Board says, "do not certify any of the voting equipment".

The voting system certification board report says none of the voting equipment passed the tests. The reports for each vendor can be found at:

Certification Overview - Premier
Certification Overview - ES&S
Certification Overview - HART
Certification Overview - Sequoia

A court ordered re-certification of voting equipment in Colorado has concluded that none of the voting equipment supplied by Premier, Hart, ES&S, and Sequoia should be certified for use in elections.

The reasons for decertification vary, they focus on security and accuracy, and they include some of the problems identified by Ohio and California.

Despite Secretary of State Mike Coffman’s hand-picked certification board’s conclusions and recommendations, Mr. Coffman granted conditional certification to Premier’s voting and counting equipment. He also granted conditional certification to HART DREs and Sequoia optical scanners. His override of the board’s determination is an illustration that the process is not independent. Until the certification process is independent, it should not be trusted.

Colorado voting integrity advocates are very displeased with Mr. Coffman’s decisions, although they are relieved to be proven correct in their years long efforts to discredit the equipment. According to them, the certification process itself is fatally flawed. It is not independent, it is not comprehensive, and its factual determinations can be overridden by political expediency. And there is no test to verify that voting equipment components work when they are combined into a system.

There is a massive flurry of activity in Colorado as county clerks and vendors try to come up with a plan to get around the certification decisions. Mr. Coffman has announced his intent to request legislative changes that would enable him to get around the laws designed to protect the election system. He wants to shop around for a state that has certified this equipment, and use their positive certification results instead of Colorado’s negative results. He also wants legislative permission to bypass required testing of changes to the equipment and software.

Voter integrity groups and local systems experts who advocate for verifiable and transparent elections are fighting to break thru the wall of secrecy thrown up by officials. The public is being excluded from even observing meetings of election officials. This raises the question, are officials overtly violating Colorado’s open government laws?

This is a story that needs to be told. Colorado press on Monday and Tuesday was filled with the story.

Key points are:

• What are the implications for other states that are using this equipment?
• What does this decertification mean for the results of past elections that used this unreliable and insecure equipment?
• Is Colorado violating open government laws?
• What will Colorado do for 2008?

For more information see:

Colorado Voter Group

CAMBER

Request to be heard by the JBC during Department of State Hearing

December 7, 2007

Colorado Joint Budget Committee
200 E. Colfax
Denver, CO 80203

RE: Request to be heard by the JBC during Department of State Hearing
Dear JBC Chairman and Members:

It is our understanding that your committee has invited some county clerks to be present at the planned December 20th continuation of your Nov 15th JBC meeting.

As you know, the county clerks, the Secretary of State, and their staffs constitute one of the interests in election matters – the election officials.

A second interest is represented by their legislative representatives – the electors.

A third interest includes the producers of election related goods and services – the suppliers.

A fourth interest, with valuable election expertise, often forgotten and generally un-represented, includes the canvass boards, election judges, poll watchers, candidates, campaign managers and campaigns, petitioners, expert witnesses, technology experts, and election system advocates – the independent overseers.

The Colorado Voter Group has dedicated many person-years to the improvement of Colorado’s election system. Members of the Board of Trustees have been or currently are: canvass board members, election judges, poll watchers, political party county chairmen, candidates, petitioners, campaign managers, expert witnesses, technology experts, voting system standards developers, and leaders of statewide and national election system advocacy groups.

The perspective of the independent overseer is unique and valuable, yet is generally denied a place at the table during election system discussions between election officials and the electorate’s representatives.

1. Election officials, being burdened by cost and efficiency responsibilities, are motivated to create the impression that each election is secure, accurate, fraud-free, and error-free. They manufacture voter confidence and polish their own public image by controlling the facts.

To maintain control, election officials resist independent oversight. What they cannot prevent outright, they thwart by preventing access to the facts. By positioning themselves so they are not accountable, election officials can make unsubstantiated claims that effectively cannot be challenged. The Attorney General represents the Secretary of State, not the electors. Courts accept the tiniest hint of compliance as “substantial” and resist interfering with elected officials.

Election officials, because of their unhealthy dependence on them, protect their suppliers at the expense of the people. Further, most election officials lack the technical training to oversee their suppliers or their complicated and secretive voting and vote counting equipment. They are easily overwhelmed by election complexity, and this increases their substantial reliance on assistance from the manufacturers.

2. Electors rely on the purity of the election system including the laws established by the legislators, election officials and rules, and independent overseers to guarantee a fair and accurate election. Aside from the valuable acts of voter registration and voting, most electors do not directly engage in the planning, conduct or verification of an election. They trust, but do not verify.

3. Suppliers work to make profits by convincing election officials that their products and services are superior. They establish a dependency relationship with officials using proprietary technology, secrecy, and overly complex products. They resist oversight and public disclosure.

4. Independent overseers are absent from the discussion. We propose to represent the interests of the various constituents that we have identified as the independent overseers. We believe that our information will help you complete your understanding of (1) the state of our election system, and (2) the best alternative for conducting the 2008 elections.

Attached is a Framework for Colorado’s 2008 Election. It contradicts the positions expressed by many election officials, and it is a cost-effective and verifiably trustworthy way to conduct our elections – all things being considered.

For many years, we have documented concerns regarding election system certification and SCORE II. These concerns have not been addressed.

Specific details aside, it is most troubling that election officials have been unwilling to engage in a two-way public discussion of the issues we have raised. If election officials are permitted to continue to operate in this protective self-defined vacuum, without benefit of oversight, transparency and accountability, public distrust of the election system will reach a level that will likely prompt backlash.

We ask you to invite us to actively participate in your December 20th meeting. We believe that our unique perspective and knowledge are valuable assets. It is vital that the needs of election overseers be represented in the discussion.

Assuming that you will permit us to participate, we are happy to work with you or your representatives to properly prepare for your hearing.

We thank you for your consideration of this request.

Al Kolwicz
For the Board of Trustees, Colorado Voter Group

Attachments:
Colorado Elections 2008 - Framework for Primary and General Elections – 11/19/2007
Colorado Voter Group wants polling place elections with a few adjustments. – 11/19/2007
Open letter to Colorado Clerk - Colorado Elections 2008 - Framework for Elections – 11/20/2007


Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.AlKolwicz.net

Colorado Voter Group wants polling place elections with a few adjustments.

Group concerned that back room deals will trade accuracy for convenience. November 19, 2007

County clerks have been pushing Colorado legislators to adopt all-mail elections for the 2008 elections. Colorado Voter Group has published a superior alternative.

The framework shows how to significantly reduce election risk and uncertainty by limiting the use of questionable equipment, and rigorously auditing the equipment that does get used.

The framework says "no" to all-mail elections and "no" to invisible electronic ballots.

Click to read the press release.

Click to read Colorado Elections 2008 - Framework for Primary and General Elections

Secret scheme to overturn 2002 vote against mail ballot elections

The Colorado Secretary of State and several county clerks are scheming to overturn the 2002 vote which rejected the use of mail ballot elections for major elections. Rumors persist that certain state legislators are involved in the plot.

Colorado Voter Group hopes to inform readers of the background and facts regarding Colorado's current voting system mess.

1. In November 2002, Colorado voters rejected Amendment 28, which would have deprived voters of the right to vote in precincts by anonymous ballot.

63 of 64 Colorado counties voted this amendment down. 757,299 voters, nearly 60 percent of the votes, voted “no”. See election results on pages 145 and 159 of the November 2002 Abstract of Votes.

2. It appears from a Rocky Mountain News article, County clerks urge all-mail vote in '08, that county clerks are meeting in secret with the Secretary of State to overturn the vote of the people.

Further, it appears that clerks were not informed that the Colorado Voter Group has already submitted to the Secretary of State a workable voting alternative in the event that voting equipment is decertified. This alternative fulfills both the law and the wishes of the people of Colorado, and is a superior alternative to mail ballot elections.

3. Mail ballot elections have been proven to be undesirable. They are not secure, not accurate, not verifiable, not accessible, not anonymous, not transparent, and not accountable. Those who claim otherwise are either not informed or don’t care.

None of the problems brought out during the debate on Amendment 28 have been fixed.

The Rocky Mountain News published an Editorial, Don't take chance on mail ballots.

The Denver Post published PRO-CON opinions of Rutt Bridges (Bighorn Center) and Al Kolwicz (CAMBER) that addressed many of the issues.

CBS investigative reporter Rick Salinger, in an October 31, 2002 televised report, disproved the accuracy and security claims of election officials.

It is wrong for Colorado officials to secretly scheme to override the vote of the people.

It would be wrong to force Colorado voters to vote using a system that cannot be trusted because it cannot be verified.

Colorado legislators should reject any attempt to get them to join in this conspiracy to override the will of Colorado voters. They should use their position of trust to represent the people, not the bureaucracy.

We challenge the Secretary of State, the county clerks, and Colorado Legislators to an independently moderated public debate on whether mail ballot elections are secure, accurate, verifiable, anonymous, accessible, accountable, and transparent.

New voting system standards

From: stds-scc38@IEEE.ORG [mailto:stds-scc38@IEEE.ORG] On Behalf Of Al Kolwicz
Sent: Sunday, September 16, 2007 10:10 AM
To: g.robinson@computer.org
Cc: stds-scc38@IEEE.ORG; w.ash@IEEE.ORG
Subject: RE: SCC38 meeting announcement Oct 29 and 30

Mr. Robinson,

Two items that I would like to have included in the agenda are (1) scope of effort, and (2) governance. Neither of these items can be resolved at the meeting, but the committee can form a common understanding of what is meant by each, and can create subcommittees to address each.

Regarding "scope of effort", in my opinion this committee's prior efforts and the current EAC standards are both incomplete and misdirected. Incomplete, because the focus of the effort is on the EQUIPMENT and not the SYSTEM. Misdirected, because the work product is focused on mechanics rather than outcomes. A VOTING SYSTEM must meet certain functional requirements and do so within precisely measured performance specifications.

Voting System requirements deal with topics like districts/jurisdictions, eligibility (contests, contestants, and electors), anonymity, accuracy, verifiability, security, transparency, accountability, accessibility, poll watching, canvass boards, auditing, testing, etc. To date, the work of this committee has ignored most of the important functional elements of a voting system. If this committee does not choose to address these elements, then the committee should at a minimum declare in a set of "assumptions" that specific elements are to be addressed elsewhere. At a very minimum, we must have a voting systems diagram with each of the functional elements identified with standard nomenclature.

By focusing on minutiae, the volume of the standard is so large it becomes ineffective. No county clerk or judge in a court of law will ever read or understand the work. Re-focusing the effort will enable the standard to incorporate all of the functional elements, and do so in a manner that is durable over time and technology.

Regarding "governance", in my opinion this committee's work-in-progress should be available on the Internet - at no charge - including copies of drafts and committee correspondence. To my knowledge, there is no document of understanding detailing how this work will be used by government, and this needs to be negotiated and documented. Further, I cannot help but feel that the prior work product was misused by the prior leadership. Rules should be set to establish maximum transparency and to prevent misuse of the work.

Al


Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.AlKolwicz.net
www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com

Absolutely reckless election planned

Check out the article -- Voting Equipment Recert Delayed, Lawsuit Likely.

We support Paul Hultin’s position, as we have previously written to the Colorado Department of State.

CDOS is trying to fabricate distinctions where none exist when they attempt to justify their position that the Nov 2007 election is not subject to the recertification court order. No such distinction was mentioned (or even conceived of?) during the trial.

The people of Colorado rely on the State Certification process for their local decisions. That’s the way the law is designed. If county commissioners had been informed that the equipment was not certified, they would not have authorized its purchase, and public pressure would have “encouraged” commissioners to deny the purchase request.

We have provided specific evidence that the equipment is not trustworthy, and will likely produce an inaccurate and unverifiable election in November 2007. CDOS must immediately issue guidance to the County Clerks informing them of the facts.

At present the facts are being wrongfully withheld.

It would be absolutely reckless to use uncertified DRE and optical scan equipment that is known to suffer serious defects.

Any close contests will surely wind up in court.

Al Kolwicz

Verifying vote counts

Even with a great set of written vote interpretation procedures, votes counted on the current crop of optical scan equipment are not verifiable.

Three of the issues are:

1. The equipment does not produce a verifiable record of how it INTERPRETED each vote on each ballot. Instead, the equipment collects votes from many ballots and offers a “batch” total as proof of proper interpretation. We do not trust this method, and prefer the ability to perform vote by vote verification.

2. The equipment is controlled by software which is itself “controlled” by parameters and option switches that control the “rules” used to interpret votes. There is no way to verify which “rules” were used to interpret each specific vote. We do not trust this unverifiable method, and prefer that there be a way to know what rules were used to interpret each specific vote.

3. The equipment does not produce a file by batch that includes for each specific ballot page, the VOTES that were interpreted by the system. Without this computer file, there is o way to independently verify that the COUNTS have been calculated correctly. Obviously, we prefer that such a file be required.

We’d prefer optical scan equipment to (1) endorse each ballot page with a unique identifier at the time that the ballot page is first scanned, (2) create an exportable file of scanned ballot images as the ballots are scanned, (3) create an exportable file of the votes interpreted from each ballot page, and (4) create and exportable file of detailed vote count totals including over, under, and ambiguous votes.

In this way, the public can independently compare individual votes (from a particular scanned ballot image) against the interpreted votes (from the corresponding interpreted votes record). Also, the file of interpreted votes can be imported into a program, such as Microsoft Access. This way the results can be independently calculated and compared against the official results.

[What is meant by verifiable?]

Good question. Hope this is a useful answer.

1. To verify, one must have access to a specification of correct (expected) behaviour, transparent access to an indelible record of actual behaviour, and the ability to detect every difference between expected and actual. In voting we have several discrete steps: issue ballot, mark votes on ballot, interpret marks, and count votes.

2. In voting, only the voter can verify that votes are actually recorded as intended (expected), and this must be done before the ballot is cast. It must be physically impossible for any other person to make this determination. It must be physically impossible for the voter to make this determination after the ballot is cast.

3. Before voting, there must be a set of verifiable specifications that result in the particular ballot issued to a voter. These specifications must include the specification of districts, voter eligibility, and ballot style. If an ineligible person is permitted to vote, this must be detectable. If an eligible person is given the wrong ballot style, this must be detectable.

4. After the ballot is cast, each of the following discrete steps must be verifiable:

a. Batch control - it must be verifiable that all and only the ballots cast in a batch are counted. This is a verification of ballots, not of votes.

b. It must be verifiable that each individual vote is interpreted according to (vote interpretation) specifications. Because some votes can be recorded ambiguously, it must be verifiable that the interpretation of ambiguously recorded votes is consistent. In a hand counting situation, the ballots for each contest can (should) be sorted into stacks, one for each contestant, and one each for over, under, and ambiguous. In the case of optical scan count, each interpreted vote should produce a permanent record that includes the source of the vote, as well as the interpretation of the vote itself. This way, it is possible to statistically sample items, and go back to the original materials to compare the marks against the interpretation.If the scanned ballot images are recorded, then the file of scanned ballot images and the file of interpreted votes can be published on the Internet for independent verification.

c. It must be verifiable that the totals for each contest be correct, and distributed according to specification (eg. into precincts, absentee votes, districts, etc.) This cannot be done by statistical sampling. Count verification requires that all interpreted votes be independently tallied. [If original tallies are reported by batch, then individual batches can be verified, however, the process of selecting representative batches is very complex and may not result in sufficient confidence.In the case of hand counted paper ballots, the ballots in each stack can be independently counted by different teams and the results compared by an independent judge.In the case of optical scan counting, the data file containing the votes can be published on the Internet for the world to use for independent verification.

Not-so-secret ballots. It's worse than reported.

C/NET has published a Story: E-voting predicament: Not-so-secret ballots

The secret ballot issues raised by Moyer and Cropcho www.thepublicballot.org won't be solved until the toilet-paper roles used to sequentially record voter activity are eliminated.

As a Colorado poll watcher, I have the right to record the names of people who vote. By observing the sequence in which they use a specific DRE, I know the sequence of their (supposed) votes recorded on the VVPAT. Access to the roll means access to their "ballot". The canvass board and election officials have legal access to the roll.

NO!, I do not trust the officials. Not because they are evil, but because the protection of a secret ballot is sacrosanct. If any pathway to retrieving a specific voters ballot exists, it might be used: (1) by the court, or (2) for political purposes by a partisan official, or (3) to create a "threat of disclosure" needed by vote-buyers and voter-intimidators to suggest that they can know a voter's selections.

Furthermore, HART Intercivic suffers not only the problem described above, but also uniquely identifies every PAPER and VVPAT ballot with a unique, NON-REMOVABLE, serial number and barcode. Voters can make a record of this serial number on their ballot and use it to later identify their specific ballot. Consequently, the market for vote-selling is facilitated and the opportunity for voter intimidation is supported.

The arrogance of vendors who trample on our right to use a secret ballot must be punished by immediately forcing them to meet our requirements for "privately voted anonymous ballots".

Al

Harmonizing expectations!

It is no secret that election officials and voting system public advocates are not working together. It is vital that growing hostility and distrust be redirected into positive collaboration. The alternative is not pretty.

Key to finding a solution is an understanding of the root cause of the problem. We believe the following to be the root cause.

Problem: Conflicting expectations

On almost every election system topic there is a difference in expectations between election officials and voting system public advocates.

The problem has existed for at least eight years (perhaps forever). It is present before, during and after elections. It exists at the federal, state, county and municipal levels. It is actively interfering with today’s achievement of objectives for high quality and trustworthy elections.

Think about it. When public advocates have a conflict with election officials, it invariably results from a fundamental disagreement over expectations. Public advocates think that officials are supposed to be doing “X” while officials think that they are supposed to be doing “Y”.

Take Colorado’s voting system certification test underway as an illustration. Public advocates’ expectation for what it takes to certify a voting system is not the same as that of officials. Public advocates criticize officials for not doing what advocates believe to be vital requirements of election code and rules. Driven by a different set of priorities, officials treat these criticisms and complaints as irrelevant.

From the perspective of the public advocate, the issues never get resolved. Worse, there is no mutually acceptable process for resolving these differences in expectations. Currently: (a) officials unilaterally dictate unacceptable decisions, or (b) officials simply ignore public advocates.

There is a way to solve the “conflicting expectations” problem. We call it “harmonizing expectations”.

Solution: Harmonizing expectations!

1. Domains of mutually accepted expectations must be identified including:

• Relationships between players. Who are the actors, what is their role, who decides? Who are the customers and who are the suppliers?
  
• Transparency and participation. What is open and what is closed? How to achieve access in a timely manner – without disruption, and before irreversible commitment? How to achieve a dialog between public advocates and officials?
  
• Accountability. How to achieve independent oversight? How to achieve independent judgment? Who is responsible for what?
  
• Performance priorities. Prioritized list of election system performance expectations, precise definitions, how measured, and acceptable performance range? Consequences?

2. A process for harmonizing expectations must be created and formalized.

• It must be mutually acceptable to public advocates and officials.
• It must be subject to independent oversight.
• It must produce measurable expectations.
• It must be instituted immediately.

Secretaries of State are required to act within the boundaries of the law. Officials believe that legal restrictions may limit their ability to collaborate. In Colorado, we believe that ways can be found to get the right things done.

• Step one is for the Secretary of State to acknowledge the problem and the immediate need to harmonize expectations. OpEd?
  
• Step two is for the Secretary of State and the Colorado Voter Group to recruit a mutually acceptable volunteer independent moderator(s) who will ensure a fair debate and who will serve as editor of the work products.
  
• Step three is for the moderator to oversee negotiation of a process to harmonize expectations.
  
• Step four is for the moderator to oversee the development of harmonized expectation agreements.
  
• Step five is for the Secretary of State to implement the expectation agreements.

Implementation of these steps will produce a durable improvement in the way that voting system public advocates and election officials work together. It will also provide the basis for increased voter confidence.

CDOS transparency and accountability

From: Al Kolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Sunday, June 17, 2007 5:07 PM
To: SOS Mike Coffman (Secretary@sos.state.co.us)
Cc: Jonathan Tee (Jonathan.Tee@SOS.State.CO.US); Paul Hultin; Colorado Voter Group (ColoradoVoter@googlegroups.com); 'peter.groff.senate@state.co.us'; 'reppaul@aol.com'; 'Harvie Branscomb'
Subject: CDOS transparency and accountability
Attachments: CDOS transparency and accountability
Compressed file of documents

Dear Mr. Coffman:

Attached is a letter that we hope will gain your attention. It addresses our concerns about CDOS transparency and accountability, and it recommends that certification be denied to the vendor products currently under re-certification orders.

Also attached is a compressed file containing copies of the documents referred to in the letter.

Mr. Branscomb and I are meeting with Mr. Tee on Wednesday morning. We hope to include this letter in the topics discussed at this meeting.



Al Kolwicz

Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
http://www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com/

The Colorado Voter Group is a private sector entity that is working to improve the Colorado election system.

Certification questions and concerns

Colorado Voter Group

May 25, 2007

RE: Voting System Public Demonstration

Dear Mr. Tee:

We just completed another unsatisfactory Voting System Public Demonstration - the fifth day of pointless demonstrations.

We suspect that the Colorado Department of State intends to claim that the public was involved in the certification process. First, the demonstrations are so superficial that they cannot be considered a substantive part of any legitimate certification process. Second, the time that we have invested has been made superficial and inconsequential by this unprofessional process.

The demonstrations were superficial and addressed almost no real election system issues. So what is the point? Even the temporary workers who are watching the demonstrations and occupying valuable seats will not be sufficiently informed by the demo to be ready to operate the equipment.

Questions asked by the public might have inspired the test board to include tests for real election problems. But we have been told that the questions posed by the public will not result in any change of the planned functional testing. Why allow staff to deceive management into believing that they are actually doing something of value?

1. We were aghast when the ES&S representative announced the six (6) Mesa County and Jefferson County employees as being present “to support the vendors”. Who paid for these people? Why were they representing the interests of the vendors instead of the public? More than once, the vendor asked these county employees to participate in the demo. It was clear that they were not under the same restrictions as the rest of the public attendees.

2. Unchanged from Kolwicz’s May 3 note to Secretary Coffman, the public was still unable to clearly see or hear the May 25th demonstration. Thankfully, the Legislative Liaison for the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, Sheila Hicks, attended the ES&S session and successfully got the meeting stopped and the seating rearranged. We would like to understand why Ms. Hicks received an immediate response, and our report was ignored. Is it because she was in a wheelchair?.

3. We overheard at the ES&S demo that Mr. Gardner controlled the seating arrangements and purposefully assigned the "best" seats to insiders and squished the public into a noisy back corner of the room. We would like to know if this is true. We definitely observed that the table containing the “test board” has served as a barrier between the vendor and the public in every test.

4. At the ES&S demo, there was a new person sitting at the "Test Board Table". When Mr. Branscomb asked Mr. Gardner, informally during a break, if there were now five members of the Test Board, Gardner stated that the meeting was on break and questions could only be asked at the end of the demo. When Mr. Branscomb repeated the question during the public question period Gardner refused to respond on the basis that the question was not one for the vendor pertaining to the demo. (At the May 2nd demo Gardner announced that questions could be posed to the vendor or to the SOS staff.) After the demonstration was over Branscomb approached Gardner one more time, at which time Gardner said: “You are just pushing too much” and he told Branscomb that he had “filed too many open records requests” and should “go downstairs for an answer”. In fact, Mr. Branscomb has not filed an open records request at all. However, Mr. Kolwicz has and may have to do so again to obtain even simple answers to simple questions. This is only an example of how badly the public is being treated.We hope that an adult and civil response to Branscomb’s question is immediately forthcoming from CDOS.

5. We have heard that there will be another demonstration focused on disabled voter capabilities. If this is true, when and where will this demonstration be conducted, who has been invited to attend, and may we attend?

6. In our March 28 letter to Secretary Coffman, our April 26 email to you, and our May 3 conversation with and email to Dan Kopelman, we discussed the lack of transparency of the entire certification process, including functional testing. How can we observe the functional testing process? How will the critical decision for approval/rejection of equipment be made and who will make this decision? How will the public participate in this decision?

7. In the ES&S demonstration, as in the past, the public did not have enough time to ask all of their questions, and was prohibited by Mr. Gardner from even asking relevant questions. As well, Mr. Gardner chose the order of questioners according to his own preference and apparently arbitrarily decided the ending time, forcing (as had been done previously) the public to cease asking questions at the time he decided (in spite of the maximum 3 day plan for this demonstration set in the rules). Does Secretary Coffman approve of this heavy-handed, unfair treatment of the public? Does he support these methods which obviously censor the public’s speech? If not, what will Mr. Coffman do about it? If so, how may we appeal this policy?

8. What is the procedure for gaining access to the un-redacted video tapes of the demonstrations?

To reiterate what we said in our May 3 note to Secretary Coffman, the demonstrations continue to be unsatisfactory.

Based on what we saw and what we know from the public record, two things are clear enough to make recommendations.

· We recommend that the following DRE voting equipment not be advanced to functional testing: (a) Hart Intercivic eSlate, (b) Diebold AccuVote TSX, (c) Sequoia AVC Edge, and (d) ES&S iVotronic. All of these products fail to meet Colorado requirements. All bring unnecessary risk and uncertainty to Colorado’s election process. All would subvert Secretary Coffman's plan to restore public trust in elections.

· We recommend that the AutoMark be advanced to functional testing. This product uses simple and straightforward full-ballot-text paper ballots. These ballots are verifiable, they simplify election processes, and they avoid the security issues of electronic ballots. The AutoMark permits blind and physically restricted voters, and in fact almost all voters (more of the voters than with any of the DREs), to independently and privately select and verify their votes. As an extra practical advantage, this vote is recorded on a reliable and easily verifiable and re-countable full size paper ballot. Without sacrificing voter privacy, AutoMark provides a way for any voter, with or without disability, to make use of an assistant if needed. It clearly satisfies the HAVA requirements in a manner which is compatible with the interests of the voting public at large.

We hope that you will be able to quickly get answers to our questions and concerns. We are available to meet with you or talk by phone to discuss these points.

We thank you very much for facilitating and expediting this communication and for anything that you do to improve the transparency and credibility of this re-certification process.



Al Kolwicz

Harvie Branscomb

Colorado suppresses criticism

May 5, 2007

Mr. Hobbs
Colorado Deputy Secrecary of State

RE: Ruling to prohibit testimony

At the May 1st rules hearing, you ruled to limit my oral testimony to the text that was proposed for modification. I infer that staff will so limit their reading of my written testimony.

I was not permitted to address the entirety of each rule that was proposed for change. I disagreed with your ruling because: (a) it defies common sense, (b) it censors the public, and (c) it is not authorized by statute or rule.

Myopic. Colorado’s election rules are not crafted in a way that the content of each subsection is a stand alone rule. A change to any part of a rule can ripple over the entire rule. When a rule is opened for change, the collective experience gained using the pre-amended rule is available for improving the quality of the rule.

Not transparent. The draft of the proposed rule change is created by a process that prevents public influence on the proposed change. The drafting process is not transparent, and there is no accountability for the completeness and quality of the draft. Lacking a fair forum for debate on the content of the proposed rule change, the only opportunity for the public to improve a rule is at the rules hearing.

Unauthorized ruling. We have scanned the online documents and cannot find any place that supports your ruling to limit discussion of each rule to the text proposed for modification.

While searching the state’s online documents, we did not find a “Rules Drafting Manual” corresponding to the “Legislative Drafting Manual”. Is there such a document?

When you consider your response to this letter, I hope that you will also review my testimony regarding transparency. Staff has consistently refused to discuss election rules with the public; yet staff regularly discusses proposed rules with county clerks and secret committees. Is it official policy that the public be prohibited from participating in the drafting process?

I hope that you will reconsider your ruling to restrict comment during a rulemaking hearing to the text of the proposed changes. If there are writings that support your ruling I would like to learn of them so that we can work on getting them changed.

As we tried to communicate in our written submission, the proposed rules are deficient and must be repaired in order to protect the purity of elections.

Al Kolwicz

REF: http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/LDM/03.0_Amendments_to_Bills.pdf


Al Kolwicz
CAMBER – Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results

Colorado Department of State --- secretive, arbitrary and anti-scientific.

Colorado Department of State is secretive, arbitrary and anti-scientific.

The Colorado Department of State has chosen to operate in a secretive, arbitrary and anti-scientific manner. This has cost the department highly valuable voluntary contributions of many experts who have shown their interest in election quality. It has cost the voters of Colorado a trustworthy election system. Examples of this assertion include:

• Many problem and suggestion documents have been submitted to the Department of State and have gone unanswered. (Some of these documents have received non-responsive responses.)

• The Department of State consistently refuses to engage in open conversation and debate regarding election system issues. (This refusal is one-sided and unfair. It is used to exclude voting system quality advocates, but does not exclude County Clerks, election officials, and hand picked people.)

It is hoped that the Department of State will discontinue its practice of exclusion, and replace it with a policy that will lead to trustworthy elections. This requires that election processes be held to uniform standards and metrics, and that every element of the election system be secure, accurate, verifiable, anonymous, accessible, transparent, and accountable.

To listen to the hearing where this assertion was presented, go so Department of State Audio and listen to the May 1st hearing.

Click to read specific critiques of the Proposed Rules and Regulatory Analysis.

Disallow HART Certification

Mike Coffman By FAX: 303 869 4860
Colorado Secretary of State
1700 Broadway, Suite 270
Denver, CO 80290

May 3, 2007

RE: Voting System Demonstration – May 2, 2007

Dear Mr. Coffman:

You have a problem in your elections office that requires your immediate attention. Yesterday’s voting system demonstration was mind-numbing, irrelevant, and unbelievably poorly organized.

• The presentation did not address the topics required by election rule 45.
  
• The vendor and the elections division staff representatives were unable or unwilling to answer questions. I was essentially disallowed from even asking relevant questions.
  
• The public was rudely treated. They could not see, could not hear, and could not speak – even to ask for inaudible utterances to be repeated – and was forced to endure six hours of inaudible presentation in order to ask questions that were not answered.

You have stated that transparency is one of your key goals. I want you to know, in no uncertain terms; yesterday’s demonstration was a total failure in this regard.

I for one am highly offended by what happened yesterday. There were four video cameras running during the demonstration. The public was seated well behind the cameras. You might wish to review the tapes so you can make your own assessment.

There are at least two more demonstrations scheduled. I hope that you will take immediate action to (a) disallow the HART application from proceeding to functional testing, and (b) ensure that the remaining demonstrations comply with the rule, are transparent, and are friendlier to the public.

In addition, we were aghast to learn that ITA testing will not be conducted for this certification.

Al Kolwicz
CAMBER – Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
www.coloradovoter.blogspot.com

NO on SB 234 -- Junk mail ballots

Colorado Legislators: Please Vote NO on SB 234.

This bill would compromise our entire election system and must be defeated.

As you may recall, in 2002, the people spent an entire year working to defeat Amendment 28, the Mandatory Mail Ballot Election amendment. The amendment was resoundingly defeated by 63 of 64 Colorado counties – 60 percent of the votes cast said “NO”. Every Colorado County voted "no", with the single exception of La Plata County.

The Rocky Mountain News as well as many other papers opposed the amendment then, and just a few days ago, on April 24, Vince Carroll of the Rocky Mountain News wrote:

“Ballot ballet
Once again I’ve cast more than a single ballot in a local election. And once again it’s given me an uneasy feeling about the integrity of mail elections.

On Monday I dropped off three ballots at the Wellington Webb building in downtown Denver. It’s legal to mail or deliver a ballot that isn’t yours, of course, although you have to sign in and record the number you produce in person.

But how would they know how many ballots I’d dumped in a trash bin out back?

What if I’d promised to deliver a dozen ballots from a nursing home where a relative of mine resided — saving each voter the escalating postage — and then quietly discarded those I suspected disagreed with my own electoral choices?

There are simply too many points at which a mail ballot may be in the control of someone other than the voter or the office tabulating the results. And one of these days we’ll discover that it matters.

Vincent Carroll is editor of the editorial pages. Reach him at carrollv@RockyMountainNews.com .”

Our welcome screen highlights some of the problems – see www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz/welcome.htm

Supporters of junk mail ballots hope to exploit the opportunity created when thousands of ballots are retrieved by unknown recipients. They’ll argue that the voter asked for the ballot. But we all know that voter registration data is never current, and that we live in a mobile society.

SB 234 is attempting to resurrect this bad idea using a device called the “permanent absentee ballot”. WE can prove that the approach is not secure, does not yield accurate results, and disenfranchises voters. This bill will re-open the opportunity for massive error and vote fraud that we fought so hard to successfully defeat.

Please do everything you can to stop this affront against the people of Colorado.

Please Vote NO on SB 234. And please help us to reach other Representatives and convince them that SB 234 is a terrible idea that has already been rejected by the voters.

CO Senate Bill 83- must protect election verifiability

To: Representatives
re. Senate Bill 83 (election statutes)

April 26 2007 v.3

From: Coloradoans for Voting Integrity (CFVI);
The Voting Integrity Project, Be The Change USA;
Honest Elections U.S.;
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results (CAMBER);
Democracy For Colorado (DFC)

(six pages attached with talking points for each issue, one per page)

Coloradoans for Voting Integrity (CFVI) a state-wide election advocacy group, and the other groups listed above have prepared a list of talking points on 4 critical elements of SB83 which impact the public in general and need correction now before the bill becomes law. We are looking for sponsors for amendments on these issues:

• Verified paper audit trail should contain ballot issue submission clause not only number or letter
• Vote center must have a functional local backup poll book for cases of network failures
• ballot marking devices should be acceptable by statute to be certified
• preserve accuracy and full records of audits

. and two provisions which have already been removed by House committee which removal is consistent with the public interest and should not be reversed on the house floor or in the conference committee…

• polling place posting of results should be maintained
• mandatory recount on close election should be maintained

These six are appended to this message. We hope members of the House can use this information and these arguments to support needed amendments to the SB-83 bill language in the floor debate on second reading. Please keep these pages in your file for SB083.

Please introduce and or support an amendment on second reading of SB083 to the following effect :

Require Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (V-VPAT) to contain "name" of ballot issue

SECTION 2 (P. 4, LINES 15-21 of March 30 engrossed bill)

PRO ARGUMENT: THE V-VPAT SHOULD DISPLAY THE SUBMISSION CLAUSE OR FULL TEXT OF THE ISSUE AND QUESTION, AND THE NAME OF COLORADO JUDGES STANDING FOR RETENTION (supporting change in language from "number or letter" to "submission clause and or full text"):

* voter can not be expected to remember the meaning of the number or letter of every issue and question on the ballot
* voter expected to verify meaning of "Amendment 39 Yes"
* submission clause is already used in statute, required on results printout from machine (which is itself usually a long narrow paper tape)
* V-VPAT is useless unless truly verified (except blind disabled voters can not verify on current DRE machines)

COUNTER ARGUMENT
* may not be room for submission clause on paper tape (also may not be room for candidate name)
* voter may not care to, or be able to verify (which is the very reason not to use DRE machines and to return to paper ballots for all voters using optical scanners and BMDs)

*******************************************************************

Please introduce and or support an amendment on second reading of SB083 to the following effect :

PROVIDE LOCAL BACKUP SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION BOOKS IN CASE OF VOTE CENTER NETWORK FAILURE

(CRS 1-5-102.7- substitute language on p 18 line 5 of Mar 30 engrossed SB083)

PRO ARGUMENT - THERE IS VITAL NEED FOR A POLL SITED COPY OF THE COUNTY REGISTRATION LISTS. (supporting change of language)

* Denver's 2006 election failure caused huge disenfranchisement of eligible voters who left the poll sites without voting- possibly affecting outcome of election
* Denver election failure could have been avoided if registration data were available locally at each poll site, and Colorado statute and SOS rule would allow its use to verify voter eligibility at the poll site
* registration is now finalized 30 days prior to election, so data are easy to produce either on paper poll books, or on electronic storage for local use
* if any voter votes twice, their name will be forwarded to DA and criminal prosecution will follow, and every case will be recorded and likely reported to the public
* enfranchisement of many voters takes priority over prevention of the remote possibility of occasional duplicate voting
* depending on size of county, data may be kept on paper or electronic media

COUNTER ARGUMENT
* registration book for a large county with vote centers is almost unprintable on paper poll books
* non networked local data for emergency means voter could vote twice in 2 different polling places
* registration lookup on paper may be difficult with a paper poll book

*****************************************************************

ALLOW BALLOT MARKING DEVICES (BMD) TO BE CERTIFIED BY THE SOS AS HAVA-COMPLIANT ACCESSIBLE VOTING SYSTEMS

PRO ARGUMENTS (supporting re-inserting language to allow BMD certification):

(please amend to re-insert page 19 lines 9-23 of the 2^nd engrossed version of the bill which were removed by amendment in House committee)

* two states, Colorado and Arkansas, prevent certification of BMD systems now in use
* BMDs are superior to DRE in aiding disabled- they provide full verification on a paper ballot
* BMD permit all voters to vote on paper, but DREs require electronic ballots and it is hard to verify electronic counts and may prevent voting on paper
* Disabled voters' lobby argues that they should vote in the same method as others, this argument can and has worked to disadvantage of all voters when DRE provides less transparency and accessibility for testing and auditing and recounting than paper ballots and BMD systems
* if a county chooses 100% DRE, voters have no right or ability to vote at polling place on paper
* if there is no right to vote on a paper ballot, polling can not be designed to avoid lines when crowds appear at the polls... but with paper ballots, distributed freely with proper procedures, lines can be avoided.
* casting of hand marked paper ballots with precinct optical scan often consists of a voter carrying a ballot in a secrecy sleeve to an election judge who sometimes removes the ballot and operates the optical scanner. This is no different from an election judge assisting the disabled voter to perform the same function. This comparison shows that the existing language does not differentially discriminate against the disabled, nor is it a violation of equal protection.

COUNTER ARGUMENT (supporting removal of existing SB83 "CASTING" language, which supplements the current statute)

* disabled deserve to "independently" and personally deposit their ballot into the ballot box or optical scanner, since this is what casting of a ballot consists of
* the existing statue was written to favor the DRE system; the disabled voter is able to electronically "cast" their ballot without assistance even though the blind can not verify their vote

Please introduce and or support an amendment with the following beneficial effects on post election audit:

AMENDMENT 044 on audits adopted by committee 4/24/07

RECOMMENDATION TO AMEND AUDIT PROVISION TO PRESERVE ACCURACY and FULL RECORDS of AUDITS:

(Concerning page 24 lines 9-18 of March 30 engrossed SB083)

A discussion on auditing will come to the floor of the House. The reality of auditing typically being performed is already chaotic and not technically sound. The amended bill now calls for 5% of the machines to be audited for two randomly selected races where also all of the races are now to be audited, but this statute does not sufficiently define what constitutes an audit. The amended bill also calls for an alternate audit method to be used by approval of the SOS. We recommend that additional language be applied to call for improved accuracy in this alternative audit. We also recommend that records be kept of the precise method of audit in each audit report, as well as a log of exceptions found, corrections made, and lessons learned. This new audit report created by the canvass board should be published with the audit numerical results on the SOS web site. This will permit access to enough information to be able to compare the success of two or more methods of audit, as well as to be able to evaluate the success of the audit qualitatively.

There is basically zero record-keeping of the existing audit under existing rules. The legislature should call for the SOS to require additional record-keeping and publishing of a description of the process taken by the canvass board in each district to supplement the already published simple numerical results of audits... to reveal the real situation with audits for future analysis. As canvass board members in different counties both Al Kolwicz and Harvie Branscomb have attempted to include notes with the audit results and these results have not been made public by the SOS.

We will never have a truly functional audit until the legislature and other people who care about election quality (other than the secretary of state and his office) can read what has transpired during the audits. It is very possible that human error could produce a "perfect" audit in the reconciliation process when election officials strive to cause the numbers to match. I have heard of this happening.

Please consider to bring an amendment for record keeping and publishing of the actual audit procedures and incremental results found including exceptions and recommended enhancements. (e.g. “first a mismatch was uncovered, then a human error was found and subsequently the hand count and machine tally were found to match”, etc.)... This would fit well with Chairman Weissman's idea of promoting a "pilot audit" in certain counties if they choose to do so. If the procedures taken and results of this pilot audit are not published, how useful will such a pilot be?

Also please support any amendment to the effect that any replacement audit should achieve statistical accuracy and significance greater than the audit it replaces.

PROPOSED AUDIT AMENDMENT LANGUAGE for SB083

Section 26 1-7-514(1)(a)(III), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read:

(III) For an election taking place in a county on or after the date the county has satisfied the requirements of section 1-5-802, the audit shall be conducted for the purpose of comparing the manual tallies of the voter-verified paper records produced or employed by each voting device selected for such audit with the corresponding ballot tallies recorded directly by each such device IN THE ORIGINAL ELECTION TALLY.

(b) To the extent practicable, no voting device that is used for the random audit required by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) shall be used for conducting the testing of voting devices for recount purposes required by section 1-10.5-102 (3) (a).

(2) (a) Upon completion of the audit required by subsection (1) of this section, if there is any discrepancy between the manual tallies, as specified in accordance with the requirements of subparagraph (II) or (III) of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, as applicable, of the voting device selected for the audit, and the corresponding tallies recorded by such devices, and the discrepancy is not able to be accounted for by voter error, the county clerk and recorder, in consultation with the canvass board of the county established pursuant to section 1-10-101, shall investigate the discrepancy and shall take such remedial action as necessary in accordance with its powers under this title.

(b) Upon receiving any written complaint from a registered elector from within the county containing credible evidence concerning a problem with a voting device, the canvass board along with the county clerk and recorder shall investigate the complaint and take such remedial action as necessary in accordance with its powers under this title. (but the canvass board has no such powers)

Section 26 1-7-514(2)(c), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read:

(c) The CANVASS BOARD AND county clerk and recorder shall promptly report to the secretary of state A DESCRIPTION OF THE AUDIT PROCESS UNDERTAKEN INCLUDING ANY INITIAL, INTERIM, AND FINAL the results of any completed audit or investigation conducted pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection (2).

Section 26 1-7-514(3), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read:

(3) The secretary of state shall post the REPORTS results of any completed audit or investigation conducted RECEIVED pursuant to the requirements of subsection (2) of this section on the official website of the department of state not later than twenty-four hours after receiving the results of the completed audit or investigation. The clerk and recorder of the affected county may timely post the results of the completed audit or investigation on the official website of the county. The secretary shall publish once in a newspaper of general circulation throughout the state notification to the public that the results have been posted on the department's website.

Change to end the polling place posting of the vote abstract

This section of SB-83 has been removed in committee on a vote, thanks. Please vote against any attempt to reinsert this damaging provision.

(This Section of SB-83 should be removed-Delete lines 26-27 on page 25 and lines 1-16 on page 26 of the 2^nd engrossed bill)

PRO ARGUMENT: PRECINCT POSTING OF VOTE ABSTRACT IS PROTECTIVE OF VALID ELECTION RESULTS:

* Precinct posting requires quick resolution of results at polling place, avoids delay of the reporting of election results, internet posting is neither immediate nor polling place specific
* quick posting helps prevent hiding of poll site errors and fraud
* precinct posting is usually a direct printout from the voting machine, not manipulated results
* without precinct posting, no motivation for the rules to call for or the machine to be designed to produce an immediate local results record on paper
* posting is an early warning system for results, and allows quick election problem follow up
* posting allows immediate election day comparison of similar results from different places
* posting is popular with voters and is expected in many counties especially rural areas,
* posting can be done with simple physical security and should be accompanied by a sign notifying site tenants of the 48 hour posting period
* for cross checking, posting should include under and over votes.
* new language in this section does not specify either time or place that poll results can be obtained
* without posting, clerks will likely wait until data is combined before release of results to the public
* data separated by polling place allows errors to be noticed earlier
* public has a right to have quick access to all vote counts and exceptions
* Central posting of results may be a long distance from rural poll site
* posting provides faster access to results... where otherwise we must wait for memory cards to be transported and uploaded at central tabulation center, manipulated and redistributed

COUNTER ARGUMENT: POLL SITE ABSTRACT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO BE POSTED AT THE POLL SITE- ONLY AT CENTRAL CLERKS OFFICE

* posting is inconvenient in certain locations such as without a glass door or window accessible to the public- abstract tapes could blow away
* posting is inconvenient in metro vote centers where so many precincts vote together and voting machine tapes are therefore long, cumbersome and take space
* some county clerks have programmed their voting machines to not produce the precinct abstract tapes
*****************************************************

Waiver of Mandatory Election Recount

(This section of SB-83 has been removed in committee 4/24/07, thanks. Please vote against any reintroduction of this damaging provision):

SECTION 30 (CORRECTED 2ND ENGROSSED SB-083, pp. 27, LINES 10-27)

PRO ARGUMENT: CURRENT MANDATORY ELECTION RECOUNTS ARE BENEFICIAL FOR DEMOCRACY:
* preserves status quo- provides some means for verifiability
* recount is for election accuracy, not losing candidate "sour grapes" or vanity
* recount involves needed extra attention to ballots by hand counting- (preferably NOT by machine counting unverifiable barcodes as currently permitted)
* use of recount is rare - elections are not often within 1/2% margin
* recount becomes unlikely if it is made optional but costly
* pressure on losing candidate to waive recount is inevitable
* pressure is likely on political and fiscal conservation arguments
* pressure will be self-asserted by the loser (not necessarily overt)
* recount should resolve unseen mistakes and overlooked ballots
* losing candidate does not have the right to make this a personal choice - it is the public's election
* benefit of recount is for all persons in Colorado, not merely the losing candidate

THE COUNTER ARGUMENT:
* recount is expensive and time consuming for county election officials

*****************************************

Additional notes by Harvie Branscomb, CFVI on the Ballot Marking Device issue and BMD advantages versus DRE (electronic voting and counting- Direct Record Electronic) April 25, 2007

1) CFVI is concerned that SB-83 will affect the public's future access to paper ballots at the polls because it does not sufficiently address ballot marking devices (BMD). These are electronic devices which permit any voter including many disabled to mark a standard paper ballot. In committee, a provision in SB-83 supporting BMD (Section 18 of the Corrected 2nd Engrossed SB-83 - pp.19, lines 11-23) was lost. The current Colorado statute [CRS Section 1-5-704 (1)(N)(I)] on HAVA compliant accessible voting systems has been the stated excuse used by prior Colorado SOS certification directors for blocking the state certification of ballot marking devices (BMD) in Colorado. The SOS office felt that they were bound to reject certification followng the restrictive statutory language concerning "casting of ballots" - however "casting" has not been statutorily defined.

Colorado is one of only two or three states in the U.S. that have not election-certified Ballot Marking Devices (Arkansas is another). This denial of certification of BMD systems has severely affected the Colorado voter's access to paper ballots. In turn, this has forced county clerks, in trying to be HAVA compliant, to buy DRE machine systems. The counties could have purchased Ballot Marking Devices to supplement their existing paper ballot optical scanners to satisfy federal HAVA requirements for disabled voter access (as has happened in counties in most other states).

Counties like Eagle, Douglas, Routt and others, decided that while taking the federal HAVA money, they could try to go to 100% DRE machine voting. However, this has proved to be much less than desirable... leaving disgruntled would-be voters abandoning the poll sites because of long lines (CFVI has the names of voters who abandoned in Eagle County). This "fleeing voter" problem, resulting from long lines, also occurred in Denver, Routt and Montrose counties - these counties are all now on the SOS "election watch" list for 2008. This would not have happened with Ballot Marking Device systems, since the voters could have chosen voter-marked paper ballots if the BMD machines malfunctioned. The lack of or misuse of a paper ballot alternative system created problems in many Colorado counties in 2006. We simply do not know how many counties were affected and by how much.

County Clerks, like in Eagle County, argue they are saving the time it would take to train election judges on two voting systems, but in reality the extra cost of the DRE machines (capital cost, maintenance, testing and future software upgrades) surely far outweighs any possible extra cost of election judge training for two parallel election technologies at the polls.

The language which has recently been removed from the SB-83 bill was meant to ensure that BMD systems could be SOS certified. The use of a BMD paper ballot system would have allowed both disabled and non-specific voters to use the same paper ballots and optical scanner equipment.

The argument that some disabled advocates (but not all) are making about "independent" unassisted voting, makes little sense when the DRE machine alternative allows very few disabled voters to actually verify their ballot choices as marked on the DRE screen. This seems clearly more problematic than the inability for some small number of the disabled voters to personally carry, or visually verify that an election judge carried their voted, secrecy-sleeved ballot from the Ballot Marking Device machine to the counting device or ballot box. All voters choosing to use the BMD system would cast their ballot in the same manner - there would be no equal protection issues with the BMD systems.

Paper ballots vs. DRE

The unnecessary switch from paper ballots to DRE (direct record electronic voting ) machines involves several disadvantages:

1) extreme increase in testing time and decrease in test accuracy during pre-election Logic and Accuracy Testing, required by statute.

2) reduced accessibility to ballots for election officials to recount the votes

3) much higher cost per voter with these DRE systems (not even calculating future upgrade and maintenance costs of these machines)

4) complex election judge retraining and extra machine security required per SOS rules

5) the possibility that voters can not have their vote intention correctly interpreted by the touch screen (or similar) interface, and are too embarrassed to report this to the poll site election judges (this is indicated in part by totally blank electronic ballots- a statistic which should be recorded and published)

6) the impossibility of quickly creating new DRE voting stations at a poll site as necessitated by high turnout and long lines. This is easy to accomplish with paper ballot based systems.

Coloradoans for Voting Integrity (CFVI) hope you will seriously consider our 6 major points about SB-83 and most importantly seriously consider finding BMD language to motivate the SOS and election machine manufacturers to bring Ballot Marking Device paper ballot systems to Colorado. The national federal legislative trend is towards a return to paper ballots, and Colorado needs to re-emphasize the advantages of paper ballots at Colorado polling places - for both the disabled voting community and for all Colorado voters.

Respectfully submitted,

Cary Lacklen, CFVI

Harvie Branscomb, CFVI

Margit Johansson, CFVI

Claudia Kuhns, The Public Integrity Project, Be The Change, USA

Jeff Cook, Honest Elections U.S.

Al Kolwicz, Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Results

Joe Richey, Democracy For Colorado

SB083 talking points: protecting election integrity

Specific arguments about issues in SB 083 for the State, Veterans, and Military Affairs Committee and for any debate on the House floor or in conference committee:

(1) SECTION 30 (CORRECTED 2ND ENGROSSED SB-083, pp. 27, LINES 10-27)

Waiver of Mandatory Election Recount (This section of SB-83 should be removed):

PRO ARGUMENT: CURRENT MANDATORY ELECTION RECOUNTS ARE BENEFICIAL FOR DEMOCRACY:
* preserves status quo- provides some means for verifiability
* recount is for election accuracy, not loser "sour grapes" or vanity
* recount involves needed extra attention to ballots by hand counting- must NOT be by barcode count as currently permitted
* use of recount is rare - elections are not often within 1/2% margin
* recount becomes unlikely if it is made optional but costly
* pressure on losing candidate to waive recount is inevitable
* pressure is likely on political and fiscal conservation arguments
* pressure will be self-asserted by the loser (not necessarily overt)
* recount should resolve unseen mistakes and overlooked ballots
* losing candidate does not have the right to make this a personal choice - it is the public's election
* benefit of recount is for all persons in Colorado, not merely the losing candidate

THE COUNTER ARGUMENT:
* recount is expensive and time consuming for county election officials

****************************************************************

(2) Change in the polling place posting of the vote abstract to end required posting
(This Section of SB-83 should be removed-Delete lines 26-27 on page 25 and lines 1-16 on page 26 of the 2^nd engrossed bill)

PRO ARGUMENT: PRECINCT POSTING OF VOTE ABSTRACT IS PROTECTIVE OF VALID ELECTION RESULTS:

* Precinct posting requires quick resolution of results at polling place, avoids delay of the reporting of election results,
* quick posting helps prevent hiding of poll site errors and fraud
* precinct posting is usually of direct result from voting machine, not manipulated results
* without precinct posting, no motivation for the rules to call for or the machine to be designed to produce an immediate local results record on paper
* posting is an early warning system for results, and allows quick election problem follow up
* posting allows immediate election day comparison of similar results from different places
* posting is popular with voters and is expected in many counties especially rural areas,
* posting can be done with simple physical security and should be accompanied by a sign notifying site tenants of the 48 hour posting period
* for cross checking, posting should include under and over votes.
* new language in this section does not specify either time or place that poll results can be obtained
* without posting, clerks will likely wait until all data is combined before release of results to the public
* data separated by polling place allows errors to be noticed earlier
* public has a right to have quick access to all vote counts and exceptions
* Dentral posting of abstract results may be at central clerk's office a long distance from rural poll site
* posting provides faster access to results... where otherwise we must wait for memory cards to be transported and uploaded at central tabulation center

COUNTER ARGUMENT: POLL SITE ABSTRACT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO BE POSTED AT THE POLL SITE- ONLY AT CENTRAL CLERKS OFFICE

* posting is inconvenient in certain locations such as without a glass door or window accessible to the public- abstract tapes could blow away
* posting is inconvenient in metro vote centers where so many precincts vote together and voting machine tapes are therefore long, cumbersome and take space
* some county clerks have programmed their voting machines to not produce the precinct abstract tapes

***********************************************************************

(3) SECTION 2 (P. 4, LINES 15-21) Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (V-VPAT) not required to contain "name" of ballot issue

PRO ARGUMENT: THE V-VPAT SHOULD DISPLAY THE SUBMISSION CLAUSE OR FULL TEXT OF THE ISSUE AND QUESTION, AND THE NAME OF COLORADO JUDGES STANDING FOR RETENTION (supporting change in language from "number or letter" to "submission clause and or full text"):

* voter can not be expected to remember the meaning of the number or letter of every issue and question on the ballot
* voter expected to verify meaning of "Amendment 39 Yes"
* submission clause is already used in statute, required on results printout from machine (which is itself usually a long narrow paper tape)
* V-VPAT is useless unless truly verified (except blind disabled voter can not verify on most DRE machines)

COUNTER ARGUMENT
* may not be room for submission clause on paper tape (also may not be room for candidate name)
* voter may not care to, or be able to verify (which is the very reason not to use DRE machines and to return to required paper ballots for the majority of or all voters)

*******************************************************************

(4) PROVIDE LOCAL BACKUP SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION BOOKS IN CASE OF VOTE CENTER NETWORK FAILURE (CRS 1-5-102.7- substitute language on p 18 line 5)

PRO ARGUMENT - THERE IS VITAL NEED FOR A POLL SITED COPY OF THE COUNTY
REGISTRATION LISTS. (supporting change of language)

* Denver'S 2006 election failure caused huge disenfranchisement of eligible voters who left the poll sites without voting- possibly affecting outcome of election
* Denver election failure could have been avoided if registration data was
available locally at each poll site, and Colorado statute and SOS rule would allow its use to verify voter eligibility to vote at the poll site
* registration is now finalized 30 days prior to election, so data is easy to produce either on paper poll books, or on electronic storage for local use
* if any voter votes twice, their name will be forwarded to DA and criminal prosecution will follow, and every case will be recorded and likely reported to the public
* enfranchisement of many voters takes priority over prevention of of the remote possibility of occasional duplicate voting
* depending on size of county, data may be kept on paper or electronic media

COUNTER ARGUMENT
* registration book for a large county with vote centers is almost unprintable on paper poll books
* non networked local data for emergency means voter could vote twice
* registration lookup on paper may be difficult with a paper poll book

*****************************************************************

(5) BALLOT MARKING DEVICES (BMD) - ALLOW BALLOT MARKING DEVICES TO BE CERTIFIED BY THE SOS AS HAVA-C0MPLIANT ACCESSIBLE VOTING SYSTEMS

PRO ARGUMENT (supporting existing language allowing BMD certification):
(retain page 19 lines 9-23 of the 2^nd engrossed version of the bill)

* only two states, Colorado and Arkansas, prevent certification of of BMD systems now in use
* BMDs are superior to DRE in aiding disabled- they provide full verification on a paper ballot
* BMD permit all voters to vote on paper, but DREs require electronic ballots and it is hard to verify electronic counts and may prevent voting on paper
* Disabled voters' lobby argues that they should vote in the same method as others, this argument can and has worked to disadvantage of all voters when DRE provides less transparency and accessibility for testing and auditing and recounting than paper ballots and BMD systems
* if a county chooses 100% DRE, voters have no right or ability to vote at polling place on paper
* if there is no right to vote on a paper ballot, polling can not be designed to avoid lines when crowds appear at the polls... but with paper ballots, distributed freely with proper procedures, lines can be avoided.
* typical casting of hand marked paper ballots with precinct optical scan, consists of voter handing a ballot in a secrecy sleeve to an election judge who removes the ballot and operates the optical scanner. This is no different from an election judge assisting the disabled voter to perform the same function. This comparison shows that the existing language does not differentially discriminate against the disabled, nor is it a violation of equal protection of equal protection

COUNTER ARGUMENT (supporting removal of existing SB83 "CASTING" language, which supplements the current statute)

* disabled deserve to "independently" and personally deposit their ballot into the ballot box or optical scanner, since this is what casting of a ballot consists of
* the original statue was written for the DRE machine system, and the disabled voter is able to electronically "cast" their ballot without assistance

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Protecting verifiability from Colorado Senate Bill 83

TO: House State, Veterans and Military Committee April 22, 2007 version 4

*for committee meeting on Tuesday April 24 at 1:30PM

FROM: Coloradoans for Voting Integrity (CFVI); The Public Integrity Project, BTC USA; Honestelections.us; & Joe Richey, Democracy For Colorado (DFC)

RE: SB07-083: On Conduct of Elections (Tupa, Weissman)

Please consider changing the following three provisions of the 2^nd Engrossed version (March 30) of SB07-083 which contradict the public interest of verifiability and transparency of elections:

1. ELIMINATION OF THE AUTOMATIC RECOUNT

Replacing the now-required automatic recount in close elections, this provision allows the losing candidate to waive the recount.

Rationale for opposition: Recounts should not be politicized and this provision would cause political pressure to be a major factor of whether recounts would occur. The outcome of an election has consequences for the entire electorate, not just the losing candidate, who may be subjected to intimidation or improper inducements to waive the recount. The recount is required to maintain high standards of accuracy, not to satisfy the loser.

Recommended: Remove the item. Delete lines 10-27 on page 27 of the 2nd engrossed bill.

2. TERMINATION OF POLLING-PLACE POSTING OF RESULTS

This is a provision to abandon the practice of posting polling results at the polling place immediately after election officials have signed off on them on election night, for 48 hours, and leaving the time of publication unspecified.

Rationale for opposition: Posted results are a major tool for public transparency of elections and timely onsite records provide the best accuracy check. Public records enhance the trust of an electorate that is presently suspicious of the election process. Existing practice is essential as it increases the chances that an accurate record exists of polling place results. Posted results can raise red flags immediately about problems at particular polling locations, if results differ from those of other polling places where similar results are expected.

Recommended: Remove the item. Delete lines 26-27 on page 25 and lines 1-16 on page 26 of the 2^nd engrossed bill.

3. BALLOT ISSUES ON THE VOTER-VERIFIABLE PAPER RECORD KNOWN ONLY BY NUMBER OR LETTER

This is a provision to identify ballot issues or questions only by “THE NUMBER OR LETTER” on the voter-verifiable paper audit trail.

Rationale for opposition: Makes voter verification difficult. It will substantially impair the ability of voters whose ballots are created electronically to be able to verify that their votes were recorded correctly.

Recommended: The statutory requirement should be improved to require, at minimum, the short description of an item known as “the submission clause”, or, where possible, the full text.

(On page 4, line 15 of 2nd Engrossed bill, replace “THE NUMBER OR LETTER” with “THE SUBMISSION CLAUSE AND OR FULL TEXT”.)

--SB083 elections statute alert April 22, 2007 version 4 page 1--

Please add to SB083:

4. REQUIRE LOCAL BACKUP OF THE COMPUTERIZED REGISTRATION BOOK USED AT A VOTE CENTER.

Rationale for inclusion: An amendment to remove the non computerized registration books from this bill recently passed in the Senate, but the local backup of the vote center registration data is of paramount importance to prevent spectacular election failures.

Recommended: (on page 18 line 5 substitute for “EQUIPMENT” “EQUIPMENT WITH NON-COMPUTERIZED REGISTRATION BOOKS OR REGISTRATION DATA LOCALLY STORED AT THE POLLING PLACE TO BE USED IN CASE OF A SYSTEM FAILURE”

Please also support the following existing text in SB083:

5. DEFINING THE CASTING OF A BALLOT FOR ACCESSIBLE VOTING SYSTEMS

Rationale for support: The Secretary of State’s office has denied certification to ballot marking devices on the grounds that some disabled voters would have to depend on help to cast their ballot after it was printed by the electronic device. Currently, SB083 defines “the final step of casting a ballot” as “causing a ballot to be placed into any device that protects the privacy and integrity of the elector’s choice”. Transporting the ballot in a secrecy sleeve across the room to an optical scanner or ballot box is what this discussion is about.

Blind engineer and computer expert Noel Runyon asserts that there are ballot marking devices that meet essential requirements for a secret ballot for the disabled, and that the assistance required of some disabled to cast the ballot when using a ballot marking device is no more compromising of a person’s privacy than the help required by some to insert the card permitting them to vote into a machine. He also asserts that the several direct record electronic voting machines (DRE’s which were certified by the Secretary of State) serve the disabled less well than a ballot marking device, as none of them allow the blind to verify their vote.

Recommended: Keep the amendment in the bill so that ballot marking devices can be certified.

(Keep page 19 lines 9-23 of the 2^nd engrossed version of the bill.)

Notes: Regarding posting, we also recommend putting up a sign near the posted election results, which cites the requirement that they remain posted for 48 hours, in both English and other languages commonly spoken in the county. In addition, the Secretary of State should require that the results be posted in a relatively protected manner.

Many Colorado voters still vote on machines which do not allow them to verify their votes; many verifiable ballots go unverified; most races are never audited; and the audit as currently implemented is relatively unlikely to catch errors. This unfortunately impairs transparency and accountability in our elections, making it particularly important that we preserve the information that election-night polling-place postings provide. The posted abstract of votes should include totals of undervotes and overvotes to permit full cross checking of vote tallies.

Colorado statute should also confirm that stored ballots constitute a public record and the Colorado Open Records Act ensures public access to stored ballots when requested.

We have identified many serious problems with existing statutes and practice which have not been addressed: method of audit, recount and testing, use of barcodes, lack of access to paper ballots at the polls, insufficient oversight and many other problems.

We are looking for legislators to carry future legislation on these topics.

Please contact us at margitjo [at] gmail.com.

--SB083 elections statute alert April 22, 2007 version 4 detail page 2--

Colorado Voter Group publishes public BLOG

The Colorado Voter Group is a private sector entity that is working to improve the Colorado election system.

This BLOG is used to communicate with the public.

Membership in the group itself is by invitation only. We are assembling a team of people with technical expertise and election experience that works well together.

The group has established two projects. Each project is working to understand the needs and wishes of voters and contestants.

Public oversight and official accountability
The oversight and accountability project focuses on independent oversight and official accountability. The scope of the effort will be determined by the project. The oversight and accountability project's allegiance is to voters and contestants, as contrasted with election officials and equipment suppliers.

Technical
This technical project focuses on all technical aspects of the election process. The scope of the effort will include districting, voter registration and eligibility, candidate eligibility, voting, counting, reporting, auditing and canvassing, standards, and certification. The technical project will establish goals and objectives for the system and its components, and they will evaluate the work of others. It will not design or develop voting systems.

The public is encouraged use this BLOG to communicate with the Colorado Voter Group.