Voters choose paper ballots over voting machines

Dear Ms. Kim,

I am concerned that your story in today’s Rocky Mountain News might mislead voters and election officials. Voters enthused about mail option

The phrases “Coloradans are responding so enthusiastically” and “voters who want to only vote by mail “ strongly suggest that voters want to use the “permanent absentee” method of voting. Increased usage does not necessarily mean that voters want or prefer the method. In fact, there are several other explanations for the increased usage of the method.

1. Preference for paper ballots -- Where paper ballots in precinct polling locations is not an option, we have for years now recommended that voters obtain and hand deliver an absentee ballot. This is how voters can vote a paper ballot on Election Day, even when the county does not offer paper ballots in precinct polling locations. (We explain to voters that hand delivery does not guarantee that votes will be counted, but the risk is less than the risk when using electronic vote recording equipment.)
   
   
2. Unauthorized promotion -- County clerks have been aggressively promoting the use of “permanent absentee” status. I have personally observed a clerk employee persuade a new registrant to choose this method. I have a photo of a sign in the clerk’s office promoting the method. The clerk’s are mailing unauthorized propaganda to voters that encourages voters to use the “permanent absentee” method.
   
   The propaganda completely ignores the risks associated with “permanent absentee” voting, and therefore misleads the voters. It is very difficult for election system reformers to overcome the unauthorized use of thousands and thousands of dollars of public funds that are being used to promote this voting method and to silence the questions raised by reformers. When the clerks want to do something, they find the money. And they want to make their own lives easier and less accountable.
   
   
3. Unaccountable clerks -- County clerks are not accountable for the error and fraud that results from this unauthorized propaganda effort. Lacking effective oversight, clerks have nothing to lose by promoting this unsafe method. “Permanent absentee” is different than “absentee” voting. With absentee voting, a voter submits an application for a ballot. This application applies only to the current election. It is pretty likely that the voter is alive, receiving mail at the address indicated on the application, and intends to vote in the current election. The county verifies that the application is valid, and fulfills the request. With “permanent absentee” voting, there is no application for the current election. Whether the voter is alive or has moved or is absent from their residence or does not intend to vote in the current election has no bearing. A ballot is mailed to the “permanent absentee” address. Many of these ballots will be fraudulently voted and counted.

It is important to distinguish between voters who want a paper ballot and voters who actually understand and want to use the “permanent absentee” method.


Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.ColoradoVoterGroup.org
www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com

SPEAKOUT: Colorado’s county clerks do not know best

SPEAKOUT: Colorado’s county clerks do not know best
By Al Kolwicz

Despite assurances to the contrary, Colorado county clerks do not know best. Their job has changed. It used to be an administrative job, overseeing people, procedures, and paper. It is now a systems manager job, overseeing the design, purchase, testing and operation of complex computerized election systems.

Not many county clerks are qualified to do the job they have chosen. Not surprisingly, clerks abdicate responsibilities to equipment suppliers who claim to know what’s best. Clerks have an unhealthy dependency on these suppliers. The supplier’s agenda is not the electorate’s agenda.

Clerks shun accountability and public debate. They hold secret meetings. They withhold data needed to detect election errors and fraud. They block public participation in election planning and oversight. To promote their agenda, clerks use public resources to lobby against the interests of the electorate, and they make misleading statements that disparage watchdogs and give false assurances to voters.

Most county clerks give convenience and cost their top priority. Many claim that voter confidence tops their list. But voter confidence is not based on convenience and cost. Voter confidence is earned when an election is transparent, each process is independently verified, and every problem is publicly disclosed. Clerks may know what is best for clerks; but clerks don’t do what is best for the electorate.

In his recent SPEAKOUT: Colorado’s county clerks know best, Secretary of State Coffman puts words into the mouth of election system activists and practices revisionist history. He says that clerks know best, but he does not support this assertion.

Mr. Coffman says that the “ultimate goal” of so-called voter activists “is to prohibit the use of all electronic voting devices”. This is not true, and it has never been true. Election system activists want election systems that are transparent and verifiable. The systems certified by the Secretary of State are neither.

Mr. Coffman says that the court ordered re-certification was only about documentation. This is not true. The court decision was about standards and competence. The new standards are weak and the re-certification team largely ignored them. All of the equipment failed to meet these weak and selectively tested standards. Ignoring problems does not make them go away.

We agree with Mr. Coffman when he originally said “I have more confidence in having votes cast on paper ballots at the polls rather than relying exclusively on electronic voting machines or in voting by mail.” (SOS News, 12/26/07).

We disagree with Mr. Coffman when he now says, “The legislature and the Governor should defer to Colorado’s county clerks …” (SPEAKOUT, 3/12/08). Colorado county clerks do not share the electorate’s agenda, they refuse to be accountable, and they resist transparent and verifiable systems.

Election system activists do not know everything about election law, but they do know some. And, they know a great deal about computers, software and systems. It is time for Colorado’s clerks to acknowledge their limitations and to work toward a transparent and verifiable election system.

People should trust their clerk, but independently verify their elections.

Al Kolwicz, for Colorado Voter Group
www.ColoradoVoterGroup.org
303-494-1540

Election system auditing - whither?

This note is not intended to offend the fine people working on election system auditing. I hope that it will be viewed positively, and spur folks to meet its challenge.

Before getting too committed to a post election audit scheme, I suggest that we take a step back and think about what the audit is supposed to accomplish -- precisely.

Lots of folks are getting enthusiastic about potential mechanisms – the solutions. But I have not seen an adequate statement of requirements for what the election system audit is committing to accomplish. And exactly how will we know when it has succeeded, or failed?

Election system auditing is a technical/analytical/ almost mathematical problem. This is not the way I see it being approached. Sure, people are using statistics and arithmetic, but I see no postulate leading to proof.

Election system auditing is being discussed as though every ballot is like every other ballot. This is not a correct assumption. The ballot style, including its precinct, makes ballots fall into a number of non-identical sets. Something true of one ballot may be untrue for ballots of a different style/precinct.

Election system audit designers seem to not differentiate between the various methods of voting – precinct-paper, precinct-electronic, early-paper, early-electronic, absentee, provisional, and emergency. These are non-identical methods. Results from a sample in one set do not necessarily carry over to another set.

Election auditor designers seem to not differentiate between the individual units of voting equipment used to record and count ballots and votes. Just because a ballot is successfully processed on one unit does not mean that it would be processed correctly on a different unit of the same type. Each individual unit is uniquely customized for each election. No two units are identical. What is true of one unit is not necessarily true of any other unit.

And, election audit designers seem to ignore completely the processes that do not involve voting equipment, yet represent enormous opportunities for error and fraud. The voter eligibility system, the ballot issuing mechanisms, ballot production, mailing, return mail processing, signature verification, batch integrity, etc. Every one of these represents a potential threat.

In a nutshell, I hope that people wanting to be election system audit experts will first develop widespread agreement on the exact requirements for the audit and how it will be verified that the audit meets these requirements. Only then does it make sense to propose a solution.

Finally, there are data flows that make auditing possible, and data flows that do not. None of the election systems certified for use in Colorado have an auditable data flow. Consequently, all of the work being done on audit today is destined to be discarded once a more rigorous data flow model is adopted.

It is time to establish the precise requirements for election system auditing.


Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.org/
http://www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com/

Questions re: Colorado's Paper Ballot Bill

Many questions about elections, many news reports and still not enough answers.

The Colorado Secretary of State has done what Myriah Conroy predicted in her recent testimony and has already recertified most of the voting machines in a political process which lacked transparency. The process may have avoided actually determining the accuracy of the voting systems. This looks like a very unsatisfying end to the saga of the Conroy v. Dennis law suit. It ought to be observed that the accuracy tested by Colorado certification is limited to a best case count of 10,000 ballots, when elections may process considerably more than that number on a single machine. We cannot have confidence in machine counts when the only set of tests which is intended to prove that the machines are accurate has not counted ballots on an election scale, and may not have addressed the ability of voting systems to obtain voter intent from ballots in a manner which is consistent with statute.

When and if we are ever able to determine if the tests were adequate to determine accuracy we will of course report on this. The fact that the Secretary has recertified systems will have little or no bearing on whether or not the tests prove accuracy or fail to do so. His ability to define substantial compliance has allowed him to make capricious decisions for which there is so far precious little explanation or justification. The extent to which the Secretary carried on with a non technical approach to the needs of the State regarding elections even after enduring the spotlight on this topic in the course of discussion over HB 1155 shows how little intelligence is applied in our State regulatory framework for elections. The Secretary has told members of the public that their only avenues for improvement of this situation is in the courts and in the legislature. He will then be expecting our response from both directions. The legislature will one would hope be prepared to address public interests on behalf of or in stead of the Secretary.

Senator Gordon's paper ballot bill is here, click to read bill.

The Senate State Affairs meeting on this bill is scheduled for 1:30 PM on Monday March 3rd.

The public have not been adequately served in the airing of information about elections in the Colorado press. This is primarily because the press do not provide an adequate platform for discussion and debate of issues and underlying facts. Most often important facts do not reach the form of printed word. It is the legislative process which allows for a form of debate, although it tends to be one sided and non interactive by the nature of the protocol used for these public sessions in which one side has control over the order and extent of the commentary. The public is depending, in this case almost entirely,on the legislature for the opportunity to have facts about elections aired to a full extent, even though a permanent written record is not created.

In the course of discussion of the SB 189 the following topics ought to be addressed and the underlying truths revealed. It will take time in committee to expose the answers to these questions. I sincerely hope that this time is made available:

1) Is precinct reporting needed and is it a valuable resource for public oversight and understanding of election results?

2) Can clerks perform precinct reporting and if so, just how hard is it? If not, why not? How many clerks are in this condition?

3) Do vote centers actually solve problems for elections or do they primarily introduce new and difficult problems? Why are vote centers not just combined precincts?

4) Can lines be avoided on election day without the guaranteed availability of a paper ballot?

5) How can paper ballots and paper poll books be employed to provide the best accountability and the least amount of waiting at precinct polling places? Will the existing statute and rule favor an accountable and transparent election where voters do not have to stand in line for more than a few minutes?

6) Will the widespread public exposure of a record of length of lines, machine audit logs, audit procedures and interim and final results help improve our election? Would it be better to actively collect the stories of success and failure of our elections including specific complaints or successes by clerks and by voters? And will the Secretary of State be likely to collect and publish this information under existing statute?

7) Paper ballot elections are good in part because humans can count ballots in the case an election flaw or exception is discovered. Is Colorado prepared to actually count paper ballots by hand when this becomes necessary? Do we have adequate preparations and adequate training to hand count our ballots accurately? Can the legislature assist in improving our hand count procedures? Could the clerks' negative attitude about hand counting self fulfill in the form of poor election practices and less accurate results?

8) What difference is there in the efficiency and on the other hand transparency and accountability and accuracy of election systems of the following types: an all mail ballot, an all electronic precinct election, an election with precinct counting of paper ballots and a precinct election with central counting? As far as I can tell this discussion has never taken place in Colorado.

8) Can hand counting be performed by using a bar code? Current definitions allow this. Is publication by newspaper sufficient for public oversight? Can the Department of State improve its methods of publication to make access to records more convenient? Will this take place without statutory changes?

9) Can we ever achieve a straight forward approach to elections if the legislature remains short sighted by enacting law for the current year only? What is the byproduct of limiting legislation to one year?

10) Can we expect the Secretary of State to take a non political and technically proficient approach to election quality? Will a Secretary appointed task force actually change the existing practices of the Department in addressing election process? How can the legislature serve the public in motivating beneficial change at the Secretary of State's office.

11) What is the procedural response to a narrow victory margin election under current statute and rule (less than 1/2 percent)?
Under what conditions would ballots be hand counted for voter intent in a recount? What procedure or source proves the sufficient accuracy of the machine which is used to count ballots accurately to the precision necessary to have confidence in a close margin election? Is it possible to hand count with the precision necessary to determine the outcome of a close election with confidence? Is it practical to undertake such a recount?

These are some fundamental questions for which both State Affairs committees. Legislators and the public ought to have a good understanding of the answers which would be provided not only by clerks and Department of State staff, but by members of the public who serve in the voluntary or superficially paid roles as canvass board members who do not benefit directly from a lack of exposure of election system deficiencies to the public.

I would like to see each of these questions answered in the course of the testimony on SB 189.

Harvie Branscomb
Colorado Voter Group

Detecting election fraud made virtually impossible

The story by Myung Oak Kim on Voter-database doubts in yesterday's Rocky Mountain News raises serious questions about the potential for election fraud. From the article it appears that election officials intend to use Colorado's SCORE II statewide voter registration database as an electronic poll book during precinct elections in the future. Certainly electronic poll books are already in use, and required for vote center and mail ballot elections. However, such usage is fraught with peril, and the current system cannot even keep such simple fields as a voter's party affiliation straight. Since the system has been developed in secret, and public review will no doubt be extremely limited in the future, there is absolutely no way to know whether the names in the database are corporeal, the addresses exist and are residential, how many are in a secret file for alleged victims of domestic violence, what other chicanery exists or, more likely, gross incompetence is hidden behind "security by obscurity."

Before going further, I would like to recommend the book Deliver The Vote, A History Of Election Fraud, An American Political Tradition - 1742-2004 by Tracy Campbell. Anyone familiar with election fraud, and as Tracy Campbell abundantly documents, realizes that a basic and essential tool for detecting election fraud is a printed poll book containing signatures of those who appeared at the precinct and voted in the election. But election officials are rapidly eliminating that fundamental protection with no debate or review.

While the use of "repeaters," "drifters," and "illegals," together with vote buying and selling are nothing new to American elections, requiring a voter to appear in person at their precinct and physically sign a printed poll book in which they were listed, and that was available for future inspection, at least made the logistics of election fraud complicated and heightened the possibility of exposure and prosecution. But with electronic poll books there is little likelihood that public inspection can be easily accomplished or that the records will be preserved intact and complete. Also, signature capture and comparison is becoming all-electronic with little or no testing, and certainly no standards, for the required equipment and methods. The problems are particularly acute with mail ballots and exacerbated by mail-in voter registration where the "citizen" never personally appears before an election official, then may request a ballot by mail without any justification, or may be sent a ballot without even requesting one.

Thus we now have a system where we don't have access to any real documentation, there is no requirement that "voters" establish their physical existence, and only ephemeral electronic records exist for the election that we can't see.

One of the perennial problems with election fraud is that there are more ballots cast than voters who signed the poll book. Ofttimes there are even more ballots cast than there are registered voters in a precinct, which has happened on numerous occasions with electronic voting machines. But with vote centers it hasn't proven possible to break the voters and ballots down by precinct. With electronic poll books, mail ballots, early voting, and precinct voting combined it is impossible to control the number of ballots cast in a precinct in an election. While anyone with evil intent will insure that the total number of ballots cast is somewhat less than the number of registered voters in the precinct, with only easily-manipulated electronic records the problems of proving election fraud are greatly increased. The issue is also made worse by the tendency for county clerks to determine voter turnout by dividing the number of ballots returned by the number of ballots they send out in mail ballot elections. That is done to make it appear turnout was larger than in traditional elections, but such smoke-and-mirror techniques only serve to hide underlying problems which is, of course, desirable for election officials.

I always quake in fear when attorneys set out in haste to dictate solutions to technical problems. That is particularly true when they legislate on such fundamental issues as elections. I'm quite certain that I don't know all the problems that will result from this mad dash to computerized voting, yet legislators are hastily passing laws to dictate the unknown and, inevitably, the election disasters of tomorrow.

Given hundreds of years of election fraud experience, our forefathers had figured out that, except in very limited circumstances, requiring voters to physically appear at their local precinct on Election Day and sign a printed poll book that identified them as registered voters in that precinct was the safest, but not perfect, way to insure only eligible citizen's were allowed to vote.

After establishing their identity and valid registration, voters were then given a ballot that they hand marked in the privacy of a voting booth. Before the voter left their polling place the ballot was dropped into a ballot box after any identifying tags were removed. That ensured a secret ballot cast free from any intimidation, coercion, or electioneering. Vote buying and selling were also minimized by this method.

When the polls closed the ballots were hand counted at the precinct in full view of poll watchers and the public, and the totals posted at the precinct before the sealed ballot boxes and totals were taken to the clerk's office. The county clerk then totaled the results from all precincts in the county and gave out a public notice that could easily be verified by totaling up the posted precinct results.

The discerning reader will note that none of these protections exist today in many elections. Perhaps we should heed the lessons learned by our forefathers and return to the methods they developed for secure and honest elections. That isn't to say better means and methods for voting can't or won't be developed in the future, or that computers don't have a place in elections. But it is safe to state that present hastily and ill-informed election legislation has and is making elections less trustworthy and secure.

Chuck Corry
Charles E. Corry, Ph.D., F.G.S.A.
President
Equal Justice Foundation http://www.ejfi.org/

________________________________________

Board says, "do not certify any of the voting equipment".

The voting system certification board report says none of the voting equipment passed the tests. The reports for each vendor can be found at:

Certification Overview - Premier
Certification Overview - ES&S
Certification Overview - HART
Certification Overview - Sequoia

A court ordered re-certification of voting equipment in Colorado has concluded that none of the voting equipment supplied by Premier, Hart, ES&S, and Sequoia should be certified for use in elections.

The reasons for decertification vary, they focus on security and accuracy, and they include some of the problems identified by Ohio and California.

Despite Secretary of State Mike Coffman’s hand-picked certification board’s conclusions and recommendations, Mr. Coffman granted conditional certification to Premier’s voting and counting equipment. He also granted conditional certification to HART DREs and Sequoia optical scanners. His override of the board’s determination is an illustration that the process is not independent. Until the certification process is independent, it should not be trusted.

Colorado voting integrity advocates are very displeased with Mr. Coffman’s decisions, although they are relieved to be proven correct in their years long efforts to discredit the equipment. According to them, the certification process itself is fatally flawed. It is not independent, it is not comprehensive, and its factual determinations can be overridden by political expediency. And there is no test to verify that voting equipment components work when they are combined into a system.

There is a massive flurry of activity in Colorado as county clerks and vendors try to come up with a plan to get around the certification decisions. Mr. Coffman has announced his intent to request legislative changes that would enable him to get around the laws designed to protect the election system. He wants to shop around for a state that has certified this equipment, and use their positive certification results instead of Colorado’s negative results. He also wants legislative permission to bypass required testing of changes to the equipment and software.

Voter integrity groups and local systems experts who advocate for verifiable and transparent elections are fighting to break thru the wall of secrecy thrown up by officials. The public is being excluded from even observing meetings of election officials. This raises the question, are officials overtly violating Colorado’s open government laws?

This is a story that needs to be told. Colorado press on Monday and Tuesday was filled with the story.

Key points are:

• What are the implications for other states that are using this equipment?
• What does this decertification mean for the results of past elections that used this unreliable and insecure equipment?
• Is Colorado violating open government laws?
• What will Colorado do for 2008?

For more information see:

Colorado Voter Group

CAMBER

Request to be heard by the JBC during Department of State Hearing

December 7, 2007

Colorado Joint Budget Committee
200 E. Colfax
Denver, CO 80203

RE: Request to be heard by the JBC during Department of State Hearing
Dear JBC Chairman and Members:

It is our understanding that your committee has invited some county clerks to be present at the planned December 20th continuation of your Nov 15th JBC meeting.

As you know, the county clerks, the Secretary of State, and their staffs constitute one of the interests in election matters – the election officials.

A second interest is represented by their legislative representatives – the electors.

A third interest includes the producers of election related goods and services – the suppliers.

A fourth interest, with valuable election expertise, often forgotten and generally un-represented, includes the canvass boards, election judges, poll watchers, candidates, campaign managers and campaigns, petitioners, expert witnesses, technology experts, and election system advocates – the independent overseers.

The Colorado Voter Group has dedicated many person-years to the improvement of Colorado’s election system. Members of the Board of Trustees have been or currently are: canvass board members, election judges, poll watchers, political party county chairmen, candidates, petitioners, campaign managers, expert witnesses, technology experts, voting system standards developers, and leaders of statewide and national election system advocacy groups.

The perspective of the independent overseer is unique and valuable, yet is generally denied a place at the table during election system discussions between election officials and the electorate’s representatives.

1. Election officials, being burdened by cost and efficiency responsibilities, are motivated to create the impression that each election is secure, accurate, fraud-free, and error-free. They manufacture voter confidence and polish their own public image by controlling the facts.

To maintain control, election officials resist independent oversight. What they cannot prevent outright, they thwart by preventing access to the facts. By positioning themselves so they are not accountable, election officials can make unsubstantiated claims that effectively cannot be challenged. The Attorney General represents the Secretary of State, not the electors. Courts accept the tiniest hint of compliance as “substantial” and resist interfering with elected officials.

Election officials, because of their unhealthy dependence on them, protect their suppliers at the expense of the people. Further, most election officials lack the technical training to oversee their suppliers or their complicated and secretive voting and vote counting equipment. They are easily overwhelmed by election complexity, and this increases their substantial reliance on assistance from the manufacturers.

2. Electors rely on the purity of the election system including the laws established by the legislators, election officials and rules, and independent overseers to guarantee a fair and accurate election. Aside from the valuable acts of voter registration and voting, most electors do not directly engage in the planning, conduct or verification of an election. They trust, but do not verify.

3. Suppliers work to make profits by convincing election officials that their products and services are superior. They establish a dependency relationship with officials using proprietary technology, secrecy, and overly complex products. They resist oversight and public disclosure.

4. Independent overseers are absent from the discussion. We propose to represent the interests of the various constituents that we have identified as the independent overseers. We believe that our information will help you complete your understanding of (1) the state of our election system, and (2) the best alternative for conducting the 2008 elections.

Attached is a Framework for Colorado’s 2008 Election. It contradicts the positions expressed by many election officials, and it is a cost-effective and verifiably trustworthy way to conduct our elections – all things being considered.

For many years, we have documented concerns regarding election system certification and SCORE II. These concerns have not been addressed.

Specific details aside, it is most troubling that election officials have been unwilling to engage in a two-way public discussion of the issues we have raised. If election officials are permitted to continue to operate in this protective self-defined vacuum, without benefit of oversight, transparency and accountability, public distrust of the election system will reach a level that will likely prompt backlash.

We ask you to invite us to actively participate in your December 20th meeting. We believe that our unique perspective and knowledge are valuable assets. It is vital that the needs of election overseers be represented in the discussion.

Assuming that you will permit us to participate, we are happy to work with you or your representatives to properly prepare for your hearing.

We thank you for your consideration of this request.

Al Kolwicz
For the Board of Trustees, Colorado Voter Group

Attachments:
Colorado Elections 2008 - Framework for Primary and General Elections – 11/19/2007
Colorado Voter Group wants polling place elections with a few adjustments. – 11/19/2007
Open letter to Colorado Clerk - Colorado Elections 2008 - Framework for Elections – 11/20/2007


Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.AlKolwicz.net

Colorado Voter Group wants polling place elections with a few adjustments.

Group concerned that back room deals will trade accuracy for convenience. November 19, 2007

County clerks have been pushing Colorado legislators to adopt all-mail elections for the 2008 elections. Colorado Voter Group has published a superior alternative.

The framework shows how to significantly reduce election risk and uncertainty by limiting the use of questionable equipment, and rigorously auditing the equipment that does get used.

The framework says "no" to all-mail elections and "no" to invisible electronic ballots.

Click to read the press release.

Click to read Colorado Elections 2008 - Framework for Primary and General Elections

Secret scheme to overturn 2002 vote against mail ballot elections

The Colorado Secretary of State and several county clerks are scheming to overturn the 2002 vote which rejected the use of mail ballot elections for major elections. Rumors persist that certain state legislators are involved in the plot.

Colorado Voter Group hopes to inform readers of the background and facts regarding Colorado's current voting system mess.

1. In November 2002, Colorado voters rejected Amendment 28, which would have deprived voters of the right to vote in precincts by anonymous ballot.

63 of 64 Colorado counties voted this amendment down. 757,299 voters, nearly 60 percent of the votes, voted “no”. See election results on pages 145 and 159 of the November 2002 Abstract of Votes.

2. It appears from a Rocky Mountain News article, County clerks urge all-mail vote in '08, that county clerks are meeting in secret with the Secretary of State to overturn the vote of the people.

Further, it appears that clerks were not informed that the Colorado Voter Group has already submitted to the Secretary of State a workable voting alternative in the event that voting equipment is decertified. This alternative fulfills both the law and the wishes of the people of Colorado, and is a superior alternative to mail ballot elections.

3. Mail ballot elections have been proven to be undesirable. They are not secure, not accurate, not verifiable, not accessible, not anonymous, not transparent, and not accountable. Those who claim otherwise are either not informed or don’t care.

None of the problems brought out during the debate on Amendment 28 have been fixed.

The Rocky Mountain News published an Editorial, Don't take chance on mail ballots.

The Denver Post published PRO-CON opinions of Rutt Bridges (Bighorn Center) and Al Kolwicz (CAMBER) that addressed many of the issues.

CBS investigative reporter Rick Salinger, in an October 31, 2002 televised report, disproved the accuracy and security claims of election officials.

It is wrong for Colorado officials to secretly scheme to override the vote of the people.

It would be wrong to force Colorado voters to vote using a system that cannot be trusted because it cannot be verified.

Colorado legislators should reject any attempt to get them to join in this conspiracy to override the will of Colorado voters. They should use their position of trust to represent the people, not the bureaucracy.

We challenge the Secretary of State, the county clerks, and Colorado Legislators to an independently moderated public debate on whether mail ballot elections are secure, accurate, verifiable, anonymous, accessible, accountable, and transparent.

New voting system standards

From: stds-scc38@IEEE.ORG [mailto:stds-scc38@IEEE.ORG] On Behalf Of Al Kolwicz
Sent: Sunday, September 16, 2007 10:10 AM
To: g.robinson@computer.org
Cc: stds-scc38@IEEE.ORG; w.ash@IEEE.ORG
Subject: RE: SCC38 meeting announcement Oct 29 and 30

Mr. Robinson,

Two items that I would like to have included in the agenda are (1) scope of effort, and (2) governance. Neither of these items can be resolved at the meeting, but the committee can form a common understanding of what is meant by each, and can create subcommittees to address each.

Regarding "scope of effort", in my opinion this committee's prior efforts and the current EAC standards are both incomplete and misdirected. Incomplete, because the focus of the effort is on the EQUIPMENT and not the SYSTEM. Misdirected, because the work product is focused on mechanics rather than outcomes. A VOTING SYSTEM must meet certain functional requirements and do so within precisely measured performance specifications.

Voting System requirements deal with topics like districts/jurisdictions, eligibility (contests, contestants, and electors), anonymity, accuracy, verifiability, security, transparency, accountability, accessibility, poll watching, canvass boards, auditing, testing, etc. To date, the work of this committee has ignored most of the important functional elements of a voting system. If this committee does not choose to address these elements, then the committee should at a minimum declare in a set of "assumptions" that specific elements are to be addressed elsewhere. At a very minimum, we must have a voting systems diagram with each of the functional elements identified with standard nomenclature.

By focusing on minutiae, the volume of the standard is so large it becomes ineffective. No county clerk or judge in a court of law will ever read or understand the work. Re-focusing the effort will enable the standard to incorporate all of the functional elements, and do so in a manner that is durable over time and technology.

Regarding "governance", in my opinion this committee's work-in-progress should be available on the Internet - at no charge - including copies of drafts and committee correspondence. To my knowledge, there is no document of understanding detailing how this work will be used by government, and this needs to be negotiated and documented. Further, I cannot help but feel that the prior work product was misused by the prior leadership. Rules should be set to establish maximum transparency and to prevent misuse of the work.

Al


Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.AlKolwicz.net
www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com

Absolutely reckless election planned

Check out the article -- Voting Equipment Recert Delayed, Lawsuit Likely.

We support Paul Hultin’s position, as we have previously written to the Colorado Department of State.

CDOS is trying to fabricate distinctions where none exist when they attempt to justify their position that the Nov 2007 election is not subject to the recertification court order. No such distinction was mentioned (or even conceived of?) during the trial.

The people of Colorado rely on the State Certification process for their local decisions. That’s the way the law is designed. If county commissioners had been informed that the equipment was not certified, they would not have authorized its purchase, and public pressure would have “encouraged” commissioners to deny the purchase request.

We have provided specific evidence that the equipment is not trustworthy, and will likely produce an inaccurate and unverifiable election in November 2007. CDOS must immediately issue guidance to the County Clerks informing them of the facts.

At present the facts are being wrongfully withheld.

It would be absolutely reckless to use uncertified DRE and optical scan equipment that is known to suffer serious defects.

Any close contests will surely wind up in court.

Al Kolwicz

Verifying vote counts

Even with a great set of written vote interpretation procedures, votes counted on the current crop of optical scan equipment are not verifiable.

Three of the issues are:

1. The equipment does not produce a verifiable record of how it INTERPRETED each vote on each ballot. Instead, the equipment collects votes from many ballots and offers a “batch” total as proof of proper interpretation. We do not trust this method, and prefer the ability to perform vote by vote verification.

2. The equipment is controlled by software which is itself “controlled” by parameters and option switches that control the “rules” used to interpret votes. There is no way to verify which “rules” were used to interpret each specific vote. We do not trust this unverifiable method, and prefer that there be a way to know what rules were used to interpret each specific vote.

3. The equipment does not produce a file by batch that includes for each specific ballot page, the VOTES that were interpreted by the system. Without this computer file, there is o way to independently verify that the COUNTS have been calculated correctly. Obviously, we prefer that such a file be required.

We’d prefer optical scan equipment to (1) endorse each ballot page with a unique identifier at the time that the ballot page is first scanned, (2) create an exportable file of scanned ballot images as the ballots are scanned, (3) create an exportable file of the votes interpreted from each ballot page, and (4) create and exportable file of detailed vote count totals including over, under, and ambiguous votes.

In this way, the public can independently compare individual votes (from a particular scanned ballot image) against the interpreted votes (from the corresponding interpreted votes record). Also, the file of interpreted votes can be imported into a program, such as Microsoft Access. This way the results can be independently calculated and compared against the official results.

[What is meant by verifiable?]

Good question. Hope this is a useful answer.

1. To verify, one must have access to a specification of correct (expected) behaviour, transparent access to an indelible record of actual behaviour, and the ability to detect every difference between expected and actual. In voting we have several discrete steps: issue ballot, mark votes on ballot, interpret marks, and count votes.

2. In voting, only the voter can verify that votes are actually recorded as intended (expected), and this must be done before the ballot is cast. It must be physically impossible for any other person to make this determination. It must be physically impossible for the voter to make this determination after the ballot is cast.

3. Before voting, there must be a set of verifiable specifications that result in the particular ballot issued to a voter. These specifications must include the specification of districts, voter eligibility, and ballot style. If an ineligible person is permitted to vote, this must be detectable. If an eligible person is given the wrong ballot style, this must be detectable.

4. After the ballot is cast, each of the following discrete steps must be verifiable:

a. Batch control - it must be verifiable that all and only the ballots cast in a batch are counted. This is a verification of ballots, not of votes.

b. It must be verifiable that each individual vote is interpreted according to (vote interpretation) specifications. Because some votes can be recorded ambiguously, it must be verifiable that the interpretation of ambiguously recorded votes is consistent. In a hand counting situation, the ballots for each contest can (should) be sorted into stacks, one for each contestant, and one each for over, under, and ambiguous. In the case of optical scan count, each interpreted vote should produce a permanent record that includes the source of the vote, as well as the interpretation of the vote itself. This way, it is possible to statistically sample items, and go back to the original materials to compare the marks against the interpretation.If the scanned ballot images are recorded, then the file of scanned ballot images and the file of interpreted votes can be published on the Internet for independent verification.

c. It must be verifiable that the totals for each contest be correct, and distributed according to specification (eg. into precincts, absentee votes, districts, etc.) This cannot be done by statistical sampling. Count verification requires that all interpreted votes be independently tallied. [If original tallies are reported by batch, then individual batches can be verified, however, the process of selecting representative batches is very complex and may not result in sufficient confidence.In the case of hand counted paper ballots, the ballots in each stack can be independently counted by different teams and the results compared by an independent judge.In the case of optical scan counting, the data file containing the votes can be published on the Internet for the world to use for independent verification.

Not-so-secret ballots. It's worse than reported.

C/NET has published a Story: E-voting predicament: Not-so-secret ballots

The secret ballot issues raised by Moyer and Cropcho www.thepublicballot.org won't be solved until the toilet-paper roles used to sequentially record voter activity are eliminated.

As a Colorado poll watcher, I have the right to record the names of people who vote. By observing the sequence in which they use a specific DRE, I know the sequence of their (supposed) votes recorded on the VVPAT. Access to the roll means access to their "ballot". The canvass board and election officials have legal access to the roll.

NO!, I do not trust the officials. Not because they are evil, but because the protection of a secret ballot is sacrosanct. If any pathway to retrieving a specific voters ballot exists, it might be used: (1) by the court, or (2) for political purposes by a partisan official, or (3) to create a "threat of disclosure" needed by vote-buyers and voter-intimidators to suggest that they can know a voter's selections.

Furthermore, HART Intercivic suffers not only the problem described above, but also uniquely identifies every PAPER and VVPAT ballot with a unique, NON-REMOVABLE, serial number and barcode. Voters can make a record of this serial number on their ballot and use it to later identify their specific ballot. Consequently, the market for vote-selling is facilitated and the opportunity for voter intimidation is supported.

The arrogance of vendors who trample on our right to use a secret ballot must be punished by immediately forcing them to meet our requirements for "privately voted anonymous ballots".

Al

Harmonizing expectations!

It is no secret that election officials and voting system public advocates are not working together. It is vital that growing hostility and distrust be redirected into positive collaboration. The alternative is not pretty.

Key to finding a solution is an understanding of the root cause of the problem. We believe the following to be the root cause.

Problem: Conflicting expectations

On almost every election system topic there is a difference in expectations between election officials and voting system public advocates.

The problem has existed for at least eight years (perhaps forever). It is present before, during and after elections. It exists at the federal, state, county and municipal levels. It is actively interfering with today’s achievement of objectives for high quality and trustworthy elections.

Think about it. When public advocates have a conflict with election officials, it invariably results from a fundamental disagreement over expectations. Public advocates think that officials are supposed to be doing “X” while officials think that they are supposed to be doing “Y”.

Take Colorado’s voting system certification test underway as an illustration. Public advocates’ expectation for what it takes to certify a voting system is not the same as that of officials. Public advocates criticize officials for not doing what advocates believe to be vital requirements of election code and rules. Driven by a different set of priorities, officials treat these criticisms and complaints as irrelevant.

From the perspective of the public advocate, the issues never get resolved. Worse, there is no mutually acceptable process for resolving these differences in expectations. Currently: (a) officials unilaterally dictate unacceptable decisions, or (b) officials simply ignore public advocates.

There is a way to solve the “conflicting expectations” problem. We call it “harmonizing expectations”.

Solution: Harmonizing expectations!

1. Domains of mutually accepted expectations must be identified including:

• Relationships between players. Who are the actors, what is their role, who decides? Who are the customers and who are the suppliers?
  
• Transparency and participation. What is open and what is closed? How to achieve access in a timely manner – without disruption, and before irreversible commitment? How to achieve a dialog between public advocates and officials?
  
• Accountability. How to achieve independent oversight? How to achieve independent judgment? Who is responsible for what?
  
• Performance priorities. Prioritized list of election system performance expectations, precise definitions, how measured, and acceptable performance range? Consequences?

2. A process for harmonizing expectations must be created and formalized.

• It must be mutually acceptable to public advocates and officials.
• It must be subject to independent oversight.
• It must produce measurable expectations.
• It must be instituted immediately.

Secretaries of State are required to act within the boundaries of the law. Officials believe that legal restrictions may limit their ability to collaborate. In Colorado, we believe that ways can be found to get the right things done.

• Step one is for the Secretary of State to acknowledge the problem and the immediate need to harmonize expectations. OpEd?
  
• Step two is for the Secretary of State and the Colorado Voter Group to recruit a mutually acceptable volunteer independent moderator(s) who will ensure a fair debate and who will serve as editor of the work products.
  
• Step three is for the moderator to oversee negotiation of a process to harmonize expectations.
  
• Step four is for the moderator to oversee the development of harmonized expectation agreements.
  
• Step five is for the Secretary of State to implement the expectation agreements.

Implementation of these steps will produce a durable improvement in the way that voting system public advocates and election officials work together. It will also provide the basis for increased voter confidence.

CDOS transparency and accountability

From: Al Kolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Sunday, June 17, 2007 5:07 PM
To: SOS Mike Coffman (Secretary@sos.state.co.us)
Cc: Jonathan Tee (Jonathan.Tee@SOS.State.CO.US); Paul Hultin; Colorado Voter Group (ColoradoVoter@googlegroups.com); 'peter.groff.senate@state.co.us'; 'reppaul@aol.com'; 'Harvie Branscomb'
Subject: CDOS transparency and accountability
Attachments: CDOS transparency and accountability
Compressed file of documents

Dear Mr. Coffman:

Attached is a letter that we hope will gain your attention. It addresses our concerns about CDOS transparency and accountability, and it recommends that certification be denied to the vendor products currently under re-certification orders.

Also attached is a compressed file containing copies of the documents referred to in the letter.

Mr. Branscomb and I are meeting with Mr. Tee on Wednesday morning. We hope to include this letter in the topics discussed at this meeting.



Al Kolwicz

Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com/

The Colorado Voter Group is a private sector entity that is working to improve the Colorado election system.

Certification questions and concerns

Colorado Voter Group

May 25, 2007

RE: Voting System Public Demonstration

Dear Mr. Tee:

We just completed another unsatisfactory Voting System Public Demonstration - the fifth day of pointless demonstrations.

We suspect that the Colorado Department of State intends to claim that the public was involved in the certification process. First, the demonstrations are so superficial that they cannot be considered a substantive part of any legitimate certification process. Second, the time that we have invested has been made superficial and inconsequential by this unprofessional process.

The demonstrations were superficial and addressed almost no real election system issues. So what is the point? Even the temporary workers who are watching the demonstrations and occupying valuable seats will not be sufficiently informed by the demo to be ready to operate the equipment.

Questions asked by the public might have inspired the test board to include tests for real election problems. But we have been told that the questions posed by the public will not result in any change of the planned functional testing. Why allow staff to deceive management into believing that they are actually doing something of value?

1. We were aghast when the ES&S representative announced the six (6) Mesa County and Jefferson County employees as being present “to support the vendors”. Who paid for these people? Why were they representing the interests of the vendors instead of the public? More than once, the vendor asked these county employees to participate in the demo. It was clear that they were not under the same restrictions as the rest of the public attendees.

2. Unchanged from Kolwicz’s May 3 note to Secretary Coffman, the public was still unable to clearly see or hear the May 25th demonstration. Thankfully, the Legislative Liaison for the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, Sheila Hicks, attended the ES&S session and successfully got the meeting stopped and the seating rearranged. We would like to understand why Ms. Hicks received an immediate response, and our report was ignored. Is it because she was in a wheelchair?.

3. We overheard at the ES&S demo that Mr. Gardner controlled the seating arrangements and purposefully assigned the "best" seats to insiders and squished the public into a noisy back corner of the room. We would like to know if this is true. We definitely observed that the table containing the “test board” has served as a barrier between the vendor and the public in every test.

4. At the ES&S demo, there was a new person sitting at the "Test Board Table". When Mr. Branscomb asked Mr. Gardner, informally during a break, if there were now five members of the Test Board, Gardner stated that the meeting was on break and questions could only be asked at the end of the demo. When Mr. Branscomb repeated the question during the public question period Gardner refused to respond on the basis that the question was not one for the vendor pertaining to the demo. (At the May 2nd demo Gardner announced that questions could be posed to the vendor or to the SOS staff.) After the demonstration was over Branscomb approached Gardner one more time, at which time Gardner said: “You are just pushing too much” and he told Branscomb that he had “filed too many open records requests” and should “go downstairs for an answer”. In fact, Mr. Branscomb has not filed an open records request at all. However, Mr. Kolwicz has and may have to do so again to obtain even simple answers to simple questions. This is only an example of how badly the public is being treated.We hope that an adult and civil response to Branscomb’s question is immediately forthcoming from CDOS.

5. We have heard that there will be another demonstration focused on disabled voter capabilities. If this is true, when and where will this demonstration be conducted, who has been invited to attend, and may we attend?

6. In our March 28 letter to Secretary Coffman, our April 26 email to you, and our May 3 conversation with and email to Dan Kopelman, we discussed the lack of transparency of the entire certification process, including functional testing. How can we observe the functional testing process? How will the critical decision for approval/rejection of equipment be made and who will make this decision? How will the public participate in this decision?

7. In the ES&S demonstration, as in the past, the public did not have enough time to ask all of their questions, and was prohibited by Mr. Gardner from even asking relevant questions. As well, Mr. Gardner chose the order of questioners according to his own preference and apparently arbitrarily decided the ending time, forcing (as had been done previously) the public to cease asking questions at the time he decided (in spite of the maximum 3 day plan for this demonstration set in the rules). Does Secretary Coffman approve of this heavy-handed, unfair treatment of the public? Does he support these methods which obviously censor the public’s speech? If not, what will Mr. Coffman do about it? If so, how may we appeal this policy?

8. What is the procedure for gaining access to the un-redacted video tapes of the demonstrations?

To reiterate what we said in our May 3 note to Secretary Coffman, the demonstrations continue to be unsatisfactory.

Based on what we saw and what we know from the public record, two things are clear enough to make recommendations.

· We recommend that the following DRE voting equipment not be advanced to functional testing: (a) Hart Intercivic eSlate, (b) Diebold AccuVote TSX, (c) Sequoia AVC Edge, and (d) ES&S iVotronic. All of these products fail to meet Colorado requirements. All bring unnecessary risk and uncertainty to Colorado’s election process. All would subvert Secretary Coffman's plan to restore public trust in elections.

· We recommend that the AutoMark be advanced to functional testing. This product uses simple and straightforward full-ballot-text paper ballots. These ballots are verifiable, they simplify election processes, and they avoid the security issues of electronic ballots. The AutoMark permits blind and physically restricted voters, and in fact almost all voters (more of the voters than with any of the DREs), to independently and privately select and verify their votes. As an extra practical advantage, this vote is recorded on a reliable and easily verifiable and re-countable full size paper ballot. Without sacrificing voter privacy, AutoMark provides a way for any voter, with or without disability, to make use of an assistant if needed. It clearly satisfies the HAVA requirements in a manner which is compatible with the interests of the voting public at large.

We hope that you will be able to quickly get answers to our questions and concerns. We are available to meet with you or talk by phone to discuss these points.

We thank you very much for facilitating and expediting this communication and for anything that you do to improve the transparency and credibility of this re-certification process.



Al Kolwicz

Harvie Branscomb

Colorado suppresses criticism

May 5, 2007

Mr. Hobbs
Colorado Deputy Secrecary of State

RE: Ruling to prohibit testimony

At the May 1st rules hearing, you ruled to limit my oral testimony to the text that was proposed for modification. I infer that staff will so limit their reading of my written testimony.

I was not permitted to address the entirety of each rule that was proposed for change. I disagreed with your ruling because: (a) it defies common sense, (b) it censors the public, and (c) it is not authorized by statute or rule.

Myopic. Colorado’s election rules are not crafted in a way that the content of each subsection is a stand alone rule. A change to any part of a rule can ripple over the entire rule. When a rule is opened for change, the collective experience gained using the pre-amended rule is available for improving the quality of the rule.

Not transparent. The draft of the proposed rule change is created by a process that prevents public influence on the proposed change. The drafting process is not transparent, and there is no accountability for the completeness and quality of the draft. Lacking a fair forum for debate on the content of the proposed rule change, the only opportunity for the public to improve a rule is at the rules hearing.

Unauthorized ruling. We have scanned the online documents and cannot find any place that supports your ruling to limit discussion of each rule to the text proposed for modification.

While searching the state’s online documents, we did not find a “Rules Drafting Manual” corresponding to the “Legislative Drafting Manual”. Is there such a document?

When you consider your response to this letter, I hope that you will also review my testimony regarding transparency. Staff has consistently refused to discuss election rules with the public; yet staff regularly discusses proposed rules with county clerks and secret committees. Is it official policy that the public be prohibited from participating in the drafting process?

I hope that you will reconsider your ruling to restrict comment during a rulemaking hearing to the text of the proposed changes. If there are writings that support your ruling I would like to learn of them so that we can work on getting them changed.

As we tried to communicate in our written submission, the proposed rules are deficient and must be repaired in order to protect the purity of elections.

Al Kolwicz

REF: http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/LDM/03.0_Amendments_to_Bills.pdf


Al Kolwicz
CAMBER – Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results

Colorado Department of State --- secretive, arbitrary and anti-scientific.

Colorado Department of State is secretive, arbitrary and anti-scientific.

The Colorado Department of State has chosen to operate in a secretive, arbitrary and anti-scientific manner. This has cost the department highly valuable voluntary contributions of many experts who have shown their interest in election quality. It has cost the voters of Colorado a trustworthy election system. Examples of this assertion include:

• Many problem and suggestion documents have been submitted to the Department of State and have gone unanswered. (Some of these documents have received non-responsive responses.)

• The Department of State consistently refuses to engage in open conversation and debate regarding election system issues. (This refusal is one-sided and unfair. It is used to exclude voting system quality advocates, but does not exclude County Clerks, election officials, and hand picked people.)

It is hoped that the Department of State will discontinue its practice of exclusion, and replace it with a policy that will lead to trustworthy elections. This requires that election processes be held to uniform standards and metrics, and that every element of the election system be secure, accurate, verifiable, anonymous, accessible, transparent, and accountable.

To listen to the hearing where this assertion was presented, go so Department of State Audio and listen to the May 1st hearing.

Click to read specific critiques of the Proposed Rules and Regulatory Analysis.

Disallow HART Certification

Mike Coffman By FAX: 303 869 4860
Colorado Secretary of State
1700 Broadway, Suite 270
Denver, CO 80290

May 3, 2007

RE: Voting System Demonstration – May 2, 2007

Dear Mr. Coffman:

You have a problem in your elections office that requires your immediate attention. Yesterday’s voting system demonstration was mind-numbing, irrelevant, and unbelievably poorly organized.

• The presentation did not address the topics required by election rule 45.
  
• The vendor and the elections division staff representatives were unable or unwilling to answer questions. I was essentially disallowed from even asking relevant questions.
  
• The public was rudely treated. They could not see, could not hear, and could not speak – even to ask for inaudible utterances to be repeated – and was forced to endure six hours of inaudible presentation in order to ask questions that were not answered.

You have stated that transparency is one of your key goals. I want you to know, in no uncertain terms; yesterday’s demonstration was a total failure in this regard.

I for one am highly offended by what happened yesterday. There were four video cameras running during the demonstration. The public was seated well behind the cameras. You might wish to review the tapes so you can make your own assessment.

There are at least two more demonstrations scheduled. I hope that you will take immediate action to (a) disallow the HART application from proceeding to functional testing, and (b) ensure that the remaining demonstrations comply with the rule, are transparent, and are friendlier to the public.

In addition, we were aghast to learn that ITA testing will not be conducted for this certification.

Al Kolwicz
CAMBER – Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
www.coloradovoter.blogspot.com

NO on SB 234 -- Junk mail ballots

Colorado Legislators: Please Vote NO on SB 234.

This bill would compromise our entire election system and must be defeated.

As you may recall, in 2002, the people spent an entire year working to defeat Amendment 28, the Mandatory Mail Ballot Election amendment. The amendment was resoundingly defeated by 63 of 64 Colorado counties – 60 percent of the votes cast said “NO”. Every Colorado County voted "no", with the single exception of La Plata County.

The Rocky Mountain News as well as many other papers opposed the amendment then, and just a few days ago, on April 24, Vince Carroll of the Rocky Mountain News wrote:

“Ballot ballet
Once again I’ve cast more than a single ballot in a local election. And once again it’s given me an uneasy feeling about the integrity of mail elections.

On Monday I dropped off three ballots at the Wellington Webb building in downtown Denver. It’s legal to mail or deliver a ballot that isn’t yours, of course, although you have to sign in and record the number you produce in person.

But how would they know how many ballots I’d dumped in a trash bin out back?

What if I’d promised to deliver a dozen ballots from a nursing home where a relative of mine resided — saving each voter the escalating postage — and then quietly discarded those I suspected disagreed with my own electoral choices?

There are simply too many points at which a mail ballot may be in the control of someone other than the voter or the office tabulating the results. And one of these days we’ll discover that it matters.

Vincent Carroll is editor of the editorial pages. Reach him at carrollv@RockyMountainNews.com .”

Our welcome screen highlights some of the problems – see www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz/welcome.htm

Supporters of junk mail ballots hope to exploit the opportunity created when thousands of ballots are retrieved by unknown recipients. They’ll argue that the voter asked for the ballot. But we all know that voter registration data is never current, and that we live in a mobile society.

SB 234 is attempting to resurrect this bad idea using a device called the “permanent absentee ballot”. WE can prove that the approach is not secure, does not yield accurate results, and disenfranchises voters. This bill will re-open the opportunity for massive error and vote fraud that we fought so hard to successfully defeat.

Please do everything you can to stop this affront against the people of Colorado.

Please Vote NO on SB 234. And please help us to reach other Representatives and convince them that SB 234 is a terrible idea that has already been rejected by the voters.