to cast or count votes in any election. Since the LAT did not include use of the NEW SCORE data, the LAT was reliant on the results of an earlier acceptance test. We expect that the acceptance test will verify all system functions, including but not limited to:
  • The accuracy and adequacy of all reports.
  • The voting system’s ability to perform the recount procedure.
  • The voting system’s ability to perform the post-election audit procedure.
  • The voting system’s ability to perform the Canvass procedure.
ELECTION RULE
45.11 Acceptance Testing by Jurisdictions

45.11.1 Whenever an
election jurisdiction acquires a new system or modification of an existing
system certified by the Secretary of State, the election jurisdiction shall
perform acceptance tests of the system before it may be used to cast or count
votes at any election. The voting system shall be operating correctly, pass all
tests as directed by the acquiring jurisdiction’s project manager or contract
negotiator, and shall be identical to the voting system certified by the
Secretary of State.

45.11.2 The voting system provider shall
provide all manuals and training necessary for the proper operation of the
system to the jurisdiction, or as indicated by their
contract.

45.11.3 The election jurisdiction shall perform a series
of functional and programming tests that shall test all functions of the voting
system at their discretion.

45.11.4 The jurisdiction shall
coordinate acceptance testing with the Secretary of State’s designated agent and
complete a Jurisdiction Acceptance Test form provided by the Secretary of State.

ACTION: If acceptance tests of the entire voting system were performed, we wish to review the test plans and the test results. If the acceptance tests were not performed, we wish to know how Boulder County’s election system will be brought into compliance with Rule 45.11 before it is used to cast or count votes for the Primary Election.


Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group

Enclosed: Three open records requests.

Tuesday, July 08, 2008

Clerk acknowledges voter file problems

-----Original Message-----
From: Hall, Hillary [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Sent: Monday, July 07, 2008 3:54 PM
To: Al Kolwicz [Colorado Voter Group]
Cc: Thomas, Scott [Chief Deputy Clerk]
Subject: Voter file


Al,

The export provided to the parties is more complete and gives the most comprehensive look at our voter registration database ever available in an export. We appreciate you looking it over and letting us know your concerns. If you have further questions please contact Scott Thomas.

Below are answers to your questions.

Hillary


Al Kolwicz: The Voter Registration file contains: Non-citizens.
Hillary Hall:
While 36 people have been flagged as non-citizens, these voters were flagged incorrectly. This field is one of the issues that we have identified in SCORE. We are continuing to work with the Colorado Secretary of State's office to make improvements to such areas of the system. As you are aware anyone registering to vote is required to sign an oath, which includes an affirmation that they are a U.S. citizen. It is noted on all voter registration forms that it is a crime to swear or affirm falsely to this qualification. Therefore, anyone who has completed, signed, and returned a voter registration form to our office is to our knowledge a U.S. citizen. We also check all voters' certified identification as provided by the Help America Vote Act. It should also be noted that even if a voter is tagged by this field in SCORE, it does not disqualify the voter from receiving a ballot as this non-citizen field is a report only field.

Al Kolwicz: People registered in invalid precincts.
Hillary Hall:
This is just another example of the issues we have identified while in the process of scrubbing the SCORE files. We have identified a total of 113 voters in invalid precincts. We have 39 voter registration files left to correct. Many of these people have provided addresses that are located in new developments not yet in the County's records. The 0 precinct is a place holder precinct.

Al Kolwicz: A suspiciously small number of 2008 Primary Election mail-in voters. We know of at least one voter who is not marked as a non-permanent mail in voter.
Hillary Hall:
I am not sure what you mean by "marked as non-permanent mail in voter". As to the small number, it is reflected in SCORE that we have 66, 563 Boulder County registered voters signed up for permanent mail-in voting. A large portion of these are affiliated as either Democratic or Republican and will receive mail-in ballots for the 2008 Primary Election. Voters are encouraged to check their voter information on our website, www.VoteBoulder.org, to ensure they are registered to vote by mail if they have signed up for this service. If the person to whom you refer accidentally signed up for permanent mail-in status but wanted to vote by mail in this election only, he or she can correct this issue by contacting the Elections Division at 303-413-7740.

Al Kolwicz: There are no place-markers for CONFIDENTIAL voters, so it will be impossible to accurately verify election results for the Canvass.
Hillary Hall:
Al, you are viewing a public export file in which Confidential voters are not included for their protection. A report that includes confidential voters will be available only to the Canvass Board.

Al Kolwicz: There is no DATE associated with the PERMANENT MAIL-IN FLAG.
Hillary Hall:
True. However, our office can look up any voter who has requested to vote by mail and find the date record that the vote by mail request was made to our office.

Al Kolwicz: Key information is not included in the file. For example, there is no indicator for "1st time voter who registered by mail" This will limit the effectiveness of poll watchers.
Hillary Hall:
True. You are correct that this data is not indicated; however, this information is not of consequence for poll watchers because all voters who vote at a polling location are required to show ID. In addition, this information has never been available to the public.

Al Kolwicz: There is no indicator showing that a voter's ballot was REJECTED and its VOTES NOT COUNTED.
Hillary Hall:
This is true, however, there are other reports available that contain a ballot's status, whether it was rejected or if a vote was not counted. This information would be provided to the Canvass Board.

Al Kolwicz: You can easily see the poor quality of the terminology used in the fields. Inconsistent, redundant, and unintelligible.
Hillary Hall:
I disagree with your assessment; employees in the Elections Division are clear on the field information.

Al Kolwicz: 1. It appears that there are no records for voters that voted in prior elections, but are no longer on the current registration file.
Hillary Hall:
True. Cancelled or moved voters are not included in the report, as this information is no longer pertinent to our office. The voter history file only provides a snapshot of how current voters participated in past elections. The report cannot be used to reconstruct a past election. You would need to reference the Statement of Vote if you wished to understand an accurate statistical analysis of voter participation in a past election.

Al Kolwicz: 2. There are records in the Voter Registration file that are not present in the Vote History Details file.
Hillary Hall:
True. Voters with no voting history will have no records in the history file.

Al Kolwicz: 3. There are records in the Vote History Details file that are not present in the Voter Registration file.
Hillary Hall:
True. The history file contains placeholders for the confidential voters. The voter details file does not.

Al Kolwicz: Detail records do not indicate the precinct number of the voter when the vote was recorded.
Hillary Hall:
True. But if an individual voter wants this information, we can research it and find it.

Al Kolwicz: Detail records contain invalid METHOD OF VOTING.
Hillary Hall:
Not true. The Method of Voting field may be empty. There are 244 voter history records that have no data in Method of Voting. All but one of these is from elections prior to 2001. The exception is from the 2004 election.

Tuesday, July 01, 2008

SCORE Voter Files are incorrect and insufficient.

From: Al Kolwicz
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 7:57 AM
To: Hillary Hall [Boulder County Clerk & Recorder]
Cc: Carlos Webb; Canvass Board Group; SOS Mike Coffman ; 'Richard Coolidge'
Subject: SCORE Voter Files are incorrect and insufficient.

Dear Ms. Hall,

We have completed a very preliminary analysis of the SCORE voter files dated June 23rd.

The Voter Registration file contains:
  • Non-citizens.
  • People registered in invalid precincts.
  • A suspiciously small number of 2008 Primary Election mail-in voters. We know of at least one voter who is not marked as a non-permanent mail in voter.
There are no place-markers for CONFIDENTIAL voters, so it will be impossible to accurately verify election results for the Canvass.

There is no DATE associated with the PERMANENT MAIL-IN FLAG.

Key information is not included in the file. For example, there is no indicator for “1st time voter who registered by mail” This will limit the effectiveness of poll watchers.

The Voter History files are:
Attached is a summary analysis of the Vote History data.
  • There is no indicator showing that a voter’s ballot was REJECTED and its VOTES NOT COUNTED.
  • You can easily see the poor quality of the terminology used in the fields. Inconsistent, redundant, and unintelligible.
  • The counts indicate that there are a massive number of missing records.
    1. It appears that there are no records for voters that voted in prior elections, but are no longer on the current registration file.
    2. There are records in the Voter Registration file that are not present in the Vote History Details file.
    3. The are records in the Vote History Details file that are not present in the Voter Registration file.
  • Detail records do not indicate the precinct number of the voter when the vote was recorded.
  • Detail records contain invalid METHOD OF VOTING.
Obviously, this brief review of the files is incomplete. The fact that there are so many issues at this late date is very disturbing.

Will you please e-mail the entity relationship diagram and the field specifications? We want to see what data are available so that we can formulate a request for a more complete voter file.

Also, we have had a number of discussions with you regarding the frequency of update and the electronic delivery of this data to the political party organizations. We hope that you will implement our requests.

Al Kolwicz
Canvass Board Member
Boulder County Republican Party
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/CanvassBoard/
http://www.bouldercountygop.org/