Specific arguments about issues in SB 083 for the State, Veterans, and Military Affairs Committee and for any debate on the House floor or in conference committee:
(1) SECTION 30 (CORRECTED 2ND ENGROSSED SB-083, pp. 27, LINES 10-27)
Waiver of Mandatory Election Recount (This section of SB-83 should be removed):
PRO ARGUMENT: CURRENT MANDATORY ELECTION RECOUNTS ARE BENEFICIAL FOR DEMOCRACY:
* preserves status quo- provides some means for verifiability
* recount is for election accuracy, not loser "sour grapes" or vanity
* recount involves needed extra attention to ballots by hand counting- must NOT be by barcode count as currently permitted
* use of recount is rare - elections are not often within 1/2% margin
* recount becomes unlikely if it is made optional but costly
* pressure on losing candidate to waive recount is inevitable
* pressure is likely on political and fiscal conservation arguments
* pressure will be self-asserted by the loser (not necessarily overt)
* recount should resolve unseen mistakes and overlooked ballots
* losing candidate does not have the right to make this a personal choice - it is the public's election
* benefit of recount is for all persons in Colorado, not merely the losing candidate
THE COUNTER ARGUMENT:
* recount is expensive and time consuming for county election officials
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(2) Change in the polling place posting of the vote abstract to end required posting
(This Section of SB-83 should be removed-Delete lines 26-27 on page 25 and lines 1-16 on page 26 of the 2nd engrossed bill)
PRO ARGUMENT: PRECINCT POSTING OF VOTE ABSTRACT IS PROTECTIVE OF VALID ELECTION RESULTS:
* Precinct posting requires quick resolution of results at polling place, avoids delay of the reporting of election results,
* quick posting helps prevent hiding of poll site errors and fraud
* precinct posting is usually of direct result from voting machine, not manipulated results
* without precinct posting, no motivation for the rules to call for or the machine to be designed to produce an immediate local results record on paper
* posting is an early warning system for results, and allows quick election problem follow up
* posting allows immediate election day comparison of similar results from different places
* posting is popular with voters and is expected in many counties especially rural areas,
* posting can be done with simple physical security and should be accompanied by a sign notifying site tenants of the 48 hour posting period
* for cross checking, posting should include under and over votes.
* new language in this section does not specify either time or place that poll results can be obtained
* without posting, clerks will likely wait until all data is combined before release of results to the public
* data separated by polling place allows errors to be noticed earlier
* public has a right to have quick access to all vote counts and exceptions
* Dentral posting of abstract results may be at central clerk's office a long distance from rural poll site
* posting provides faster access to results... where otherwise we must wait for memory cards to be transported and uploaded at central tabulation center
COUNTER ARGUMENT: POLL SITE ABSTRACT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO BE POSTED AT THE POLL SITE- ONLY AT CENTRAL CLERKS OFFICE
* posting is inconvenient in certain locations such as without a glass door or window accessible to the public- abstract tapes could blow away
* posting is inconvenient in metro vote centers where so many precincts vote together and voting machine tapes are therefore long, cumbersome and take space
* some county clerks have programmed their voting machines to not produce the precinct abstract tapes
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(3) SECTION 2 (P. 4, LINES 15-21) Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (V-VPAT) not required to contain "name" of ballot issue
PRO ARGUMENT: THE V-VPAT SHOULD DISPLAY THE SUBMISSION CLAUSE OR FULL TEXT OF THE ISSUE AND QUESTION, AND THE NAME OF COLORADO JUDGES STANDING FOR RETENTION (supporting change in language from "number or letter" to "submission clause and or full text"):
* voter can not be expected to remember the meaning of the number or letter of every issue and question on the ballot
* voter expected to verify meaning of "Amendment 39 Yes"
* submission clause is already used in statute, required on results printout from machine (which is itself usually a long narrow paper tape)
* V-VPAT is useless unless truly verified (except blind disabled voter can not verify on most DRE machines)
COUNTER ARGUMENT
* may not be room for submission clause on paper tape (also may not be room for candidate name)
* voter may not care to, or be able to verify (which is the very reason not to use DRE machines and to return to required paper ballots for the majority of or all voters)
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(4) PROVIDE LOCAL BACKUP SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION BOOKS IN CASE OF VOTE CENTER NETWORK FAILURE (CRS 1-5-102.7- substitute language on p 18 line 5)
PRO ARGUMENT - THERE IS VITAL NEED FOR A POLL SITED COPY OF THE COUNTY
REGISTRATION LISTS. (supporting change of language)
* Denver'S 2006 election failure caused huge disenfranchisement of eligible voters who left the poll sites without voting- possibly affecting outcome of election
* Denver election failure could have been avoided if registration data was
available locally at each poll site, and Colorado statute and SOS rule would allow its use to verify voter eligibility to vote at the poll site
* registration is now finalized 30 days prior to election, so data is easy to produce either on paper poll books, or on electronic storage for local use
* if any voter votes twice, their name will be forwarded to DA and criminal prosecution will follow, and every case will be recorded and likely reported to the public
* enfranchisement of many voters takes priority over prevention of of the remote possibility of occasional duplicate voting
* depending on size of county, data may be kept on paper or electronic media
COUNTER ARGUMENT
* registration book for a large county with vote centers is almost unprintable on paper poll books
* non networked local data for emergency means voter could vote twice
* registration lookup on paper may be difficult with a paper poll book
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(5) BALLOT MARKING DEVICES (BMD) - ALLOW BALLOT MARKING DEVICES TO BE CERTIFIED BY THE SOS AS HAVA-C0MPLIANT ACCESSIBLE VOTING SYSTEMS
PRO ARGUMENT (supporting existing language allowing BMD certification):
(retain page 19 lines 9-23 of the 2nd engrossed version of the bill)
* only two states, Colorado and Arkansas, prevent certification of of BMD systems now in use
* BMDs are superior to DRE in aiding disabled- they provide full verification on a paper ballot
* BMD permit all voters to vote on paper, but DREs require electronic ballots and it is hard to verify electronic counts and may prevent voting on paper
* Disabled voters' lobby argues that they should vote in the same method as others, this argument can and has worked to disadvantage of all voters when DRE provides less transparency and accessibility for testing and auditing and recounting than paper ballots and BMD systems
* if a county chooses 100% DRE, voters have no right or ability to vote at polling place on paper
* if there is no right to vote on a paper ballot, polling can not be designed to avoid lines when crowds appear at the polls... but with paper ballots, distributed freely with proper procedures, lines can be avoided.
* typical casting of hand marked paper ballots with precinct optical scan, consists of voter handing a ballot in a secrecy sleeve to an election judge who removes the ballot and operates the optical scanner. This is no different from an election judge assisting the disabled voter to perform the same function. This comparison shows that the existing language does not differentially discriminate against the disabled, nor is it a violation of equal protection of equal protection
COUNTER ARGUMENT (supporting removal of existing SB83 "CASTING" language, which supplements the current statute)
* disabled deserve to "independently" and personally deposit their ballot into the ballot box or optical scanner, since this is what casting of a ballot consists of
* the original statue was written for the DRE machine system, and the disabled voter is able to electronically "cast" their ballot without assistance
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Showing posts with label legislation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label legislation. Show all posts
Sunday, April 22, 2007
Protecting verifiability from Colorado Senate Bill 83
TO:
*for committee meeting on Tuesday April 24 at 1:30PM
RE: SB07-083: On Conduct of Elections (Tupa, Weissman)
Please consider changing the following three provisions of the 2nd Engrossed version (March 30) of SB07-083 which contradict the public interest of verifiability and transparency of elections:
1. ELIMINATION OF THE AUTOMATIC RECOUNT
Replacing the now-required automatic recount in close elections, this provision allows the losing candidate to waive the recount.
Rationale for opposition: Recounts should not be politicized and this provision would cause political pressure to be a major factor of whether recounts would occur. The outcome of an election has consequences for the entire electorate, not just the losing candidate, who may be subjected to intimidation or improper inducements to waive the recount. The recount is required to maintain high standards of accuracy, not to satisfy the loser.
Recommended: Remove the item. Delete lines 10-27 on page 27 of the 2nd engrossed bill.
2. TERMINATION OF POLLING-PLACE POSTING OF RESULTS
This is a provision to abandon the practice of posting polling results at the polling place immediately after election officials have signed off on them on election night, for 48 hours, and leaving the time of publication unspecified.
Rationale for opposition: Posted results are a major tool for public transparency of elections and timely onsite records provide the best accuracy check. Public records enhance the trust of an electorate that is presently suspicious of the election process. Existing practice is essential as it increases the chances that an accurate record exists of polling place results. Posted results can raise red flags immediately about problems at particular polling locations, if results differ from those of other polling places where similar results are expected.
Recommended: Remove the item. Delete lines 26-27 on page 25 and lines 1-16 on page 26 of the 2nd engrossed bill.
3. BALLOT ISSUES ON THE VOTER-VERIFIABLE PAPER RECORD KNOWN ONLY BY NUMBER OR LETTER
This is a provision to identify ballot issues or questions only by “THE NUMBER OR LETTER” on the voter-verifiable paper audit trail.
Rationale for opposition: Makes voter verification difficult. It will substantially impair the ability of voters whose ballots are created electronically to be able to verify that their votes were recorded correctly.
Recommended: The statutory requirement should be improved to require, at minimum, the short description of an item known as “the submission clause”, or, where possible, the full text.
(On page 4, line 15 of 2nd Engrossed bill, replace “THE NUMBER OR LETTER” with “THE SUBMISSION CLAUSE AND OR FULL TEXT”.)
--SB083 elections statute alert April 22, 2007 version 4 page 1--
Please add to SB083:
4. REQUIRE LOCAL BACKUP OF THE COMPUTERIZED REGISTRATION BOOK USED AT A
Rationale for inclusion: An amendment to remove the non computerized registration books from this bill recently passed in the Senate, but the local backup of the vote center registration data is of paramount importance to prevent spectacular election failures.
Recommended: (on page 18 line 5 substitute for “EQUIPMENT” “EQUIPMENT WITH NON-COMPUTERIZED REGISTRATION BOOKS OR REGISTRATION DATA LOCALLY STORED AT THE POLLING PLACE TO BE USED IN CASE OF A SYSTEM FAILURE”
Please also support the following existing text in SB083:
5. DEFINING THE CASTING OF A BALLOT FOR ACCESSIBLE VOTING SYSTEMS
Rationale for support: The Secretary of State’s office has denied certification to ballot marking devices on the grounds that some disabled voters would have to depend on help to cast their ballot after it was printed by the electronic device. Currently, SB083 defines “the final step of casting a ballot” as “causing a ballot to be placed into any device that protects the privacy and integrity of the elector’s choice”. Transporting the ballot in a secrecy sleeve across the room to an optical scanner or ballot box is what this discussion is about.
Blind engineer and computer expert Noel Runyon asserts that there are ballot marking devices that meet essential requirements for a secret ballot for the disabled, and that the assistance required of some disabled to cast the ballot when using a ballot marking device is no more compromising of a person’s privacy than the help required by some to insert the card permitting them to vote into a machine. He also asserts that the several direct record electronic voting machines (DRE’s which were certified by the Secretary of State) serve the disabled less well than a ballot marking device, as none of them allow the blind to verify their vote.
Recommended: Keep the amendment in the bill so that ballot marking devices can be certified.
(Keep page 19 lines 9-23 of the 2nd engrossed version of the bill.)
Notes: Regarding posting, we also recommend putting up a sign near the posted election results, which cites the requirement that they remain posted for 48 hours, in both English and other languages commonly spoken in the county. In addition, the Secretary of State should require that the results be posted in a relatively protected manner.
Many Colorado voters still vote on machines which do not allow them to verify their votes; many verifiable ballots go unverified; most races are never audited; and the audit as currently implemented is relatively unlikely to catch errors. This unfortunately impairs transparency and accountability in our elections, making it particularly important that we preserve the information that election-night polling-place postings provide. The posted abstract of votes should include totals of undervotes and overvotes to permit full cross checking of vote tallies.
We have identified many serious problems with existing statutes and practice which have not been addressed: method of audit, recount and testing, use of barcodes, lack of access to paper ballots at the polls, insufficient oversight and many other problems.
We are looking for legislators to carry future legislation on these topics.
Please contact us at margitjo [at] gmail.com.
--SB083 elections statute alert April 22, 2007 version 4 detail page 2--
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