From: Al Kolwicz
Sent: Saturday, November 27, 2010 11:17 AM
To: 'Marilyn R Marks'; 'judd.choate@sos.state.co.us'
Subject: RE: Urgent Action Required to Lift Unfair 6 foot rule policies in Saguache
Marilyn, Judd,
It troubles me that an illegal 6-foot barrier is being referred to as a “six foot rule”.
In the first place, as we all know, there is no such rule.
In the second place, the 6-foot barrier is illegal. The illegal 6-foot barrier restricts poll watchers in a way that blocks poll watchers from exercising their rights under “C.R.S. 1-7-108(3) Each watcher shall have the right to maintain a list of eligible electors who have voted, to witness and verify each step in the conduct of the election from prior to the opening of the polls through the completion of the count and announcement of the results, to challenge ineligible electors, and to assist in the correction of discrepancies.”
I ask that you cease referring to the illegal 6-foot barrier as a “six foot rule” and suggest that you refer to the “6-foot barrier”, or “illegal 6-foot barrier”.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
Saturday, November 27, 2010
Saturday, October 16, 2010
We need your help!
We need your help!
The Colorado Attorney General’s office has issued an opinion (October 15th email below) that, if left unchallenged, would essentially shut down independent oversight of elections.
I encourage each of you to intensify your efforts to ensure that Colorado elections are independently verifiable by the public. If we fail, we are one step closer to widespread election fraud and error.
Remember that the Attorney General is the attorney for the Secretary of State – not the people’s Attorney General.
There are three sections below. Please take time to read thru them. Then share your ideas. We must act promptly.
Colorado Voter Group
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
http://coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com/
October 15th email from Attorney General’s office
From: Judd Choate [mailto:Judd.Choate@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Friday, October 15, 2010 9:11 AM
To: Marilyn R Marks
Cc: attorney.general@state.co.us; Harvie Branscomb; Al Kolwicz; joseph richey
Subject: RE: opinion on poll watching
Here is what Maurice Knaizer, the Deputy Attorney General, sent me last night regarding the six foot rule. If you would prefer that he put this on a letterhead, I’m sure that can be accomplished.
Kolwicz annotations to the AG’s email.
1. The statement of the issue is ill-formed, and will result in a fuzzy response. It is sort of a “straw-man”. It restricts the issue to one that might be answered by 1-5-503. We have actually asked for much more transparency, and never asked to see what is happening in the immediate area of the voting booth or see the content of non-anonymous ballots.
4. Knaizer then goes on and creates, on his own initiative, an extensive expansion of the written law.
Kolwicz notes regarding Colorado’s statutes and election rules.
The reason that watchers need to get within 6 feet of computer screens, cast ballots, and various other election information is so that watchers, who are trying to accomplish their statutory rights, can actually “see” and “hear” what is going on. We have no interest in seeing the computer screens or the issued-but-uncast ballot seen by the elector as he marks, verifies, and casts an anonymous ballot.
I have clipped pertinent sections of our statutes and rules below. Any reasonable reading will conclude that watchers are expected to have access to election data including who is voting, how the votes on a ballot are interpreted, and how the votes on a ballot are counted.
The public depends on independent oversight (watchers) because watchers can discover errors that might otherwise get missed or covered up, and to prevent official misdeeds. It is not difficult to understand that there are often measures on the ballot that affect the jobs and pay of government officials. (Officials often have “a horse in the race”.) In Colorado counties, election officials can choose their own people for mail-in, early, and provisional ballot processing, and for all vote counting. In many cases these people are government employees. Sometimes key processes of the election are performed by sub-contractors, some of which may be offsite, or even out of state.
With the exception of voter privacy issues outlined above, watchers need both real-time access to the data in every election process, including anonymous cast ballots, and post election access to all election data computer files.
We trust the officials, but, since they are human, and to obtain certainty, we must verify.
Al
1-1-104. Definitions. (51) "Watcher" means an eligible elector other than a candidate on the ballot who has been selected by a political party chairperson on behalf of the political party, by a party candidate at a primary election, by an unaffiliated candidate at a general, congressional vacancy, or nonpartisan election, or by a person designated by either the opponents or the proponents in the case of a ballot issue or ballot question.
1-7-108. Requirements of watchers. (1) Watchers shall take an oath administered by one of the election judges that they are eligible electors, that their name has been submitted to the designated election official as a watcher for this election, and that they will not in any manner make known to anyone the result of counting votes until the polls have closed.
(2) Neither candidates nor members of their immediate families by blood or marriage to the second degree may be poll watchers for that candidate.
(3) Each watcher shall have the right to maintain a list of eligible electors who have voted, to witness and verify each step in the conduct of the election from prior to the opening of the polls through the completion of the count and announcement of the results, to challenge ineligible electors, and to assist in the correction of discrepancies.
1-7-307. Method of counting paper ballots. (4) All persons, except election judges and watchers, shall be excluded from the place where the ballot counting is being held until the count has been completed.
1-7-507. Electronic vote-counting - procedure. (1) All proceedings at the counting centers shall be under the direction of the designated election official and the representatives of the political parties, if a partisan election, or watchers, if a nonpartisan election. No persons, except those authorized for the purpose, shall touch any ballot, ballot card, "prom" or other electronic device, or return.
1-7.5-107.5. Counting mail ballots. The election officials at the mail ballot counting place may receive and prepare mail ballots delivered and turned over to them by the designated election official for tabulation. Counting of the mail ballots may begin fifteen days prior to the election and continue until counting is completed. The election official in charge of the mail ballot counting place shall take all precautions necessary to ensure the secrecy of the counting procedures, and no information concerning the count shall be released by the election officials or watchers until after 7 p.m. on election day.
1-8-109. Watchers at mail-in polling places. Any political party, candidate, or proponents or opponents of a ballot issue entitled to have watchers at polling places shall each have the right to maintain one watcher in the office of the designated election official and mail-in polling places during the period in which mail-in ballots may be applied for or received.
1-8-206. Watchers at early voters' polling places. Any political party, candidate, or proponents or opponents of a ballot issue entitled to have watchers at polling places shall each have the right to maintain one watcher at the early voters' polling place during the casting and counting of early voters' ballots.
1-8-208. Manner of early voting. (1) An eligible elector who receives an early voters' ballot may cast the ballot in the early voters' polling place, as provided in this part 2. Ballot boxes for early voting shall be locked and sealed each night with a numbered seal under the supervision of the election judges or watchers, and the keys shall remain in the possession of the designated election official until transferred to the supply judge for the mail-in and early voters' counting place for preparation for counting and tabulating pursuant to section 1-8-303. When a seal is broken, the designated election official and a person who shall not be of the same political party as the designated election official shall record the number of the seal and maintain the seal along with an explanation of the reasons for breaking the seal.
1-9-201. Right to vote may be challenged. (1) (a) A person's right to vote at a polling place or in an election may be challenged.
(b) If a person whose right to vote is challenged refuses to answer the questions asked or sign the challenge form in accordance with section 1-9-203 or take the oath pursuant to section 1-9-204, the person shall be offered a provisional ballot. If the person casts a provisional ballot, the election judge shall attach the challenge form to the provisional ballot envelope and indicate "Challenge" on the provisional ballot envelope.
(2) An election judge shall challenge any person intending to vote who the judge believes is not an eligible elector. In addition, challenges may be made by watchers or any eligible elector of the precinct.
(3) A challenge at a polling place shall be made in the presence of the person whose right to vote is challenged.
1-10-101. Canvass board for partisan elections - appointment, fees, oaths. (1) (a) At least fifteen days before any primary, general, congressional vacancy, or special legislative election, the county chairpersons of each of the two major political parties in each county shall certify to the county clerk and recorder, in the manner prescribed by such clerk and recorder, the appointment of one or more registered electors to serve as a member of the county canvass board. The appointees, together with the county clerk and recorder, constitute the county canvass board. Each minor political party whose candidate is on the ballot and each unaffiliated candidate whose name is on the ballot in such election may designate, in the manner prescribed by such clerk and recorder, one watcher to observe the work of the county canvass board.
1-10.5-102. Recounts for congressional, state, and district offices, state ballot questions, and state ballot issues. (1) If the secretary of state determines that a recount is required for the office of United States senator, representative in congress, any state office or district office of state concern, any state ballot question, or any state ballot issue certified for the ballot by the secretary of state, the secretary of state shall order a complete recount of all the votes cast for that office, state ballot question, or state ballot issue no later than the twenty-fifth day after the election.
(2) The secretary of state shall notify the county clerk and recorder of each county involved by registered mail and facsimile transmission of a public recount to be conducted in the county at a place prescribed by the secretary of state. The recount shall be completed no later than the thirtieth day after any election. The secretary of state shall promulgate and provide each county clerk and recorder with the necessary rules and regulations to conduct the recount in a fair, impartial, and uniform manner, including provisions for watchers during the recount. Any rule or regulation concerning the conduct of a recount shall take into account the type of voting system and equipment used by the county in which the recount is to be conducted.
1-13-702. Interfering with watcher. Any person who intentionally interferes with any watcher while he is discharging his duties set forth in section 1-7-108 (3) is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 1-13-111.
1-13-712. Disclosing or identifying vote. (1) Except as provided in section 1-7-108, no voter shall show his ballot after it is prepared for voting to any person in such a way as to reveal its contents. No voter shall place any mark upon his ballot by means of which it can be identified as the one voted by him, and no other mark shall be placed on the ballot by any person to identify it after it has been prepared for voting.
(2) No person shall endeavor to induce any voter to show how he marked his ballot.
(3) No election official, watcher, or person shall reveal to any other person the name of any candidate for whom a voter has voted or communicate to another his opinion, belief, or impression as to how or for whom a voter has voted.
(4) Any person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 1-13-111.
1-13-718. Release of information concerning count. Any election official, watcher, or other person who releases information concerning the count of ballots cast at precinct polling places or of mail-in voters' ballots prior to 7 p.m. on the day of the election is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 1-13-111.
ELECTION RULES
8.7 What Watchers May Observe. Duly appointed Watchers may observe polling place voting, early voting and the processing and counting of precinct, provisional, mail, and mail-in ballots. For mail ballot elections, or mail-in ballot processing, watchers may be present at each stage of the election including the receiving and bundling of the ballots received by the designated election official. Watchers may be present during provisional ballot processing but may not have access to confidential voter information.
8.8 Limitations of Watchers. Duly appointed Watchers may observe election judges but may not interrupt or disrupt the processing, verification and counting of any ballots or any other stage of the election. Watchers may track the names of electors who have cast ballots by utilizing their previously obtained lists, but may not write down any ballot numbers or any other identifying information about the electors. Watchers may not handle the poll books, official signature cards, ballots, mail ballot envelopes, mail-in ballot envelopes or provisional ballot envelopes, voting or counting machines or machine components. Watchers shall not interfere with the orderly process and conduct of any election, including ballot issuance, receiving of ballots, voting or counting of the ballots. Watchers may not be allowed to interact with election officials or election judges, except that each designated election official shall name at least one individual in each precinct polling place or election location to whom Watchers may direct questions or from whom watchers may seek requested information.
The Colorado Attorney General’s office has issued an opinion (October 15th email below) that, if left unchallenged, would essentially shut down independent oversight of elections.
I encourage each of you to intensify your efforts to ensure that Colorado elections are independently verifiable by the public. If we fail, we are one step closer to widespread election fraud and error.
Remember that the Attorney General is the attorney for the Secretary of State – not the people’s Attorney General.
There are three sections below. Please take time to read thru them. Then share your ideas. We must act promptly.
1. October 15th email from Attorney General’s officeAl Kolwicz
2. My annotations to the AG’s email.
3. My notes regarding Colorado’s statutes and election rules
Colorado Voter Group
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
http://coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com/
October 15th email from Attorney General’s office
From: Judd Choate [mailto:Judd.Choate@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Friday, October 15, 2010 9:11 AM
To: Marilyn R Marks
Cc: attorney.general@state.co.us; Harvie Branscomb; Al Kolwicz; joseph richey
Subject: RE: opinion on poll watching
Here is what Maurice Knaizer, the Deputy Attorney General, sent me last night regarding the six foot rule. If you would prefer that he put this on a letterhead, I’m sure that can be accomplished.
Poll Watchers have asked whether they may witness activities of election officials involving voting equipment, voting booths and the ballot boxes within six feet of such equipment, booths and boxes when a voter is not present. The Department of State has concluded that watchers may not be permitted within six feet of the equipment, booths and ballot boxes even when a voter is not present.
Section 1-5-503 provides:
"The voting equipment or voting booths and the ballot box shall be situated in the polling place so as to be in plain view of the election officials and watchers. No person other than the election officials and those admitted for the purpose of voting shall be permitted within the immediate voting area, which shall be considered as within six feet of the voting equipment or voting booths and the ballot box, except by authority of election judges or the designated election official, and then only when necessary to keep order and enforce the law"
This section does not contain any temporal limitations It covers activities, such as casting of ballots, counting of ballots and recounts, that occur during the election process. It also covers all locations where equipment or ballot boxes may be placed while ballots are being cast or counted. If a ballot box is moved from one location in a polling place to another, the six foot buffer would apply to the second location. Ballots themselves are also covered because the primary purpose of this section is to protect the integrity of the ballot and preserve the secrecy of the ballot. Allowing persons other than designated election officials or their agents to come closer to the equipment, booths or ballot boxes increases the likelihood that a watcher with malevolent intent could corrupt the election process. Any potential disadvantage to the watcher is mitigated by the requirement that the equipment, booths and ballot boxes must be "in plain view."
For these reasons, I concur with the Secretary's interpretation.
Maurice Knaizer
Kolwicz annotations to the AG’s email.
1. The statement of the issue is ill-formed, and will result in a fuzzy response. It is sort of a “straw-man”. It restricts the issue to one that might be answered by 1-5-503. We have actually asked for much more transparency, and never asked to see what is happening in the immediate area of the voting booth or see the content of non-anonymous ballots.
Poll Watchers have asked whether they may witness activities of election officials involving voting equipment, voting booths and the ballot boxes within six feet of such equipment, booths and boxes when a voter is not present. The Department of State has concluded that watchers may not be permitted within six feet of the equipment, booths and ballot boxes even when a voter is not present.2. The citation, by Knaizer, of 1-5-503 is faulty in that it refers only to the polling place, and not to all of the other election activities. Also, it is clear to me that the intent is to protect the privacy of the voter and the anonymity of the ballot. Once the ballot is cast it must be, by constitution and statute, anonymous.
Section 1-5-503 provides:3. Knaizer conveniently eliminates all of the other, many, statutes and election rules related to this topic. I have scraped many of these in the synopsis below.
"The voting equipment or voting booths and the ballot box shall be situated in the polling place so as to be in plain view of the election officials and watchers. No person other than the election officials and those admitted for the purpose of voting shall be permitted within the immediate voting area, which shall be considered as within six feet of the voting equipment or voting booths and the ballot box, except by authority of election judges or the designated election official, and then only when necessary to keep order and enforce the law"
4. Knaizer then goes on and creates, on his own initiative, an extensive expansion of the written law.
This section does not contain any temporal limitations It covers activities, such as casting of ballots, counting of ballots and recounts, that occur during the election process. It also covers all locations where equipment or ballot boxes may be placed while ballots are being cast or counted. If a ballot box is moved from one location in a polling place to another, the six foot buffer would apply to the second location. Ballots themselves are also covered because the primary purpose of this section is to protect the integrity of the ballot and preserve the secrecy of the ballot. Allowing persons other than designated election officials or their agents to come closer to the equipment, booths or ballot boxes increases the likelihood that a watcher with malevolent intent could corrupt the election process. Any potential disadvantage to the watcher is mitigated by the requirement that the equipment, booths and ballot boxes must be "in plain view."
It appears to me that Mr. Knaizer’s response is political rather than legal, and should be challenged immediately.
Kolwicz notes regarding Colorado’s statutes and election rules.
The reason that watchers need to get within 6 feet of computer screens, cast ballots, and various other election information is so that watchers, who are trying to accomplish their statutory rights, can actually “see” and “hear” what is going on. We have no interest in seeing the computer screens or the issued-but-uncast ballot seen by the elector as he marks, verifies, and casts an anonymous ballot.
I have clipped pertinent sections of our statutes and rules below. Any reasonable reading will conclude that watchers are expected to have access to election data including who is voting, how the votes on a ballot are interpreted, and how the votes on a ballot are counted.
The public depends on independent oversight (watchers) because watchers can discover errors that might otherwise get missed or covered up, and to prevent official misdeeds. It is not difficult to understand that there are often measures on the ballot that affect the jobs and pay of government officials. (Officials often have “a horse in the race”.) In Colorado counties, election officials can choose their own people for mail-in, early, and provisional ballot processing, and for all vote counting. In many cases these people are government employees. Sometimes key processes of the election are performed by sub-contractors, some of which may be offsite, or even out of state.
With the exception of voter privacy issues outlined above, watchers need both real-time access to the data in every election process, including anonymous cast ballots, and post election access to all election data computer files.
We trust the officials, but, since they are human, and to obtain certainty, we must verify.
Al
1-1-104. Definitions. (51) "Watcher" means an eligible elector other than a candidate on the ballot who has been selected by a political party chairperson on behalf of the political party, by a party candidate at a primary election, by an unaffiliated candidate at a general, congressional vacancy, or nonpartisan election, or by a person designated by either the opponents or the proponents in the case of a ballot issue or ballot question.
1-7-108. Requirements of watchers. (1) Watchers shall take an oath administered by one of the election judges that they are eligible electors, that their name has been submitted to the designated election official as a watcher for this election, and that they will not in any manner make known to anyone the result of counting votes until the polls have closed.
(2) Neither candidates nor members of their immediate families by blood or marriage to the second degree may be poll watchers for that candidate.
(3) Each watcher shall have the right to maintain a list of eligible electors who have voted, to witness and verify each step in the conduct of the election from prior to the opening of the polls through the completion of the count and announcement of the results, to challenge ineligible electors, and to assist in the correction of discrepancies.
1-7-307. Method of counting paper ballots. (4) All persons, except election judges and watchers, shall be excluded from the place where the ballot counting is being held until the count has been completed.
1-7-507. Electronic vote-counting - procedure. (1) All proceedings at the counting centers shall be under the direction of the designated election official and the representatives of the political parties, if a partisan election, or watchers, if a nonpartisan election. No persons, except those authorized for the purpose, shall touch any ballot, ballot card, "prom" or other electronic device, or return.
1-7.5-107.5. Counting mail ballots. The election officials at the mail ballot counting place may receive and prepare mail ballots delivered and turned over to them by the designated election official for tabulation. Counting of the mail ballots may begin fifteen days prior to the election and continue until counting is completed. The election official in charge of the mail ballot counting place shall take all precautions necessary to ensure the secrecy of the counting procedures, and no information concerning the count shall be released by the election officials or watchers until after 7 p.m. on election day.
1-8-109. Watchers at mail-in polling places. Any political party, candidate, or proponents or opponents of a ballot issue entitled to have watchers at polling places shall each have the right to maintain one watcher in the office of the designated election official and mail-in polling places during the period in which mail-in ballots may be applied for or received.
1-8-206. Watchers at early voters' polling places. Any political party, candidate, or proponents or opponents of a ballot issue entitled to have watchers at polling places shall each have the right to maintain one watcher at the early voters' polling place during the casting and counting of early voters' ballots.
1-8-208. Manner of early voting. (1) An eligible elector who receives an early voters' ballot may cast the ballot in the early voters' polling place, as provided in this part 2. Ballot boxes for early voting shall be locked and sealed each night with a numbered seal under the supervision of the election judges or watchers, and the keys shall remain in the possession of the designated election official until transferred to the supply judge for the mail-in and early voters' counting place for preparation for counting and tabulating pursuant to section 1-8-303. When a seal is broken, the designated election official and a person who shall not be of the same political party as the designated election official shall record the number of the seal and maintain the seal along with an explanation of the reasons for breaking the seal.
1-9-201. Right to vote may be challenged. (1) (a) A person's right to vote at a polling place or in an election may be challenged.
(b) If a person whose right to vote is challenged refuses to answer the questions asked or sign the challenge form in accordance with section 1-9-203 or take the oath pursuant to section 1-9-204, the person shall be offered a provisional ballot. If the person casts a provisional ballot, the election judge shall attach the challenge form to the provisional ballot envelope and indicate "Challenge" on the provisional ballot envelope.
(2) An election judge shall challenge any person intending to vote who the judge believes is not an eligible elector. In addition, challenges may be made by watchers or any eligible elector of the precinct.
(3) A challenge at a polling place shall be made in the presence of the person whose right to vote is challenged.
1-10-101. Canvass board for partisan elections - appointment, fees, oaths. (1) (a) At least fifteen days before any primary, general, congressional vacancy, or special legislative election, the county chairpersons of each of the two major political parties in each county shall certify to the county clerk and recorder, in the manner prescribed by such clerk and recorder, the appointment of one or more registered electors to serve as a member of the county canvass board. The appointees, together with the county clerk and recorder, constitute the county canvass board. Each minor political party whose candidate is on the ballot and each unaffiliated candidate whose name is on the ballot in such election may designate, in the manner prescribed by such clerk and recorder, one watcher to observe the work of the county canvass board.
1-10.5-102. Recounts for congressional, state, and district offices, state ballot questions, and state ballot issues. (1) If the secretary of state determines that a recount is required for the office of United States senator, representative in congress, any state office or district office of state concern, any state ballot question, or any state ballot issue certified for the ballot by the secretary of state, the secretary of state shall order a complete recount of all the votes cast for that office, state ballot question, or state ballot issue no later than the twenty-fifth day after the election.
(2) The secretary of state shall notify the county clerk and recorder of each county involved by registered mail and facsimile transmission of a public recount to be conducted in the county at a place prescribed by the secretary of state. The recount shall be completed no later than the thirtieth day after any election. The secretary of state shall promulgate and provide each county clerk and recorder with the necessary rules and regulations to conduct the recount in a fair, impartial, and uniform manner, including provisions for watchers during the recount. Any rule or regulation concerning the conduct of a recount shall take into account the type of voting system and equipment used by the county in which the recount is to be conducted.
1-13-702. Interfering with watcher. Any person who intentionally interferes with any watcher while he is discharging his duties set forth in section 1-7-108 (3) is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 1-13-111.
1-13-712. Disclosing or identifying vote. (1) Except as provided in section 1-7-108, no voter shall show his ballot after it is prepared for voting to any person in such a way as to reveal its contents. No voter shall place any mark upon his ballot by means of which it can be identified as the one voted by him, and no other mark shall be placed on the ballot by any person to identify it after it has been prepared for voting.
(2) No person shall endeavor to induce any voter to show how he marked his ballot.
(3) No election official, watcher, or person shall reveal to any other person the name of any candidate for whom a voter has voted or communicate to another his opinion, belief, or impression as to how or for whom a voter has voted.
(4) Any person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 1-13-111.
1-13-718. Release of information concerning count. Any election official, watcher, or other person who releases information concerning the count of ballots cast at precinct polling places or of mail-in voters' ballots prior to 7 p.m. on the day of the election is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 1-13-111.
ELECTION RULES
8.7 What Watchers May Observe. Duly appointed Watchers may observe polling place voting, early voting and the processing and counting of precinct, provisional, mail, and mail-in ballots. For mail ballot elections, or mail-in ballot processing, watchers may be present at each stage of the election including the receiving and bundling of the ballots received by the designated election official. Watchers may be present during provisional ballot processing but may not have access to confidential voter information.
8.8 Limitations of Watchers. Duly appointed Watchers may observe election judges but may not interrupt or disrupt the processing, verification and counting of any ballots or any other stage of the election. Watchers may track the names of electors who have cast ballots by utilizing their previously obtained lists, but may not write down any ballot numbers or any other identifying information about the electors. Watchers may not handle the poll books, official signature cards, ballots, mail ballot envelopes, mail-in ballot envelopes or provisional ballot envelopes, voting or counting machines or machine components. Watchers shall not interfere with the orderly process and conduct of any election, including ballot issuance, receiving of ballots, voting or counting of the ballots. Watchers may not be allowed to interact with election officials or election judges, except that each designated election official shall name at least one individual in each precinct polling place or election location to whom Watchers may direct questions or from whom watchers may seek requested information.
Friday, May 14, 2010
Pollbook 101
To Aspen Election Commission
I have clipped some sections from Title 1, and created a paper demonstration of how a pollbook works.
If you follow these procedures you should be on firm ground. You will have anonymous ballots and be able to consider release of same to the public. If you start afresh, I suggest that you use a public forum to do so, because of side effects that you might not personally know about. Off-hand I am unaware of anything in Title 31 that would prevent you from adopting these recommendations.
I believe that there is an advantage to maintaining a pollbook as a sequential list of the electors who were issued ballots.
Each row of the list should contain the row number, the name/voter_ID of the elector, and the serial number on the ballot stub that was issued to the elector. Space needs to be provided for issuing replacement ballots (up to three).
• When a person is determined to be an eligible elector they are admitted to the voting area.
• When a ballot is issued, the row is completed by the issuing judge.
• Before the ballot is cast, the stub containing the serial number, is removed and retained as an election record.
• When the ballot box is opened, the ballots are shuffled.
• Before the ballots are copied, a new unique identifier is recorded on the original ballot. This identifier will appear in any copies and can be used to (a) specifically identify the original ballot, and (2) appear as a field in Cast Vote Records.
This procedure preserves the data needed to audit the election AND it strictly preserves voter privacy by using an anonymous ballot.
The sequential pollbook has advantages:
1. It supports the needs of GOTV pollwatchers. Electronic pollbooks do not. Use of the registration list as a pollbook requires that the pollwatcher flip through the registration list to locate “their” voters.
2. In larger counties, or vote centers, or other multi-precinct polling locations, it reduces the amount of searching by pollwatchers for “their voters”. Presently pollwatchers are limited.
3. It supports the needs of election officials (including the canvass board) to promptly audit the election. One can tell immediately how many voters voted (for example), and how many ballots were issued.
4. It facilitates preparation and verification of vote history records that record which electors voted using which voting method.
Imagine the following pollbook.
See how easy it is to know how many ballots are supposed to be in the Ballot Box.
Also, this makes it easy to determine the number of spoiled and unused ballots.
The use of ballot stubs does not require that the ballots be issued in sequence number order.
Some counties do have voters sign the registration book. But, this is inconvenient for both the poll watchers and the officials. And, it is error prone to count the voters – especially when one considers the provisional, emergency, etc. special cases. Some electors names are not in the registration book.
Polling Location ABC Ballot Styles: S01 S02
Voter..Name...................ID............1stBallot#....2ndBallot#....3rdBallot#....LastBallot#
1 ........Mike LaBonte..... 70851........S01-0001
2 ........Marilyn Marks..... 8020156...S01-0002...S01-0005
3 ........Harvie Branscomb.643201....S01-0003
4 ........Al Kolwicz ...........5572463 ..S01-0004
5........ Elizabeth Milas.....20744432 .S02-0001
6.........Bob Leatherman ..8012247... S01-0006
7 ........Ward Hauenstein 77443322...S02-0002
Following is a selective set of items from the CRS. I think that it nearly supports my recommendation for maintaining sequential list for a pollbook.
The “post-cast” ballot shuffling and numbering recommendation is something that is not directly required in current law, but would help. To my knowledge, there is nothing in Title 1 that would disallow either. Shuffling would help achieve the required anonymity, so I think that it would survive debate. Post-cast numbering would help achieve a more vigorous post election audit, so I think that it would survive debate.
Selections from TITLE 1 C.R.S.
1-1-104. Definitions.
(27) "Pollbook" means the list of eligible electors who are permitted to vote at a polling place or by mail ballot in an election conducted under this code.
(36) "Registration book" means the original elector registration records for each county retained and stored by one of the following methods:
(a) On registration records by precinct in bound books arranged alphabetically for all active and all inactive registrations with all withdrawn and canceled registrations kept in separate bound books or on film; or
(b) On film and computer with access to the registration records available both alphabetically and by precinct. The system shall have the capability to print out active and inactive registration records, to retain the voting history for each active and inactive registration by surname, and to film completed voter signature forms by precinct for each election. Computer lists of registration records shall be furnished for use at the precinct polling places on election days.
1-7-109. Judges to keep pollbooks. (1) The election judges shall keep a pollbook which shall contain one column headed "names of voters" and one column headed "number on ballot". The name and the number on the ballot of each eligible elector voting shall be entered successively under the appropriate headings in the pollbook.
1-7-302. Electors given only one ballot. Election judges shall give to each eligible elector a single ballot, which shall be separated from the stub by tearing or cutting along the perforated or dotted line. The election judge having charge of the ballots shall endorse his or her initials on the duplicate stub.
Another election judge shall enter the date and the number of the ballot on the registration record of the eligible elector before delivering the ballot to the eligible elector. The election judge having charge of the pollbook shall write the name of the eligible elector and the number of the ballot on the pollbook.
1-7-305. Counting by counting judges.
(3) When an exchange of ballot boxes is made as described in subsection (2) of this section, the receiving judges shall sign and furnish to the counting judges a statement showing the number of ballots that are to be found in each ballot box as indicated by the pollbooks. The counting judges shall then count ballots in the manner prescribed in section 1-7-307.
1-7-307. Method of counting paper ballots. (1) The election judges shall first count the number of ballots in the box. If the ballots are found to exceed the number of names entered on each of the pollbooks, the election judges shall then examine the official endorsements. If, in the unanimous opinion of the judges, any of the ballots in excess of the number on the pollbooks are deemed not to bear the proper official endorsement, they shall be put into a separate pile and into a separate record, and a return of the votes in those ballots shall be made under the heading "excess ballots". When the ballots and the pollbooks agree, the judges shall proceed to count the votes.
1-7-502. Elector given only one ballot or ballot card. An election judge shall give to each eligible elector only one ballot or ballot card, which shall be removed from the package by tearing it along the perforated line below the stub. The election judge having charge of the pollbook shall write the name of the eligible elector and the number of the ballot or ballot card upon the pollbook.
1-7-505. Close of polls - count and seals in electronic voting.
(2) In precincts in which voting is on a ballot or ballot card, election judges shall prepare a return in
duplicate showing the number of eligible electors, as indicated by the pollbook, who have voted in the
precinct, the number of official ballots or ballot cards received, and the number of spoiled and unused
ballots or ballot cards returned. The original copy of the return shall be deposited in the metal or durable plastic transfer box, along with all voted and spoiled ballots. The transfer box shall then be sealed in such a way as to prevent tampering with the box or its contents. The designated election official shall provide a numbered seal. The duplicate copy of the return shall be mailed at the nearest post office or post-office box to the designated election official by an election judge other than the one who delivers the transfer box to the designated counting center. For partisan elections, two election judges of different political affiliations, as provided in section 1-6-109.5, shall deliver the sealed transfer box to the counting center designated by the county clerk and recorder.
I have clipped some sections from Title 1, and created a paper demonstration of how a pollbook works.
If you follow these procedures you should be on firm ground. You will have anonymous ballots and be able to consider release of same to the public. If you start afresh, I suggest that you use a public forum to do so, because of side effects that you might not personally know about. Off-hand I am unaware of anything in Title 31 that would prevent you from adopting these recommendations.
I believe that there is an advantage to maintaining a pollbook as a sequential list of the electors who were issued ballots.
Each row of the list should contain the row number, the name/voter_ID of the elector, and the serial number on the ballot stub that was issued to the elector. Space needs to be provided for issuing replacement ballots (up to three).
• When a person is determined to be an eligible elector they are admitted to the voting area.
• When a ballot is issued, the row is completed by the issuing judge.
• Before the ballot is cast, the stub containing the serial number, is removed and retained as an election record.
• When the ballot box is opened, the ballots are shuffled.
• Before the ballots are copied, a new unique identifier is recorded on the original ballot. This identifier will appear in any copies and can be used to (a) specifically identify the original ballot, and (2) appear as a field in Cast Vote Records.
This procedure preserves the data needed to audit the election AND it strictly preserves voter privacy by using an anonymous ballot.
The sequential pollbook has advantages:
1. It supports the needs of GOTV pollwatchers. Electronic pollbooks do not. Use of the registration list as a pollbook requires that the pollwatcher flip through the registration list to locate “their” voters.
2. In larger counties, or vote centers, or other multi-precinct polling locations, it reduces the amount of searching by pollwatchers for “their voters”. Presently pollwatchers are limited.
3. It supports the needs of election officials (including the canvass board) to promptly audit the election. One can tell immediately how many voters voted (for example), and how many ballots were issued.
4. It facilitates preparation and verification of vote history records that record which electors voted using which voting method.
Imagine the following pollbook.
See how easy it is to know how many ballots are supposed to be in the Ballot Box.
Also, this makes it easy to determine the number of spoiled and unused ballots.
The use of ballot stubs does not require that the ballots be issued in sequence number order.
Some counties do have voters sign the registration book. But, this is inconvenient for both the poll watchers and the officials. And, it is error prone to count the voters – especially when one considers the provisional, emergency, etc. special cases. Some electors names are not in the registration book.
Polling Location ABC Ballot Styles: S01 S02
Voter..Name...................ID............1stBallot#....2ndBallot#....3rdBallot#....LastBallot#
1 ........Mike LaBonte..... 70851........S01-0001
2 ........Marilyn Marks..... 8020156...S01-0002...S01-0005
3 ........Harvie Branscomb.643201....S01-0003
4 ........Al Kolwicz ...........5572463 ..S01-0004
5........ Elizabeth Milas.....20744432 .S02-0001
6.........Bob Leatherman ..8012247... S01-0006
7 ........Ward Hauenstein 77443322...S02-0002
Following is a selective set of items from the CRS. I think that it nearly supports my recommendation for maintaining sequential list for a pollbook.
The “post-cast” ballot shuffling and numbering recommendation is something that is not directly required in current law, but would help. To my knowledge, there is nothing in Title 1 that would disallow either. Shuffling would help achieve the required anonymity, so I think that it would survive debate. Post-cast numbering would help achieve a more vigorous post election audit, so I think that it would survive debate.
Selections from TITLE 1 C.R.S.
1-1-104. Definitions.
(27) "Pollbook" means the list of eligible electors who are permitted to vote at a polling place or by mail ballot in an election conducted under this code.
(36) "Registration book" means the original elector registration records for each county retained and stored by one of the following methods:
(a) On registration records by precinct in bound books arranged alphabetically for all active and all inactive registrations with all withdrawn and canceled registrations kept in separate bound books or on film; or
(b) On film and computer with access to the registration records available both alphabetically and by precinct. The system shall have the capability to print out active and inactive registration records, to retain the voting history for each active and inactive registration by surname, and to film completed voter signature forms by precinct for each election. Computer lists of registration records shall be furnished for use at the precinct polling places on election days.
1-7-109. Judges to keep pollbooks. (1) The election judges shall keep a pollbook which shall contain one column headed "names of voters" and one column headed "number on ballot". The name and the number on the ballot of each eligible elector voting shall be entered successively under the appropriate headings in the pollbook.
1-7-302. Electors given only one ballot. Election judges shall give to each eligible elector a single ballot, which shall be separated from the stub by tearing or cutting along the perforated or dotted line. The election judge having charge of the ballots shall endorse his or her initials on the duplicate stub.
Another election judge shall enter the date and the number of the ballot on the registration record of the eligible elector before delivering the ballot to the eligible elector. The election judge having charge of the pollbook shall write the name of the eligible elector and the number of the ballot on the pollbook.
1-7-305. Counting by counting judges.
(3) When an exchange of ballot boxes is made as described in subsection (2) of this section, the receiving judges shall sign and furnish to the counting judges a statement showing the number of ballots that are to be found in each ballot box as indicated by the pollbooks. The counting judges shall then count ballots in the manner prescribed in section 1-7-307.
1-7-307. Method of counting paper ballots. (1) The election judges shall first count the number of ballots in the box. If the ballots are found to exceed the number of names entered on each of the pollbooks, the election judges shall then examine the official endorsements. If, in the unanimous opinion of the judges, any of the ballots in excess of the number on the pollbooks are deemed not to bear the proper official endorsement, they shall be put into a separate pile and into a separate record, and a return of the votes in those ballots shall be made under the heading "excess ballots". When the ballots and the pollbooks agree, the judges shall proceed to count the votes.
1-7-502. Elector given only one ballot or ballot card. An election judge shall give to each eligible elector only one ballot or ballot card, which shall be removed from the package by tearing it along the perforated line below the stub. The election judge having charge of the pollbook shall write the name of the eligible elector and the number of the ballot or ballot card upon the pollbook.
1-7-505. Close of polls - count and seals in electronic voting.
(2) In precincts in which voting is on a ballot or ballot card, election judges shall prepare a return in
duplicate showing the number of eligible electors, as indicated by the pollbook, who have voted in the
precinct, the number of official ballots or ballot cards received, and the number of spoiled and unused
ballots or ballot cards returned. The original copy of the return shall be deposited in the metal or durable plastic transfer box, along with all voted and spoiled ballots. The transfer box shall then be sealed in such a way as to prevent tampering with the box or its contents. The designated election official shall provide a numbered seal. The duplicate copy of the return shall be mailed at the nearest post office or post-office box to the designated election official by an election judge other than the one who delivers the transfer box to the designated counting center. For partisan elections, two election judges of different political affiliations, as provided in section 1-6-109.5, shall deliver the sealed transfer box to the counting center designated by the county clerk and recorder.
Tuesday, May 04, 2010
Aspen - Both transparency and trustworthy elections are required. There can be no tradeoff.
May 4, 2009
TO: Aspen Independent Election Commissioners
Dear Commissioners Hauenstein and Leatherman
I am writing in regard to tomorrow’s Election Commission meeting. Please permit me to first introduce myself. I have lived and worked in Colorado since 1966. For more than a decade, I have worked to improve Colorado’s election system. I am a Trustee and co-founder of Colorado Voter Group. I have served on multiple Boulder County Canvass Boards and voting equipment test boards. I have actively participated in Colorado’s equipment certification process, and contributed to the development of election rules, and have testified numerous times before state and local governmental bodies. I have testified in court as an expert witness on election system matters. I have closely monitored with much interest Aspen’s May 2009 election and its follow on activities. I have worked closely with Nick Koumoutseas of TrueBallot, the vendor whose system was used in the election. I have had a private demonstration of the TrueBallot system including a description of the database tables and macros, and the software used to capture, interpret and correct votes. I have also explored the software used to calculate the selection of the winners. In addition, I have analyzed the database and strings, as well as the first-pass vote interpretations published by Aspen. I have studied Title 31 and have in-depth knowledge of Title 1, the Colorado Election Rules, and Colorado Constitution Article VII Section 8.
My interest in the May 2009 election is due to the ranked choice methodology used for the election. The Colorado legislature has instructed the Secretary of State to prepare a report of Colorado IRV experience by February 2011. As of now, it appears that Aspen’s will be the only Colorado IRV election completed before the report deadline. I hope that by detailed analysis of this election we can make a significant contribution to the Secretary of State’s report to the legislature. We expect this report to significantly influence future legislation.
Clean government does not just happen. The public needs protection from potentially tyrannical governments. Therefore, protection must be independent of government. It must work to serve public, not government, interests. The Aspen Election Commission should strive to become such a protector. You have statutory authority, and your tools are transparency and trustworthy elections.
Transparency means that public information is public and affordable. Government has the power, but not the right, to withhold or destroy information that might undermine its power. The Commission can and should facilitate the public’s access to all non-private election-related information.
A trustworthy election is one that can be independently verified. Voters are supposed to exercise power over government through elections. However, once elected, officials wield an awesome power that can be turned against the public. Officials, through appointments and laws, can hide and misrepresent information and events. And, unmonitored, officials can rig elections in order to pick the winners. The Commission can and should do all in its power to give people access to the all of the information needed to independently verify elections.
In 1946, Coloradoans voted for a constitutional amendment to reject the “trust government” approach. (See attached report, 1946 Ballot Issue No. 1.) Until then, Colorado ballots were voter-identifiable; each ballot was linked to a specific voter. Now, cast ballots must be anonymous – that is, there must be no way for anybody (including government, election judges, even the voters themselves) to be able to determine who voted which ballot. The 1945 amendment also requires voting in private – that is, there must be no way for anybody other than the voter to see what choices the voter is marking on their ballot.
Anonymous ballots and private voting are now the law in Colorado. Creating information that could have been used to connect voters and ballots is now illegal. Information that can be used to prove how a person voted must never be created.
Voter-identifiable ballots could be used to support directed product marketing, fundraising, and electioneering activities. Anonymous ballots and private voting are our protections against intimidation and vote selling. Government employers with access to voter-identifiable ballots can punish employees that do not vote as told. Officials can leak or even sell this information to others who can similarly punish those who do not vote as told. Jobs, promotions and raises can be withheld. Contracts can be withheld or even withdrawn. Housing opportunities or permits can be denied. A market for vote selling is created. Buyers can verify, or plausibly threaten to verify, that “what they bought is what they got”.
Aspen officials have admittedly violated the law. They created and operated an election system that does not provide for anonymous ballots.
Good things happen when election records cannot be used to determine a voter’s votes. Copies of pollbooks and ballots can be published for public inspection, as can the interpretation of each and every vote on each and every ballot. The public can verify for itself that the correct ballots were included in the count, and that each vote was correctly interpreted and counted. Although not a complete verification that an election is trustworthy, it is a very important first step.
I am available to discuss these matters with you more fully. And I most sincerely hope that you will accept these recommendations.
Yours truly,
Al Kolwicz
Trustee, Colorado Voter Group
1946 BALLOT ISSUE NO. 1 – Referred
The right to vote using an anonymous ballot was created by the people of Colorado when they adopted a referred amendment to the Colorado Constitution. A brief history follows.
Article VII, Sec. 8 of the 1876 Constitution says:
According to a report, Legislative Council Staff to Interim Committee on Judiciary, August 11, 1977, the 1946 Amendment No. 1 was passed by the following vote:
The Secret Ballot Amendment was put into law by the 1947 General Assembly:
There is no ambiguity in what Article VII Sec. 8 means. Prior to November 1946 ballots were given serial numbers. After November 1946 ballots were not permitted to have serial numbers or other marks that could be used to identify the voter of a ballot. Colorado voters clearly knew what they were doing when they changed the constitution.
TO: Aspen Independent Election Commissioners
Dear Commissioners Hauenstein and Leatherman
I am writing in regard to tomorrow’s Election Commission meeting. Please permit me to first introduce myself. I have lived and worked in Colorado since 1966. For more than a decade, I have worked to improve Colorado’s election system. I am a Trustee and co-founder of Colorado Voter Group. I have served on multiple Boulder County Canvass Boards and voting equipment test boards. I have actively participated in Colorado’s equipment certification process, and contributed to the development of election rules, and have testified numerous times before state and local governmental bodies. I have testified in court as an expert witness on election system matters. I have closely monitored with much interest Aspen’s May 2009 election and its follow on activities. I have worked closely with Nick Koumoutseas of TrueBallot, the vendor whose system was used in the election. I have had a private demonstration of the TrueBallot system including a description of the database tables and macros, and the software used to capture, interpret and correct votes. I have also explored the software used to calculate the selection of the winners. In addition, I have analyzed the database and strings, as well as the first-pass vote interpretations published by Aspen. I have studied Title 31 and have in-depth knowledge of Title 1, the Colorado Election Rules, and Colorado Constitution Article VII Section 8.
My interest in the May 2009 election is due to the ranked choice methodology used for the election. The Colorado legislature has instructed the Secretary of State to prepare a report of Colorado IRV experience by February 2011. As of now, it appears that Aspen’s will be the only Colorado IRV election completed before the report deadline. I hope that by detailed analysis of this election we can make a significant contribution to the Secretary of State’s report to the legislature. We expect this report to significantly influence future legislation.
Clean government does not just happen. The public needs protection from potentially tyrannical governments. Therefore, protection must be independent of government. It must work to serve public, not government, interests. The Aspen Election Commission should strive to become such a protector. You have statutory authority, and your tools are transparency and trustworthy elections.
Transparency means that public information is public and affordable. Government has the power, but not the right, to withhold or destroy information that might undermine its power. The Commission can and should facilitate the public’s access to all non-private election-related information.
A trustworthy election is one that can be independently verified. Voters are supposed to exercise power over government through elections. However, once elected, officials wield an awesome power that can be turned against the public. Officials, through appointments and laws, can hide and misrepresent information and events. And, unmonitored, officials can rig elections in order to pick the winners. The Commission can and should do all in its power to give people access to the all of the information needed to independently verify elections.
In 1946, Coloradoans voted for a constitutional amendment to reject the “trust government” approach. (See attached report, 1946 Ballot Issue No. 1.) Until then, Colorado ballots were voter-identifiable; each ballot was linked to a specific voter. Now, cast ballots must be anonymous – that is, there must be no way for anybody (including government, election judges, even the voters themselves) to be able to determine who voted which ballot. The 1945 amendment also requires voting in private – that is, there must be no way for anybody other than the voter to see what choices the voter is marking on their ballot.
Anonymous ballots and private voting are now the law in Colorado. Creating information that could have been used to connect voters and ballots is now illegal. Information that can be used to prove how a person voted must never be created.
Voter-identifiable ballots could be used to support directed product marketing, fundraising, and electioneering activities. Anonymous ballots and private voting are our protections against intimidation and vote selling. Government employers with access to voter-identifiable ballots can punish employees that do not vote as told. Officials can leak or even sell this information to others who can similarly punish those who do not vote as told. Jobs, promotions and raises can be withheld. Contracts can be withheld or even withdrawn. Housing opportunities or permits can be denied. A market for vote selling is created. Buyers can verify, or plausibly threaten to verify, that “what they bought is what they got”.
Aspen officials have admittedly violated the law. They created and operated an election system that does not provide for anonymous ballots.
1. Their violation is now being exploited by these same officials in their efforts to justify their refusal to produce election records in response to an open records request.To restore voter confidence in Aspen elections, I recommend that the Commission:
2. There is no public effort underway to enforce the anonymous ballot requirement for future elections.
3. There is no public effort underway to identify and hold accountable those responsible for the violation.
1. Using your legal authority, assert your independence and your intent to represent the public.Both transparency and trustworthy elections are required. There can be no tradeoff.
2. Define, adopt, and implement a policy of strict compliance with requirements for open election records including, but not limited to, copies of: (a) pollbooks, (b) ballots, and (c) the interpretation of the votes on each ballot.
3. Define, adopt, and implement a policy of strict compliance with requirements for anonymous ballots, private voting, open election records, and trustworthy elections.
4. Reproduce and shuffle copies of the May 2009 ballots and make these PDF files or photocopies available for open records requests.
5. If there are ballots that you believe contain voter-identifiable information, (a) create a team that includes someone who is free from government influence, (b) swear the team as election judges, and (c) instruct them to make anonymous replacement ballots by hand-duplicating these ballots before they are copied.
6. Refer the officials suspected of the anonymous ballot violation to law enforcement.
Good things happen when election records cannot be used to determine a voter’s votes. Copies of pollbooks and ballots can be published for public inspection, as can the interpretation of each and every vote on each and every ballot. The public can verify for itself that the correct ballots were included in the count, and that each vote was correctly interpreted and counted. Although not a complete verification that an election is trustworthy, it is a very important first step.
I am available to discuss these matters with you more fully. And I most sincerely hope that you will accept these recommendations.
Yours truly,
Al Kolwicz
Trustee, Colorado Voter Group
1946 BALLOT ISSUE NO. 1 – Referred
The right to vote using an anonymous ballot was created by the people of Colorado when they adopted a referred amendment to the Colorado Constitution. A brief history follows.
Article VII, Sec. 8 of the 1876 Constitution says:
All elections by the people shall be by ballot; every ballot voted shall be numbered in the order in which it shall be received, and the number be recorded by the election officers on the list of voters opposite the name of the voter who presents the ballot. The election officers shall be sworn or affirmed not to enquire or disclose how any elector shall have voted. In all cases of contested elections, the ballots cast may be counted, compared with the list of voters, and examined under such safeguards and regulations as may be prescribed by law.On November 7, 1946, an election was held in which there was a contest to adopt an amendment to the Colorado Constitution. As follows:
1946 BALLOT ISSUE NO. 1 – ReferredThe Rocky Mountain News opposed the amendment in its editorial of November 2, 1946, saying:
TITLE - Amendment to Article VII of the Constitution of the State of Colorado providing for secret ballots
Reject the Amendments
Both the proposed amendments referred to the people by the last General Assembly are dangerous and should be voted down.
Amendment No. 1 rules out the use of numbered ballots. The aim is to protect the secrecy of the ballot. If adopted, however, this proposal would make virtually impossible the tracing of ballots and would prevent the investigation of election frauds, such as is now underway in Kansas city. The disadvantages would far outweigh the advantages.
According to a report, Legislative Council Staff to Interim Committee on Judiciary, August 11, 1977, the 1946 Amendment No. 1 was passed by the following vote:
FOR 118,470 (56%)
AGAINST 92,203 (44%)
TOTAL 210,673
The Secret Ballot Amendment was put into law by the 1947 General Assembly:
HB47-0248 – ELECTIONS – Amends present statutes to provide for putting into effect the amendment to the constitution of the state providing for a secret ballot. April 22, 1947. (From Digest of Senate and House Bills Enacted by the 36th General Assembly of the State of Colorado (1947 Regular Session - http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/PDF/digest1947.pdf )
I have not researched the Denver Post or news articles before November 1946. Nor have I researched the actual language of the General Assembly in 1946 that adopted the referred measure or 1947 that adopted HB47-0248. These documents are available at CU Norlin and the Legislative Council.
There is no ambiguity in what Article VII Sec. 8 means. Prior to November 1946 ballots were given serial numbers. After November 1946 ballots were not permitted to have serial numbers or other marks that could be used to identify the voter of a ballot. Colorado voters clearly knew what they were doing when they changed the constitution.
Wednesday, April 07, 2010
Wrongly denied, again. Public seeks scanned ballot image files from HART InterCivic system.
Subject: RE: Response to your letter of March 29th re: CORA
Dear Mr. Kolwicz:
The bottom line to all of your records requests is that the documents you are seeking are not in existence and under CORA we have no obligation to create any documents. That is not to say that the information does not exist – it does, just not in document form. As I noted before, these files cannot be exported. I have conferred with Stephanie Cegielski at the Secretary of State’s Office and she agrees with this interpretation of CORA in light of your request. In fact, she suggested, as a custodian of records, that you contact her about your request should you have any further questions. She can be reached at 894-2200 ext 6327, and I am copying her on this e-mail.
As far as Rule 45.5.2.1.7 is concerned, that Rule applies to the testing for certification process which has already occurred. Furthermore, the records you request are not “election results” as contemplated by that Rule. Therefore, that Rule is not applicable to your request.
Finally, I am aware of which Title applies to our elections. I mentioned the Pitkin County Order by way of analogy only as there are similar provisions in the Election Code.
Sincerely,
Shelley Bailey
Assistant County Attorney
Boulder County
Dear Mr. Kolwicz:
The bottom line to all of your records requests is that the documents you are seeking are not in existence and under CORA we have no obligation to create any documents. That is not to say that the information does not exist – it does, just not in document form. As I noted before, these files cannot be exported. I have conferred with Stephanie Cegielski at the Secretary of State’s Office and she agrees with this interpretation of CORA in light of your request. In fact, she suggested, as a custodian of records, that you contact her about your request should you have any further questions. She can be reached at 894-2200 ext 6327, and I am copying her on this e-mail.
As far as Rule 45.5.2.1.7 is concerned, that Rule applies to the testing for certification process which has already occurred. Furthermore, the records you request are not “election results” as contemplated by that Rule. Therefore, that Rule is not applicable to your request.
Finally, I am aware of which Title applies to our elections. I mentioned the Pitkin County Order by way of analogy only as there are similar provisions in the Election Code.
Sincerely,
Shelley Bailey
Assistant County Attorney
Boulder County
Tuesday, April 06, 2010
Public seeks scanned ballot image files from HART InterCivic system.
Shelley Bailey
Assistant County Attorney
Boulder County, Colorado
April 5, 2010
RE: Response to your March 29th letter regarding our CORA request.
Dear Ms. Bailey:
We have studied your letter of March 29, 2010. Perhaps you were rushed in preparing your letter since it contains several significant errors of law. I have copied the text of your letter into numbered sections below so that we may conveniently respond to each section.
1. First, our system does not allow us to export these files.
If this is true, then the voting system is defective. Colorado Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7 requires that all election data be exportable. If “your” system does not comply with this Rule, as an agent of the court you should report this fact to the Secretary of State and ask that its certification be withdrawn.
2. Second, under statutory law, C.R.S. 31-10-616(1),[…]the clerk is to keep the ballots secret and to preserve them for access only for contest proceedings.
Boulder County elections are conducted under Title 1, not Title 31. Title 31 has absolutely nothing to do with our elections. Surely you must know this.
For your information, you infer that Title 31 has something to do with the computer files that we have requested. A careful reading shows that this is not true. 31-10-616(1) describes when the actual ballots may be removed from the ballot box, and when they must be destroyed. As you must know, we are not seeking access to the actual ballots. 31-10-616(2) explicitly does not restrict access to or require destruction of any “other official election records and forms”.
3. and [under] Article VII, Section 8 of the State’s Constitution, the clerk is to keep the ballots secret and to preserve them for access only for contest proceedings.
There is no such language in Article VII, Section 8. It does not say anything about “keeping ballots secret” or “preserving ballots”. Surely you must know this.
What Article VII, Section 8 does say, explicitly, is, “no ballots shall be marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it”. Boulder County routinely violates this Constitutional provision. It is the intent of the 1946 Constitutional Amendment that created this protection that every ballot must be anonymous – meaning that there is no way to identify which voter marked which ballot.
4. Your CORA request is not a proceeding to contest the election, and the time for such a contest has passed.
We made no claim to contest the election. Surely you must know this. Further, your comment suggests that you are confusing Title 31 and Title 1 election laws. (See discussion in #2 above.)
5. C.R.S. 31-10-1303 See also Marks v Koch, Case Number P09CV294, Pitkin County (e-mail to follow) Therefore, these records are not available pursuant to a CORA request.
To repeat, Title 31 is not relevant to Title 1 elections.
6. It has always been the County’s position, as well as the secretary of state’s position, that it would do substantial harm to the public interest to allow the release of mail ballot images.
If you have documentation supporting this assertion we would like to review it. I do not recall any published arguments from Boulder County detailing the harm that might occur by releasing to the public copies of computer files containing scanned images of anonymous ballots.
We have a December 18, 2009 document from Secretary of State Buescher saying in part, “…I am not opposed in principle to the public disclosure of images …”.
7. The County has never released ballot images.
This is a problem for the public. For a number of years we have submitted CORA requests for the data and have never been given the opportunity to inspect the data.
8. Finally, our system does not allow us to export these files. They are only viewable with Ballot Now, proprietary software, in our database.
To repeat, this is a violation of Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7.
If need be, we are willing to negotiate ways that the county can meet its obligations by providing us access to the proprietary software so that we may inspect the records in Boulder County’s database.
9. With regard to your request for the cast vote records, again, the County’s system does not allow the export of these files.
To repeat, this is a violation of Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7.
If need be, we are willing to negotiate ways that the county can meet its obligations by providing us access to the proprietary software so that we may inspect the records in Boulder County’s database.
10. Cast vote records are not the same as results, and they cannot be printed out. They are the record of how Ballot Now tabulates each ballot.
In the first place, you should know that we have not requested a printout of the cast vote records. Our request is to inspect the actual cast vote records. Once we see these records, we will decide whether or not to request copies of the computer files containing them.
Also, for your information, you have been misinformed. The cast vote records are NOT a record of how BallotNow “tabulates” each ballot. The cast vote records are the record of how BallotNow “interprets” each vote on each ballot. The votes on the cast vote records are subsequently tabulated by a program referred to as TALLY.
11. The statement of vote is available, however.
We are not, at this time, seeking access to the statement of vote.
12. I am still working on the administrative logs that you requested and will get an answer to you as soon as possible. Could you please explain with specificity what it is you are asking for?
To expedite this response, please provide us with a list of the official titles and summary description of all files created and/or maintained by the HART voting system. We have found that when we do not ask for an exact file name, we are not able to make a request that staff understands.
Now that we have presented and directed you to the correct legal framework, we expect you to promptly arrange for us to inspect the materials we have requested.
Please let me know when we may review the materials.
Sincerely,
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
CC:
Hillary Hall, Boulder County Clerk & Recorder
Bernie Buescher, Colorado Secretary of State
Judd Choate, Director, Colorado Division of Elections
Harvie Branscomb, Trustee, Colorado Voter Group
Assistant County Attorney
Boulder County, Colorado
April 5, 2010
RE: Response to your March 29th letter regarding our CORA request.
Dear Ms. Bailey:
We have studied your letter of March 29, 2010. Perhaps you were rushed in preparing your letter since it contains several significant errors of law. I have copied the text of your letter into numbered sections below so that we may conveniently respond to each section.
1. First, our system does not allow us to export these files.
If this is true, then the voting system is defective. Colorado Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7 requires that all election data be exportable. If “your” system does not comply with this Rule, as an agent of the court you should report this fact to the Secretary of State and ask that its certification be withdrawn.
2. Second, under statutory law, C.R.S. 31-10-616(1),[…]the clerk is to keep the ballots secret and to preserve them for access only for contest proceedings.
Boulder County elections are conducted under Title 1, not Title 31. Title 31 has absolutely nothing to do with our elections. Surely you must know this.
For your information, you infer that Title 31 has something to do with the computer files that we have requested. A careful reading shows that this is not true. 31-10-616(1) describes when the actual ballots may be removed from the ballot box, and when they must be destroyed. As you must know, we are not seeking access to the actual ballots. 31-10-616(2) explicitly does not restrict access to or require destruction of any “other official election records and forms”.
3. and [under] Article VII, Section 8 of the State’s Constitution, the clerk is to keep the ballots secret and to preserve them for access only for contest proceedings.
There is no such language in Article VII, Section 8. It does not say anything about “keeping ballots secret” or “preserving ballots”. Surely you must know this.
What Article VII, Section 8 does say, explicitly, is, “no ballots shall be marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it”. Boulder County routinely violates this Constitutional provision. It is the intent of the 1946 Constitutional Amendment that created this protection that every ballot must be anonymous – meaning that there is no way to identify which voter marked which ballot.
4. Your CORA request is not a proceeding to contest the election, and the time for such a contest has passed.
We made no claim to contest the election. Surely you must know this. Further, your comment suggests that you are confusing Title 31 and Title 1 election laws. (See discussion in #2 above.)
5. C.R.S. 31-10-1303 See also Marks v Koch, Case Number P09CV294, Pitkin County (e-mail to follow) Therefore, these records are not available pursuant to a CORA request.
To repeat, Title 31 is not relevant to Title 1 elections.
6. It has always been the County’s position, as well as the secretary of state’s position, that it would do substantial harm to the public interest to allow the release of mail ballot images.
If you have documentation supporting this assertion we would like to review it. I do not recall any published arguments from Boulder County detailing the harm that might occur by releasing to the public copies of computer files containing scanned images of anonymous ballots.
We have a December 18, 2009 document from Secretary of State Buescher saying in part, “…I am not opposed in principle to the public disclosure of images …”.
7. The County has never released ballot images.
This is a problem for the public. For a number of years we have submitted CORA requests for the data and have never been given the opportunity to inspect the data.
8. Finally, our system does not allow us to export these files. They are only viewable with Ballot Now, proprietary software, in our database.
To repeat, this is a violation of Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7.
If need be, we are willing to negotiate ways that the county can meet its obligations by providing us access to the proprietary software so that we may inspect the records in Boulder County’s database.
9. With regard to your request for the cast vote records, again, the County’s system does not allow the export of these files.
To repeat, this is a violation of Election Rule 45.5.2.1.7.
If need be, we are willing to negotiate ways that the county can meet its obligations by providing us access to the proprietary software so that we may inspect the records in Boulder County’s database.
10. Cast vote records are not the same as results, and they cannot be printed out. They are the record of how Ballot Now tabulates each ballot.
In the first place, you should know that we have not requested a printout of the cast vote records. Our request is to inspect the actual cast vote records. Once we see these records, we will decide whether or not to request copies of the computer files containing them.
Also, for your information, you have been misinformed. The cast vote records are NOT a record of how BallotNow “tabulates” each ballot. The cast vote records are the record of how BallotNow “interprets” each vote on each ballot. The votes on the cast vote records are subsequently tabulated by a program referred to as TALLY.
11. The statement of vote is available, however.
We are not, at this time, seeking access to the statement of vote.
12. I am still working on the administrative logs that you requested and will get an answer to you as soon as possible. Could you please explain with specificity what it is you are asking for?
To expedite this response, please provide us with a list of the official titles and summary description of all files created and/or maintained by the HART voting system. We have found that when we do not ask for an exact file name, we are not able to make a request that staff understands.
Now that we have presented and directed you to the correct legal framework, we expect you to promptly arrange for us to inspect the materials we have requested.
Please let me know when we may review the materials.
Sincerely,
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
CC:
Hillary Hall, Boulder County Clerk & Recorder
Bernie Buescher, Colorado Secretary of State
Judd Choate, Director, Colorado Division of Elections
Harvie Branscomb, Trustee, Colorado Voter Group
Friday, April 02, 2010
COMPLAINT: Urgent - ongoing violation of Open Meetings Laws
From: Al Kolwicz [mailto:AlKolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 10:26 AM
To: 'attorney.general@state.co.us'
Cc: 'Newsroom Denver_Post'; 'coloradovoter@googlegroups.com'
Subject: COMPLAINT: Urgent - ongoing violation of Open Meetings Laws
Dear Attorney General Suthers,
There is a meeting of Colorado election officials underway today in Westminster. These same officials are interfering with the Public’s right to observe. Your immediate intervention is requested.
These officials are operating behind a shield of the Colorado County Clerks Association.
However, it is our understanding that they are discussing topics that lead to decisions regarding election law (see email thread below).
We believe that these officials are violating the spirit and letter of the Colorado open meetings laws.
Will you please intervene in behalf of the people of Colorado?
Thank you for your immediate attention.
Al
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
303-494-1540
mailto:AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 10:26 AM
To: 'attorney.general@state.co.us'
Cc: 'Newsroom Denver_Post'; 'coloradovoter@googlegroups.com'
Subject: COMPLAINT: Urgent - ongoing violation of Open Meetings Laws
Dear Attorney General Suthers,
There is a meeting of Colorado election officials underway today in Westminster. These same officials are interfering with the Public’s right to observe. Your immediate intervention is requested.
These officials are operating behind a shield of the Colorado County Clerks Association.
However, it is our understanding that they are discussing topics that lead to decisions regarding election law (see email thread below).
We believe that these officials are violating the spirit and letter of the Colorado open meetings laws.
Will you please intervene in behalf of the people of Colorado?
Thank you for your immediate attention.
Al
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
303-494-1540
mailto:AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
Sunday, March 21, 2010
Protect independent Logic and Accuracy Testing
RE: Please amend HB 1116 to protect independent Logic and Accuracy Testing
Dear Senator Heath:
It is my understanding that the State, Veterans & Military Affairs committee will take up HB 1116 on Monday afternoon.
In your position as Chair of the committee, and as a fellow Boulder County resident, you are in a position to give serious consideration to and recommend adoption of the following proposal to amend HB 1116.
To earn voter confidence, it is vital that Logic and Accuracy Test members be chosen independently of election officials.
Please amend HB 1116 to something like the following:
We hope the law will maximize independence and minimize official control over the verification that the election system is ready to conduct a fair and accurate election.
As you may recall, Boulder County has had embarrassing problems during the last few elections. Many of these problems could have been avoided by an independent (and system wide) LAT.
The current language proposed in HB 1116, Section 15 removes the party affiliation requirements for judges who perform logic and accuracy testing on electronic voting equipment if the election for which the equipment is being tested is a nonpartisan election.
Secondly, why should the clerk select the testing board members for NONPARTISAN elections? Again, the major political party chairs should each make at least one appointment. They have experience, and are a stable element of the community. In addition, each of the participating districts should submit a candidate for LAT tester, and the Clerk can choose among the appointees of the special districts.
Some Colorado County Clerks are guilty of restricting LAT test cases to things that the clerk has pre-tested before the test. For example, only a blue or black pen may be used to mark LAT ballots. In so doing, Clerks wind up serving as surrogates for the vendors. They use these unfair testing procedures to cover up defects in the equipment and procedures.
Eventually, the Legislature must ensure that pre-election testing will verify that (1) every eligible voter will be given an opportunity to vote once, (2) every eligible vote will be correctly counted once, and that (3) every aspect of the election (with the exception of where a voter’s SSN would be made public, or a connection between the voter and the voted ballot would be exposed) will be fully transparent and independently verifiable.
It is reckless for the clerks to select the LAT teams.
Please amend the bill as recommended in the opening language above.
Elections will be better, and more trustworthy.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder CO, 80305
303-494-1540
mailto:AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
Cc: 'geoff.johnson@state.co.us'; 'linda.newell.senate@gmail.com'
Dear Senator Heath:
It is my understanding that the State, Veterans & Military Affairs committee will take up HB 1116 on Monday afternoon.
In your position as Chair of the committee, and as a fellow Boulder County resident, you are in a position to give serious consideration to and recommend adoption of the following proposal to amend HB 1116.
To earn voter confidence, it is vital that Logic and Accuracy Test members be chosen independently of election officials.
Please amend HB 1116 to something like the following:
1-7-509. Electronic and electromechanical vote counting - testing of equipment required.The key objective of the amendment is to make sure that county-wide elections are supported by party appointed testers, and that other elections are supported by governing boards of the districts.
(1)(c)(I) For all partisan elections, the County major Political Party Chairs shall appoint to a Testing Board an equal number of one or more registered electors. The number of members of the Testing Board shall be determined by the county clerk and recorder.
(II) For nonpartisan elections that are coordinated elections, the County major Political Party Chairs shall appoint to a Testing Board an equal number of one or more registered electors. The number of members of the Testing Board shall be determined by the county clerk and recorder. In addition, each participating Governing Board will recommend to the designated election official one or more Testing Board members, and the designated election official will choose from among these recommended testers no fewer than one and no more than half of the number allocated to the political parties.
(III) For nonpartisan elections that are not coordinated elections, a Testing Board will be appointed with the number of members determined by the designated election official. Each participating Governing Board will recommend to the designated election official one or more Testing Board members, and the designated election official will choose from among these recommended testers no fewer than two and will attempt to evenly distribute the Testing Board members across the districts.
We hope the law will maximize independence and minimize official control over the verification that the election system is ready to conduct a fair and accurate election.
As you may recall, Boulder County has had embarrassing problems during the last few elections. Many of these problems could have been avoided by an independent (and system wide) LAT.
The current language proposed in HB 1116, Section 15 removes the party affiliation requirements for judges who perform logic and accuracy testing on electronic voting equipment if the election for which the equipment is being tested is a nonpartisan election.
SECTION 15. 1-7-509 (1) (c), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read:In the first place, why should the clerk select the testing board members for PARTISAN elections? Each Major Political Party Chair should select the person(s) that they feel confident will best perform this highly technical duty. This paragraph should be revised by an amendment that assigns to the County Political Party Chair the appointment of the person or persons that will participate in the design and execution of the LAT.
1-7-509. Electronic and electromechanical vote counting - testing of equipment required.
(1) (c) (I) FOR ALL PARTISAN ELECTIONS, the designated election official shall select a testing board comprising at least two persons, one from each major political party, from the list provided by the major political parties pursuant to section 1-6-102.
(II) FOR ALL NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS, THE DESIGNATED ELECTION OFFICIAL SHALL SELECT A TESTING BOARD COMPRISING AT LEAST TWO PERSONS WHO ARE REGISTERED ELECTORS.
Secondly, why should the clerk select the testing board members for NONPARTISAN elections? Again, the major political party chairs should each make at least one appointment. They have experience, and are a stable element of the community. In addition, each of the participating districts should submit a candidate for LAT tester, and the Clerk can choose among the appointees of the special districts.
Some Colorado County Clerks are guilty of restricting LAT test cases to things that the clerk has pre-tested before the test. For example, only a blue or black pen may be used to mark LAT ballots. In so doing, Clerks wind up serving as surrogates for the vendors. They use these unfair testing procedures to cover up defects in the equipment and procedures.
• Clerks won’t permit testers to use “realistic marks” on the test ballots.Even more egregious, but probably not fixable in HB 1116, the LAT itself is flawed in that it does not test the entire path.
• Clerks won’t permit the “expected results” to be hidden from the people running the equipment and performing the ballot resolution function.
• Clerks won’t permit testers to address many of the election procedures required by law, including compliance with “conditional certification requirements”.
• Currently, there is no testing to verify that signature verifiers are able to detect forgery.Sadly, the LAT has devolved into an ineffective drama designed to generate false confidence. Most of the defects discovered in recent elections should have and would have been detected by a fair public testing process.
• Currently, there is no testing to verify that procedures are followed.
• Currently, there is no testing to verify that batch controls work, and that the election can be accurately canvassed..
• Currently, there is no testing to verify that election reports comply with the law.
Eventually, the Legislature must ensure that pre-election testing will verify that (1) every eligible voter will be given an opportunity to vote once, (2) every eligible vote will be correctly counted once, and that (3) every aspect of the election (with the exception of where a voter’s SSN would be made public, or a connection between the voter and the voted ballot would be exposed) will be fully transparent and independently verifiable.
It is reckless for the clerks to select the LAT teams.
Please amend the bill as recommended in the opening language above.
Elections will be better, and more trustworthy.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder CO, 80305
303-494-1540
mailto:AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
Cc: 'geoff.johnson@state.co.us'; 'linda.newell.senate@gmail.com'
Polling place voting is more secure and more accurate than mail ballots..
March 19, 2010
TO: Boulder County Commissioners: Ben Pearlman (Chair), Will Toor, Cindy Domenico
CC: Boulder County Clerk and Recorder: Hillary Hall
RE: Arguments for conducting the 2010 Primary Election as a Polling Place Election.
Dear Commissioners:
Before addressing the voting method, we beg you to take necessary action to remove the unique ballot bar-code/serial-number from our ballots. The unique identification of ballots denies voters the right to cast an anonymous ballot. Identified ballots can be linked back to the voter, despite official admonitions to “trust the government”. Please forbid this violation of voter’s rights.
At the time of the writing of this appeal, the public has seen no real numbers to support the official claims that eliminating in-person voting will cost less and increase turnout. How much less cost, and how many more voters? Where are the historical and forecast numbers to support these assertions? And, what is the threat assessment for each of the voting methods? Please ensure that the facts are available for verification before making a decision based on emotion and hearsay.
It is important to keep in mind that elections can be won by one vote. One single case of undetected fraud or error can change the outcome.
We submit the following to encourage Boulder County to conduct the 2010 Primary Election as a polling place election.
Electors who want the freedom to choose to vote at a polling place do so for a variety of reasons:
1. Objections to overreaching by government.
14. Polling place elections have independent oversight.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder CO, 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
TO: Boulder County Commissioners: Ben Pearlman (Chair), Will Toor, Cindy Domenico
CC: Boulder County Clerk and Recorder: Hillary Hall
RE: Arguments for conducting the 2010 Primary Election as a Polling Place Election.
Dear Commissioners:
Before addressing the voting method, we beg you to take necessary action to remove the unique ballot bar-code/serial-number from our ballots. The unique identification of ballots denies voters the right to cast an anonymous ballot. Identified ballots can be linked back to the voter, despite official admonitions to “trust the government”. Please forbid this violation of voter’s rights.
At the time of the writing of this appeal, the public has seen no real numbers to support the official claims that eliminating in-person voting will cost less and increase turnout. How much less cost, and how many more voters? Where are the historical and forecast numbers to support these assertions? And, what is the threat assessment for each of the voting methods? Please ensure that the facts are available for verification before making a decision based on emotion and hearsay.
It is important to keep in mind that elections can be won by one vote. One single case of undetected fraud or error can change the outcome.
We submit the following to encourage Boulder County to conduct the 2010 Primary Election as a polling place election.
- In a polling place election, voters can choose to vote in person or by mail ballot.
- A polling place election will honor the wishes of electors who have signed up to vote as permanent mail-in elector.
- A polling place election is more secure.
- A polling place election is more accurate.
- There will be less opportunity for mischief in a polling place election.
Electors who want the freedom to choose to vote at a polling place do so for a variety of reasons:
1. Objections to overreaching by government.
Some electors object to being forced to vote using a mail-ballot system that they believe is insecure and inaccurate.2. Some voters want to know the facts before they vote.
Late breaking news, available on Election Day, can affect a voter’s choices. Mail-in ballots must be posted days in advance of Election Day.3. Campaigns are less costly.
Shorter campaigns can be less expensive, and candidates have a less difficult time programming their campaign activities. Mail-in ballot voting might start a soon as 20 days before Election Day. A lot can happen in 20 days. Instead of scheduling election activities around one day, Election Day, broadcast advertising and literature mailings for mail ballot elections must be repeated in order to reach voters near the time that the voter is preparing to mark their ballot. These costs are incurred by each of the campaigns.
4. Polling place voting is more secure.
a. There is much tighter control over the physical ballots since the ballots never leave the control of the election judges.5. Mail-in voting is less secure.
b. It is more likely that the person who marks the ballot is the eligible elector. Electors must show their face at the polls.
c. There is much tighter control over electioneering.
a. Ineligible ballots can be voted and the votes counted.6. Non-professional signature verification is not proof that the eligible elector freely marked and cast a mail ballot.
b. Mail ballots are sent to electors that are not eligible because they no longer live in the County.
c. Incorrect mail ballots are issued to people who are ineligible to vote the ballot style because they have changed jurisdictions within the county.
d. The Postal Service does not guarantee delivery of ballots to the intended elector.
e. Ballots are delivered to addresses where the elector is no longer eligible.
f. Ballots are delivered to an address, but the elector never receives the ballot.
g. People can vote by mail in Boulder County and vote again in another out of state location.
a. Identity theft can be used to forge signatures on ballots that are harvested in dumpsters and Post Office trash barrels.7. Polling place voters have less possibility of suffering voter intimidation.
b. Family members, roommates, and office mates can successfully forge an elector’s signature.
c. With modern technology, it is relatively easy to scan a stolen signature and adjust its size and density for printing onto a ballot return envelope.
d. Temporary election workers are not certified to accurately detect false signatures.
a. When a private voting booth is available to a voter, the voter cannot be pressured by others, including friends and family. The voter can say that they voted X when they actually voted Y.8. Claims of increased voter turnout in mail ballot elections are not substantiated.
b. Votes on mail ballots can easily be traded, and/or sold.
c. Electioneering can take place in the elector’s home, as the elector is encouraged to mark their ballot in front of somebody electioneering.
a. High voter turnout results from competitive contests and the elector’s belief that their vote can affect the results. High turnout does not result from forcing everybody to vote using mail ballots.9. Inappropriate electioneering of Permanent mail-in voter option.
b. Even year elections have higher turnout than odd, and general election have higher turnout than primary elections. Given two supposedly equal mail ballot elections, the turnout in one varies from another.
c. In past Boulder County Primary elections, where voting by mail ballot was available to all electors, turnout has varied:
· DEM 13,230 REP 10,267 1998 Governor’s Primary (both contested)
· DEM 7,742 REP 6,561 2002 Governor’s Primary (both uncontested)
· DEM 12,963 REP 6,537 2006 Governor’s Primary (both uncontested)
d. It is common for the same voter to have a different turnout on the same ballot in the same election. They vote for some contests but not others.
e. Even when a permanent mail in elector is sent a ballot, a large percentage of these ballots are not accepted for counting.
f. And among those mail ballots accepted for counting, there is no hard evidence that the ballots were voted by eligible electors voting without intimidation and/or vote trading.
a. Using public funds to engineer an overturn of the 2002 Amendment 28 vote of the people, election officials have misinformed electors. Electors, therefore, do not have the facts needed to make an informed choice when deciding whether or not to elect permanent mail ballot status.10. Attempt to overturn 2002 election results.
· With no explanation of risk, driver license officials encourage new registrants to sign us as a permanent mail-in voter.
· Election offices persuade electors to sign up for permanent mail-in ballots.
· Government sponsored literature stresses (potential) benefits, and fails to disclose the uncertainties and problems associated with mail ballot elections.
· Rosy claims about fabulously low costs and deliriously high turnout are not supported with detailed cost and turnout data.
a. Special interests, despite the fact that Amendment 28 was defeated in 63 out of 64 Colorado counties, did not give up when they lost the 2002 statewide contest to eliminate polling place elections. (60 percent of Boulder County voters voted NO to this scheme.) Since then:11. Election cost detail is not available.
· Officials worked against the public to create the permanent mail-in option.
· They have expended public money to persuade electors to sign up for permanent mail-in status.
· They have worked to permit forced mail-in voting for partisan Primary elections.
b. And who are these special interests? Some are unknown, but one is the Colorado County Clerks Association. CCCA is a secret association that influences its members to eliminate polling place elections. The association refuses to permit representatives of the public to observe their meetings, and refuses to permit representatives of the public to present facts that contradict their dogma.
a. The public is unable to analyze the differences between mandatory mail-in ballot and polling place elections, because the detail needed for such an analysis is not available to the public. A questioning public might discover opportunities to cut costs.12. Election integrity is threatened with mail-in ballots.
b. Mail ballot packets cost more to print, package, and mail than polling place ballots -- a great deal more.
c. Many permanent mail ballots are returned as Undeliverable. This demonstrates that the voter list is not accurate, it releases live ballots into the wild, and it costs the County a great deal to print, package, and mail these ballots. Postage costs extra for returning the undeliverable ballot packets to the county.
d. Boulder County residents benefit when money spent on elections is kept in Boulder County. It appears that a polling place election will keep more money at home than would a mail ballot election.
e. If we understand correctly, there is no publicly verified estimate of the cost for running the Primary as a polling place election or a mail ballot only election.
· Whatever the difference, it is not sufficient to deprive voters of the right to vote in person if they choose to do so.
· It is not sufficient to accept the additional threats to integrity which come with a mail ballot election.
f. Is Boulder County prepared to sacrifice the integrity of its election for money?
g. We hope that the commissioners will require cost data with sufficient detail to determine if all of the related costs are included. For example, fees to HART, postage in and out and undeliverable ballot packet returns, how many early voting locations for each voting method, etc.
a. Mail ballots are issued, accepted/rejected, opened and processed up to 22 days before Election Day, and votes may be counted up to 15 days before Election Day. This makes possible the leakage of voting information to “friendly” campaigns, opening the possibility of unfair elections. For example, a visual assessment by an “insider” of the number of votes cast for each contestant in a key contest is valuable information. This data could be used by campaigns to tune their last minute spending and activities, and thereby unfairly influence the outcome of the election.13. Polling place elections build and nurture community.
a. Some electors believe that elections have a secondary benefit – they build and nurture community. People directly participate in the election processes as workers, poll watchers, and election judges.b. More community involvement has the secondary benefit of increasing public confidence that the election results are fair and accurate.
c. Whereas, mail ballot elections are sterile, and most of the activity occurs in the back room.
a. Most of the election workers in a mail-in only election are staff and temporary employees of the Clerk. In polling place elections, most election workers are election judges who are not employees of the Clerk. We need the transparency of independent oversight.Boulder County is fortunate to have a well-intentioned County Clerk. Pressure on her to minimize cost is high, as it should be. However, as outlined above, it is vital that election cost is not awarded a higher priority than election integrity and voter confidence. The first job for government is to protect the integrity of the ballot box. The second job is to do so as efficiently as practical.
We encourage Boulder County to conduct the 2010 Primary Election as a standard polling place election. Let those who wish to vote by mail ballot do so. Let those who wish to vote in person, and cast a ballot that is not enclosed in an envelope that is coded with the voter’s name and address, do so.
And please keep in mind that each and every single vote counts.
Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder CO, 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
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